Yugoslav Exception

Yugoslav, Cominform, and Soviet Correspondence. 1948

 

From a Letter by the Yugoslav Premier, J. B. Tito, to Soviet Foreign Minister, V. M. Molotov, of March 20, 1948

On March 18, General Barskov (1) advised us of the receipt of a telegram from Marshal Bulganin, Minister of National Defense of the USSR, informing us that the Government of the USSR had decided to withdraw immediately all military advisers and instructors with the motivation that they were “surrounded by an uncomradely attitude,” namely, that they were not treated in a friendly way in Yugoslavia.

Of course, the Government of the USSR may recall its military specialists whenever it chooses to do so, but the reasons stated by the Government of the USSR for this decision amazed us. After examining, on the basis of this charge, the attitude of lower officials in our country towards the Soviet military advisers and instructors, we were completely convinced that such an explanation of their withdrawal was out of place, that throughout their stay in Yugoslavia the attitude towards them was not only good but brotherly and most, hospitable, as is customary with regard to Soviet people in the new Yugoslavia. This is, therefore, strange and incomprehensible to us and affects us deeply, since we do not know the real cause of this decision of the Government of the USSR.

Furthermore, on March 19, 1948, I received a visit from the Charge d’Affaires Armianinov who informed me of the contents of a telegram in which the Government of the USSR ordered the withdrawal from Yugoslavia of all civilian specialists as well. The reasons stated for this decision are incomprehensible to us and astonish us.

It is true that Minister Kidric’s assistant, Srzentic (2) declared to your Commercial Representative, Lebedev (3), that by decision of the Government of the FPRY (4), they were not authorized to give important economic information to anyone and that Soviet people should apply for such information to higher levels, i.e. to the CC of the CPY (5) or to the Government. Srzentic also told Lebedev to apply for the information he was interested in to Minister Kidric. Your people were told long ago that official representatives of the Soviet Government could get all important necessary information directly from the leaders of our country.

Such a decision was made by us because of the fact that the officials in our Ministries were giving necessary and unnecessary information to anyone whomsoever. Consequently, various people disclosed State and economic secrets which could, and some did, reach the hands of our common enemies.

We have no special agreement, as stated in the telegram, respecting the right of our people to give various kinds of information of an economic nature without the authorization of our Government or the CC to the Soviet people engaged in economic matters, with the exception, however, of the information the latter might need in performing duties assigned to them.

Whenever the Ambassador of the Government of USSR, Comrade Lavrentiev, requested necessary information from me personally, I always gave it to him without reserve and so did the other responsible leaders. We would be very surprised if the Soviet Government did not approve of such an attitude on our part from the point of view of State interests.

From a Letter by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, of March 27, 1948

With respect to the matter of the recall of military advisers, the sources of our information are statements made by the officials of the Ministry of the Armed Forces and communications from the advisers themselves. It is a known fact that military advisers were sent to Yugoslavia, after repeated requests by the Yugoslav Government, in a considerably smaller number than requested by the Yugoslav Government. Consequently, the Soviet Government had no intention to impose its advisers upon Yugoslavia.

Later, however, the Yugoslav military leaders, including Koca Popovic ventured to state that it was necessary to reduce the number of Soviet military advisers by 60 per cent. Different reasons were given for this statement: some said that the Soviet military advisers were very expensive for Yugoslavia; others contended that the Yugoslav Army did not need to adopt the experience of the Soviet Army; others again declared that the regulations of the Soviet Army were stereotyped and inflexible and that they were of no value to the Yugoslav Army; others, finally, made very plain allusions to the effect that the Soviet military advisers were being paid for nothing, since they were of no use…

As the Yugoslav Government did not check these attempts to discredit the Soviet Army, it bears the responsibility for the situation that was created.

