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The New Military Oath

Order of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Concerning the Text of the Military Oath of the Workers–Peasants’ Red Army, 3 January 1939

 

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Original Source: RUSSIAN SOURCE. English translation ©1998 by James F. Gebhardt

In accordance with the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the following text is approved for the military oath of the Workers–Peasants’ Red Army.

I, a citizen of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entering into the ranks of the Workers–Peasants’ Red Army, take this oath and solemnly promise to be an honest, brave, disciplined, vigilant fighter, staunchly to protect military and state secrets, and unquestioningly to obey all military regulations and orders of commanders and superiors.

I promise conscientiously to study military affairs, in every way to protect military and state property, and to my last breath to be faithful to the people, the Soviet Motherland, and the Workers–Peasants’ Government.

I am always prepared on order of the Workers–Peasants’ Government to rise to the defense of my Motherland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and as a fighting man of the Workers–Peasants’ Red Army, I promise to defend it bravely, skillfully, with dignity and honor, sparing neither my blood nor my life itself for the achievement of total victory over our enemies.

If by evil intent I should violate this, my solemn oath, then let the severe punishment of Soviet law and the total hatred and contempt of the working classes befall me.

Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
M. Kalinin

Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
A. Gorkin

Moscow, the Kremlin
3 January, 1939

Source: TRANSLATION SOURCE.

Red Army Oath

Solemn Oath on Induction into the Worker-Peasant Red Army. 1918

 

Original Source: Translated from a recruiting poster, 1918.

1. I, son of the laboring people, citizen of the Soviet Republic, assume the title of warrior in the Worker-Peasant Army.
Dmitrii Moor. Solemn Oath (1918)

2. Before the laboring classes of Russia and the entire world, I accept the obligation to carry this title with honor, to study the art of war conscientiously, and to guard national and military property from spoil and plunder as if it were the apple of my eye.

3. I accept the obligation to observe revolutionary discipline and unquestioningly carry out all orders of my commanders, who have been invested with their rank by the power of the Worker-Peasant government.

4. I accept the obligation to restrain myself and my comrades from all conduct that might debase the dignity of citizens of the Soviet Republic, and to direct all my thoughts and actions to the great cause of liberating the laboring masses.

5. I accept the obligation to answer every summons of the Worker-Peasant government to defend the Soviet Republic from all danger and the threats of all enemies, and to spare neither my strength nor my very life in the battle for the Russian Soviet Republic, for the cause of socialism and the brotherhood of peoples.

6. If I should with malicious intent go back on this my solemn vow, then let my fate be universal contempt and let the righteous hand of Revolutionary law chastise me.

Zhores Medvedev in a Psychiatric Hospital

The Confinement of Zhores Medvedev in a Psychiatric Hospital, 30 June 1970

 

Roy Medvedev enjoyed the unique status of dissent from a Marxist position. He was expelled from the Communist Party in 1969 after his Let History Judge was published abroad, and continued to face house arrest and KGB harassment thereafter. He nonetheless continued to succeed in publishing his work abroad. His twin brother Zhores, a dissident biologist, did not fare so well. After publication of his Rise and Fall of T.D. Lysenko, he was subjected to involuntary commitment in the Kaluga Psychiatric Hospital. Ultimately he was exiled to Great Britain.

Original Source: Khronika tekushchikh sobytii, No. 14, 30 June 1970

(In this account of events Roy Medvedev’s detailed notes have been used.)

On the evening of 29 May 1970 Zhores Medvedev was taken from his flat in Obninsk, Kaluga Region, to the Kaluga city psychiatric hospital for “diagnosis” and “observation”.

A group of policemen led by a major, the head doctor of the Kaluga psychiatric hospital Livshits and the Obninsk psychiatrist Kiryushin entered the flat, and without producing either documents or medical findings demanded that Zh. Medvedev should accompany them to Kaluga for psychiatric diagnosis. He refused, saying that while he would not resist physically, neither would he voluntarily leave his house. Some colleagues of Medvedev who were present began to accuse the policemen of violating legality, to which the major replied: “We are an organ of coercion, and you can complain to whoever you like.” In front of his wife, children and friends Medvedev’s arms were twisted behind his back and he was taken away. Zh. Medvedev has never suffered from any mental disorders or consulted a psychiatrist.

Zhores Alexandrovich Medvedev is a well-known biologist and publicist. His scientific achievements in the field of genetics are acknowledged by biologists the world over. He is the author of several books and more than 100 scientific papers. He is known to the general public in the USSR and abroad for his work on the history of biological debate in the USSR (original title: The Cult of Personality and biological science). He recently finished a big work International academic cooperation and national frontiers (see Chronicle 12.10 [item 5]). In 1969, without the legal formalities being observed, Zh. Medvedev was dismissed from the Scientific Research Institute for Medical Radiology at the insistence of the Obninsk city Party committee, and for nine months he was not issued with the documents necessary to take up new work. In spring 1970, after the Procuracy had intervened three times, Zh. Medvedev received the necessary documents and submitted them for a vacancy at the Institute of Medical Genetics in Moscow. Selection was to take place at the beginning of June.

Zh. Medvedev was taken to the psychiatric hospital on Friday evening, on the eve of the two non-work days of the weekend.

His brother, Roy Medvedev, leading biologists and other academics attempted to contact the USSR and RSFSR Ministries of Health, the Party Central Committee and the KGB, but without result. Everywhere they were told: “Phone on Monday.”

A psychiatric commission from Moscow was appointed for Sunday 31 May.

30 May

Zh. Medvedev’s brother, wife and friends managed to see him at the hospital. He had been placed in a general ward with people who were really ill.

Livshits, the head doctor of the Kaluga hospital, did not inform them of any diagnosis.

31 May

Many Soviet scientists and writers (Kapitza, Sakharov, Astaurov, Tamm, Engelgardt, Tvardovsky, Tendryakov et al.) sent telegrams to the head doctor, Livshits, protesting against Zh. Medvedev’s forcible hospitalisation.

A commission of experts consisting of B. V. Shostakovich (Serbsky Institute), chairman, Kaluga psychiatrists G.P. Bondarev and B.N. Levchenko, and Livshits, head doctor of the Kaluga hospital, “found in Zh. Medvedev no obvious deviations from the mental norm. It found, however, that Medvedev was exhibiting abnormal nervousness and would therefore need some further observation in hospital conditions.”

Zh. Medvedev’s wife sent a telegram of protest to the USSR Procurator-General, Rudenko. His brother made a declaration to the CPSU Central Committee and sent Rudenko a telegram demanding Medvedev’s immediate release and the punishment of those guilty of violations of legality.

2 June

Many scholars, writers and other representatives of the intelligentsia continue to send telegrams protesting against the forcible hospitalisation of Zh. Medvedev. A large group of long-standing Party members called on N.A. Demidov, head of the department of special medical services, at the RSFSR Ministry of Health. After hearing them out Demidov said that he knew nothing about Medvedev’s hospitalisation. He telephoned Kaluga to ask Livshits for an explanation. Since Livshits was unable to give a satisfactory explanation, Demidov ordered him to come to Moscow on 3 June.

3 June

In the office of the head of the department of special psychiatric services Z.N. Serebryakova in the USSR Ministry of Health a meeting of psychiatrists took place to consider the events in Obninsk and Kaluga. It was resolved to convene a new commission. Roy Medvedev asked permission to stand surety for Shores until the commission met, which is allowed even in cases of [genuine] illness. “That is not now our practice,” replied Serebryakova.

4 June

Psychiatrists Morozov, Nadzharov, Lunts and Portnov were included in the new commission, which was arranged for Friday, June 5. Roy Medvedev declared himself for the exclusion of Lunts: “He has a bad reputation among my friends.” Lunts was excluded from the commission. Roy Medvedev asked for the commission to be postponed. In the evening the commission proved to have already met. It had consisted of G. Morozov, V. Morozov and R. Nadzharov. Diagnosis had lasted twenty minutes. Questions had been put with telegraphic rapidity, and the members of the commission had not even troubled to listen to the answers. Then, after long deliberation, they left. The commission’s decision was communicated neither to Zh. Medvedev nor to his wife.

R. Medvedev telephoned Livshits that night, but this too shed no light on the matter.

On 4 June a group of scholars employed by the USSS Academy of Sciences appealed to academics, scientists and artists of the whole world to organise a broad and comprehensive boycott of scientific, technical and cultural links with the official authorities and establishments of the USSR, to suspend cooperation and to refuse all scientific and cultural contacts until Zhores Medvedev released and he received an apology for the coercion to which he had been subjected.

On the same day a group of twenty academics sent a letter of protest to the USSR Minister of Health, the Minister of Internal Affairs and the Procurator-General. “The forcible hospitalisation of Zh, A. Medvedev is clearly connected with his public activities, which have been conducted on a strictly legal basis (…) No honest and principled scholar can be sure of his safety if such a basis can result in repressions in the form of confinement in a psychiatric hospital for an indefinite period with deprivation of all human rights (…).” The signatories include Academicians A.D. Sakharov, I.E. Tamm and M.A. Leontovich, Doctors of physico-mathematical sciences V.F. Turchin and L.V. Altshuler, Doctor of biological sciences G.A. Dvorkin, Master of biological sciences S.A. Kovalyov, mathematical logician A.S. Volpin and physicist V. N. Chalidze.

5 June

In the morning Zh. Medvedev’s brother and a group of friends left for Kaluga. Livshits arrived at the hospital only at five o’clock in the afternoon and announced to [Medvedev’s] wife that Zhores would not yet be discharged from the hospital and that he had received an instruction from the minister that Zhores was mentally ill and that he was to be kept in hospital “for a few more days”. No exact diagnosis or decision of the previous day’s commission was communicated.

6 June

Academician Sakharov addressed an open letter to Brezhnev. “The action taken with regard to Zh. Medvedev,” Sakharov writes, “is arousing deep indignation and anxiety in the Soviet and international scientific communities; it is seen not only as lawlessness towards Medvedev personally, but also as a potential threat to intellectual freedom and to Soviet democracy in general.

“Psychiatric hospitals must not be used as a means of repression against inconvenient persons …”

Zh. Medvedev continued to be held in the psychiatric hospital.

Various authorities received a further series of collective and personal protests against the forcible confinement in a psychiatric hospital of a mentally healthy person and prominent scholar.

12 June

The USSR Minister of Health Petrovsky received the president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Keldysh, and Academicians Kapitsa, Astaurov and Sakharov, who had sent him letters and telegrams of protest. During the conversation it was stated that Zh. Medvedev was ill and that the doctors were carrying out a humanitarian mission with respect to him. Nonetheless it became clear that Zh. Medvedev would soon be released.

13 June

Livshits, head doctor of the Kaluga psychiatric hospital, said that Zh. Medvedev would be released on Wednesday, 17 June.

15 June

A letter from the writer A. Solzhenitsyn.

“This is how we live: without any arrest warrant or any medical justification four policemen and two doctors come to a healthy man’s house. The doctors declare that he is crazy, the police Major shouts: ‘We are an ORGAN OF COERCION! Get up!’, they twist his arms and drive him off to the madhouse.

“This can happen tomorrow to anyone of us. It has just happened to Zhores Medvedev, a geneticist and publicist, a man of subtle, precise and brilliant intellect and of warm heart (I know personally of his disinterested help to unknown, ill and dying people). It is precisely for the DIVERSITY of his fertile gifts that he is charged with abnormality: ‘a split personality’! It is precisely his sensitivity to injustice, to stupidity, which is presented as a sick deviation: ‘poor adaptation to the social environment’! Once you think in other ways that is PRESCRIBED – that means you’re abnormal! As for well adapted people, they must all think alike. And there is no means of redress: even the appeals of our best scientists and writers bounce back like peas off a wall.

“If only this were the first case! But this devious suppression of people without searching for any guilt, when the real reason is too shameful to state, is becoming a fashion. Some of the victims are widely known, many more are unknown. Servile psychiatrists, breakers of their [Hippocratic] oath, define as ‘mental illness’: concern about social problems, and superfluous enthusiasm, and superfluous coldness, and excessively brilliant gifts, and the lack of them.

“Yet even simple common sense ought to have acted as a restraint. After all, Chaadayev [a thinker declared ‘officially mad’ by Emperor Nicholas I in 1837, ed /// in PBR Commentary?] did not even have a finger laid on him, but we have now been cursing his persecutors for over a century. It is time to think clearly: the incarceration of free-thinking healthy people in madhouses is SPIRITUAL MURDER, it is a variation on the GAS CHAMBER, but is even more cruel: the torture of the people being killed is more malicious and more prolonged. Like the gas chambers these crimes will NEVER be forgotten, and all those involved in them will be condemned for all time, during their life and after their death.

“In lawlessness, in the committing of crimes, the point must be remembered at which a man becomes a cannibal!

“It is short-sighted to think that one can live by constantly relying on force alone, constantly ignoring the objections of conscience.”

17 June

Zhores Alexandrovich Medvedev was released from the psychiatric hospital.

What, after all, served as the grounds for Zh. Medvedev’s forcible hospitalisation? According to the admission of A. E. Livshits, head doctor of the Kaluga psychiatric hospital: fragments of Zh. Medvedev’s manuscripts, with which he, Livshits, had acquainted himself and which “caused him to doubt Zh. Medvedev’s mental health.” (As later became clear, he had two works in mind – “The cult of personality and biological science” and “International academic cooperation and national frontiers”).

Besides this Bondarenko, the doctor who treated Zh. Medvedev, announced to Roy Medvedev that his brother had been examined unbeknown to him by the psychiatrist Liznenko, who had been present at a conversation between Zh. Medvedev and Antonenko, chairman of the Obninsk city soviet. The conversation had been about placing Zh. Medvedev in employment. There had been present a person unknown to Zh. Medvedev, who described himself as a representative of the Kaluga City Education Department and who put two questions to Zhores about the conduct of his son. This was enough for Liznenko, when he arrived in Kaluga, to write a medical conclusion about Zh. Medvedev’s “illness”, and the order was issued for his forcible hospitalisation.

After Zh. Medvedev’s release from hospital, reactions to the events in Kaluga continued. In an Open Letter of 20 June stress is laid on the principal threat – not the potential, but the very immediate possibility of medical reprisals directed personally against absolutely anybody, regardless of his scientific or social merits. “If Zh. Medvedev were not a scholar whose achievements are recognised by biologists the world over, if he were not an outstanding public figure, what has happened to him would be no less tragic.” The letter points out the need for the public actively to intervene whenever arbitrary power is manifested. There are 31 signatures.

Source: Chronicle of Current Events, translated from the Russian into English.

Nuremburg Testimony on Katyn

Stenogram of the hearings of 1-2 July 1946, at which testimony concerning the Katyn massacre was heard

 

THE PRESIDENT: I have an announcement to make.

The Tribunal orders that any of the evidence taken on commission which the Defense Counsel or the Prosecution wish to use shall be offered in evidence by them. This evidence will then become a part of the record, subject to any objections.

Counsel for the organizations should begin to make up their document books as soon as possible and put in their requests for translations.

That is all.

Dr. Stahmer.

DR. STAHMER: With reference to the events at Katyn, the Indictment contains only the remark: “In 9/1941 11000 Polish officers, prisoners of war, were killed in the Katyn woods near Smolensk.” The Russian Prosecution only submitted the details at the session of 2/14/1946. Document USSR-54 was then submitted to the Tribunal. This document is an official report by the Extraordinary State Commission, which was officially authorized to investigate the Katyn case. This commission, after questioning the witnesses . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, the Tribunal are aware of the document and they only want you to call your evidence; that is all.

DR. STAHMER: I wanted only to add, Mr. President, that according to this document, there are two accusations: One, that the period of the shooting of the Polish prisoners of war was the autumn of 1941; and the second assertion is, that the killing was carried out by some German military authority, camouflaged under the name of “Staff of Engineer Battalion 537.”

THE PRESIDENT: That is all in the document, is it not? I have just told you we know the document. We only want you to call your evidence.

DR. STAHMER: Then, as my first witness for the Defense, I shall call Colonel Friedrich Ahrens to the witness stand.

DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I have a request to make before the evidence is heard in the Katyn case. The Tribunal decided that three witnesses should be heard, and it hinted that in the interests of equality, the Prosecution could also produce only three witnesses, either by means of direct examination or by means of an affidavit. In the interests of that same principle of equality, I should be grateful if the Soviet Delegation, in the same way as the Defense, would state the names of their witnesses before the hearing of the evidence. The Defense submitted the names of their witnesses weeks ago. Unfortunately, up to now, I note that in the interests of equality and with regard to the treatment of the Defense and the Prosecution, the Soviet Delegation has so far not given the names of the witnesses.

THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, were you going to give me the names of the witnesses?

GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, Mr. President. Today we notified the General Secretary of the Tribunal that the Soviet Prosecution intends to call three witnesses to the stand: Professor Prosorovsky, who is the Chief of the Medico-Legal Experts Commission; the Bulgarian subject, Professor of Legal Medicine at Sofia University Markov, who at the same time was a member of the so-called International Commission created by the Germans; and Professor Bazilevsky, who was the deputy mayor of Smolensk during the time of the German occupation.

[The witness Ahrens took the stand.]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?

FRIEDRICH AHRENS (Witness): Friedrich Ahrens.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God the Almighty and Omniscient that I will speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.

[The witness repeated the oath.]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

DR. STAHMER: Witness, did you, as a professional officer in the German Armed Forces, participate in the second World War?

AHRENS: Yes, of course; as a professional officer I participated in the second World War.

DR. STAHMER: What rank did you hold finally?

AHRENS: At the end as colonel.

DR. STAHMER: Were you stationed in the eastern theater of war?

AHRENS: Yes.

DR. STAHMER: In what capacity?

AHRENS: I was the commanding officer of a signal regiment of an army group.

DR. STAHMER: What were the tasks of your regiment?

AHRENS: The signal regiment of an army group had the task of setting up and maintaining communications between the army group and the neighboring units and subordinate units, as well as preparing the necessary lines of communication for new operations.

