Zaslavskaia on Perestroika

Tat’iana Zaslavskaia, Considering the Central Committee Theses and Fundamental Questions of Perestroika. June 4, 1988

Co-author Elena Manucharova

Sociologist Tatiana Zaslavskaia was a leading proponent of reforms, who viewed glasnost and perestroika as a social revolution. In an interview on the eve of the 19th Party Conference, she criticized the entrenched bureaucracy and highlighted social groups that opposed the reforms. Conservatives deeply disliked Zaslavskaia and prevented her election as a delegate to the 19th Party Conference.

Original Source: Izvestiia, 4 June 1988.

Manucharova: Tat’iana Ivanovna! The CPSU Central Committee theses offer absolutely new conditions of life. [The theses published by the Central Committee of the CPSU on the eve of the 19th Party Conference were limited in scope compared to Gorbachev’s proposals.] They commit every person to a great deal. But the people who grew up in the era when social activeness was not encouraged and initiative was punished remain fettered. It is as though a “circle of prohibition,” invisible to others but highly imperative, has been drawn around each of us, separating the “accepted” from the “unaccepted.”

Zaslavskaia: This circle is a dangerous thing. It is widespread. And traditional. Much comes within it. For instance, the passiveness of the majority of Supreme Soviet deputies. As far as I know, in the past twenty-five years not a single deputy has displayed any genuinely radical social initiative, although he ran no risk and no actions would have been taken against a single deputy, whatever he demanded. But, as we know, until the last session, when the draft Law of Cooperatives underwent stormy discussion, the Supreme Soviet essentially rubber-stamped decisions prepared by the apparatus.

You are right. After a long period of stagnation it is hard to immediately acquire different habits and to behave in a truly free manner, as you consider necessary. Our consciousness is overgrown with many erroneous ideas, illusions of prohibition, and skepticism. And that is characteristic of all strata of society. But a very great deal in the fate of perestroika now depends on the level of public awareness.

Manucharova: Forgive me for interrupting you, but different people have different understandings of what perestroika is. Some people think it pertains only to the quality of work, others to the number of goods, and this correspondingly determines their position. Skepticism is manifested when goods disappear from the shelves. But few people think about the underlying meaning of the breakthrough period.

Zaslavskaia: I believe that the key to an understanding of perestroika is given in Mikhail Gorbachev’s words to the effect that perestroika is a social revolution. That is how I see it (or at any rate want to see it) in the CPSU Central Committee theses.

Manucharova: It is the theses that our talk is about today. But it would be a good thing to determine also what should be understood in this case by the word revolution. Precise terms are particularly important here.

Zaslavskaia: There are no variant readings here. Revolution is a radical means of changing the socioeconomic formation. Marx called revolutions the “locomotives of history.”

Manucharova: What is the main question that any revolution must resolve to ensure its victory?

Zaslavskaia: Power. Without resolving the question of power there are no revolutions. Our present-day revolution is no exception. The transfer of a large part of incomes, rights, and social privileges from the top stories of the social pyramid to the lower is connected with the redistribution of power. This is a profoundly democratic action, but it is understandable that it can only be carried out by encroaching on the interests of those groups who occupy a privileged position today, primarily the apparatus of party, soviet, and economic management. The principle of the radical redistribution of power is “built into” the very concept of perestroika, and that is what makes it a social revolution. Fundamental transformations are required to lead our society onto a Leninist path of socialist development.

But it would be premature to conclude from the fact that these changes are essential that they are already taking place, in other words, that the measures that are being implemented in society are of a revolutionary nature. To assert this would mean deceiving ourselves and others. From my viewpoint, the system of measures that are being implemented so far can be assessed only as a rather incomprehensive, contradictory reform based on many compromises, a reform whose pace and only slight efficiency are so far curbing society’s development.

We have yet to attain genuinely revolutionary transformations. Or, to be more precise, they must be won in a hard sociopolitical struggle that will markedly change today’s balance of social forces.

Manucharova: Let’s dwell on today’s obstacles to reform. The situation is complex, after all.