The sources of our information in respect to the recall of Soviet civilian specialists are mainly the reports of the Soviet Ambassador in Beograd, Lavrentiev, and the statements of the specialists themselves. Your statement to the effect that Srzentic allegedly told our Commercial Representative Lebedev that the Soviet people should apply to the Central Committee of the CPY and to the Yugoslav Government for economic information, in no way corresponds to reality. Here is Lavrentiev’s communication of March 9th:

Srzentic, Kidrics assistant in the Economic Council, declared to the Commercial Representative Lebedev that there was a Government decision prohibiting State officials and institutions from giving any economic data to anyone whomsoever. Therefore, regardless of the earlier agreement, he could not give Lebedev the data concerned. The State security organs have been ordered to implement control in this matter. Srzentic also said that Kidric himself intended to speak of this with Lebedev.

From Lavrentiev’s statement it appears, first, that Srzentic did not even mention the possibility of obtaining economic information from the CC or the Yugoslav Government. And in general, it would be ridiculous to imagine that it is possible to apply to the CC or the Government for every item of economic information. There are regular economic bodies in Yugoslavia from which Soviet people used to obtain the necessary economic information.

Lavrentiev’s statement, furthermore shows something contrary to what you allege–viz. that the Soviet representatives in Yugoslavia are under surveillance by the Yugoslavia security organs.

It is not superfluous to mention that we meet with a similar practice of surveillance over Soviet representatives only in bourgeois countries, and not in all of them at that.

We must also note that the Yugoslav security organs shadow not only the representatives of the Soviet

Government but also the representative of the CPSU(B) in the Cominform, Comrade Iudin. (7)

It would be ridiculous to imagine keep the Soviet Government can agree to keep its civilian specialists in Yugoslavia under such conditions as have been created for them.

Evidently, here again the responsibility for the conditions created lies with the Yugoslav Government.

From a Letter by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia To I. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov, of April 13, 1948

It was clearly expressed and established at the plenum of the CC of the CPY that S. Zujovic and A. Hebrang, members of the CC of the CPY, were chiefly to blame for giving incorrect and slanderous information to Soviet representatives in Yugoslavia both regarding alleged statements made by certain leading people, and our Party in general. By giving such inaccurate and slanderous information they wanted to conceal their anti-Party activities and the tendencies and attempts on their part, which had been manifested much earlier, to disrupt the unity of the leadership and the unity of the Party in general. Besides, information given by such people can be neither impartial, nor well-intentioned, nor accurate, and it usually has definite purpose. In this case the information has the aim of doing harm to the leadership of our Party, i.e. the new Yugoslavia; of aggravating the already hard task of developing the country, of preventing the fulfillment of the Five Year Plan and, by this token, the realization of Socialism in our country. We cannot understand why the Mission of the USSR has to this day not attempted to verify such information-first by contacting responsible people in our country, or by trying to obtain an explanation either from the CC of the CPY or from the Government. We consider the giving of such information as anti-Party as well as anti-State activity, because it has a negative effect on the relations between our two countries.

No matter how deeply one might love the country of Socialism, the USSR, one should under no circumstances feel less love for his own country, which is also building Socialism, in this case the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, for which hundreds of thousands of its most progressive men have given their lives. We know very well that this opinion prevails in the Soviet Union as well.

We are extremely surprised that this matter was not brought up while Kardelj, Djilas and Bakaric were in Moscow as delegates of our Party and Government. (8) Your letter shows that your Government was in possession of this, and similar, information before our delegation came to Moscow. We think that both the question of the treatment of military and civilian specialists and other ones as well could have been put to our delegation then.

We consider that our Government should have been informed through this delegation, or even earlier in some way, that the Soviet Government was not satisfied with the attitude of our people towards the Soviet specialists and that this matter should be settled in one way or another. Thus it came to pass that the Government of the USSR, by its decision to withdraw military and civilian specialists, placed before us an accomplished fact and in doing so caused us unnecessary difficulties.