DR. STAHMER: Did your regiment have any special tasks apart from that?

AHRENS: No, with the exception of the duty of defending themselves, of taking all measures to hinder a sudden attack and of holding themselves in readiness to defend themselves with the forces at their disposal, so as to prevent the capture of the regimental battle headquarters.

This was particularly important for an army group signal regiment and its battle headquarters because we had to keep a lot of highly secret material in our staff.

DR. STAHMER: Your regiment was the Signal Regiment 537. Was there also an Engineer Battalion 537, the same number?

AHRENS: During the time when I was in the Army Group Center I heard of no unit with the same number, nor do I believe that there was such a unit.

DR. STAHMER: And to whom were you subordinated?

AHRENS: I was directly subordinated to the staff of the Army Group Center, and that was the case during the entire period when I was with the army group. My superior was General Oberhauser.

With regard to defense, the signal staff of the regiment with its first battalion, which was in close touch with the regimental staff, was at times subordinated to the commander of Smolensk; all orders which I received from that last-named command came via General Oberhauser, who either approved or refused to allow the regiment to be employed for a particular purpose.

In other words, I received my orders exclusively from General Oberhauser.

DR. STAHMER: Where was your staff accommodated?

AHRENS: I prepared a sketch of the position of the staff headquarters west of Smolensk.

DR. STAHMER: I am having the sketch shown to you. Please tell us whether that is your sketch.

AHRENS: That sketch was drawn by me from memory.

DR. STAHMER: I am now going to have a second sketch shown to you. Will you please have a look at that one also, and will you tell me whether it presents a correct picture of the situation?

AHRENS: May I briefly explain this sketch to you? At the right-hand margin, that large red spot is the town of Smolensk. West of Smolensk, and on either side of the road to Vitebsk, the staff of the army group was situated together with the Air Force corps, that is south of Krasnibor. On my sketch I have marked the actual area occupied by the Army Group Center.

That part of my sketch which has a dark line around it was very densely occupied by troops who came directly under the army group; there was hardly a house empty in that area.

The regimental staff of my regiment was in the so-called little Katyn wood. That is the white spot which is indicated on the sketch; it measures about 1 square kilometer of the large forest and is a part of the entire forest around Katyn. On the southern edge of this small wood there lay the so-called Dnieper Castle, which was the regimental staff headquarters.

Two and a half kilometers to the east of the staff headquarters of the regiment there was the first company of the regiment. which was the operating company, which did teleprinting and telephone work for the army group. About 3 kilometers west of the regimental staff headquarters there was the wireless company. There were no buildings within the radius of about 1 kilometer of the regimental staff headquarters.

This house was a large two-story building with about 14 to 15 rooms, several bath installations, a cinema, a rifle range, garages, Sauna (steam baths) and so on, and was most suitable for accommodating the regimental staff. Our regiment permanently retained this battle headquarters.

DR. STAHMER: Were there also any other high-ranking staff headquarters nearby?

AHRENS: As higher staff headquarters there was the army group, which I have already mentioned, then a corps staff from the Air Force, and several battalion staffs. Then there was the delegate of the railway for the army group, who was at Gnesdovo in a special train.

DR. STAHMER: It has been stated in this Trial that certain events which have taken place in your neighborhood had been most secret and most suspicious. Will you please, therefore, answer the following questions with particular care?

How many Germans were there in the staff personnel, and what positions did they fill?

AHRENS: I had 3 officers on my staff to begin with, and then 2, and approximately 18 to 20 non-commissioned officers and men; that is to say, as few as I could have in my regimental staff, and every man in the staff was fully occupied.

DR. STAHMER: Did you have Russian personnel in your staff?

AHRENS: Yes, we had four auxiliary volunteers and some female personnel living in the immediate vicinity of the regimental staff quarters. The auxiliary volunteers remained permanently with the regimental staff, whereas the female personnel changed from time to time. Some of these women also came from Smolensk and they lived in a separate building near the regimental staff.

DR.STAHMER: Did this Russian personnel receive special instructions from you about their conduct?

AHRENS: I issued general instructions on conduct for the regimental headquarters, which did not solely apply to the Russian personnel.

I have already mentioned the importance of secrecy with reference to this regimental headquarters, which not only kept the records of the position of the army group, but also that of its neighboring units, and on which the intentions of the army group were clearly recognizable. Therefore, it was my duty to keep this material particularly secret. Consequently, I had the rooms containing this material barred to ordinary access. Only those persons were admitted generally officers who had been passed by me, but also a few noncommissioned officers and other ranks who were put under special oath.

DR. STAHMER: To which rooms did this “no admission” order refer?

AHRENS: In the first place, it referred to the telephone expert’s room, it also referred to my own room and partly, although to a smaller degree, to the adjutant’s room. All remaining rooms in the house and on the site were not off limits.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, how is this evidence about the actual conditions in these staff headquarters relevant to this question?

DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, in the Russian document the allegation is contained that events of a particularly secret nature had taken place in this staff building and that a ban of silence had been imposed on the Russian personnel by Colonel Ahrens, that the rooms had been locked, and that one was only permitted to enter the rooms when accompanied by guards. I have put the questions in this connection in order to clear up the case and to prove that these events have a perfectly natural explanation on account of the tasks entrusted to the regiment and which necessitated quite obviously, a certain amount of secrecy.

For that reason, I have put these questions. May I be permitted…

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

DR. STAHMER: I have almost finished with these questions.

[Turning to the witness.] Was the Katyn wood cordoned of, and especially strictly guarded by soldiers?

Mr. President, may I remark with reference to this question that here also it had been alleged that this cordon had only been introduced by the regiment. Previously, there had been free access to the woods, and from this conclusions are drawn which are detrimental to the regiment.

AHRENS: In order to secure anti aircraft cover for the regimental staff headquarters, I stopped any timber from being cut for fuel in the immediate vicinity of the regimental staff headquarters. During this winter the situation was such that the units cut wood wherever they could get it.

On 22 January, there was a fairly heavy air attack on my position during which half a house was torn away. It was quite impossible to find any other accommodation because of the over… crowding of the area, and I therefore took additional precautions to make sure that this already fairly thin wood would be preserved r so as to serve as cover. Since, on the other hand, I am against the !;. putting up of prohibition signs, I asked the other troop units by way of verses to leave us our trees as anti aircraft cover. The wood was not closed off at all, particularly as the road had to be kept open for heavy traffic, and I only sent sentries now and then into the wood to see whether our trees were left intact.

DR. STAHMER: The Prosecution . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, at a time that is convenient to you, you will, of course, draw our attention to the necessary dates, the date at which this unit took over its headquarters and the date at which it left.

DR. STAHMER: Very well.

[Turning to the witness.] When did your unit, your regiment, move into this Dnieper Castle?

AHRENS: As far as I know, this house was taken over immediately after the combat troops had left that area in 8/1941, and it was confiscated together with the other army group accommodations and was occupied by advance parties. It was then permanently occupied by the regimental headquarters as long as I was there up to 8/1943.

DR. STAHMER: So, if I understand you correctly, it was first of all in 8/1941 that an advance party took it over?

AHRENS: Yes, as far as I know.

DR. STAHMER: When did the staff actually arrive?

AHRENS: A few weeks later.

DR. STAHMER: Who was the regimental commander at that time?

AHRENS: My predecessor was Colonel Bedenck.

DR. STAHMER: When did you take over the regiment?

AHRENS: I joined the army group during the second half of 11/1941, and after getting thoroughly acquainted with all details I took over the command of the regiment, at the end of November, if I remember rightly, on 30 November.

DR. STAHMER: Was there a proper handing over from Bedeck to you?

AHRENS: A very careful, detailed, and lengthy transfer took place, on account of the very considerable tasks entrusted to this regiment. Added to that, my superior, General Oberhauser, was an extraordinarily painstaking superior, and he took great pains to convince himself personally whether, by the transfer negotiations and the instructions which I had received, I was fully capable of taking over the responsibilities of the regiment.

DR. STAHMER: The Prosecution further alleges and claims that it was suspicious that shots were often fired in the forest. Is that true, and to what would you attribute that?

AHRENS: I have already mentioned that it was one of the main tasks of the regiment to take all the necessary measures to defend themselves against sudden attack. Considering the small number of men which I had in my regimental staff, I had to organize and take the necessary steps to enable me to obtain replacements in the shortest time possible. This was arranged through wireless communication with the regimental headquarters. I ordered that defensive maneuvers should be carried out and that defense works should be prepared around the regimental headquarters sector and that there should be maneuvers and exercises in these works together with the members of the regimental headquarters. I personally participated in these maneuvers at times and, of course, shots were fired, particularly since we were preparing ourselves for night fighting.

DR. STAHMER: There is supposed to have been a very lively and rather suspicious traffic to and around your staff building. Will you please tell us quite briefly what this traffic signified?

AHRENS: There was an extraordinary lively traffic around staff headquarters which still increased in the spring of 1941 as I was having the house rebuilt. I think I mentioned that it had been destroyed through air attacks. But, of course, the traffic increased also through the maneuvers which were held nearby. The battalions in the front area operating at 300 and 400 kilometers distance had to, and could perform their job only by maintaining personal contact with the regiment and its staff headquarters.

DR. STAHMER: There is supposed to have been considerable truck traffic which has been described as suspicious.

AHRENS: Besides our supplies, which were relatively small, the Kommandos, as I have just mentioned, were brought in by trucks; but so was, of course, all the building material which I required. Apart from that, the traffic was not unusually heavy.

DR. STAHMER: Do you know that about 25 kilometers west of Smolensk there were three Russian prisoner-of-war camps, which had originally been inhabited by Poles and which had been abandoned by the Russians when the German troops approached in 7/1941?

AHRENS: At that time I had not yet arrived. But never during the entire period I served in Russia did I see a single Pole; nor did I hear of Poles.

DR. STAHMER: It has been alleged that an order had been issued from Berlin according to which Polish prisoners of war were to be shot. Did you know of such an order?

AHRENS: No. I have never heard of such an order.

DR. STAHMER: Did you possibly receive such an order from any other office?

AHRENS: I told you already that I never heard of such an order and I therefore did not receive it, either.

DR. STAHMER: Were any Poles shot on your instructions, your direct instructions?

AHRENS: No Poles were shot on my instructions. Nobody at all was ever shot upon my order. I have never given such an order in all my life.

DR. STAHMER: Well, you did not arrive until 11/1941. Have you heard anything about your predecessor, Colonel Bedenck, having given any similar orders?

AHRENS: I have not heard anything about it. With my regimental staff, with whom I lived closely together for 21 months, I had such close connections, I knew my people so well, and they also knew me, that I am perfectly convinced that this deed was not perpetrated by my predecessor nor by any member of my former regiment. I would undoubtedly have heard rumors of it at the very least.

THE PRESIDENT: This is argument, you know, Dr. Stahmer. This is not evidence; it is argument. He is telling you what he thinks might have been the case.

DR. STAHMER: I asked whether he had heard of it from members of his regiment.

THE PRESIDENT: The answer to that would be “no,” I suppose, that he had not heard not that he was convinced that he had not done it.

DR. STAHMER: Very well.

[Turning to the witness.] After your arrival at Katyn, did you notice that there was a grave mound in the woods at Katyn?

AHRENS: Shortly after I arrived the ground was covered by snow one of my soldiers pointed out to me that at a certain spot there was some sort of a mound, which one could hardly describe as such, on which there was a birch cross. I have seen that birch cross. In the course of 1942 my soldiers kept telling me that here in our woods shootings were supposed to have taken place, but at first I did not pay any attention to it. However, in the summer of 1942 this topic was referred to in an order of the army group later commanded by General Von Harsdorff. He told me that he had also heard about it.

DR. STAHMER: Did these stories prove true later on?

AHRENS: Yes, they did turn out to be true and I was able to confirm, quite by accident, that there was actually a grave here. During the winter of 1943I think either January or February quite accidentally I saw a wolf in this wood and at first I did not believe that it was a wolf; when I followed the tracks with an expert, we saw that there were traces of scratchings on the mound with the cross. I had investigations made as to what kind of bones these were. The doctors told me “human bones.” Thereupon I informed the officer responsible for war graves in the area of this fact, because I believed that it was a soldier’s grave, as there were a number of such graves in our immediate vicinity.

DR. STAHMER: Then, how did the exhumation take place?

AHRENS: I do not know about all the details. Professor Dr. Butz arrived one day on orders from the army group, and informed me that following the rumors in my little wood, he had to make exhumations, and that he had to inform me that these exhumations would take place in my wood.

DR. STAHMER: Did Professor Butz later give you details of the result of his exhumations?

AHRENS: Yes, he did occasionally give me details and I remember that he told me that he had conclusive evidence regarding the date of the shootings. Among other things, he showed me letters, of which I cannot remember much now; but I do remember some sort of a diary which he passed over to me in which there were dates followed by some notes which I could not read because they were written in Polish. In this connection he explained to me that these notes had been made by a Polish officer regarding events of the past months, and that at the end the diary ended with the spring of 1940the fear was expressed in these notes that something horrible was going to happen. I am giving only a broad outline of the meaning.

DR. STAHMER: Did he give you any further indication regarding the period he assumed the shooting had taken place?

AHRENS: Professor Butz, on the basis of the proofs which he had found, was convinced that the shootings had taken place in the spring of 1940 and I often heard him express these convictions in my presence, and also later on, when commissions visited the grave and I had to place my house at the disposal of these commissions to accommodate them. I personally did not have anything to do whatsoever with the exhumations or with the commissions. All I had to do was to place the house at their disposal and act as host.

DR. STAHMER: It was alleged that in 3/1943 lorries had transported bodies to Katyn from outside and these bodies were buried in the little wood. Do you know anything about that?

AHRENS: No, I know nothing about that.

DR. STAHMER: Would you have had to take notice of it?

AHRENS: I would have had to take notice of it at least my officers would have reported it to me, because my officers were constantly at the regimental battle headquarters, whereas I, as a regimental commander, was of course, frequently on the way. The officer who in those days was there constantly was First Lieutenant Hodt, whose address I got to know last night from a letter.

DR. STAHMER: Were Russian prisoners of war used for these exhumations?

AHRENS: As far as I remember, yes.

DR. STAHMER: Can you tell us the number?

AHRENS: I cannot say exactly as I did not concern myself any further with these exhumations on account of the dreadful and revolting stench around our house, but I should estimate the number as being about 40 to 50 men.

DR. STAHMER: It has been alleged that they were shot afterward; have you any knowledge of that?

AHRENS: I have no knowledge of that and I also never heard of it.

DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions, Mr. President.

FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBUHLER (Counsel for Defendant Donitz): Colonel, did you yourself ever discuss the events of 1940 with any of the local inhabitants?

AHRENS: Yes. At the beginning of 1943 a Russian married couple were living near my regimental headquarters; they lived 800 meters away and they were beekeepers. I, too, kept bees, and I came into close contact with this married couple. When the exhumations had been completed, approximately in 5/1943, I told them that, after all, they ought to know when these shootings had taken place, since they were living in close proximity to the graves. Thereupon, these people told me it had occurred in the spring of 1940, and that at the Gnesdovo station more than 200 Poles in uniform had arrived in railway trucks of 50 tons each and were then taken to the woods in lorries. They had heard lots of shots and screams, too.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Was the wood off limits to the local inhabitants at the time?

AHRENS: We have…

THE PRESIDENT: That is a leading question. I do not think you should ask leading questions.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Do you know whether the local inhabitants could enter the woods at the time?

AHRENS: There was a fence around the wood and according to the statements of the local inhabitants, civilians could not enter it during the time the Russians were there. The remains of the fence were still visible when I was there, and this fence is indicated on my sketch and is marked with a black line.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: When you moved into Dnieper Castle did you make inquiries as to who the former owners were?

AHRENS: Yes, I did make inquiries because I was interested. The house was built in a rather peculiar way. It had a cinema installation and its own rifle range and of course that interested me; but I failed to ascertain anything definite during the whole time I was there.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Apart from mass graves in the neighborhood of the castle, were there any other graves found?

AHRENS: I have indicated by a few dots on my sketch, that in the vicinity of the castle there were found a number of other small graves which contained decayed bodies; that is to say, skeletons which had disintegrated. These graves contained perhaps six, eight, or a few more male and female skeletons. Even I, a layman, could recognize that very clearly, because most of them had rubber shoes on which were in good condition, and there were also remains of handbags.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: How long had these skeletons been in the ground?

AHRENS: That I cannot tell you. I know only that they were decayed and had disintegrated. The bones were preserved, but the skeleton structure was no longer intact.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Thank you, that is all.

DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces): Mr. President . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, you know the Tribunal’s ruling.

DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you have no right to ask any questions of the witness here.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr.President, I just wanted to ask you, in this unusual case, to allow me to put questions…

THE PRESIDENT: I said to you that you know the Tribunal’s ruling and the Tribunal will not hear you. We have already ruled upon this once or twice in consequence of your objections and the Tribunal will not hear you.

DR.LATERNSER: Mr.President, the Katyn case is one of the most serious accusations raised against the group.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is perfectly well aware of the nature of the allegations about Katyn and the Tribunal does not propose to make any exceptional rule in that case and it therefore will not hear you and you will kindly sit down.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I wish to state that on account of this ruling I feel myself unduly handicapped in my defense.

THE PRESIDENT: As Dr. Laternser knows perfectly well, he is entitled to apply to the Commission to call any witness who is called here, if his evidence bears upon the case of the particular organizations for which Dr. Laternser appears. I do not want to hear anything further.

DR.LATERNSER: Mr. President, the channel you point out to me is of no practical importance. I cannot have every witness who appears here called by the Commission.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, you are appearing for the Defendant Donitz, or is it Raeder?

DR. SIEMERS: Defendant Raeder.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, unless the questions you are going to ask particularly refer to the case of the Defendant Raeder, the Tribunal is not prepared to hear any further examination. The matter has been generally covered by Dr. Stahmer and also by Dr. Kranzbuhler. Therefore, unless the questions which you want to ask have some particular reference to the case of Raeder, the Tribunal will not hear you.

DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I had merely assumed that there were two reasons on the strength of which I could put a few questions: First, because the Tribunal itself has stated that within-the framework of the conspiracy all defendants had been participants; and second, that according to the statements by the Prosecution Grossadmiral Raeder, too, is considered a member of the alleged criminal organizations, the General Staff and the OKW. It was for that reason I wanted to ask one or two supplementary questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, if there were any allegations that in any way bore on the case against Defendant Raeder, the Tribunal would of course allow you to ask questions, but there is no allegation which in any way connects the Defendant Raeder with the allegations about the Katyn woods.

DR. SIEMERS: I am grateful to the Tribunal for that statement, Mr. President.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, may r be allowed to ask something else? May I have the question put to the Prosecution, who is to be made responsible for the Katyn case?

THE PRESIDENT: I do not propose to answer questions of that sort.

The Prosecution may now cross-examine if they want to.

CHIEF COUNSELLOR OF JUSTICE L. N. SMIRNOV (Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): Please tell me, Witness, since when, exactly, have you been in the Smolensk district territory?

AHRENS: I have already answered that question: since the second half of 11/1941.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please answer me further, where were you prior to the second part of 1941? Did you in any way have anything to do with Katyn or Smolensk or this district in general? Were you there personally in September and 10/1941?

AHRENS: No, I was not there.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That is to say that you were -not there, either in September or in 10/1941, and therefore do not know what happened at that time in the Katyn forest?

AHRENS: I was not there at that time, but I mentioned earlier on that…

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, I am actually only interested in a short question. Were you there personally or not? Were you able to see for yourself what was happening there or not?

THE PRESIDENT: He says he was not there.

AHRENS: No, I was not there.

THE PRESIDENT: He said he was not there in September or 10/1941.

MR.COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Thank you, Mr. President.

Turning to the witness. Maybe you recall the family names of the Russian women workers who were employed at the country house in the woods?

AHRENS: Those female workers were not working in different houses. They merely worked as auxiliary kitchen personnel in our Dnieper Castle. I have not known their names at all.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That means that the Russian women workers were employed only in the villa situated in Katyn forest where the staff headquarters were located?

AHRENS: I believe that question was not translated well. I did not understand it.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I asked you whether the Russian women workers were employed exclusively in the villa in Kosig Gory where the staff headquarters were located? Is that right?

AHRENS: The women workers worked for the regimental headquarters as kitchen help, and as kitchen helpers they worked on our premises; and by our premises I mean this particular house with the adjoining houses for instance, the stables, the garage, the cellars, the boiler room.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I will mention a few names of German military employees. Will you please tell me whether they belonged to your unit? First Lieutenant Rex?

AHRENS: First Lieutenant Rex was my regimental adjutant.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please tell me, was he already assigned to that unit before your arrival at Katyn?

AHRENS: Yes, he was there before I came.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: He was your adjutant, was he not?

AHRENS: Yes, he was my adjutant.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Lieutenant Hodt? Hodt or Hotht

AHRENS: Lieutenant Hodt is right; but what question are you putting about Lieutenant Hodt?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am only questioning you about whether he belonged to your unit or not.

AHRENS: Lieutenant Hodt was a member of the regiment. Whether . . .

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, that is what I was asking. He belonged to the regiment which you commanded, to your army unit?

AHRENS: I did not say by that that he was a member of the regimental staff, but that he belonged to the regiment. The regiment consisted of three units.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: But he lived in the same villa, did he not?

AHRENS: That I do not know. When I arrived he was not there. I ordered him to report to me there for the first time.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I will enumerate a few other names. Corporal Rose, Private Giesecken, Oberfeldwebel Krimmenski, Feldwebel Lummert, a cook named Gustav. Were these members of the Armed Forces who were billeted in the villa?

AHRENS: May I ask you to mention the names individually once again, and I will answer you individually.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Feldwebel Lummert?

AHRENS: Yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Corporal Rose?

AHRENS: Yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And I believe, if my memory serves me correctly, Storekeeper Giesecke.

AHRENS: That man’s name was Giesecken.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, that is right. I did not pronounce this name quite correctly. These were all your people or at least they belonged to your unit, did they not?

AHRENS: Yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And you assert that you did not know what these people were doing in September and 10/1941?

AHRENS: As I was not there, I cannot tell you for certain.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.

[A recess was taken.]

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: May I continue? Mr. President, since the witness has stated that he cannot give any testimony concerning the period of September to 10/1941, I will limit myself to very short questions.

[Turning to the witness.] Witness, would you please point out the location of the villa and the forest with respect to the Smolensk-Vitebsk highway? Did the estate cover a large area?

AHRENS: My sketch is on a scale of 1 to 100000 and is drawn from memory. I estimate, therefore, that the graves were situated 200 to 300 meters directly west of the road to our Dnieper Castle, and 200 to 300 meters south of the Smolensk-Vitebsk road so that the Dnieper Castle lay a further 600 meters away.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat that?

AHRENS: South of the Smolensk-Vitebsk highway, approximately 15 kilometers west of Smolensk. According to the scale 1 to 100000, as far as one is able to draw such a sketch accurately from memory, the site of these graves was 200 to 300 meters to the south, and a further 600 meters to the south, directly on the northern bend of the Dnieper, was situated our regimental staff quarters, the Dnieper Castle.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Consequently, the villa was approximately 600 meters away from the Smolensk-Vitebsk highway?

AHRENS: No, that is not correct. What I said…

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please give a more or less exact figure. What was the distance between the highway and the villa, please?

AHRENS: I just mentioned it in my testimony, that is to say, the graves were about 200 to 300 meters away, and there were a further 600 meters to the castle, therefore, in all about 900 to 1000 meters. It might have been 800 meters, but that is the approximate distance as can also be seen by this sketch.

THE PRESIDENT: I am not following this. Your question, Colonel Smirnov, was: How far was it from the road to what you called the country house? Was it not?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, Mr. President, I asked how far was the villa from the Smolensk-Vitebsk highway.

THE PRESIDENT: What do you mean by the “Villa”?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The headquarters of the unit commanded by the witness in 1941 was quartered in a villa, and this villa was situated not far from the Dnieper River, at a distance of about 900 meters from the highroad. The graves were nearer to the highway. I would like to know how far away were the headquarters from the highway, and how far away from the highway were the graves in Katyn forest.

THE PRESIDENT: What you want to know is: How far was the house in which the headquarters was situated from the highway? Is that right?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, that is exactly what wanted to know, Mr. President.

AHRENS: You put two questions to me: first of all, how far were the graves from the highway; and secondly, how far was the house from the highway. I will repeat the answer once more, the house was 800 to 1000 meters south of the Smolensk-Vitebsk highway.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: One minute, please. I asked you primarily only about the house. Your answer concerning the graves was given on your own initiative. Now I will ask you about the. graves, how far were these mass graves from the Smolensk-Vitebsk highway?

AHRENS: From 200 to 300 meters. It might also have been 350 meters.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Consequently, the graves were 200 or 300 meters from the main road which connected two important centers? Is that right?

AHRENS: Yes, indeed. They were at a distance of 200 to 300 meters south of this, and I may say that at my time this was the most frequented road I ever saw in Russia.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That was just what I was asking you. Now, please tell me: Was the Katyn wood a real forest, or was it, rather, a park or a grove?

AHRENS: Up to now I have only spoken about the wood of Katyn. This wood of Katyn is the fenced-in wooded area of about 1 square kilometer, which I drew in my sketch. This wood is of mixed growth, of older and younger trees. There were many birch trees in this little wood. However, there were clearings in this wood, and I should say that from 30 to 40% was cleared. One could see this from the stumps of newly felled trees.

Under no circumstances could you describe this wood as a park at any rate one could not come to such a conclusion. Fighting had taken place in this wood, as one could still see trenches and fox holes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, but anyway, you would not call Katyn wood a real forest since it was relatively a small grove in the immediate vicinity of the Smolensk-Vitebsk highway. Is that right?

AHRENS: No, that is not right. It was a forest. The entire Katyn forest was a regular forest which began near our grove and extended far beyond that. Of this Katyn forest, which was a mixed forest, part of it had been fenced in, and this part, extending over 1 square kilometer, was what we called the little Katyn wood, but it did belong to this entire wooded region south of the highway. The forest began with our little wood and extended to the west.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am not interested in the general characteristics of the wood. I would like you to answer the following short question: Were the mass graves located in this grove?

AHRENS: The mass graves were situated directly west of our entrance drive in a clearing in the wood, where there was a growth of young trees.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, but this clearing, this growth of young trees, was located inside this small grove, near the Smolensk-Vitebsk highway, is that correct?

AHRENS: It was 200 to 300 meters south of the Smolensk-Vitebsk highway, and directly west of the entrance drive leading from this road to the Dnieper Castle. I have marked this spot on my sketch with, a fairly large white dot.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: One more question. As far as you know did the Smolensk-Vitebsk highway exist before the German occupation of Smolensk, or was it constructed only after the occupation?

AHRENS: When I arrived in Russia at the end of 11/1941, everything was covered with snow. Later I got the impression that this was an old road, whereas the road Minsk-Moscow was t newer. That was my impression.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I understand. Now tell me, under what circumstances, or rather, when did you first discover the cross in the grove?

AHRENS: I cannot tell the exact date. My soldiers told me about it, and on one occasion when I was going past there, about the beginning of 1/1942it could also have been at the end of 12/1941I saw this cross rising above the snow.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: This means you saw it already in 1941 or at the latest the beginning of 1942?

AHRENS: That is what I have just testified.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, certainly. Now, please be more specific concerning the date when a wolf brought you to this cross. Was it in winter or summer and what year?

AHRENS: It was the beginning of 1943.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In 1943? And around the cross you saw bones, did you not?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No?

AHRENS: No, at first I did not see them. In order to find out whether I had not been mistaken about seeing a wolf, for it seemed rather impossible that a wolf should be so near to Smolensk, I examined the tracks together with a gamekeeper and found traces of scratching on the ground. However, the ground was frozen hard, there was snow on the ground and I did not see anything further there. Only later on, after it had been thawing my men found various bones. However, this was months later and then, at a suitable opportunity I showed these bones to a doctor and he said that these were human bones. Thereupon I said, “Then most likely it is a grave, left as a result of the fighting which has taken place here,” and that the war graves registration officer would have to take care of the graves in the same way in which we were taking care of other graves of fallen soldiers. That was the reason why I spoke to this gentleman but only after the snow had melted.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: By the way, did you personally see the Katyn graves?

AHRENS: Open or before they were opened?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Open, yes.

AHRENS: When they were open I had constantly to drive past these graves, as generally they were approximately 30 meters away from the entrance drive. Therefore, I could hardly go past without taking any notice of them.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am interested in the following: Do you remember what the depth of the layer of earth was, which covered the mass of human bodies in these graves?

AHRENS: That I do not know. I have already said that I was so nauseated by the stench which we had to put up with for several weeks, that when I drove past I closed the windows of my car and rushed through as fast as I could.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: However, even if you only casually glanced at those graves, perhaps you noticed whether the layer of earth covering the corpses was deep or shallow? Was it several centimeters or several meters deep? Maybe Professor Butz told you something about it?

AHRENS: As commander of a signal regiment I was concerned with a region which was almost half as large as Greater Germany and I was on the road a great deal. My work was not entirely carried out at the regimental battle headquarters. Therefore, in general, from Monday or Tuesday until Saturday I was with my units. For that reason, when I drove through, I did cast an occasional glance at these graves; but I was not especially interested in the details and I did not speak to Professor Butz about such details. For this reason I have only a faint recollection of this matter.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: According to the material submitted to the High Tribunal by the Soviet Prosecution, it has been established that the bodies were buried at a depth of 1/2 to 2 meters. I wonder where you met a wolf who could scratch the ground up to a depth of 2 meters.

AHRENS: I did not meet this wolf, but I saw it.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Tell me please, why you started the exhumation on these mass graves in 3/1943 only, after having discovered the cross and learned about the mass graves already in 1941?

AHRENS: That was not my concern, but a matter for the army group. I have already told you that in the course of 1942 the stories became more substantial. I frequently heard about them and spoke about it to Colonel Von Gersdorff, Chief of Intelligence, Army Group Center, who intimated to me that he knew all about this matter and with that my obligation ended. I had reported what I had seen and heard. Apart from that, all this matter did not concern me and I did not concern myself with it. I had enough worries of my own.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And now the last question. Please tell me who were these two persons with whom you had this conversation, and maybe you can recollect the names of the couple who told you about the shootings in the Katyn woods?

AHRENS: This couple lived in a small house about 800 to 1000 meters north of the entrance to our drive leading to the Vitebsk road. I do not recall their names.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: So you do not remember the names of this couple?

AHRENS: No, I do not recall the names.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: So you heard about the Katyn events from a couple whose names you do not remember, and you did not hear anything about it from other local inhabitants?

AHRENS: Please repeat the question for me.

MR COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Consequently, you heard about these Katyn events only from this couple, whose names you do not remember? From none of the other local inhabitants did you hear anything about the events in Katyn?

AHRENS: I personally heard the facts only from this couple, whereas my soldiers told me the stories current among the other inhabitants.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Do you know that during the investigation of the Katyn affair, or rather of the Katyn provocation, posters were placarded by the German Police in the streets of Smolensk, promising a reward to anyone giving any information in connection with the Katyn event? It was signed by Lieutenant Voss.

AHRENS: I personally did not see that poster. Lieutenant Voss is known to me by name only.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And the very last question. Do you know of the report of the Extraordinary State Commission concerning Katyn?

AHRENS: Do you mean the Russian White Paper when you mention this report?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, I mean the report of the Soviet Extraordinary State Commission, concerning Katyn, the Soviet report.

AHRENS: Yes, I read that report.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Therefore, you are acquainted with the fact that the Extraordinary State Commission names you as being one of the persons responsible for the crimes committed in Katyn?

AHRENS: It mentions a Lieutenant Colonel Arnes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I have no further questions Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, do you wish to re-examine?

DR. STAHMER: Witness, just a little while ago you said that you did not know when First Lieutenant Hodt joined your staff. Do you know when he joined the regiment?

AHRENS: I know that he belonged to the regiment during the Russian campaign and actually right from the beginning.

DR. STAHMER: That is, he belonged to the regiment from the beginning?

AHRENS: Yes. He belonged to this regiment ever since the beginning of the Russian campaign.

DR.STAHMER: Just one more question dealing with your discussion with Professor Butz. Did Professor Butz mention anything about the last dates on the letters which he found?

AHRENS: He told me about the spring of 1940. He also showed me this diary and I looked at it and I also saw the dates, but I do not recall in detail just which date or dates they were. But they ended with the spring of 1940.

DR. STAHMER: Therefore no documents were found of a later date?

AHRENS: Professor Butz told me that no documents or notes were found which might have given indications of a later date, and he expressed his conviction that these shootings must have taken place in the spring of 1940.

DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, I have no further questions to put to the witness.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen.Nikitchenko): Witness, can you not remember exactly when Professor Butz discussed with you the date at which, the corpses were buried in the mass graves?

AHRENS: May I ask to have the question repeated?

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): When did Professor Butz speak to you about the mass graves and assert that the burial of the corpses must have taken place in the spring of 1940?

AHRENS: I cannot tell you the date exactly, but it was in the spring of 1943, before these exhumations had started I beg your pardon he told me that he had been instructed to undertake the exhumation and during the exhumations he was with me from time to time; therefore it may have been in May or the end of April. In the middle of May he gave me details of his exhumations and told me among other things that which I have testified here. I cannot now tell you exactly on which days Professor Butz visited me.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): So far as I can remember, you stated that Professor Butz arrived in Katyn. When did he actually arrive there?

AHRENS: In the spring of 1940 Professor Butz came to me and told me that on instructions of the army group, he was to undertake exhumations in my woods. The exhumations were started, and in the course of…

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): You say 1940? Or perhaps the translation is wrong?

AHRENS: 1943, in the spring of 1943. A few weeks after the beginning of the exhumations. Professor Butz visited me, when I happened to be there, and informed me; or, rather, he discussed this matter with me, and he told me that to which I have testified here. It may have been the middle of 5/1943.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): According to your testimony I understood you to say in answer to a question put by the defense counsel, that Professor Butz asserted that the shootings had taken place in the spring of 1940 before the arrival of the commission for the exhumations. Is that correct?

AHRENS: May I repeat once more that Professor Butz…

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): It is not necessary to repeat what you have already said. I am only asking you, is it correct or not? Maybe the translation was incorrect, or maybe your testimony was incorrect at the beginning.

AHRENS: I did not understand the question just put to me. That is the reason why I wanted to explain this once more. I do not know just what is meant by this last question. May I ask this question be repeated?

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): At the beginning, when you were interrogated by the defense counsel, I understood you to say that Professor Butz told you that the shooting had taken place in the spring of 1940, that is before the arrival of the commission for the exhumations.

AHRENS: No, that has not been understood correctly. I testified that Professor Butz came to me and told me that he was to make exhumations since it concerned my woods. These exhumations then took place, and approximately 6 to 8 weeks later Professor Butz came to me of course, he visited me on other occasions as well but approximately 6 to 8 weeks later he came to me and told me that he was convinced that, as a result of his discoveries, he was now able to fix the date of the shootings. This statement which he made to me, refers approximately to the middle of May.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen.Nikitchenko): Were you present when the diary and the other documents which were shown to you by Professor Butz were found?

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen.Nikitchenko): You do not know where he found the diary and other documents?

AHRENS: No, that I do not know.

THE PRESIDENT: When did you first report to superior authority the fact that you suspected that there was a grave there?

AHRENS: At first, I was not suspicious. I have already mentioned that fighting had taken place there; and at first I did not attach any importance to the stories told to me and did not give this matter any credence. I believed that it was a question of soldiers who had been killed thereof war graves, like several in the vicinity.