Zaslavskaia: Naturally. The perestroika of social relations is not being implemented in an empty space, but rather where the vitally important interests of different classes, strata, and groups of our society intersect. Each of them is seeking to protect its own interests, to achieve their implementation, and to prevent a threat to them. The professional demands made on leaders under the new conditions are naturally growing. Labor is becoming more complex, and the intellectual level it requires is increasing. This alone is enough for a proportion of leaders to take a conservative stance, to be in no hurry to make practical changes in production management methods.

To these factors we must add insufficient thought and the inconsistencies and confusion that inevitably arise in connection with the first attempts to switch enterprises to new conditions of economic management. This is expanding still further the circle of leaders who are displeased by the course of perestroika. While supporting the fundamental concept of perestroika they believe that it is not being implemented, that many of the innovations that are actually being introduced are in fact only consolidating a leadership based on administration through command.

Hence the skepticism and the reservation of their own established positions.

A very high concentration of power has always been characteristic of our society. The majority of representatives of the top group hold responsible jobs in several ruling organs simultaneously. CPSU Central Committee members have become Supreme Soviet deputies, republican leaders have become CPSU Central Committee members, and ministers have joined the Supreme Soviet and the Central Committee. In brief, a powerful ruling nucleus subordinate to no one has always taken shape. The centralist principle always drastically dominated the democratic principle.

During the time of stagnation the management apparatus wielded enormous power. A command-based style of managing the lower echelons, the unconditional execution of orders from higher-ranking echelons, formalism and bureaucracy in resolving questions affecting people’s interests, and the minimizing of direct contacts with working people became characteristic features of behavior here.

That is why it is precisely in this group that we can now find the staunchest champions of the ideological views of the period of stagnation. Many of them are reluctant to concede their positions, to surrender even a small amount of power, and they allow themselves to ignore even keen criticism in the press.

The pseudo-supporters of perestroika working in the management apparatus also present a great danger. While creating a semblance of great activeness and effective participation in the elaboration of directive documents and instructions, they are in fact bit by bit reducing transformation efforts to nothing.

I think that this group will wield a large number of rights for a long time. That is why many “prohibited zones” are still preserved which seem not to be affected by the transformations taking place in other regions. The changing of leading cadres at least improves the situation, but it is taking place relatively slowly and not always successfully.

Many unseen but tangible barriers are obviously dividing society into groups that are constantly seeking to consolidate their positions and which are aware of the opposing nature of their interests. On the one hand there are the initiators, champions, and allies of perestroika, on the other hand the opponents of perestroika. In this connection there arises the question of the “social price” that our society can, should, and is prepared to pay for overcoming its backwardness, for purging itself of the accumulated dirt, and for moral renewal.

Manucharova: Please name the points in the CPSU Central Committee theses that you consider to be truly momentous.

Zaslavskaia: First of all, of course, the transformation of the soviets of people’s deputies into fully empowered organs of power and the party organs’ renunciation of interference in the solution of economic questions. In other words, spheres of power are being precisely differentiated. The management of the country and of socioeconomic processes will be undertaken by the soviets, while the party organs will fulfill actual political and ideological functions. This allocation will make it possible to overcome the political organs’ unnecessary and harmful tutelage over economic activity.

The slogan “All power to the soviets” put forward by October has acquired particular popularity among the masses in recent years. It seems to me that the theses express precisely this truly Leninist revolutionary idea. The theses suggest a system of specific measures for the life support and implementation of this idea. One of these measures is aimed against the “private unions” of which I was speaking, against the merging of executive and legislative power. For instance, it will no longer be possible to elect ispolkom members to the soviets, the soviet is to be the supreme legislative organ, while the ispolkom will be under the control of and subordinated to the soviet.

So far deputies have divided their time between their workplace and representation at sessions, and their main profession naturally dominated. That is why they readily agreed to vote for any decision prepared by the apparat. And they did not even think particularly about its content; frequently they did not even have time to understand it properly. To strengthen the soviets, for the period of their election a proportion of deputies will be relieved of their professional work.

The restriction of the terms in office of leading elected posts also seems to me to be important. This ensures the rotation of cadres.

One more fundamental position, the rejection of the nomenklatura system for forming cadres, is being submitted for discussion. This is very important, but I should like to see this thesis formulated even more precisely.