As regards the withdrawal of Soviet military specialists, we do not see any other reason which might have induced the Government of the USSR to do this, except our decision to reduce their number to the minimum owing to financial difficulties. As early as 1946 the Yugoslav Premier, Tito, officially informed the Ambassador of the Soviet Government, Lavrentiev, that for several reasons it was almost impossible for us to pay such high salaries to Soviet military specialists and he asked him to notify the Government of the USSR of this and of our wish that it should alleviate the conditions relative to the salaries of specialists. Ambassador Lavrentiev transmitted the reply of the Soviet Government that the salaries could not be reduced and that we were free to act as we thought proper. Tito immediately told Lavrentiev that we should, therefore, have to reduce the number of the above-mentioned specialists as soon as it would be possible to do so without great detriment to the training of our Army. The salaries of the Soviet specialists were four times as high as the salaries of our army corps commanders and three times as high as the salaries of our Federal Ministers. The commander of an army corps, with the rank of Lieutenant General or Colonel General, at the time received from 9-11,000 dinars a month, while a Soviet military specialist with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, Colonel or General received 30-40,000 dinars. At the same time our Federal Ministers received a salary of 12,000 dinars a month. Naturally, we felt this was not only financially burdensome, but also politically incorrect, because it gave rise to misunderstanding among our people. Consequently our decision to reduce the number of Soviet military specialists results only from the reason we have stated and from no other reasons. On the other hand, we do not exclude the possibility that some of our people made some inappropriate remarks. In such cases we should have been forwarded verified evidence and then we would undoubtedly have taken steps to prevent this happening in the future. We should also mention here that certain Soviet specialists did not always behave as they should and that this caused dissatisfaction among our people. Such behavior probably provoked, against our wishes and orders, various remarks which were later distorted and in such distorted form forwarded to the Command of the Soviet Army. We, however, consider these to be matters of such slight significance that they ought not to impair our State relationships. The assertions in your letter that our state security organs shadow the Soviet specialists and other Soviet people do not correspond to facts. No one has ever brought decisions of such a nature nor is it true that Soviet representatives are shadowed. This is somebody’s arbitrary information. It is even less true that officials of the Soviet Government and Comrade Iudin of the Cominform were subjected to such surveillance.

We cannot understand who found such slanders necessary, slanders which misled the Government of the USSR. We should like to be given concrete facts on this case as well. (9)

On what grounds is it contended in the letter that there is no democracy in our Party? Perhaps on the basis of information from Lavrentiev? Where did he get such information? We consider that he, as Ambassador, is not entitled to seek information from anyone on the work of our Party,-this is not his business. Such information can be obtained by the CC of the CPSU(B) from the CC of the CPY. If you were to ask us if there is anything causing dissatisfaction with you, we would openly have to say that there are several reasons for which we are dissatisfied. What are these reasons? It is impossible to enumerate all these reasons in this letter, but we shall mention several of them. First, we consider it improper for organs of the Soviet intelligence to recruit citizens in our country, which is heading for Socialism, into their intelligence service. This we can look upon only as being aimed against the interests of our country. This is being done despite the fact that our leading men and State security organs protested against it and brought it to your knowledge that we could not allow this. Our army officers, various officials and those who have a hostile attitude towards the new Yugoslavia are inveigled in this way.

We have proofs that certain organs of the Soviet intelligence service, while thus inveigling our Party members, cast suspicion upon our leaders, undermine their authority, make them appear incompetent and untrustworthy. For example, Colonel Stepanov did not hesitate, as early as 1945, while inveigling one of our good comrades attached to the Central Code Department in our State Security apparatus, to defame, and express suspicion of, all our leading men-admitting that “for the present Marshal Tito was working correctly.” Such instances have continued to the present day. This also means that such inveigling is not being conducted with the purpose of fighting against some capitalist country and so we must inevitably come to the conclusion that this inveigling is destroying our internal unity, undermining confidence in our leadership, demoralizing our men, compromising our leading men and becoming a source of daily false information. Such a manner of proceeding on the part of the organs of the Soviet intelligence service cannot be termed loyal and friendly towards our country which is heading for Socialism and is the most faithful ally of the USSR.