THE PRESIDENT: You are not answering my question. I am asking you, when did you first report to superior authority that there was a grave there?

AHRENS: In the course of the summer 1942 I spoke to Colonel Von Gersdorff about these stories which had come to my knowledge. Gersdorff told me that he had heard that too, and that ended my conversation with Von Gersdorff. He did not believe it to be true; in any case he was not thoroughly convinced. That I do not know, however.

Then in the spring of 1943, when the snow had melted, the bones which had been found there were brought to me, and I then telephoned to the officer in charge of war graves and told him that apparently there were some soldiers’ graves here. That was before Professor Butz had visited me.

THE PRESIDENT: Did you make any report in writing?

AHRENS: No, I did not do that.

THE PRESIDENT: Never?

AHRENS: No, I was not in any way concerned with this matter.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.

DR. STAHMER: Then, as another witness, I should like to call Lieutenant Reinhard von Eichborn.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

[The witness Von Eichborn took the stand.]

Will you state your full name please.

REINHARD VON EICHBORN (Witness): Reinhard von Eichborn.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God the Almighty and Omniscient that I will speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.

[The witness repeated the oath.]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

DR. STAHMER: Witness, what is your occupation?

VON EICHBORN: Assistant judge.

DR. STAHMER: Were you called up for service in the German Armed Forces during this war?

VON EICHBORN: Yes, in 8/1939.

DR. STAHMER: And what was your unit?

VON EICHBORN: Army Group Signal Regiment 537.

DR. STAHMER: And what was your rank?

VON EICHBORN: At the outbreak of the war, platoon leader and lieutenant.

DR. STAHMER: And at the end?

VON EICHBORN: First lieutenant.

DR. STAHMER: Were you on the Eastern Front during the war?

VON EICHBORN: Yes, from the beginning.

DR.STAHMER: With your regiment?

VON EICHBORN: No, from 1940 onward, on the staff of Army Group Center.

DR. STAHMER: Apart from this Regiment 537, was there an Engineer Battalion 537?

VON EICHBORN: In the sphere of the Army Group Center there was no Engineer Battalion 537.

DR. STAHMER: When did you arrive with your unit in the vicinity of Katyn?

VON EICHBORN: About 20 September the staff of Army Group Center transferred its headquarters to Smolensk, that is to say in the Smolensk region.

DR. STAHMER: Where had you been stationed before?

VON EICHBORN: How am I to understand this question?

DR.STAHMER: Where did you come from?

VON EICHBORN: We came from Borisov.

THE PRESIDENT: One moment. The witness said 20 September. That does not identify the year.

DR. STAHMER: In what year was this 20 September?

VON EICHBORN: 9/20/1941.

DR. STAHMER: Was Regiment 537 already there at that time?

VON EICHBORN: The staff of Regiment 537 was transferred at about the same time together with the staff of the army group to the place where the headquarters of the army group was. Advance units had already been stationed there previously, in order to set up communication facilities.

DR. STAHMER: And where was this staff accommodated?

VON EICHBORN: The staff of Army Group Signal Regiment 537 was accommodated in the so-called Dnieper Castle.

DR. STAHMER: Where was the advance unit?

VON EICHBORN’: The advance unit may have occupied this building, too or at least a part of this advance unit did to safeguard this building for the regimental staff.

DR. STAHMER: Do you know who was in command of this advance unit?

VON EICHBORN: Lieutenant Hodt was in command of this advance unit.

DR. STAHMER: When did this advance unit come to Katyn?

VON EICHBORN: Smolensk fell on about 7/17/1941. The army group had planned to put up its headquarters in the immediate vicinity of Smolensk, and, after this group had selected its quarters, this region was seized immediately after the fall of the city. The advance unit arrived at the same time as this area was seized, and that was probably in the second half of 7/1941.

DR. STAHMER: Therefore the advance unit was there from 7/1941 until 9/20/1941?

VON EICHBORN: Yes.

DR. STAHMER: And the entire staff was there from 9/20/1941?

VON EICHBORN: Yes. It may be that part of the staff arrived somewhat later, but the majority of the staff arrived on 20 September.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you speaking of the staff of the army group or the staff of the signal regiment?

VON EICHBORN: I am speaking of both staffs, because the moving of large staffs such as that of an army group could not be undertaken in 1 day; usually 2 to 3 days were needed for that. The operations of the signal corps had to be assured, and therefore the regiment had to leave some of the staff behind until the entire staff had been moved.

DR. STAHMER: Where was the advance unit accommodated?

VON EICHBORN: At least part of the advance unit was accommodated in the Dnieper Castle. Some of the others were in the neighborhood of those places where later on the companies were billeted. The reason for that was to keep the billets ready for this regiment until the bulk of it had been moved.

DR. STAHMER: How about the Regimental Staff 537?

VON EICHBORN: That was in the Dnieper Castle.

DR. STAHMER: Can you give us the names of the officers who belonged to the regimental staff?

VON EICHBORN: At that time there was Lieutenant Colonel Bedenck, the commanding officer; Lieutenant Rex, adjutant; Lieutenant Hodt, orderly officer; and a Captain Schafer, who was a telephone expert. It may be that one or two others were there as well, but I can no longer remember their names.

DR. STAHMER: The preceding witness has already told us about the tasks of the regimental staff. How were the activities of the regimental staff controlled?

VON EICHBORN: The regiment, which consisted of 10 to 12 companies, had to give an exact report each evening as to what work had been allotted to the various companies. This was necessary as we had to know what forces were available in case of emergency, for undertaking any new tasks.

DR. STAHMER: How far away from the Dnieper Castle were you billeted?

VON EICHBORN: Approximately 4 to 5 kilometers. I cannot give you the exact distance as I always made it by car, but it would be about 4 to 5 kilometers.

DR. STAHMER: Did you frequently go to Dnieper Castle?

VON EICHBORN: Very frequently when I was off duty, as I had belonged to this regiment and knew most of the officers, with whom I was on friendly terms.

DR. STAHMER: Can you tell us about the kind and extent of the traffic to the Dnieper Castle?

VON EICHBORN. In order to judge this you have to differentiate between persons and things. So far as people were concerned, the traffic was very lively because the regiment had to be very centrally organized in order to be equal to its tasks. Therefore, many couriers came and commanders of the various companies frequently came to visit the regimental staff.

On the other hand there was a heavy traffic of trucks and passenger cars, because the regiment tried to improve its billets there; and since we remained there for some time all sorts of building alterations were carried out in the house.

DR. STAHMER: Did you hear anything about there being three Russian camps with captured Polish officers, 25 to 45 kilometers west of Smolensk, which had allegedly fallen into German hands?

VON EICHBORN: I never heard anything about any kind of Polish officers’ camps or Polish prisoner-of-war camps.

DR. STAHMER: Did your army group receive reports about the capture of such Polish officers?

VON EICHBORN: No. I would have noticed that, since the number of prisoners, and especially the number of officers, was always submitted to me in the evening reports of the armies which took these prisoners. It was our responsibility to receive these signal reports and we therefore saw them every evening.

DR. STAHMER: You did not receive a report to that effect?

VON EICHBORN: I neither saw such a report from an army, which would have issued it, nor did I ever receive a report from an army group which would have had to transmit this report in their evening bulletin to the High Command of the Army (OKH).

DR. STAHMER: Could a report like that have been handed in from another source or been sent to another office?

VON EICHBORN: The official channel in the Army was very stringent, and the staffs saw to it that official channels were strictly adhered to. In any case the armies were always required to make the detailed reports, following the lines stipulated in the form sheets and this applied especially to the figures concerning prisoners. Therefore, it is quite out of the question that if such a number of officers had fallen into the hands of an army, it would not have reported the matter through the appropriate channel.

DR. STAHMER: You said, just a little while ago, that you were in particularly close relationship with the officers of this regiment. Did you ever hear that Polish prisoners of war, officers, were shot at some time or other in the Katyn forest at the instigation of Regiment 537 under Colonel Bedenck or under Colonel Ahrens?

VON EICHBORN: I knew nearly all the officers of the regiment, as I myself had been over a year with the regiment, and I was on such-familiar terms with most of the officers that they told me everything that took place, even anything of an unofficial nature. Therefore, it is quite out of the question that such an important matter should not have come to my knowledge. From the nature of the whole character moulding in the regiment, it is quite impossible that there should not have been at least one who would have come to tell me about it immediately.

DR. STAHMER: Were all the operational orders for Regiment 537 officially known to you?

VON EICHBORN: The operational orders for this army group Signal regiment were twofold: The orders which concerned only the wireless company and those which applied to the nine telephone companies. Since I was a telephone expert, it was quite natural for me to draft these orders and submit them to my superior, General Oberhauser. Therefore, each order which was issued had either been drafted by me or I had seen it beforehand.

DR. STAHMER: Was there ever at any time an order given out by your office to shoot Polish prisoners of war?

VON EICHBORN: Such an order was neither given to the regiment by our office nor by any other office. Neither did we receive a report to this effect, nor did we hear about things like that through any other channel.

DR. STAHMER: If an order like that came through official channels, it could come only through you?

VON EICHBORN: This order would have necessitated a great many members of the regiment being taken away from their own duties, which were to safeguard the system of communications. As we were very short of signallers, we had to know what almost every man in the regiment was doing. It would have been quite out of the question for any member of the regiment to have been taken away from such a duty without our knowledge.

DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuhler, whom are you appearing on behalf of?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: For Grossadmiral Donitz, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: There is no charge made against Grossadmiral Donitz in connection with this offense at all.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Mr. President, the exhumations and the propaganda connected with them occurred during the period when Grossadmiral Donitz was Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. The Prosecution alleges that at that time Grossadmiral Donitz was a member of the Cabinet and had participated in all acts taken by the Government. Therefore, I must consider him as being implicated in all the problems arising out of the Katyn case.

THE PRESIDENT: That would mean that we should have to hear examination from everybody who was connected with the Government. And the Tribunal has already pointed out, with reference to Admiral Raeder, that his case was not connected with this matter. It is only when a case is directly connected with the matter that counsel for the individual defendants are allowed to cross examine, in addition to the defendant’s counsel who calls the witness. If there is any suggestion that you want to make to the counsel who is calling the witness, you can make it to him, but you are not entitled…

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: But I am asking your permission to put two or three questions to this witness.

THE PRESIDENT: If you have any special questions to put, you may suggest them to Dr. Stahmer, and Dr. Stahmer will put them. Dr. Kranzbuhler, if you want to put any questions, you may put them to Dr. Stahmer, and he will put them to the witness.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Mr. President, I did not quite understand. Shall I propose to Dr. Stahmer to put the questions or…

THE PRESIDENT: If you cannot do it verbally, you may do it in writing, and you may do it later on. But I really do not think there can be any questions which are so difficult to suggest to Dr. Stahmer as all that.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: They can also be put through Dr. Stahmer. I was only thinking that I would save some time by putting the questions myself.

THE PRESIDENT: I told you if you wish to ask any questions, you must ask them through Dr. Stahmer.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Thank you, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: In the meantime, the Tribunal will go on with the cross-examination, and any questions which you wish to put can be put in re-examination.

Does the prosecution wish to cross-examine?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Witness, I am interested to know your exact function in the army. Were you in charge of teleprinter communications at the headquarters of Army Group Center or were you a wireless expert?

VON EICHBORN: No, Mr. Prosecutor, you are wrong. I was the telephone expert of Army Group Center, not the wireless expert.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That is exactly what I am asking you. The translation was evidently incorrect. So you were in charge of telephone communications, were you not?

VON EICHBORN: Yes; you are right.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Ordinary telegrams, or ciphered telegrams?

VON EICHBORN: The task of a telephone expert connected with an army group consisted in keeping the telephone lines intact . . .

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, I am not interested in the tasks in a general way. I would like to know whether these were secret ciphered telegrams or the ordinary army mail, army communications which were not secret.

VON EICHBORN: There were two kinds of telegrams, open and secret.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Were secret telegrams transmitted by you, too?

VON EICHBORN: Both came through me.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Consequently, all communications between the Wehrmacht, between Army units and the highest police authorities also passed through you; is that correct?

VON EICHBORN: The most important telegrams, and especially the secret ones were submitted to the telephone expert.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes. Consequently, the correspondence between the police authorities and the Armed Forces units passed through you; is that correct? I am asking you this question for a second time.

VON EICHBORN: I must answer with the reservation that the messages did not pass through the telephone expert, but only the most important secret teletype matters were submitted to him not the whole correspondence, because that went also through the mail as well as by courier service.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That is clear. Do you know in this case that in September and 10/1941 there were special detachments in Smolensk whose duty, in close co-operation with the Army, was to carry out the so-called purge of the prisoner-of-war camps and the extermination of prisoners of war?

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I must decisively object to this questioning of the witness. This questioning can have only the purpose of determining the relations between the General Staff and the OKW and any commands of the Security Service. Therefore, they are accusing the General Staff and the OKW; and if I, Mr. President, as defense counsel for the General Staff and the OKW am not permitted to put questions, then on the basis of equal treatment, the same rules must apply to the Prosecution as well.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: May I, Mr. President, make a short statement?

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov, the question is competent.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I beg your pardon.

THE PRESIDENT: I said the question was competent. You may ask the question.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would like to ask you the following question, Witness. Since all secret teletypes passed through you, did you ever encounter among these telegrams any from the so-called 1st Einsatzgruppe “That was the so-called first commander from the Special Command “Moscow” which at that time was located at Smolensk and kept in reserve in anticipation of better times? The latter had the order to perpetrate mass murders in Moscow. Both commands were located at Smolensk at that time.

VON EICHBORN: No such reports came into my hands. I can fully explain this to you, Mr. Prosecutor. When any detachments of this sort had been established in the area of Army Group Center, these detachments had their own wireless stations. It was only later on in the course of the Russian campaign that these posts had teletype facilities as well; then they used the army group network. However, that only happened later

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Consequently, the telegrams of those special units which, by order of high police authorities, were assigned to carry out special actions in co-operation with military units, did not pass through your hands in September and 10/1941?

VON EICHBORN: That is correct. At that time, there were no teletype facilities and offices for such special units, even if they were in that area at all.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, this document was already presented to the Court together with the Extraordinary State Commission Report, Document Number USSR-3. If the High Tribunal will permit it, I should like to present to the Tribunal and to the Defense photostatic copies of one of the documents which was attached to the report of the Extraordinary State Commission. If the Tribunal will look at Page 2 of this document, it w-ill see that the Special Command “Moscow” and the Einsatzgruppe “B” were both located in Smolensk. It says on the first page that these detachments together with units of the Armed Forces, were assigned to carry out mass killings in the camps. If the Tribunal will permit me, I shall submit this document now…

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov, that is a matter of argument. We shall take judicial notice of it, of course, of everything which is in the Soviet Government’s publication. And I understand You to say that this document is a part of the Soviet Government communication or Soviet Government report.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, Mr. President; but I would like to ask permission to present an original German document, a secret document, which states that in the Smolensk area there were two large special commands whose duties were to carry out mass murders in the camps, and that these actions had to be carried out together with the Armed Forces units which had to co-operate with them.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov, is this document which you have just handed up to us a part of the report USSR-3?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, Mr.President, it is a part of the report, Document USSR-3, called “Special Directives of the Hitler Government Concerning the Annihilation of Prisoners of War.” I would like to ask the Tribunal to allow me to present one of the original documents even if the report, USSR-3, has been already submitted in full.

It says there that these special units were located in Smolensk and were assigned together with the Armed Forces units to carry out mass killings in the camps.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Colonel Smirnov. This document is already in evidence, if the Tribunal understands correctly.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Thank you, Mr. President.

[Turning to the witness.] Consequently, we may consider it as an established fact that the correspondence, the telegraphic messages of these special detachments did not pass through your hands; is that correct?

THE PRESIDENT: He has said that twice already.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Excuse me, Mr. President.

[Turning to the witness.] Why did you assert with such certainty that there were no reports about the killing of the Poles? You know that the killing of the Polish prisoners of war was a special action, and any report about this action would have to pass through your hands? Is that correct?

VON EICHBORN: I answered the prosecutor rather, I answered Dr. Stahmer that if in the area of Army Group Signal Regiment 537 killings of that sort had taken place, I would undoubtedly have known about them. I did not state what the prosecutor is now trying to ascribe to me.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov, the Tribunal think you had better read this passage from this document, which is in the German language, to the Tribunal so that it will go into the record.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In this document, Mr. President, it is stated…

THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Colonel Smirnov.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Thank you, Mr. President.

This document is dated “Berlin, 10/29/1941.” It is headed, “The Chief of the Security Police and of the Security Service.” It has a classification, “Top Secret; Urgent letter; Operational Order Number-14.” Reference is made to decrees of 7/17/1941 and 9/12/1941. I shall now read a few short sentences, and I shall begin with the first sentence:

“In the appendix, I am sending directions for the evacuation of Soviet civilian prisoners and prisoners of war out of permanent prisoner-of-war camps and transit camps in the rear of the Army…

“These directives have been worked out in collaboration with the Army High Command. The Army High Command has notified the commanders of the armies in the rear as well as the local commanders of the prisoner-of-war camps and of the transit camps.

“The task force groups, depending on the size of the camp in their territory, are setting up special commands in sufficient strength under the leadership of an SS leader. The commands are instructed immediately to start work in the camps.”

I break off here, and will continue reading the last paragraph:

I emphasize especially that Operational Orders Number 8 and 14 as well as the appendix are to be destroyed immediately in the case of immediate danger.”

I shall finish my reading and now I shall only mention the distribution list. On Page 2 I quote the part concerning Smolensk. It says here that in Smolensk the Einsatzgruppe “B” was located, consisting of Special Commands 7a, 7b, 8, and 9; and in addition to this, there was already located in Smolensk a special command, which had been rather prematurely named “Moscow” by its organizers.