The idea of the self-purging of the Communists’ ranks is very important; this will help the party to protect itself against those people who, without sharing its basic ideas, have joined the CPSU for selfish reasons. There are undoubtedly such people in the party. We must free ourselves of them, but how? After all it is not clear who will undergo recertification and who will be able, with a full knowledge of all the circumstances, to offer an objective decision on the alienation of a particular party member. For instance the example of Uzbekistan, with which everyone is familiar, shows that under certain conditions it is precisely the people for whom there ought to be no place in the party who can seize the upper hand in the party apparat.

Manucharova: Perhaps you have already switched to a criticism of the theses.

Zaslavskaia: The theses are the fruit of collective thinking. They reflect a compromise between people’s different positions, hence the large number of streamlined formulations. In fact they have been put forward as a platform for subsequent discussion and undoubtedly need to be given practical concrete form.

Their text is concentrated more on what has to be done rather than on how to achieve it. In them you will find no answer to how the most important demands can and will be implemented: intensifying the role of the USSR Supreme Soviet, altering the election system, and subordinating the apparat to the elected organs. Only general words are uttered about a drastic reduction of the party apparat.

The discussion of the theses has already developed, and people are demanding more radical changes. In my view this is extraordinarily important. The raising of the level of public awareness is having an effect here. Some three years ago the very publication of such theses would probably simply have caused a mass shock.

Manucharova: The value of feedback…

Zaslavskaia: It is important for society that feedback should travel upward through many channels, and not just one. It is a good thing that we have a large and powerful press and television and that social initiatives are growing.

Manucharova: What do you think of informal associations? A march and meeting by the Civic Dignity group was held in front of our newspaper building recently. Their slogans are “All power to the soviets” and “Long live perestroika.” Are they of any use?

Zaslavskaia: For the time being they are still perhaps not mature enough on the social plane. But they should be supported. In my view organizational forms are needed into which the desire of many people to take an active part in transforming social relations could merge. People are now talking increasingly frequently about creating a “people’s alliance for assisting perestroika” that would operate on a public basis. This has already been done in Estonia. Why should the experience not be extended to all of the Soviet Union? If this initiative is supported, the organization could exist on the people’s money, not state money.

There are funds protecting children, culture, and peace. There should be a fund for assisting perestroika. Informal organizations could be of considerable benefit to society, becoming one more channel of feedback for the government.

Manucharova: Many people do not accept the very idea of informal associations and have probably lived their whole lives without seeing such enterprising and uninvited organizations. That is why they consider the informal associations to be simply savages that some “evil forces” will be able to launch into any conflict between nations or between groups.

Zaslavskaia: Distrust scarcely extends only to young social initiatives. The development of society is never without conflicts. Denying the inevitability of the struggle of group interests in connection with perestroika means closing your eyes to reality. But our path will not be so hard if we consciously and promptly enlist science for our assistance. It is necessary for the elaboration of a strategy for the social management of perestroika. And it will make it possible to minimize and to “domesticate” intergroup conflicts, to reduce social tension in society so that it is possible to achieve the projected goals at the least social cost.

The least cost-I want to stress that. Here an understanding of the measure of things is extraordinarily important. Under the conditions of antagonism of the interests of different social groups, an attempt to ease conflicts can in reality result in the emasculation of the main ideas of perestroika. And a one-sided orientation toward compromises, an excessive fear of offending the interests of a particular group will delay progress. Then the slow progress of perestroika will lead to acute dissatisfaction among working people, although it is being implemented precisely in their interests. The implementation of a thoughtful strategy for managing perestroika will make it possible to accelerate the progress of the revolution.

After all, it is only the convinced, self- sacrificing participation of the broadest masses which can ensure its victory. Social revolution implemented through the efforts of the apparatchiks, revolution “from above” cannot work. It should be the business of those who are vitally interested in it: the progressive section of workers, kolkhoz members, and the intelligentsia. It is essential to sharply intensify their influence on the progress of perestroika. The theses show how much can be done if you alter the political power structure.

Manucharova: You will repeat all of your bold ideas at the party conference?

Zaslavskaia: I will not be there. I was not elected. But you can consider that I have already delivered my speech here.

Source: Isaac Tarasulo, ed., Gorbachev and Glasnost: Viewpoints from the Soviet Press (Wilmington: SR Books, 1989), pp. 313-320.

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