We cannot agree to have the Soviet intelligence service create its intelligence network in Yugoslavia. We have our State security and our intelligence service for fighting against various foreign capitalist elements and the class enemy within the country, and if the Soviet intelligence organs need information or aid of this nature, they may get it whenever they want it, just as they have been getting it from us so far.

There are more such and similar matters with which we are not satisfied. But ought this to be a reason for the deterioration of our mutual relations? No. These are matters which can be eliminated or explained.

From a Letter by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, of May 4, 1948

Concerning the recall of Soviet military advisers from Yugoslavia. In its letter of March 27, 1948, the CC of the CPSU(B) stated the reasons for the recall of the Soviet military advisers declaring that the information of the CC of the CPSU(B) was based on the complaints of these advisers against the hostile attitude of the Yugoslav officials towards the Soviet Army and its representatives in Yugoslavia. Comrades Tito and Kardelj completely deny the justifiability of these complaints. The question arises: why should the CC of the CPSU (B) have more faith in the mere words of Comrades Tito and Kardelj than in the repeated complaints of the military advisers of the USSR? On what grounds? The USSR has military advisers in almost all the countries of people’s democracy. We cannot but stress that so far we have not had any complaints from our military advisers in these countries. This accounts for the fact that we have had no disagreements in these countries in connection with the work of the Soviet military advisers there. We have had complaints and disagreements of this nature only in Yugoslavia. Is it not clear that this circumstance is to be explained only by the particular and hostile regime to which the Soviet military advisers are subjected in Yugoslavia?

Comrades Tito and Kardelj refer to heavy expenditures in connection with the maintenance of Soviet military advisers in Yugoslavia, and point out that Soviet Generals in Yugoslavia receive, in dinars, three to four times as much as Yugoslav Generals and that, in their opinion, this fact might have given rise to objections on

the part of the Yugoslav military personnel. But, firstly, the Yugoslav Generals, in addition to dinars, also receive other allowances in kind: lodging, supplies, food and the like. Secondly, the salary received by the Soviet Generals in Yugoslavia fully corresponds to the amount of money received by the Soviet Generals in the USSR. Naturally, the Soviet Government could not consent to a reduction of the salary of Soviet Generals sent to Yugoslavia.

It is possible that expenditures for the Soviet Generals in Yugoslavia were heavy for the Yugoslav budget, but, if this were the case, the Yugoslav Government should have addressed a timely proposal to the Soviet Government to take a part of the expenditures upon itself. The Soviet Government would certainly have consented to this. However, the Yugoslavs took another course: instead of solving the situation in a friendly manner, they began to slander our military advisers, to call them parasites, to discredit the Soviet Army, and the Yugoslav Government addressed itself to the Soviet Government only after a hostile atmosphere had been created around the Soviet military advisers.

It is easy to understand that the Soviet Government could not reconcile itself to such a situation.

Concerning the Soviet civilian specialists in Yugoslavia. In its letter of March 27, 1948, the CC of the CPSU(B) communicated the reasons for the withdrawal of civilian specialists from Yugoslavia. In this case, the CC of the CPSU(B) relied on the complaints of the Soviet civilian specialists and on the reports of the Soviet Ambassador in Yugoslavia. These reports show that both the Soviet civilian specialists and the representative of the CPSU(B) in the Information Bureau, Comrade Iudin, had really been placed under the surveillance of the State security organs of Yugoslavia. Comrades Tito and Kardelj deny in their letter the justifiability of these complaints and communications, contending that the Yugoslav state security organs do not watch Soviet people in Yugoslavia. But why should the CC of the CPSU (B) believe the mere words of Comrades Tito and Kardelj, and not the complaints of Soviet people, among them Comrade Iudin? The Soviet Government has many civilian specialists in all the countries of people’s democracy and yet it receives no complaints from its specialists, nor has it any disagreements with the Governments of those countries. The question arises: why did these disagreements and conflicts break out in Yugoslavia only? Is it not because the Yugoslav Government introduced a special regime for the Soviet people in Yugoslavia, including Comrade Iudin?