These are the contents of the document, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal directs that the whole document shall be translated. We will now recess until 5 minutes past 2 o’clock.

[The Tribunal recessed until 1405 hours.]

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, I have no more questions to put to this witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer.

DR. STAHMER: Witness, do you know who owned that little castle near the Dnieper before the occupation by German troops? Who owned it, who lived there?

VON EICHBORN: I cannot say that for certain. We noticed that the little castle was astonishingly well furnished. It was very well laid out. It had two bathrooms, a rifle range, and a cinema. We drew certain conclusions therefrom, when the facts became known, but I do not know anything about the previous owner.

DR. STAHMER: The Russian Prosecutor submitted to you a document dated 10/29/1941, “Directives to the Chief of the Sipo for the Detachments in the Stalags.” With reference to that document, I want to ask you whether you had an opportunity personally to ascertain the attitude of Field Marshal Kluge, your commander of Army Group Center, regarding the shooting of prisoners of war?

VON EICHBORN: By chance I became the ear-witness of a conversation between the Commanders Bock and Kluge. That conversation took place about 3 or 4 weeks before the beginning of the Russian campaign. I cannot tell you the exact time. At the time Field Marshal Von Bock was the commander of Army Group Center, and Field Marshal Von Kluge was commander of the 4th Army. The army group was in Posen and the 4th Army at Warsaw. One day I was called by the aide-de-camp of Field Marshal Von Bock, who was Lieutenant Colonel Count Hardenberg. He gave me the order…

THE PRESIDENT: These details are entirely irrelevant, aren’t they. All you want to ask him is: What was the attitude of Von Kluge? That is all.

DR. STAHMER: The answer did not come through. I did not understand what you said, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: What I said was that all these details about the particular place where Von Kluge met some other army group commander are utterly irrelevant. All you are trying to ask him is: What was Von Kluge’s attitude toward the murder of war prisoners? Isn’t that all?

DR. STAHMER: Yes.

[Turning to the witness.] Will you answer the question briefly, Witness. Please just tell us what Von Kluge said.

VON EICHBORN: Von Kluge told Von Bock, during a telephone conversation, that the order for the shooting of certain prisoners of war was an impossibility and could not be carried out, with regard to the discipline of the troops. Von Bock shared this point of view and both these gentlemen talked for half an hour about the measures which they wanted to adopt against this order.

DR. STAHMER: According to the allegations of the Prosecution, the shooting of these 11000 Polish officers is supposed to have been carried out sometime in 9/1941. The question now is: Do you consider it possible, in view of local conditions, that such mass shootings and burials could have been carried out next door to the regimental headquarters without you yourself having heard about it?

VON EICHBORN: We were very busy in preparation for the move of the army group to Smolensk. We had assigned a great number of signal troops for setting up perfect installations. On the entire site there was a constant going and coming of troops laying cables and telephone lines. It is out of the question that anything of this kind could have occurred in that particular area without the regiment and I getting knowledge of it.

DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions to put to the witness, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.

DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, before calling my third witness, Lieutenant General Oberhauser, may I ask your permission to make the following remarks?

The Prosecution has up to now only alleged that Regiment Number 537 was the one which had carried out these shootings and that under Colonel Ahrens’ command. Today again, Colonel Ahrens has been named by the Prosecution as being the perpetrator. Apparently this allegation has been dropped and it has been said that if it was not Ahrens then it must have been his predecessor, Colonel Bedenck; and if Colonel Bedenck did not do it, then apparently and this seems to be the third version it was done by the SD. The Defense had taken the position solely that Colonel Ahrens was accused as the perpetrator and it has refuted that allegation. Considering the changed situation and the attitude adopted by the Prosecution, I shall have to name a fourth witness in addition. That is First Lieutenant Hodt, who has been mentioned today as the perpetrator and who was with the regimental staff right from the beginning and who was, as we have told, the senior of the advance party which arrived at the Dnieper Castle in July. I got the address of First Lieutenant Hodt by chance yesterday. He is at Glucksburg near Flensburg, and I, therefore, ask to be allowed to name as a witness First Lieutenant Hodt, who will give evidence that during the time between July and September such shootings did not occur.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, the Tribunal will consider your application, when they adjourn at half past 3, with reference to this extra witness.

DR. STAHMER: Yes, Sir. Then I shall now call Lieutenant General Oberhauser as witness.

[The witness Oberhauser took the stand.]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?

EUGEN OBERHAUSER (Witness): Eugen Oberhauser.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God the Almighty and Omniscient that I will speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.

[The witness repeated the oath.]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

DR. STAHMER: General, what position did you hold during the war?

OBERHAUSER: I was the signal commander in an army group, first of all during the Polish campaign, in Army Group North; then, in the Western campaign Army Group B; and then in Russia Army Group Center.

DR. STAHMER: When did you and your staff reach the neighborhood of Katyn?

OBERHAUSER: Sometime during 9/1941.

DR. STAHMER: Where was your staff located?

OBERHUSER: My staff was located in the immediate vicinity of the commander of the army group; that is to say, about 12 kilometers west of Smolensk, near the railroad station of Krasnibor.

DR. STAHMER: Was Regiment Number 537 under your command?

OBERHAUSER: Regiment 537 was directly under my command.

DR. STAHMER: What task did that regiment have?

OBERHAUSER: That regiment had the task of establishing both telegraph and wireless communications between the command of the army group and the various armies and other units which were directly under its command.

DR. STAHMER: Was the staff of the regiment stationed near you?

OBERHAUSER: The staff of that regiment was located about 3, perhaps 4 kilometers west from my own position.

DR. STAHMER: Can you give us more detailed information regarding the exact location of the staff headquarters of Number 537?

OBERHAUSER: The staff headquarters of 537 was in a very nice Russian timber house. Commissars were supposed to have been living there before. It was on the steep bank of the Dnieper River. It was somewhat off the road, perhaps 400 to 500 meters away. It was, from my place, 4 kilometers west of the main highway Smolensk to Vitebsk.

DR. STAHMER: Who was the commanding officer of the regiment after the capture of Smolensk?

OBERHUSER: After the capture of Smolensk, Colonel Bedenck was the commander of the regiment.

DR. STAHMER: For how long?

OBERHAUSER: Until about 11/1941.

DR. STAHMER: Who was his successor?

OBERHAUSER: His successor was Colonel Ahrens.

DR. STAHMER: How long?

OBERHAUSER: Approximately until September it may have been August1943.

DR. STAHMER: Were you near Katyn as long as that, too?

OBERHAUSER: I was there until the command of the army group transferred its headquarters farther west.

DR. STAHMER: What were your relations with the commanders of this regiment?

OBERHAUSER: My relations with the regimental commanders were most hearty, both officially and privately, which is due to the fact that I had been the first commander of that regiment. I myself had formed the regiment and I was most attached to it.

DR. STAHMER: Did you personally visit the little Dnieper Castle frequently?

OBERHAUSER: I went to the Dnieper Castle frequently; I can well say in normal times once or twice a week.

DR. STAHMER: Did the commanders visit you in the meantime?

OBERHAUSER: The commanders came to see me more frequently than I went to see them.

DR. STAHMER: Did you know anything about the fact that near Smolensk, about 25 to 45 kilometers to the west, there were three Russian camps which contained Polish prisoners of war…

OBERHAUSER: I knew nothing of that.

DR. STAHMER: . . . who had fallen into the hands of the Germans?

OBERHAUSER: I never heard anything about it.

DR. STAHMER: Was there an order, which is supposed to have come from Berlin, that Polish officers who were prisoners of war were to be shot?

OBERHAUSER: No, such an order was never issued.

DR. STAHMER: Did you yourself ever give such an order?

OBERHAUSER: I have never given such an order.

DR. STAHMER: Do you know whether Colonel Bedenck or Colonel Ahrens ever caused such shootings to be carried out?

OBERHAUSER: I am not informed, but I consider it absolutely impossible.

DR. STAHMER: Why?

OBERHUSER: First, because such a decisive order would necessarily have gone through me, for I was the direct superior of the regiment; and second, because if such an order had been given, for a reason which I could not understand, and transmitted to the regiment through some obscure channel, then the commanders would most certainly have rung me up or they would have come to see me and said, “General, they are asking something here which we cannot understand.”

DR. STAHMER: Do you know First Lieutenant Hodt?

OBERHAUSER: Yes, I know him.

DR. STAHMER: What position did he have in Regiment 537?

OBERHAUSER: Hodt held various posts in the regiment. Usually, he was sent ahead because he was a particularly qualified officer especially in regard to technical qualifications in order to make preparations when headquarters was being changed. He was therefore used as advance party of the so-called technical company in order to establish the new command posts; and then he was the regimental expert for the telephone system, dealing with all matters relating to the telephone and teletype system with the command headquarters of the army group. In my staff he was occasionally detailed to fill the positions of any of my officers when they were on leave.

DR. STAHMER: Was he also in charge of the advance party during the advance on Katyn?

OBERHAUSER: That I cannot say. I can only say that I personally heard from my staff signal commander that he had sent an officer ahead, after it had been ascertained how the headquarters were to be laid out, that this officer was acting on my behalf, as at the time I still remained in the old quarters, and he was preparing things in the way I wanted them from the point of view of the signal commander. I do not know who was in charge of that advance party at the time, but it is quite possible that it was First Lieutenant Hodt.

DR. STAHMER: Were you in Katyn or the vicinity during the period after the capture of Smolensk, which was, I believe, on or about 7/20/1941, and up to the transfer of your staff to Katyn on 20 September?

OBERHAUSER: I was in the vicinity. I was where the headquarters of the army group wanted to settle down; that is, in the woods west of Smolensk, where Katyn is located.

DR. STAHMER: Were you frequently there during that time?

OBERHAUSER: I should say three or four times.

DR. STAHMER: Did you talk to Hodt on those occasions?

OBERHUSER: If he was the officer in charge of the advance party, which I cannot say today, then I must certainly have talked to him. At any rate, I did talk to the officer whom I had sent ahead and also to the one from my regiment.

DR. STAHMER: Did you hear anything about shootings occurring during that time?

OBERHAUSER: I heard nothing, nor did I hear anything at all except in 1943, when the graves were opened.

DR. STAHMER: Did you or Regiment 537 have the necessary technical means, pistols, ammunition, and so on, at your disposal which would have made it possible to carry out shootings on such a scale?

OBERHAUSER: The regiment, being a signal regiment in the rear area, was not equipped with weapons and ammunition as well as the actual fighting troops. Such a task, however, would have been something unusual for the regiment; first, because a signal regiment has completely different tasks, and secondly it would not have been in a position technically to carry out such mass executions.

DR. STAHMER: Do you know the place where these graves were discovered later on?

OBERHAUSER: I know the site because I drove past it a great deal.

DR. STAHMER: Can you describe it more accurately?

OBERHUSER: Taking the main road Smolensk-Vitebsk, a path led through wooded undulating ground. There were sandy spaces, which were, however, covered with scrub and heather, and along that narrow path one got to the Dnieper Castle from the main road.

DR. STAHMER: Were the places where these graves were later discovered already overgrown when you got there?

OBERHAUSER: They were overgrown just like the surrounding ground, and there was no difference between them and the rest of the surroundings.

DR. STAHMER: In view of your knowledge of the place, would you consider it possible that 11000 Poles could have been buried at that spot, people who may have been shot between June and 9/1941?

OBERHAUSER: I consider that it is out of the question, for the mere reason that if the commander had known it at the time he would certainly never have chosen this spot for his headquarters, next to 11000 dead.

DR. STAHMER: Can you tell me how the graves were discovered?

OBERHAUSER: Officially I had nothing to do with that. I only heard that through local inhabitants or somebody else it had become known that large-scale executions had taken place there years ago.

DR. STAHMER: From whom did you hear that?

OBERHAUSER: Quite probably from the commander himself, who, because he was located on the spot, had heard more about it than I had. But I cannot remember exactly now.

DR. STAHMER: So you did not receive official notice about the discovery of the graves, did you?

OBERHAUSER: No, I never did.

DR. STAHMER: After the opening of the graves, did you talk to the German or foreign members of the commission?

OBERHUSER: I have never talked to any members of that commission.

DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Witness, you arrived in the region of Katyn in 9/1943?

OBERHAUSER: 1941, not 1943.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Excuse me, I meant 9/1941. Is that correct?

OBERHAUSER: Yes, 9/1941.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And you contend that you did not know anything either about the camps for Polish prisoners of war or the prisoners in the hands of the German troops, is that so?

OBERHAUSER: I have never heard anything about Polish prisoners of war being in the hands of German troops.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I understand that this had no relation to your official activity as the commander of a signal regiment. But in spite of this you may perhaps have witnessed that various German troops combed the woods in the vicinity of the Smolensk-Vitebsk highway to capture Polish prisoners of war who had escaped from the camps?

OBERHAUSER: I never heard anything about troops going there in order to, shall we say, recapture escaped Polish prisoners of war. I am hearing this here for the first time.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please answer me. Have you perhaps seen German military units escorting Polish prisoners of war who were captured in the woods?

OBERHAUSER: I have not seen that.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please answer the following question: You were on good terms with Colonel Ahrens, were you not?

OBERHAUSER: I have had good relations with all commanders of the regiment.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And in addition to that, you were his immediate superior?

OBERHAUSER: Right.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Colonel Ahrens found out about the mass graves at the end of 1941 or at the beginning of 1942. Did he tell you anything about his discovery?

OBERHAUSER: I cannot believe that Colonel Ahrens could have discovered the graves in 1941. I cannot imagine that I especially cannot imagine that he would tell me nothing about it.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In any case do you contend that neither in 1942 nor in 1943 did Colonel Ahrens report to you in regard to this affair?

OBERHAUSER: Colonel Ahrens never told me anything about it, and he would have told me if he had known.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am interested in the following answer which you gave to a question by defense counsel. You remarked that the signal regiment had not enough weapons to carry out shootings. What do you mean by that? How many, and what kind of weapons did the regiment possess?

OBERHAUSER: The signal regiment were mostly equipped with pistols and with carbines. They had no automatic arms.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Pistols? Of what caliber?

OBERHAUSER: They were Parabellum pistols. The caliber, I think, was 7.65, but I cannot remember for certain.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Parabellum pistols, 7.65, or were there Mauser pistols or any other kind of weapons?

OBERHUSER: That varied. Noncommissioned officers, as far as I know, had the smaller Mauser pistols. Actually, only noncommissioned officers were equipped with pistols. The majority of the men had carbines.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would like you to tell us some more about the pistols. You say that they were 7.65 caliber pistols, is that so?

OBERHAUSER: I cannot now, at the moment, give you exact information about the caliber. I only know that the Parabellum pistol was 7.65 or some such caliber. I think the Mauser pistol had a somewhat smaller caliber.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And Walter pistols?

OBERHUSER: There were also Walters. I think they had the same caliber as the Mauser. It is a smaller, black pistol; and it is better than the somewhat cumbersome Parabellum pistol which is heavier.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, that is quite correct. Please tell me whether in this regiment the noncommissioned officers possessed those small pistols.

OBERHAUSER: As a rule, noncommissioned officers had pistols but not carbines.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I see. Perhaps you can tell us about how many pistols this signal regiment possessed?

OBERHUSER: Of course I cannot tell you that now. Let us assume that every noncommissioned officer had a pistol…

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And how many noncommissioned officers were there? How many pistols in all were there in your regiment if you consider that every noncommissioned officer had a pistol?

OBERHAUSER: Assuming that every noncommissioned officer in the regiment had a pistol that would amount to 15 per company, a total of 150. However, to give a definite statement about that figure retrospectively now is impossible. I can only give you clues.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Why do you consider that 150 pistols would be insufficient to carry out these mass killings which went on over a period of time? What makes you so positive about that?

OBERHAUSER: Because a signal regiment of an army group deployed over a large area as in the case of Army Group Center is never together as a unit. The regiment was spread out from Kolodov as far as Vitebsk, and there were small detachments everywhere, and in the headquarters of the regiment there were comparatively .few people; in other words, there were never 150 pistols in one and the same place.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The main part of the signal regiment was located in the Katyn woods, was it not?

OBERHUSER: I did not understand your question.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The main portions of your regiment were located in the Katyn woods, were they not?

OBERHUSER: The first company was mainly located between the regimental staff quarters and the actual command post of the army group. That was the company which was handling the communications, the telephone and teleprinted communications for the army group. It was the company, therefore, which was nearest.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: One more question. The officers of your regiment were obviously armed with pistols and not with carbines?

OBERHAUSER: Officers had pistols only, and as a rule they only had small ones. Possibly one or the other may have had a Parabellum pistol.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That is to say either a Walter or a Mauser?

OBERHAUSER: Yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Did you frequently visit the villa where the headquarters of Regiment 537 was located?

OBERHAUSER: Yes, I was there at least once, sometimes twice, a week.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Were you ever interested as to why soldiers from other military units visited the villa in Kozy Gory and why special beds were prepared for them as well as drinks and food?

OBERHUSER: I cannot imagine that there were any large scale visits of other soldiers or members of other units. I do not know anything about that.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am not speaking about a great number. I am speaking of 20 or sometimes 25 men.

OBERHUSER: If the regimental commander summoned his company and detachment commanders for an officers’ meeting, then, of course, there would be a few dozen of such officers who normally would not be seen there.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, I am not talking about officers who belonged to the unit. I would like to ask you another somewhat different question. Would the number 537 appear on the shoulder straps of the soldiers belonging to that regiment?

OBERHAUSER: As far as I recollect the number was on the shoulder straps, but at the beginning of the war it could be concealed by a camouflage flap. I cannot remember whether during that particular period these covers were used or not. At any rate at the street entrance to the regimental headquarters there was a black-yellow-black flag, which bore the number 537.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am speaking of soldiers who came to the villa in Kozy Gory, and who did not have the number 537 on their shoulder straps. Were you ever interested in finding out what those soldiers did there in September and 10/1941? Did the commander of the unit report to you about this?

