Terror in Uzbek Villages of Uzbekistan

Diakov, Report on Terror in the Villages of Uzbekistan. January 1928

With gratitude to Shoshana Keller for sharing this archival discovery.

Original Source: RGASPI, f. 62, op. 1, d. 548, ll. 92-98.

Top secret

The clearest manifestation of terror is the noticeable increase in 1928 of various kinds of political violence, and, in particular, of murder. The number of political murders in 1928 in comparison with 1926 has almost doubled. Most of the terror is related to protecting semi-feudal ways. A fall in the cases of terror organized by the clergy has been noticed.

From January to November 1928 the informational apparat of the [secret police] has registered in various regions of Uzbekistan 100 instances of political terror. Out of this number there were 34 instances of assault and battery and 17 instances of a threat of murder.

Aside from this, during this period 36 instances of murder and injury in connections with the women’s campaign have been noted, committed by relatives and people close to the victims. There were 34 cases of murder and injury of women for causes or by persons who remain unclear/unknown (there were 30 of these cases in Khorezm) and 34 cases of women being injured by husbands and relatives because they attended women’s meetings wishing to unveil, demanding divorce, etc. (in connection with the women’s campaign), etc.

In comparison with previous years 1928 shows an intensification in terror. Unfortunately, a systematic catalogue of terrorist acts in the village was not carried out in the past. The information included below for this period is subject to a certain amount of inexactness and incompleteness. On the one hand, regarding the processing of materials for 1926-27, because of the absence of necessary detail, several cases could be attributed to the number of political crimes, although political features may be shared with customary crime features; Murder due to the women’s campaign is an instance of this. On the other hand — in previous years naturally the greater number of cases were not exposed. Altogether, with this proviso, a comparison of the information for 1926, 1927, and 1928 gives a true/correct picture of the progress of terror in recent time.

NOTE: the “other cases” category indicates assault and battery, attempted assault, and threats.

The information given above suffers from inadequacies which were apparent during various periods of time. In 1926 we have information for the entire year, in 1927 information was given for only the first half of the year, and in 1928, until December. Information on the progress of political murders is therefore more meaningful when shown month by month in the first half of 1926, 1927, and 1928:

1927, in comparison with 1926, apparently shows a sort of dissipation of terror. The general mass of various kinds of violence in 1927 grows sharply (in the first table), the specific gravity, however, of political murders among them falls from 13% to 7%. The absolute number of the following also falls (in the second table). This softening of terror in 1927 applies mainly to Bukhara and Zerafshan okrugs, where 1926 coincided with the intensification of class struggle around the land reform of 1926-1927. In the group of leading okrugs (Andizhan, Fergana, Tashkent, Samarkand, and Khorezm), on the other hand, show an increase in terror. The number of political murders in comparison with the first half of 1926 grows from 1 to 7. The specific gravity of the mass of violence rises from 6% to 14%.

1928 shows a strengthening of terror not only in the leading okrugs, but in Uzbekistan as a whole. In comparison with 1927 the absolute number of political murders rises 60%; the specific gravity of the mass of violence rises from 7% to 14%. Only the mass of violence declines somewhat. The latter circumstance is explained by the breaking off in 1928 of the women’s campaign, due to [missing or unintelligible word] in 1927. It has been noted that, for the greatest number of murders, attempted murders, injuries, etc., one cannot distinguish between their political or their customary character.

III. The character and basis of political violence

Categorizing instances of terror according to their most likely causes allows us to divide them into two groups. The first — when terror objectively reflects the resistance of anti-Soviet elements to sovietization of the village, but subjectively has as its target the resolution of questions connected with personal proprietary interests — the seizure of land and water and evasion from paying workers’ salaries. The second — when terror serves the interests of a more general political order –opposition to the women’s campaign and the disruption and disorganization of Soviet activity. The most active manifestations of terror fall into the second category. At this time, in the category of violence over/because of the inventory of laborers, water use, and land use — murder and injury constitute 16% of all cases here. Violence due to the women’s campaign and the general activity of victims constitutes 60% of cases. The general mass of violence in both instances is roughly one and the same. However, the first group shows a tendency toward lessening, and the second toward increasing. A comparison of the data for 1926, 1927 and 1928 shows that in the leading okrugs the specific gravity of the newly poor among individuals who are undergoing terror sinks from 78% in 1926 to 57% in 1927 and rises to 30% in 1928.

NOTE: We cannot present data from the remaining okrugs, since in 1926 the land reform had not been carried out there, and naturally there was an absence of terror among the newly dispossessed. A comparison of the situation throughout Uzbekistan as a whole in 1927 and 1928 again results in a picture of the decline of incidents from 40% in 1927 to 25% in 1928.

The above hits the exacts number of cases where Soviet workers appeared as victims of terror and as organizers of it. In fact there are more cases of the latter. It is necessary to keep in mind that murder or threats of murder against Soviet workers almost never go unreported, but at this time the instigation of terror on their part is so legally flammable that investigation often fails.

Pay attention to the insignificant percentage of clerical participants in terror — 2%. In earlier years the percentage was higher — in 1927 37%, in 1926 20% …

Chief of Information PP OGPU Diakov in Central Asia
Deputy Chief of Information Ali
January 1928
Tashkent