It is easy to understand that the Soviet Government could not reconcile itself to such a situation, and was therefore compelled to recall its civilian specialists from Yugoslavia. Concerning the Soviet Ambassador in Yugoslavia and the Soviet State.-In their letter of April 13, 1948, Comrades Tito and Kardelj write: “We consider that he (the Soviet Ambassador), as Ambassador, is not entitled to seek information from anyone on the work of our Party. This is not his business.”

We consider that this statement of Comrades Tito and Kardelj is fundamentally incorrect, anti-Soviet. As can be seen, they place the Soviet Ambassador, a responsible Communist who represents, in Yugoslavia, the Communist Government of the USSR before the Yugoslavia Communist Government, on an equal footing with an ordinary bourgeois Envoy, with an ordinary official of a bourgeois State, whose duty is to undermine the foundations of the Yugoslav State. It is hard to conceive that Comrades Tito and Kardelj could have come to such an absurd notion. Do they realize that such an attitude towards the Soviet Ambassador means the denial of friendly relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia? Do they realize that the Soviet Ambassador, a responsible Communist, the representative of a friendly country which liberated Yugoslavia from the German occupation, has not only the right but also the duty to discuss from time to time with the Communists of Yugoslavia all the questions they might be interested in? How can these simple and elementary things be subjected to doubts, if, of course, the position of friendly relations with the Soviet Union is still adhered to?

For the information of Comrades Tito and Kardelj we should say that, contrary to the Yugoslav model, we do not consider the Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow as a simple official; we do not place him on an equal footing with bourgeois envoys and we do not deny him the right to seek information from anyone on the work of our Party. On becoming Ambassador, he did not cease to be a Communist. And we treat him as a comrade and a Communist worker. He has acquaintances and friends among the Soviet people. Does he “collect” data on the work of our Party? Probably he does. Well, let him collect. We have no reason to conceal the shortcomings in our work from comrades. We ourselves reveal them in order to eliminate them.

We consider that such an attitude by the Yugoslav comrades towards the Soviet Ambassador cannot be considered accidental. It derives from the general attitude of the Yugoslav Government owing to which the Yugoslav leaders often do not see the difference between the foreign policy of the USSR and the foreign policy of the Anglo-Americans; they identify Soviet foreign policy with the foreign policy of the English and Americans and consider that Yugoslavia should pursue the same policy towards the Soviet Union as towards the imperialist countries, Great Britain and the USA Comrades Tito and Kardelj accuse Soviet men of allegedly recruiting Yugoslav citizens into their intelligence service. They write:

We consider it improper for organs of the Soviet intelligence to recruit citizens in our country, which is heading for Socialism, into their intelligence service. This we can look upon only as being aimed against the interests of our country. This is being done despite the fact that our leading men and state security organs protested against it and brought it to your knowledge that we could not allow this. Our army officers, various officials and those who have a hostile attitude towards the new Yugoslavia are inveigled in this way.

We declare that this assertion of Comrades Tito and Kardelj, which is full of hostile offenses against the Soviet representatives in Yugoslavia, does not at all correspond to reality.

It would be odd to request that the Soviet people who work in Yugoslavia fill their mouths with water and neither talk nor chat with anyone. The Soviet representatives are politically advanced people and not simply employees hired to work for pay without the right to take an interest in what is being done in Yugoslavia. It is natural that they address Yugoslav citizens, ask questions, desire to obtain explanations and the like. Only an incorrigible Sovietophobe could consider these talks as attempts to inveigle people, even people who “have a hostile attitude” towards the new Yugoslavia, into the intelligence service. Only anti-Soviets can imagine that the leaders of the Soviet Union are less concerned with the integrity and inviolability of the new Yugoslavia than is the Politbiuro of the CC of the CPY.