OBERHAUSER: May I ask what year this was supposed to be, 1941?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, 1941, that is the year which is concerned.

OBERHAUSER: I do not think that at that time there was much coming and going of outsiders at staff headquarters because during that period everything was in course of construction and I cannot imagine that other units, even small groups of 20 or 25 people should have been there. I personally, as I have told you, was there only once or twice weekly, and not before September or October.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Beginning with what date of September did you start visiting there? You said it was in September but not from what date.

OBERHAUSER: I cannot tell you. The commander of the army group moved at the end of September from Borossilov, shortly before the battle of Vyazma, which was on 2 October, into that district.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Consequently, you could start visiting this villa for instance only at the end of September or the beginning of 10/1941?

OBERHAUSER: It was only then that the little castle was finally occupied, for the regiment did not arrive much earlier than we from the command of the army group.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov, is it necessary to go into this detail? Have you any particular purpose in going into so much detail?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr.President, I ask this question for the following reasons: Later we shall interrogate witnesses for the Soviet Prosecution on the same point and particularly the chief of the medico-legal investigation. That is why I would like to ask the permission of the Court to clarify this point concerning the time when the witness visited the villa. That will be my last question to this point.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very well. Do not go into greater detail than you find absolutely necessary.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Consequently, at the beginning of September and the first part of 10/1941 you were not in the villa of Katyn woods and you could not be there at the time, is that true?

OBERHAUSER: I cannot remember that exactly. The regimental commander had spotted the little castle and set it up for his staff headquarters. When exactly he moved in I cannot know, because I had other jobs to do.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, I asked whether you personally could not have been in the villa during the first part of September. Could you not possibly have been there before 20 September?

OBERHAUSER: I do not think so.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I have no further questions, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you wish to re-examine, Dr. Stahmer?

DR. STAHMER: Unfortunately, Mr. President, I shall have to come back to the question of time because it was not brought out too clearly during these last questions.

When did Regiment 537 move into the castle?

OBERHAUSER: I assume it was during September.

DR. STAHMER: Beginning or end of September?

OBERHAUSER: Probably rather more toward the end of September.

DR. STAHMER: Until then only the advance party was there, or . . .

OBERHAUSER: The advance party of the regiment was there and my officers whom I had sent ahead.

DR. STAHMER: How many noncommissioned officers were with the advance party?

OBERHAUSER: I cannot tell you exactly how many the regiment sent. I personally had sent one officer. Generally the regiment could not have sent very many. As a rule, as is always the case, the regiment was still operating at the old command post in Borossilov and simultaneously it had to set up the new post. Consequently, during this period of regrouping, on the point of moving a command of an army group, there is always a considerable shortage of men. The old headquarters still has to be looked after, the new post requires men for its construction, so that as always during this period there were certainly too few people.

DR. STAHMER: Can you not even give us an estimate of the figure of that advance party?

OBERHUSER: There were 30, 40, or 50 men.

DR. STAHMER: How many noncommissioned officers?

OBERHUSER: Probably one or two officers, a few noncommissioned officers, and some men.

DR. STAHMER: The regiment was very widely spread out, was it not?

OBERHUSER: Yes.

DR. STAHMER: How far, approximately?

OBERHUSER: In the entire area of Army Group Center, shall we say between Orel and Vitebskin that entire area they were widely dispersed.

DR. STAHMER: How many kilometers was that, approximately?

OBERHAUSER: More than 500 kilometers.

DR. STAHMER: Do you know Judge Advocate General Dr. Konrad of Army Group Center?

OBERHUSER: Yes.

DR. STAHMER: Do you know whether, in 1943, he interrogated the local inhabitants under oath about the date when the Polish officers were supposed to have been shot in the woods of Katyn?

OBERHUSER: No, I do not know.

DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Were there any Einsatzkommandos in the Katyn area during the time that you were there?

OBERHUSER: Nothing has ever come to my knowledge about that.

THE PRESIDENT: Did you ever hear of an order to shoot Soviet commissars?

OBERHUSER: I only knew of that by hearsay.

THE PRESIDENT: When?

OBERHUSER: Probably at the beginning of the Russian campaign, I think.

THE PRESIDENT: Before the campaign started or after?

OBERHAUSER: I cannot remember having heard anything like that before the beginning of the campaign.

THE PRESIDENT: Who was to carry out that order?

OBERHUSER: Strictly speaking, signal troops are not really fighting troops. Therefore, they really had nothing to do with that at all, and therefore we were in no way affected by the order.

THE PRESIDENT: I did not ask you that. I asked you who had to carry out the order.

OBERHUSER: Those who came into contact with these people, presumably.

THE PRESIDENT: Anybody who came in contact with Russian commissars had to kill them; is that it?

OBERHUSER: No, I assume that it was the troops, the fighting troops, the actual fighting troops at the front who first met the enemy. That could only have applied to the army group. The signal regiment never came into a position to meet commissars. That is probably why they were not mentioned in the order or affected by it in any way.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, I ask permission to call as witness the former deputy mayor of the city of Smolensk during the German occupation, Professor of Astronomy, Boris Bazilevsky.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, let him come in then.

[The witness Bazilevsky took the stand.]

Will you state your full name, please?

BORIS BAZILEVSKY (Witness): Boris Bazilevsky.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you make this form of oath: I, a citizen of the USSR called as a witness in this case solemnly promise and swear before the High Tribunal to say all that I know about this case and to add or to withhold nothing.

[The witness repeated the oath.]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: With the permission of the Tribunal, I should like to start with my interrogation, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please tell us, Witness, what your activity was before the German occupation of the city and district of Smolensk and where you were living in Smolensk.

BAZILEVSKY: Before the occupation of Smolensk and the surrounding region…

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please speak slowly.

BAZILEVSKY: . . . I lived in the city of Smolensk and was professor first at the Smolensk University and then of the Smolensk Pedagogical Institute, and at the same time I was director of the Smolensk Astronomical Observatory. For 10 years I was the dean of the physics and mathematics faculty, and in the last years I was deputy to the director of the scientific department of the Institute.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: How many years did you live in Smolensk previous to the German occupation?

BAZILEVSKY: From 1919.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Do you know what the so-called Katyn wood was?

BAZILEVSKY: Yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please speak slowly.

BAZILEVSKY: Actually, it was a grove. It was the favorite resort of the inhabitants of Smolensk who spent their holidays and vacations there.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Was this wood before the war a special reservation which was fenced or guarded by armed patrols, by watch dogs?

BAZILEVSKY: During the many years that I lived in Smolensk, this place was never fenced; and no restrictions were ever placed on access to it. I personally used to go there very frequently. The last time I was there was in 1940 and in the spring of 1941. In this wood there was also a camp for engineers. Thus, there was free access to this place for everybody.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please tell me in what year there was an engineer camp?

BAZILEVSKY: As far as I know, it was there for many years.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please speak slowly.

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. Professor, will you wait a minute, please? When you see that yellow light go on, it means that you are going too fast; and when you are asked a question, will you pause before you answer it? Do you understand?

BAZILEVSKY: Yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Will you please repeat your answer, and very slowly, if you please.

BAZILEVSKY: The last time I know that the engineer camp was in the area of the Katyn wood was in 1941.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Consequently, if I understand you correctly, in 1940 and 1941 before the beginning of the war at any rate and you speak of the spring of 1941the Katyn wood was not a special reservation and was accessible to everybody?

BAZILEVSKY: Yes. I say that that was the situation.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Do you say this as an eyewitness or from hearsay?

BAZILEVSKY: No, I say it as an eyewitness who used to go there frequently.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please tell the Tribunal under what circumstances you became the first deputy mayor of Smolensk during the period of the German occupation. Please speak slowly.

BAZILEVSKY: I was an administration official; and I did not have an opportunity of leaving the place in time, because I was busy in saving the particularly precious library of the Institute and the very valuable equipment. In the circumstances I could not try to escape before the evening of the 15th, but then I did not succeed in catching the train. I therefore decided to leave the city on 16 July in the morning, but during the night of 15 to 16 the city was unexpectedly occupied by German troops. All the bridges across the Dnieper were blown up, and I found myself in captivity.

After some time, on 20 July, a group of German soldiers came to the observatory of which I was the director. They took down that I was the director and that I was living there and that there was also a professor of physics, Efimov, living in the same building.

In the evening of 20 July two German officers came to me and brought me to the headquarters of the unit which had occupied Smolensk. After checking my personalia and after a short conversation, they suggested that I become mayor of the city. I refused, basing my refusal on the fact that I was a professor of astronomy and that, as I had no experience in such matters, I could not undertake this post. They then declared categorically and with threats, “We are going to force the Russian intelligentsia to work.”

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Thus, if I understand you correctly the Germans forced you by threats to become the deputy mayor of Smolensk?

BAZILEVSKY: That is not all. They told me also that in a few days I would be summoned to the Kommandantur.

On 25 July a man in civilian clothes appeared at my apartment, accompanied by a German policeman, and represented himself as a lawyer Menschagin. He declared that he came by order of the military headquarters and that I should accompany him immediately to headquarters.

THE PRESIDENT: You are spending a lot of time on how he came to be mayor of Smolensk.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Will you please allow me to pass to other questions, Mr. President? Thank you for your observations.

[Turning to the witness.] Who was your immediate superior? Who was the mayor of Smolensk?

BAZILEVSKY: Menschagin.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: What were the relations between this man and the German administration and particularly with the German Kommandantur?

BAZILEVSKY: These relations were very good and became closer and closer every day.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Is it correct to say that Menschagin was the trustee of the German administration and that they even gave him secret information?

BAZILEVSKY: Yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Do you know that in the vicinity of Smolensk there were Polish prisoners of war?

BAZILEVSKY: Yes, I do very well.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Do you know what they were doing?

THE PRESIDENT: I do not know what this is going to prove. You presumably do, but can you not come nearer to the point?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: He said that he knew there were Polish prisoners of war in Smolensk; and, with the permission of the Tribunal, I would like to ask the witness what these prisoners of war were doing.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well; go on.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please answer. What were the Polish prisoners of war doing in the vicinity of Smolensk, and at what time?

BAZILEVSKY: In the spring of 1941 and at the beginning of the summer they were working on the restoration of the roads, Moscow-Minsk and Smolensk-Vitebsk.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: What do you know about the further fate of the Polish prisoners of war?

BAZILEVSKY: Thanks to the position that I occupied, I learned very early about the fate of the Polish prisoners of war.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please tell the Tribunal what you know about it.

BAZILEVSKY: In the camp for Russian prisoners of war known “Gulag 126” there prevailed such a severe regime that prisoners war were dying by the hundreds every day; for this reason I tried to free all those from this camp for whose release a reason could be given. I learned that in this camp there was also a very well-known pedagogue named Zhiglinski. I asked Menschagin to make representations to the German Kommandantur of Smolensk, and in particular to Von Schwetz, and to plead for the release of Zhiglinski from this camp.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please do not go into detail and do not waste time, but tell the Tribunal about your conversation with Menschagin. What did he tell you?

BAZILEVSKY: Menschagin answered my request with, “What is the use? We can save one, but hundreds will die.” However, I insisted; and Menschagin, after some hesitation, agreed to put this request to the German Kommandantur.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please be short and tell us what Menschagin told you when he came back from the German Kommandantur.

BAZILEVSKY: Two days later he told me that he was in a very difficult situation on account of my demand. Von Schwet had refused the request by referring to an instruction from Berlin saying that a very severe regime should prevail with respect to prisoners of war.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: What did he tell you about Polish prisoners of war?

BAZILEVSKY: As to Polish prisoners of war, he told me that Russians would at least be allowed to die in the camps while there were proposals to exterminate the Poles.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: What else was said?

BAZILEVSKY: I replied, “What do you mean? What do you want to say? How do you understand this?” And Menschagin answered “You should understand this in the very literal sense of these words. He asked me not to tell anybody about it, since it was a great secret.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: When did this conversation of yours take place with Menschagin? In what month, and on what day?

BAZILEVSKY: This conversation took place at the beginning of September. I cannot remember the exact date.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: But you remember it was the beginning of September?

BAZILEVSKY: Yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Did you ever come back again to the fate of Polish prisoners of war in your further conversations with Menschagin?

BAZILEVSKY: Yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Can you tell us when?

BAZILEVSKY: Two weeks later that is to say, at the end of September I could not help asking him, “What was the fate of the Polish prisoners of war?” At first Menschagin hesitated, and then he told me haltingly, “They have already died. It is all over for them.”

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Did he tell you where they were killed?

BAZILEVSKY: He told me that they had been shot in the vicinity of Smolensk, as Von Schwetz told him.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Did he mention the exact place?

BAZILEVSKY: No, he did not mention the exact place.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Tell me this. Did you, in turn, tell anybody about the extermination, by Hitlerites, of the Polish prisoners of war near Smolensk?

BAZILEVSKY: I talked about this to Professor Efimov, who was living in the same house with me. Besides him, a few days later I had a conversation about it with Dr. Nikolski, who was the medical officer of the city. However, I found out that Nikolski knew about this crime already from some other source.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Did Menschagin tell you why these shootings took place?

BAZILEVSKY: Yes. When he told me that the prisoners of war had been killed, he emphasized once more the necessity of keeping it strictly secret in order to avoid disagreeable consequences. He started to explain to me the reasons for the German behavior with respect to the Polish prisoners of war. He pointed out that this was only one measure of the general system of treating Polish prisoners of war.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Did you hear anything about the extermination of the Poles from the employees of the German Kommandantur?

BAZILEVSKY: Yes, 2 or 3 days later.

THE PRESIDENT: You are both going too fast, and you are not pausing enough. You are putting your questions whilst the answers are coming through. You must have longer pauses, and go slower.

R. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Thank you, Mr. President.

[Turning to the witness.] Please continue, but slowly.

BAZILEVSKY: I do not know where I was.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I asked you whether any of the employees of the German Kommandantur told you anything about the extermination of the Poles.

BAZILEVSKY: Two or three days later, when I visited the office of Menschagin, I met there an interpreter, the Sonderfuhrer of the 7th Division of the German Kommandantur who was in charge of the Russian administration and who had a conversation with Menschagin concerning the Poles. He came from the Baltic region.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Perhaps you can tell us briefly what he said.

BAZILEVSKY: When I entered the room he was saying, “The Poles are- a useless people, and exterminated they may serve as fertilizer and for the enlargement of living space for the German nation.”

THE PRESIDENT: You are doing exactly what I said just now. You are asking the questions before the translation comes through.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Excuse me, Mr. President, I will try to speak more slowly.

[Turning to the witness.] Did you learn from Menschagin anything definite about the shooting of Polish prisoners of war?

BAZILEVSKY: When I entered the room I heard the conversation with Hirschfeld. I missed the beginning, but from the context of the conversation it was clear that they spoke about this event.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Did Menschagin, when telling you about the shooting of Polish prisoners of war, refer to Von Schwetz?

BAZILEVSKY: Yes; I had the impression that he referred to Von Schwetz. But evidently and this is my firm belief he also spoke about it with private persons in the Kommandantur.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: When did Menschagin tell you that Polish prisoners of war were killed near Smolensk?

BAZILEVSKY: It was at the end of September.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I have no further questions to put to this witness, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

[A recess was taken.]

MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, the Defendant Hess is absent.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer.

DR. STAHMER: Witness, in your testimony, just before recess, you read out your testimony, if I observed correctly. Will you tell me whether that was so or not?

BAZILEVSKY: I was not reading anything. I have only a plan of the courtroom in my hand.

DR.STAHMER: It looked to me as though you were reading out your answers. How can you explain the fact that the interpreter already had your answer in his hands?

BAZILEVSKY: I do not know how the interpreters could have had my answers beforehand. The testimony which I am giving was, however, known to the Commission beforehand that is, my testimony during the preliminary examination.

DR. STAHMER: Do you know the little castle on the Dnieper the little villa? Did you not understand me or hear me? Do you know the little castle on the Dnieper, the little villa on the Dnieper?

BAZILEVSKY: I do not know which villa you mean. There were quite a number of villas on the Dnieper.

DR. STAHMER: The house which was near the Katyn wood on the steep bank of the Dnieper River.

BAZILEVSKY: I still do not quite understand which house you mean. The banks of the Dnieper are long, and therefore your question is quite incomprehensible to me.

DR. STAHMER: Do you know where the graves of Katyn were found, in which 11000 Polish officers were buried?

BAZILEVSKY: I was not there. I did not see the Katyn burial grounds.

DR. STAHMER: Had you never been in the Katyn wood?

BAZILEVSKY: As I already said, I was there not once but many times.

DR. STAHMER: Do you know where this mass burial site was located?

BAZILEVSKY: How can I know where the burial grounds were situated when I could not go there since the occupation?

DR. STAHMER: How do you know that the little wood was not fenced in?

BAZILEVSKY: Before the occupation of the Smolensk district by the German troops, the entire area, as I already stated, was not surrounded by any barrier; but according to hearsay I knew that after the occupation access to this wood was prohibited by the German local command.

DR. STAHMER: Therefore you have no knowledge of the fact that here in the Katyn wood a sanitarium or a convalescent home of the GPU was located?

BAZILEVSKY: I know very well; that was known to all the citizens of Smolensk.

DR. STAHMER: Then, of course, you also know exactly which house I referred to in my question?

BAZILEVSKY: I, myself, had never been in that house. In general, access to that house was only allowed to the families of the employees of the Ministry of the Interior. As to other persons, there was no need and no facility for them to go there.

DR. STAHMER: The house, therefore, was closed of?

BAZILEVSKY: No, the house was not forbidden to strangers; but why should people go there if they had no business there or were not in the sanitarium? The garden, of course, was open to the public.

DR. STAHMER: Were there not guards stationed there?

BAZILEVSKY: I have never seen any.

DR. STAHMER: Is this Russian witness who reported to you about the matter concerning the Polish officers, is this witness still alive?

BAZILEVSKY: Mr. Counsel, you probably mean Mayor Menschagin, if I understand you rightly?

