Cultural Differences Narrowing

Iu. V. Arutiunian, On Several Trends in Narrowing Cultural Differences among USSR Peoples at the Stage of Developed Socialism. July-August 1978

 

Original Source: Istoriia SSSR, No. 4 (1978), pp. 94-104.

Not long ago, widely diverse cultures could be found in what is now the USSR. Capitalism prevailed in some regions, while patriarchal feudal regimes held sway in others, such as Central Asia, the Caucasus and parts of Siberia. The Catholic Church was the dominant religion in the Baltics, orthodoxy in Russia, Islam in Central Asia.

The October Revolution ushered in a new, multinational social order. But the social homogeneity of Soviet culture has not meant a leveling of national cultures. All peoples and social groups have broad opportunities for development.

Between 1972 and 1975, extensive sociological studies were conducted in five republics to assess the cultural and social changes taking place around the country and to identify ways to promote optimal development of, and narrow differences among, Soviet national groups. The republics chosen represent highly important ethnic regions — Moldavia, Georgia, Uzbekistan, Estonia and the Russian Republic. In each republic, from 4,000 to 6,000 urban residents and 2,000 to 4,000 rural inhabitants were questioned.

On the whole, our research data reveal a number of common traits among people of different nationalities. These similarities are most noticeable in the 18 to 29 age-group, i.e., people who were brought up in the modern period. As might be expected, the greatest differences appear in the 50 and older age-group, that is, among people brought up before World War II.

These differences show up vividly in basic elements of culture such as education and employment. Thus, the average level of education among older Moldavians and Uzbeks is below the national average, while the average educational level of older Georgians, Estonians and Russians is considerably higher than the countrywide average. Even among city people, only 4.7% of Uzbeks 60 years of age and older have a secondary or higher education, while this figure for Estonians is nearly 19%.

Among middle-aged and younger people, the picture is very different. Nearly 69% of young Uzbeks have a secondary or higher education, and the figure for young Estonians is 57%.

The following table traces the equalization of educational attainments in the countryside as well.

Level of Education for Upper and Lower Age-Groups of Republics’ Indigenous National Population

Persons per 1,000 People with Secondary and Higher Education

Age Uzbek Estonia RSFSR Georgia Moldavia
20-29 476 522 711 305 551
60 and older 110 86 149 12 18
City
20-29 566 581 850 544 686
60 and older 188 137 354 53 47
Village
20-29 322 345 571 221 492
60 and older 44 18 43 6 11

The appearance of a skilled work force and an educated intelligentsia is a key aspect of Soviet development in the republics studied. Whereas the percentage of older Uzbeks employed in skilled work is lower than the percentage of Russians or Estonians, these figures are virtually identical for the younger Soviet citizens, regardless of nationality. Some 80% to 90% of young urban Uzbeks, Russians and Estonians are skilled workers, while in the countryside these figures range from 60% to 80%.

The following table charts the emergence of a skilled work force.

The Share of Skilled Labor (Non-manual and Manual) By Age-Groups of Indigenous Nationalities

Age City_Estonia RSFSR Uzbek Village_Estonia RSFSR Uzbek
20-24 95 89 83 78 77 57
30-39 94 84 70 77 55 37
50-59 78 67 40 50 33 10

The lower percentage of Central Asians engaged in skilled work is due chiefly to the underemployment of women.

Another important part of our study involves the emergence of a common culture and the narrowing of cultural differences. Material culture — clothing, food, interior decor, furniture and housing — shows the emergence of the greatest similarities. This is because the same system of economic planning is found in all republics and because the national and international division of labor promotes standardization. Distinct but limited national preferences remain. Those differences that persist tend to involve the artistic culture — architecture, for example — or national consciousness. Ethnic distinctions are most pronounced in the choice of cuisine, especially in southern republics. For example, 87% of urban Uzbeks prefer local cuisine, as do 55% of urban Georgians and 39% of urban Moldavians. On the other hand, only 2% to 6% of urban Russians and Estonians prefer their own national cuisine. Moreover, Russians living in southern republics prefer the local cuisine.

The narrowing of cultural differences in the area of leisure activities is a more complex phenomenon. Significant differences remain between urban and rural populations. But comparison of leisure activities among urban residents of different nationalities reveals few if any distinctions. Most urbanites of all nationalities watch television (65% to 75%), more than one-half go to the theater, one-third to one-quarter read literature and engage in sports, and a small percentage participate in amateur arts.

Of course, there are differences in emphasis. Russians are avid readers, Estonians theatergoers, Moldavians and Uzbeks amateur performers and Georgians hobbyists. But again, these differences pertain mainly to older people. Young people of all nationalities exhibit the same preferences for leisure activities.

Not only do all nationalities have equal access to mass culture, but they also take advantages of this access in equal measure.

Similar educational curriculums (in history and literature in secondary schools and in Marxism-Leninism, dialectical materialism, historical materialism, scientific communism and political economy in higher schools) as well as uniformity in the content of the mass media and in popular entertainment promote a common, materialistic outlook among people of all nationalities. Traditional attitudes are dying out. This is particularly true of religion.

The number of believers has plummeted. In Saratov Province, nearly one-half of urban Russians age 60 and above are believers, and in the countryside the figure is three-fourths. In the next generation these figures fall to one-sixth and one-third, and in the younger generation, no more than 5% of city dwellers and 15% of villagers consider themselves believers. When asked to define the “good life,” people of all nationalities emphasize two factors — a happy family and an interesting job. And the importance of the latter response is growing steadily.

Ethnic differences are most marked in domestic and family relations. While nuclear families are common among the “European peoples” of the USSR, the peoples of the Caucasus and Central Asia live in extended or multi-generational families, have more children and accord greater authority to parents. This can be seen in the answers to the question: “Is it necessary to seek the consent of one’s parents before getting married?” Some 88% of urban Uzbeks think parents’ consent is essential, while this figure falls steadily as one travels westward. In Georgia it is 61%, in Moldavia – 41%, in the Russian Republic – 38% and in Estonia – 22%.

Traditional values also influence attitudes toward marriage and divorce. Urban Uzbeks reject divorce 84%, feel there can be no grounds for divorce when a husband and wife have children. This view is held by 73% of urban Georgians, 67% of Moldavians, 54% of Russians and 51% of Estonians.

It is not surprising that many peoples continue to favor marriages within the national group, rather than mixed marriages. But this is no indicator of the extent of interpersonal relations among people of different nationalities. In fact, there are very few business or production relations that do not also involve close personal relations.

Differences in attitudes toward the family also are reflected in the extent of female employment and the allocation of roles inside the family. Although women receive almost the same education as do men in Central Asia and the Caucasus, the former hold jobs much less often. The share of women in the work force is especially high in the Baltics, followed by the Russian Republic, Moldavia, the Caucasus and, finally, Central Asia. It turns out that there is an inverse proportion between average family size and the percentage of women employed in skilled non-manual jobs. In Estonia, where the highest percentage of women are skilled workers, the average family size is 3.1, in the Russian Republic 3.8, in Moldavia 3.9, in Georgia 4 and in Uzbekistan and Turkmenia 5.8 to 6.

Patterns of migration reveal another significant difference among Soviet nationalities. Though they are sufficiently educated and aware of urban culture, Uzbeks are much less likely to move to the city than are Russians. Whereas one-third of Russian young people intend to quit the countryside and migrate to the city, only 2.2% of Uzbeks express the same intention and the percentage that actually do so is even lower.

Source: USSR Today (Columbus: AAASS, 1981), pp. 19-20.

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