It is typical that we meet with such absurd charges against Soviet People in Yugoslavia only.

It appears to us that these ugly charges against Soviet people have been fabricated in order to justify the activity of the state security organs of Yugoslavia who are exercising surveillance over the Soviet people in Yugoslavia.

From the Resolution “Concerning the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia,” Passed at the Cominform Session of June 1948 in Rumania, in the Presence of the Most Responsible State and Party Leaders of the USSR and Eastern European Countries, Openly Calling Upon the Peoples of Yugoslavia to Rebel against, and Overthrow, their Legal Government

The Information Bureau, composed of the representatives of the Bulgarian Workers’ Party (Communists), Rumanian Workers’ Party, Hungarian Workers’ Party, Polish Workers’ Party, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Communist Party of France, Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Communist Party of Italy, upon discussing the situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and announcing that the representatives of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia had refused to attend the meeting of the Information Bureau, unanimously reached the following conclusions:

The Information Bureau notes that recently the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia has pursued an incorrect line on the main questions of home and foreign policy, a line which represents a departure from Marxism-Leninism. In this connection the Information Bureau approves the action of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B), which took the initiative in exposing this incorrect policy of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, particularly the incorrect policy of Comrades Tito, Kardelj, Djilas and Rankovic.

The Information Bureau declares that the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party is pursuing an unfriendly policy toward the Soviet Union and the CPSU(B). An undignified policy of defaming Soviet military experts and discrediting the Soviet Union, has been carried out in Yugoslavia. A special regime was instituted for Soviet civilian experts in Yugoslavia, whereby they were under surveillance of Yugoslav state security organs and were continually followed. The representative of the CPSU(B) in the Information Bureau, Comrade Iudin, and a number of official representatives of the Soviet Union in Yugoslavia were followed and kept under observation by Yugoslav state security organs.

All these and similar facts show that the leaders of the Community Party of Yugoslavia have taken a stand unworthy of Communists, and have begun to identify the foreign policy of the Soviet Union with the foreign policy of the imperialist powers, behaving toward the Soviet Union in the same manner as they behave toward the bourgeois states. Precisely because of this anti-Soviet stand, slanderous propaganda about the “degeneration” of the CPSU(B), about the “degeneration” of the USSR, and so on, borrowed from the arsenal of counter-revolutionary Trotskyism, is current within the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

The Information Bureau denounces this anti-Soviet attitude of the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, as being incompatible with Marxism-Leninism and only appropriate to nationalists …

It is a completely intolerable state of affairs when the most elementary rights of members in the Yugoslav Communist Party are suppressed, when the slightest criticism of incorrect measures in the Party is brutally repressed.

The Information Bureau regards as disgraceful such actions as the expulsion from the Party and the arrest of the Central Committee members, Comrades Zujovic and Hebrang, because they dared to criticize the anti-Soviet attitude of the leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party, and called for friendship between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.

The Information Bureau considers that such a disgraceful, purely Turkish, terrorist regime cannot be tolerated in the Communist Party. The interest of the very existence and development of the Yugoslav Communist Party demands that an end be put to this regime…

Unable to face the criticism of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) and the Central Committees of the other fraternal Parties, the Yugoslav leaders took the path of outright deceiving their Party and people by concealing from the Yugoslav Communist Party the criticism of the Central Committee’s incorrect policy and also by concealing from the Party and the people the real reasons for the brutal measures against Comrades Zujovic and Hebrang…

In view of this, the Information Bureau expresses complete agreement with the estimation of the situation in the Yugoslav Communist Party, with the criticism of the mistakes of the Central Committee of the Party, and with the political analysis of these mistakes contained in letters from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (B) to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia between March and May, 1948.

The Information Bureau unanimously concludes that by their anti-Party and anti-Soviet views, incompatible with Marxism-Leninism, by their whole attitude and their refusal to attend the meeting of the Information Bureau, the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia have placed themselves in opposition to the Communist Parties affiliated to the Information Bureau, have taken the path of seceding from the united socialist front against imperialism, have taken the path of betraying the cause of international solidarity of the working people, and have taken up a position of nationalism.