DR. STAHMER: When you read your testimony off, it was not easy for me to follow. What was the mayor’s name? Menschagin? Is he still alive?

BAZILEVSKY: Menschagin went away together with the German troops during their retreat, and I remained, and Menschagin’s fate is unknown to me.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, you are not entitled to say to the witness, when you read your testimony off,” just now, because he denied that he read his testimony off and there is no evidence that he has read it off.

DR. STAHMER: Did this Russian witness tell you that the Polish officers had come from the camp at Kosielsk?

BAZILEVSKY: Do you mean the camp at Kosielsk? Yes?

DR. STAHMER: Yes.

BAZILEVSKY: The witness did not say that.

DR. STAHMER: Do you know that place and locality?

BAZILEVSKY: Do you mean Kosielsk? I do, yes. In 1940, in the month of August at the end of August I spent my leave there with my wife.

DR. STAHMER: Do you know whether there were Polish officers at that place in a Russian prisoner-of-war camp?

BAZILEVSKY: Yes, I know that.

DR. STAHMER: Until what time did these prisoners of war remain there?

BAZILEVSKY: I do not know that for sure but at the end of 8/1940 they were there. I am quite sure about that.

DR. STAHMER: Do you know whether this camp, together with its inmates, fell into German hands?

BAZILEVSKY: Personally, that is, from my own observation, I do not know it; but according to rumors, it appears to have been the case. That is, of course, not my own testimony; I myself did not see it, but I heard about it only.

DR. STAHMER: Did you hear what happened to these prisoners?

BAZILEVSKY: Yes, I heard, of course, that they remained there and could not be evacuated.

DR. STAHMER: Did you hear what became of them?

BAZILEVSKY: I have already testified in my answers to the prosecutor that they were shot on the order of the German Command.

DR. STAHMER: And where did these shootings take place?

BAZILEVSKY: Mr. Defense Counsel, you have apparently not heard my answers. I already testified that Mayor Menschagin said that they were shot in the neighborhood of Smolensk, but where he did not tell me.

DR. STAHMER: How many prisoners were involved?

BAZILEVSKY: Do you mean to say, how many were mentioned in the conversation with Menschagin? I do not understand your question. Do you mean to say according to the reports of Menschagin?

DR. STAHMER: What was the figure given to you by Menschagin?

BAZILEVSKY: Menschagin did not tell me any number. I repeat that this conversation took place on the last days of 9/1941.

DR. STAHMER: Can you give us the name of an eyewitness who was present at this shooting or anyone who saw this shooting?

BAZILEVSKY: I believe that these executions were carried out under such circumstances that I think it scarcely possible that any Russian witnesses could be present.

THE PRESIDENT: Witness, you should answer the question directly. You were asked, “Can you give the names of anybody who was there?” You can answer that “yes” or “no” and then you can add any explanations necessary.

BAZILEVSKY: I will follow your instructions, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Can you give the name of anybody who saw the executions?

BAZILEVSKY: No, I cannot name any eyewitness.

DR. STAHMER: What German unit is supposed to have carried out the shootings?

BAZILEVSKY: I cannot answer that exactly. It is logical to assume that it was the construction battalion which was stationed there; but of course I could not know the exact organization of the German troops.

DR. STAHMER: Did the Poles involved here come from the camp at Kosielsk?

BAZILEVSKY: In general, this was not mentioned in the conversations of that time, but I certainly do not know that; besides these might have been any other Polish prisoners of war who had not been at Kosielsk previously.

DR. STAHMER: Did you yourself see Polish officers?

BAZILEVSKY: I did not see them myself, but my students saw them, and they told me that they had seen them in 1941.

DR. STAHMER: And where did they see them?

BAZILEVSKY: On the road where they were doing repair work at the beginning of summer, 1941.

DR. STAHMER: In what general area or location?

BAZILEVSKY: In the district of the Moscow-Minsk highway, somewhat to the west of Smolensk.

DR. STAHMER: Can you testify whether the Russian Army Command had a report to the effect that Polish prisoners at the camp at Kosielsk had fallen into the hands of the Germans?

BAZILEVSKY: No, I have no knowledge of that.

DR.STAHMER: What is the name of the German official or employee with whom you talked at the Kommandantur?

BAZILEVSKY: Not in the Kommandantur, but in Menschagin’s office. His name was Hirschfeld.

DR. STAHMER: What was his position?

BAZILEVSKY: He was Sonderfuhrer of the 7th Detachment of the German Kommandantur in the town of Smolensk.

DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions, Mr. President just another question or two, Mr. President.

[Turning to the witness.] Were you punished by the Russian Government on account of your collaboration with the German authorities?

BAZILEVSKY: No, I was not.

DR. STAHMER: Are you at liberty?

BAZILEVSKY: Not only am I at liberty; but, as I have already stated, I am still professor at two universities.

DR. STAHMER: Therefore, you are back in office.

BAZILEVSKY: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov, do you wish to re-examine?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, Mr. President, I have no further questions to put to the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Witness, do you know whether the man, whose name I understand to be Menschagin, was told about these matters or whether he himself had any direct knowledge of them?

BAZILEVSKY: From Menschagin’s own words, I understood quite definitely that he had heard those things himself at the Kommandantur, particularly from Von Schwetz, who was the commander from the beginning of the occupation.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, I beg the Tribunal to allow me to call as witness Marko Antonov Markov, a Bulgarian citizen, professor at the University of Sofia.

[The interpreter Valev and the witness Markov took the stand.]

THE PRESIDENT: Are you the interpreter?

LUDOMIR VALEV (Interpreter): Yes, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you give us your full name?

VALEV: Ludomir Valev.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear before God and the Law that I will interpret truthfully and to the best of my skill the evidence to be given by the witness.

[The interpreter repeated the oath.]

THE PRESIDENT: [To the witness.] Will you give us your full name, please?

DR. MARKO ANTONOV MARKOV (Witness): Dr. Marko Antonov Markov.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear as a witness in this case that I will speak only the truth being aware of my responsibility before God and the Law and that I will withhold and add nothing.

[The witness repeated the oath.]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

MR. DODD: Mr. President, before this witness is examined, I would like to call to the attention of the Tribunal the fact that Dr. Stahmer asked the preceding witness a question which I understood went: How did it happen that the interpreters had the questions and the answers to your questions if you didn’t have them before you? Now that question implied that Dr. Stahmer had some information that the interpreters did have the answers to the questions, and I sent a note up to the interpreters, and I have the answer from the lieutenant in charge that no one there had any answers or questions, and I think it should be made clear on the record.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think so, too.

DR. STAHMER: I was advised of this fact outside the courtroom. If it is not a fact, I wish to withdraw my statement. I was informed outside the courtroom from a trustworthy source. I do not recall the name of the person who told me, I shall have to ascertain it. .

THE PRESIDENT: Such statements ought not be made by counsel until they have verified them.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: May I begin the examination of this witness, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: The examination, yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Witness, I beg you to tell us briefly, without taking up the time of the Tribunal with too many details, under what conditions you were included in the so-called International Medical Commission set up by the Germans in the month of 4/1943 for the examination of the graves of Polish officers in the Katyn woods.

I beg you, when answering me, to pause between the question I put to you and your own answer.

MARKOV: This occurred at the end of 4/1943. While working in the Medico-Legal Institute, where I am still working, I was called to the telephone by Dr. Guerow.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness must stop before the interpreter begins. Otherwise, the voices come over the microphone together. So the interpreter must wait until the witness has finished his answer before he repeats it.

Now the witness has said at least this is what I heard that in 4/1943 he was called on the telephone.

MARKOV: I was called to the telephone by Dr. Guerow, the secretary of Dr. Filoff who was then Prime Minister of Bulgaria. I was told that I was to take part, as representative of the Bulgarian Government, in the work of an international medical commission which had to examine the corpses of Polish officers discovered in the Katyn wood. Not wishing to go, I answered that I had to replace the director of my Institute who was away in the country. Dr. Guerow told me that according to an instruction of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who had sent the telegram, it was precisely in order to replace him that I would have to go there. Guerow told me to come to the Ministry. There I asked him if I could refuse to comply with this order. He answered that we were in a state of war and that the Government could send anybody wherever and whenever they deemed it necessary. Guerow took me to the first secretary of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Schuchmanov. Schuchmanov repeated this order and told me that we were to examine the corpses of thousands of Polish officers. I answered that to examine thousands of corpses would take several months, but Schuchmanov said that the Germans had already exhumed a great number of these corpses and that I would have to go, together with other members of the commission, in order to see what had already been done and in order to sign, as Bulgarian representative, the report of the proceedings which had already been drafted. After that, I was taken to the German Legation, to Counsellor Mormann, who arranged all the technical details of the trip. This was on Saturday; and on Monday morning, 26 April, I flew to Berlin. There I was met by an official of the Bulgarian Legation and I was lodged at the Hotel Adlon.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please answer the next question:

Who took part in this so-called International Commission, and when did they leave for Katyn?

MARKOV: On the next day, 27 April, we stayed in Berlin and the other members of the commission arrived there too.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Who were they?

MARKOV: They were the following, besides myself: Dr. Birkle, chief doctor of the Ministry of Justice and first assistant of the Institute of Forensic Medicine and Criminology at Bucharest; Dr. Qiloslavich, professor of forensic medicine and criminology at Zagreb University, who was representative for Croatia; Professor Palmieri, who was professor for forensic medicine and criminology at Naples; Dr. Orsos, professor of forensic medicine and criminology at Budapest; Dr. Subik, professor of pathological anatomy at the University of Bratislava and chief of the State Department for Health for Slovakia; Dr. Hajek, professor for forensic medicine and criminology at Prague, who represented the so-called Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia; Professor Naville, professor of forensic medicine at the University of Geneva, representative for Switzerland; Dr. Speleers, professor for ophthalmology at Ghent University, who represented Belgium; Dr. De Burlett, professor of anatomy at the University of Groningen, representing Holland; Dr. Tramsen, vice chancellor of the Institute for forensic medicine at Copenhagen University, representing Denmark; Dr. Saxen, who was professor for pathological anatomy at Helsinki University, Finland.

During the investigations of the commission, a Dr. Costeduat was missing; he declared that he could attend only as a personal representative of President Laval. Professor Piga from Madrid also arrived, an elderly gentleman who did not take any part in the work of the commission. It was stated later that he was ill as a result of the long journey.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Were all these persons flown to Katyn?

MARKOV: All these persons arrived at Katyn with the exception of Professor Piga.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Who besides the members of the commission left for Katyn with you?

MARKOV: On the 28th we took off from Tempelhof Airdrome, Berlin, for Katyn. We took off in two airplanes which carried about 15 to 20 persons each.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Maybe you can tell us briefly who was there?

MARKOV: Together with us was Director Dietz, who met us and accompanied us. He represented the Ministry of Public Health. There were also press representatives, and two representatives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I beg you to stop with these details and to tell me when the commission arrived in Katyn?

MARKOV: The commission arrived in Smolensk on 28 April, in the evening.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: How many work days did the commission stay in Smolensk? I stress work days.

MARKOV: We stayed in Smolensk 2 days only, 4/29/1943 and 4/30/1943, and on 1 May, in the morning, we left Smolensk.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: How many times did the members of the commission personally visit the mass graves in the Katyn wood?

MARKOV: We were twice in the Katyn wood, that is, in the forenoon of 29 and 30 April.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I mean, how many hours did you spend each time at the mass graves?

MAROV: I consider not more than 3 or 4 hours each time.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Were the members of the commission present at least once during the opening of one of the graves?

MARKOV: No new graves were opened in our presence. We were shown only several graves which had already been opened before we arrived.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Therefore, you were shown already opened graves, near which the corpses were already laid out, is that right?

MARKOV: Quite right. Near these opened graves were exhumed corpses already laid out there.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Were the necessary conditions for an objective and comprehensive scientific examination of the corpses given to the members of the commission?

MARKOV: The only part of our activity which could be characterized as a scientific, medico-legal examination were the autopsies carried out by certain members of the commission who were themselves medico-legal experts; but there were only seven or eight of us who could lay claim to that qualification, and as far as I recall only eight corpses were opened. Each of us operated on one corpse, except Professor Hajek, who dissected two corpses. Our further activity during these 2 days consisted of a hasty inspection under the guidance of Germans. It was like a tourists’ walk during which we saw the open graves; and we were shown a peasant’s house, a few kilometers distant from the.Katyn wood, where in showcases papers and objects of various sorts were kept. We were told that these papers and objects had been found in the clothes of the corpses which had been exhumed.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Were you actually present when these papers were taken from the corpses or were they shown to you when they were already under glass in display cabinets?

MARKOV: The documents which we saw in the glass cases had already been removed from the bodies before we arrived.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Were you allowed to investigate these documents, to examine these documents, for instance, to see whether the papers were impregnated with any acids which had developed by the decay of the corpses, or to carry out any other kind of scientific examination?

MARKOV: We did not carry out any scientific examination of these papers. As I have already told you, these papers were exhibited in glass cases and we did not even touch them.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: But I would like you nevertheless to answer me briefly with “yes” or “no,” a question which I have already put to you. Were the members of the commission given facilities for an objective examination?

MARKOV: In my opinion these working conditions can in no way be qualified as adequate for a complete and objective scientific examination. The only thing which bore the character of the scientific nature was the autopsy which I carried out.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: But did I rightly understand you, that from the 11000 corpses which were discovered only 8 were dissected by members of the commission.

MARKOV: Quite right.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please answer the next question. In what condition were these corpses? I would like you to describe the state in which they were and also the state of the inner organs, the tissues, et cetera.

MARKOV: As to the condition of the corpses in the Katyn graves, I can only judge according to the state of the corpse which I myself dissected. The condition of this corpse was, as far as I could ascertain, the same as that of all the other corpses. The skin was still well preserved, was in part leathery, of a brown-red color and on some parts there were blue markings from the clothes. The nails and hair, mostly, had already fallen out. In the head of the corpse I dissected there was a small hole, a bullet wound in the back of the head. Only pulpy substance remained of the brain. The muscles were still so well preserved that one could even see the fibers of the sinews of heart muscles and valves. The inner organs were also mainly in a good state of preservation. But of course they were dried up, displaced, and of a dark color. The stomach showed traces of some sort of contents. A part of the fat had turned into wax. We were impressed by the fact that even when pulled with brute force, no limbs had detached themselves.

I dictated a report, on the spot, on the result of my investigation. A similar report was dictated by the other members of the commission who examined corpses. This report was published by the Germans under Number 827, in the book which they published.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would like you to answer the following question. Did the medico-legal investigations testify to the fact that the corpses had been in the graves already for 3 years?

MARKOV: As to that question I could judge only from the corpse on which I myself had held a post mortem. The condition of this corpse, as I have already stated, was typical of the average condition of the Katyn corpses. These corpses were far removed from the stage of disintegration of the soft parts, since the fat was only beginning to turn into wax. In my opinion these corpses were buried for a shorter period of time than 3 years. I considered that the corpse which I dissected had been buried for not more than 1 year or 18 months.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Therefore, applying the criteria of the facts which you ascertained to your experiences in Bulgaria that is, in a country of a more southern climate than Smolensk and where decay, therefore, is more rapidone must come to the conclusion that the corpses that were exhumed in the Katyn forest had been lying under the earth for not more than a year and a half? Did I understand you correctly?

MARKOV: Yes, quite right. I had the impression that they had been buried for not more than a year and a half.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 7/2/1946 at 1000 hours.] [The witness Markov resumed the stand.]

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Witness, when did you, together with the other members of the commission, perform the autopsies of these eight corpses? What date was it exactly?

MARKOV: That was on 30 April, early in the day.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And, on the basis of your personal observations, you decided that the corpses were in the ground 1 year or 18 months at the most?

MARKOV: That is correct.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Before putting the next question to you, I should like you to give me a brief answer to the following question: Is it correct that in the practice of Bulgarian medical jurisprudence the protocol about the autopsy contains two parts, a description and the deductions?

MARKOV: Yes. In our practice, as well as in the practice of other countries, so far as I know, it is done in the following way: First of all, we give a description and then the deduction.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Was a deduction contained in the record you made regarding the autopsy?

MARKOV: My record of the autopsy contained only a description without any conclusion.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Why?

MARKOV: Because from the papers which were given to us there I understood that they wanted us to say that the corpses had been in the ground for 3 years. This could be deduced from the papers which were shown to us in the little peasant hut about which I have already spoken.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: By the way, were these papers shown to you before the autopsy or afterward?

MARKOV: Yes, the papers were given us 1 day before the autopsy.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: So you were . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov, you are interrupting the interpreter all the time. Before the interpreter has finished the answer, you have put another question. It is very difficult for us to hear the interpreter.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Thank you for your indication, Mr. President.

MARKOV: Inasmuch as the objective deduction regarding the autopsy I performed was in contradiction with this version, I did not make any deductions.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Consequently you did not make any deduction because the objective data of the autopsy testified to the fact that the corpses had been in the ground, not 3 years, but only 18 months?

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov, you must remember that it is a double translation, and unless you pause more than you are pausing, your voice comes in upon the interpreter’s and we cannot hear the interpreter.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Very well, Mr. President.

MARKOV: Yes, that is quite correct.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Was there unanimity among the members of the commission regarding the time the corpses had been in the graves?

MARKOV: Most of the members of the delegation who performed the autopsies in the Katyn wood made their deductions without answering the essential question regarding the time the corpses had been buried. Some of them, as for instance, Professor Hajek, spoke about immaterial things; as for instance, that one of the killed had had pleurisy. Some of the others, as for instance, Professor Birkle from Bucharest, cut off some hair from a corpse in order to determine the age of the corpse. In my opinion that was quite immaterial. Professor Palmieri, on the basis of the autopsy that he performed, said that the corpse had been in the ground over a year but he did not determine exactly how long.