The Information Bureau condemns this anti-Party policy and attitude of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

The Information Bureau considers that in view of all this, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia has placed itself and the Yugoslav Party outside the family of the fraternal Communist Parties, outside the united Communist front and consequently outside the ranks of the Information Bureau.

The Information Bureau considers that the basis of these mistakes made by the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia lies in the undoubted fact that nationalist elements, which previously existed in a disguised form, managed in the course of the past five or six months to reach a dominant position in the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and that, consequently, the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party has broken with the international traditions of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and has taken the road of nationalism.

Considerably overestimating the internal, national forces of Yugoslavia and their influence, the Yugoslav leaders think that they can maintain Yugoslavia’s independence and build socialism without the support of the Communist Parties of other countries, without the support of the people’s democracies, without the support of the Soviet Union. They think that the new Yugoslavia can do without the help of these revolutionary forces.

Showing their poor understanding of the international situation and their intimidation by the blackmailing threats of the imperialists, the Yugoslav leaders think that by making concessions they can curry favor with the Imperialist states. They think they will be able to bargain with them for Yugoslavia’s independence and gradually get the people of Yugoslavia oriented on these states, that is, on capitalism. In this they proceed tacitly from the well-known bourgeois-nationalist thesis that “capitalist states are a lesser danger to the independence of Yugoslavia than the Soviet Union.”

The Yugoslav leaders evidently do not understand or, probably, pretend they do not understand, that such a nationalist line can only lead to Yugoslavia’s degeneration into an ordinary bourgeois republic, to the loss of its independence and to its transformation into a colony of the imperialist countries.

The Information Bureau does not doubt that inside the Communist Party of Yugoslavia there are sufficient healthy elements, loyal to Marxism-Leninism, to the international traditions of the Yugoslav Communist Party and to the united socialist front.

Their task is to compel their present leaders to recognize their mistakes openly and honestly and to rectify them; to break with nationalism, return to internationalism; and in every way to consolidate the united socialist front against imperialism. Should the present leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party prove to be incapable of doing this, their job is to replace them and to advance a new internationalist leadership of the Party.

The Information Bureau does not doubt that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia will be able to fulfill this honorable task.

From the Statement of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia of June 29, 1948, following the Cominform Resolution Concerning the Situation in the CPY

The Resolution of the Information Bureau “Concerning the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia” has a background, as is obvious from its contents.

Its basis is formed by the letters of the CC of the CPSU (B) addressed to the CC of the CPY. The first of these letters, dated March 27 of this year, in which the CC of the CPSU(B) brought forth its accusations against the CC of the CPY was simultaneously dispatched by the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) to all the other member Parties of the Cominform without the CC of the CPY being informed thereof. After this, a letter from the CC of the CP of Hungary was received through the CC of the CPSU(B) which supported the attitude of the CC of the CPSU( B) on all points. The letter of the Hungarian CC was also sent to the other Parties. After this, similar letters were received by the CC of the CPY from the other member Parties of the Cominform as well, with the exception of the Italian and French. The CC of the CPY points out that those Parties adopted the basic standpoint of the CC of the CPSU(B) without hearing the opinion or any counter-argument on the part of the CC of the CPY. After this letter from the CC of the CPSU(B) and the above-mentioned letters from the other Central Committees, as well as after the reply of the CC of the CPY to the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) dated April 13 of this year, the CC of the CPY received other letters from the CC of the CPSU (B) (of May 4th and 22nd), which took more or less the same line as the first letter. The Resolution of the Cominform “Concerning the Situation in the CPY” is essentially a recapitulation of these letters from the CC of the CPSU (B) …

As can be seen from the statement addressed by the Politbiuro of the CC of the CPY to the session of the Cominform annexed herewith, the CC of the CPY could not agree to a discussion on the basis of such accusations on the part of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) founded on slanders, fabrications and ignorance of the situation in Yugoslavia, until the actual state of affairs was established and falsities were separated from actual objections on principle, whether on the part of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B) or on the part of any other Central Committee of the member Parties of the Cominform.

In connection with the publication of the above-mentioned Resolution of the Cominform, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia states the following:

The criticism contained in the Resolution is based on inaccurate and unfounded assertions and represents an attempt to destroy the prestige of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, both abroad and in the country; to create confusion among the masses in the country and in the international workers’ movement; to weaken the unity of the CPY and its leading role. It is therefore even more surprising that the CC of the CPSU(B) refused to investigate on the spot the validity of its assertions as proposed in the letter of the CC of the CPY dated April 13, 1948…

The CC of the CPY asserts that none of the leaders consider that Yugoslavia, in the struggle for the building of Socialism and the preservation of independence, does not need the help of the countries of people’s democracy and of the USSR. Only people who have lost all contact with reality could assert anything of this kind. The CC of the CPY must in this connection emphasize that the extension of this aid and cooperation does not depend on it alone, but also on the countries of the people’s democracy and the USSR. The CC of the CPY considers that this aid must be linked up with the internal and foreign policy of Yugoslavia and in no case with the fact that the CC of the CPY could not accept unfounded charges based on untruth.

The assertions that the Yugoslav leaders are preparing to make concessions to imperialists and to bargain with them about the independence of Yugoslavia-are a complete invention and belong among the grossest slanders against the new Yugoslavia.

The CC of the CPY must, however, point out that, in certain countries of people’s democracy, a whole series of unprovoked acts have been committed by Party and State organs, acts which are insulting to the peoples of Yugoslavia, their State and State representatives, and which lead to a weakening of cooperation, and deterioration of relations with Yugoslavia. The CC of the CPY does not consider itself bound to pass in silence over similar acts in the future.

The CC of the CPY does not consider that it has in any way impaired the unity of the Communist front by refusing to discuss mistakes for which it is not responsible. The unity of this front is not based on the admission of invented or fabricated errors and slanders, but on the fact of whether or not the policy of a party is actually internationalist. One cannot, however, ignore the fact that the Cominform departed from the principles on which it was based and which provide for the voluntary adoption of its conclusions by every Party. The Cominform, however, not only compels the leaders of the CPY to admit errors which they have not committed, but even calls the members of the CPY to rebellion within the Party, to shatter the unity of the Party. The CC of the CPY can never agree to a discussion about its policy on the basis of inventions and in an uncomradely spirit, without mutual confidence. Such a basis is unprincipled and in this and only in this sense the CC of the CPY considered that it was not on an equal footing in the discussion and that it could not accept a discussion on this basis. Further, in connection with the above, the CC of the CPY resolutely rejects the accusation that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia had become nationalistic. By its entire internal and foreign policy, by its struggle in the course of the War of National Liberation especially, and by the just solution of the national question in Yugoslavia, the CPY has given proofs of the exact opposite.

The greatest historical injustice has been done by the above-mentioned unjust charges against our Party, our working class and working masses, the peoples of Yugoslavia in general, and their unselfish and heroic struggle.

The Central Committee of the CPY is aware of the fact that the charges of the CC of the CPSU(B) against the CC of the CPY will be seized upon by enemy propaganda for the purpose of slandering the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and other democratic countries. The CC of the CPY, however, declares that it bears no responsibility for all these happenings because it did not give rise to them by any of its acts.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia calls upon the party membership to close its ranks in the struggle for the realization of the Party line and for even greater Party unity, and it calls upon the working class and other working people in the People’s Front, to continue even more persistently their work in building our Socialist homeland. This is the only way to prove in practice that the mentioned charges are unjustified.

Source: White Book on Aggressive Activities by the Governments of the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania towards Yugoslavia (Beograd: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, 1951), pp. 57-78.

 

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