The only one who gave a definite statement in regard to the time the corpses had been buried was Professor Miloslavich from Zagreb, and he said it was 3 years. However, when the German book regarding Katyn was published, I read the result of his impartial statement regarding the corpse on which he had performed the autopsy. I had the impression that the corpse on which he had performed the autopsy did not differ in its stage of decomposition from the other corpses. This led me to think that his statement that the corpses had been in the ground for 3 years did not coincide with the facts of his description.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would like to ask you to reply to the following question. Were there many skulls found by the members of the commission with signs of so-called pseudo-callus? By the way, inasmuch as this term is not known in the usual books on medical jurisprudence and in general criminalistic terminology, I should like you to give us an exact explanation of what Professor Orsos, of Budapest, means by the term pseudo-callus.

THE PRESIDENT: Would you repeat that question?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Were there many skulls with signs of so-called pseudo-callus which were submitted to the members of the commission? Inasmuch as this term is not known in the usual books on medical jurisprudence, I should like you to give us a detailed explanation of what Professor Orsos means by the term pseudo-callus.

THE PRESIDENT: What are you saying the skulls had? You asked if there were many skulls with something or other.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I see this term for the first time, myself, Mr. President. It is pseudo-callus. It seems to be a Latin term of some sort of corn which is formed on the outer surface of the cerebral substance.

THE PRESIDENT: Can you spell the word in Latin?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, Mr. President.

[The prosecutor submitted a paper to the President.]

THE PRESIDENT: What you have written here is p-s-e-r-d-o. Do you mean p-s-e-u-d-o, which means false?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, that is right, pseudo.

THE PRESIDENT: Now then, put your question again, and try to put it shortly.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes.

[Turning to the witness.] Were there many skulls with signs of so-called pseudocallus shown to the members of the commission? Will you please give an exact explanation of this term of Professor Orsos.

MARKOV: Professor Orsos spoke to us regarding pseudocallus at a general conference of the delegates. That took place on 30 April, in the afternoon, in the building where the field laboratory of Dr. Butz in Smolensk was located.

Professor Orsos described the term pseudocallus as meaning some sediment of indissoluble salt, of calcium, and other salts on the inside of the cranium. Professor Orsos stated that, according to his observations in Hungary, this happened if the corpses have been in the ground for at least 3 years. When Professor Orsos stated this at the scientific conference, none of the delegates said anything either for or against it. I deduced from that that this term pseudocallus was as unknown to the other delegates as it was to me.

At the same conference Professor Orsos showed us such a pseudocallus on one of the skulls.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I should like you to answer the following question: What number did the corpse have from which this skull with signs of pseudocallus was taken?

MARKOV: The corpse from which the skull was taken and which was noted in the book bore the Number 526. From this I deduced that this corpse was exhumed before our arrival at Katyn, inasmuch as all the other corpses on which we performed autopsies on 30 April had numbers which ran above 800. It was explained to us that as soon as a corpse was exhumed it immediately received a consecutive number.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Tell me this, please. Did you notice any pseudocallus on the skulls of the corpses on which you and your colleagues performed autopsies?

MARKOV: On the skull of the corpse on which I performed an autopsy, there was some sort of pulpy substance in place of the brain, but I never noticed any sign of pseudocallus. The other delegates after the explanation of Professor Orsos likewise did not state that they had found any pseudocallus in the other skulls. Even Butz and his co-workers, who had examined the corpses before our arrival, did not mention any sign of pseudocallus.

Later on, in a book which was published by the Germans and which contained the report of Butz, I noticed that Butz referred to pseudocallus in order to give more weight to his statement that the corpses had been in the ground for 3 years.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That is to say, that of the 11000 corpses only one skull was submitted to you which had pseudocallus?

MARKOV: That is quite correct.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I should like you to describe to the Tribunal in detail the state of the clothing which you found on the corpses.

MARKOV: In general the clothing was well preserved, but of course it was damp due to the decomposition of the corpses. When we pulled off the clothing to undress the corpses, or when we tried to take off the shoes, the clothing did not tear nor did the shoes fall apart at the seams. I even had the impression that this clothing could have been used again, after having been cleaned.

There were some papers found in the pockets of the clothing of the corpse on which I performed the autopsy, and these papers were also impregnated with the dampness of the corpse. Some of the Germans who were present when I was performing the autopsy asked me to describe those papers and their contents; but I refused to do it, thinking that this was not the duty of a doctor. In fact I had already noticed the previous day that with the help of the dates contained in those papers, they were trying to make us think that the corpses had remained in the ground for 3 years.

Therefore, I wanted to base my deductions only on the actual condition of the corpses. Some of the other delegates who performed autopsies also found some papers in the clothing of the corpses. The papers which had been found in the clothing of the corpse on which I performed the autopsy were put into a cover which bore the same number as the corpse, Number 827. Later on, in the book which was published by the Germans, I perceived that some of the delegates described the contents of the papers which were found on the corpses.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I should like to ask you to reply to the following question. On what impartial medico-judicial data did the commission base the deduction that the corpses had remained in the earth not less than 3 years?

THE PRESIDENT: Will you put the question again? I did not understand the question.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I asked on what impartial medico-judicial data were the deductions of the protocol of the International Medical Commission based, which stated that the corpses had remained in the ground not less than 3 years?

THE PRESIDENT: Has he said that that was the deduction he made not less than 3 years?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): He has not said that.

THE PRESIDENT: He has not said that at all. He never said that he made the deduction that the corpses remained in the ground not less than 3 years.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: He did not make this deduction; but Professor Markov, together with the other members of the commission, signed a report of the International Commission.

THE PRESIDENT: I know; but that is why I ask you to repeat your question. The question that was translated to us was: On what grounds did you make your deduction that the corpses had remained in the ground not less than 3 years which is the opposite of what he said.

Now will you put the question again?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Very well.

[Turning to the witness.] I am not asking you about your personal minutes, Witness, but about the general record of the entire commission. I am asking you on what impartial medico-judicial data were the deductions of the entire commission based, that the corpses had remained in the earth not less than 3 years. On the record of the deductions your signature figures among those of the other members of the commission.

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. Now, then, Colonel Smirnov, will you put the question again.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, Mr. President.

[Turning to the witness.] I was asking you on what impartial medico-judicial data were the deductions of the commission based not the individual report of Dr. Markov, in which there are no deductions but the deductions of the entire commission, that the corpses had remained not less than 3 years in the ground?

MARKOV: The collective protocol of the commission which was signed by all the delegates was very scant regarding the real medico-judicial data. Concerning the condition of the corpses, only one sentence in the report was stated, namely that the corpses were in various stages of decomposition, but there was no description of the real extent of decomposition. Thus, in my opinion, this deduction was based on the papers found on the corpses and on testimony of the witnesses, but not on the actual medico-judicial data. As far as medical jurisprudence is concerned, they tried to support this deduction by the statement of Professor Orsos regarding the finding of pseudocallus in the skull of corpse Number 526.

But, according to my conviction, since this skull was the only one with signs of pseudocallus, it was wrong to arrive at a definite conclusion regarding the stage of decomposition of thousands of corpses which were contained in the Katyn graves. Besides, the observation of Professor Orsos regarding pseudocallus was made in Hungary; that is to say, under quite different soil and climatic conditions, and withal in individual graves and not in mass graves, as was the case in Katyn.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You spoke about the testimony of witnesses. Did the members of the commission have the opportunity personally to interrogate those witnesses, especially the Russian witnesses?

MARKOV: We did not have the opportunity of having any contact with the indigenous population. On the contrary, immediately upon our arrival at the hotel in Smolensk, Butz told us that we were in a military zone, and that we did not have the right to walk around in the city without being accompanied by a member of the German Army, or to speak with the inhabitants of the place, or to make photographs. In reality, during the time we were there, we did not have any contact with the local inhabitants.

On the first day of our arrival in the Katyn wood, that is to say on 29 April, in the morning, several Russian civilians were brought under German escort to the graves. Immediately upon our arrival at Smolensk some of the depositions of the local witnesses were submitted to us. The depositions were typed. When these witnesses were brought to the Katyn wood, we were told that these witnesses were the ones who gave the testimonies which had been submitted to us. There was no regular interrogation of the witnesses which could have been recorded, or were recorded. Professor Orsos started the conversation with the witnesses and told us that he could speak Russian because he had been a prisoner of war in Russia during the first World War. He began to speak with a man, an elderly man whose name, so far as I can remember, was Kiselov. Then he spoke to a second witness, whose last name so far as I can remember was Andrejev. All the conversation lasted a few minutes only. As our Bulgarian language is rather similar to the Russian, I tried also to speak to some of the witnesses…

THE PRESIDENT: Don’t you think that should be left to cross examination? Can’t these details be left to cross-examination?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, Mr. President.

I would ask you, Witness, to interrupt the reply to this question and to answer the following one: At the time you signed this general report of the commission, was it quite clear to you that the murders were perpetrated in Katyn not earlier than the last quarter of 1941, and that 1940, in any case, was excluded?

MARKOV: Yes, this was absolutely clear to me and that is why I did not make any deductions in the minutes which I made on my findings in the Katyn wood.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Why did you sign then this general report, which was incorrect in your opinion?

MARKOV: In order to make it quite clear under what conditions I signed this report, I should like to say a few words on how it was made up and how it was signed.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Excuse me, I would like to put a question to you which defines more accurately this matter. Was this report actually signed on 4/30/1941 in the town of Smolensk or was it signed on another date and at another place?

MARKOV: It was not signed in Smolensk on 30 April but was Signed on 1 May at noon, at the airport which was called Bela.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Will you please tell the Tribunal under what conditions it was signed.

MARKOV: The compilation of this record was to be done at the same conference which I already mentioned and which took place in the laboratory of Butz in the afternoon of 30 April. Present at this conference were all the delegates and all the Germans who had arrived with us from Berlin: Butz and his assistants, General Staff Physician Holm, the chief physician of the Smolensk sector, and also other German Army officials who were unknown to me. Butz stated that the Germans were only present as hosts, but actually the conference was presided over by General Staff Physician Holm and the work was performed under the direction of Butz. The secretary of the conference was the personal lady secretary of Butz who took down the report. However, I never saw these minutes. Butz and Orsos came with a prepared draft to this conference, a sort of protocol; but I never learned who ordered them to draw up such a protocol. This protocol was read by Butz and then a question was raised regarding the state and the age of the young pines which were in the clearings of the Katyn wood. Butz was of the opinion that in these clearings there were graves too.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Excuse me for interrupting you. Did you have any evidence that any graves were actually found in these clearings?

MARKOV: No. During the time we were there, no new graves were opened. As some of the delegates said they were not competent to express their opinion regarding the age of these trees, General Holm gave an order to bring a German who was an expert on forestry. He showed us the cut of the trunk of a small tree and from the number of circles in this trunk, he deduced the trees were 5 years old.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Excuse me; I interrupt you again. You, yourself can you state here that this tree was actually cut down from the grave and not from any other place in the clearing?

MARKOV: I can say only that in the Katyn wood there were some clearings with small trees and that, while driving back to Smolensk, we took a little tree with us in the bus, but I do not know whether there were any graves where these trees were standing. As I have already stated, no graves were laid open in our presence.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would request you to continue your reply, but very briefly and not to detain the attention of the Tribunal with unnecessary details.

MARKOV: Some editorial notes were made in connection with this protocol, but I do not remember what they were. Then Orsos and Butz were entrusted with the final drafting of the record. The signing of the record was intended to take place on the same night at a banquet which was organized in a German Army hospital. At this banquet Butz arrived with the minutes and he started reading them, but the actual signing did not take place for reasons which are still not clear to me. It was stated that this record would have to be rewritten, so the banquet lasted until 3 or 4 o’clock in the morning. Then Professor Palmieri told me that the Germans were not pleased with the contents of the protocol and that they were carrying on telephone conversations with Berlin and that perhaps there would not even be a protocol at all.

Indeed, having spent the night in Smolensk without having signed the record, we took off from Smolensk on the morning of 1 May. I personally had the impression that no protocol at all would be issued and I was very pleased about that. On the way to Smolensk, as well as on our way back, some of the delegates asked to stop in Warsaw in order to see the city, but we were told that it was impossible because of military reasons.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: This has nothing to do with the subject. Please keep to the facts.

MARKOV: Around noon we arrived at the airport which was called Bela. The airport was apparently a military airfield because of the temporary military barracks I saw there. We had dinner there and immediately after dinner, notwithstanding the fact that we were not told that the signing of the minutes would take place on the way to Berlin, we were submitted copies of the protocol for signature. During the signing a number of military persons were present, as there were no other people except military personnel on this airfield. I was rather struck by the fact that on the one hand the records were already completed in Smolensk but were not submitted to us for signing there, and on the other hand that they did not wait till we arrived in Berlin a few hours later. They were submitted to us for signing at this isolated military airfield. This was the reason why I signed the report, in spite of the conviction I had acquired during the autopsy which I had performed at Smolensk.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That is to say, the date and the locality which are shown in the protocol are incorrect?

MARKOV: Yes, that is so.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And you signed it because you felt yourself compelled to?

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov, I don’t think it is proper for you to put leading questions to him. He has stated the fact. It is useless to go on stating conclusions about it.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Very well, Mr. President. I have no further questions to put to the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Does anyone want to cross-examine him?

DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, I should like to ask a question concerning the legal proceedings first. Each side was to call three witnesses before the Court. This witness, as I understand it, has not only testified to facts but has also made statements which can be called an expert judgment. He has not only expressed himself as an expert witness, as we say in German law, but also as an expert. If the Court is to listen to these statements made by the witness as an expert, I should like to have the opportunity for the Defense also to call in an expert.

THE PRESIDENT: No, Dr. Stahmer, the Tribunal will not hear more than three witnesses on either side. You could have called any expert you wanted or any member of the experts who made the German examination. It was your privilege to call any of them.

DR. STAHMER: Witness, how long have you been active in the field of medical jurisprudence?

MARKOV: I have been working in the field of medical jurisprudence since the beginning of 1927 in the faculty for medical jurisprudence of the University in Sofia, first as an assistant and now I am professor of medical jurisprudence. I am not a staff professor at the university. My position can be designated by the German word “Ausserordentlicher Professor” (university lecturer).

DR. STAHMER: Before your visit to Katyn did your government tell you that you were to participate in a political action without consideration of your scientific qualification?

MARKOV: I was not told so literally, but in the press the Katyn question was discussed as a political subject.

DR. STAHMER: Did you feel free in regard to your scientific “conscience” at that time?

MARKOV: At what time?

DR. STAHMER: At the time when you went to Katyn?

MARKOV: The question is not quite clear to me; I should like you to explain it.

DR. STAHMER: Did you consider the task you had to carry out there a political one or a scientific one?

MARKOV: I understood this task from the very first moment as a political one and therefore I tried to evade it.

DR. STAHMER: Did you realize the outstanding political importance of this task?

MARKOV: Yes; from everything I read in the press.

DR. STAHMER: In your examination yesterday you said that when you arrived at Katyn the graves had already been opened and certain corpses had been carefully laid out. Do you mean to say that these corpses were not taken from the graves at all?

MARKOV: No, I should not say that, inasmuch as it was obvious that corpses were taken out of these graves and besides I saw that some corpses were still in the graves.

DR. STAHMER: Then, in order to state this positively, you had no reason to think that the corpses inspected by the commission were not taken from these mass graves?

THE PRESIDENT: He did not know where they came from, did he?

MARKOV: Evidently from the graves which were open.

DR. STAHMER: You have already made statements to the effect that. as a result of the medico-judicial examination by this International Commission, a protocol, a record was taken down. You have furthermore stated that you signed this protocol.

Mr. President, this protocol is contained in its full text in the official data published by the German Government on this incident. I ask that this evidence, this so-called White Book, be admitted as evidence. I will submit it to the Court later.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.

[A Recess was taken.]

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, the Tribunal rules that you may cross-examine this witness upon the report, and the protocol will be admitted in evidence, if you offer it in evidence, under Article 19 of the Charter. That, of course, involves that we do not take judicial notice of the report under Article 21 of the Charter but that it is offered under Article 19 of the Charter and therefore it will either come through the earphones in cross-examination or such parts of the protocol as you wish to have translated.

DR. STAHMER: Witness, was the protocol or the record signed by you and the other experts compiled in the same way in which it is included in the German White Book?

MARKOV: Yes, the record of the protocol which is included in the German White Book is the same protocol which I compiled. A long time after my return to Sofia I was sent two copies of the protocol by Director Dietz. These two copies were typewritten, and I was requested to make necessary corrections and additions if I deemed it necessary, but I left it without corrections and it was printed without any comments on my part.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Just a moment Dr. Stahmer . . .

Mr. President, I believe that there is a slight confusion here. The witness is answering in regard to the individual protocol, whereas Dr. Stahmer is questioning him on the general record. Thus the witness does not answer the proper question.

DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, I would have cleared this matter up on my own account.

[Turning to the witness.] Do you mean your autopsy protocol?

MARKOV: I mean the protocol I compiled myself and not the general record.

DR. STAHMER: Now, what about this general protocol or record? When did you receive a copy of it?

MARKOV: I received a copy of the general record in Berlin where as many copies were signed as there were delegates present.

DR. STAHMER: Just a little while ago you stated that Russian witnesses had been taken before the commission in the wood of Katyn, but that, however, there had been no opportunity afforded the experts to talk with these witnesses concerning the question at hand.

Now, in this protocol, in this record, the following remark is found, and I quote:

“The commission interrogated several indigenous Russian witnesses personally. Among other things, these witnesses confirmed that in the months of March and 4/1940 large shipments of Polish officers arrived almost daily at the railroad station Gnjesdova near Katyn. These trains were emptied, the inmates were taken in lorries to the wood of Katyn and never seen again. Furthermore, official notice was taken of the proofs and statements, and the documents containing the evidence were inspected.”

MARKOV: As I already stated during the questioning, two witnesses were interrogated on the spot by Orsos. They actually said that they saw how Polish officers were brought to the station of Gnjesdova and that later they did not see them again.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, the Tribunal thinks the witness ought to be given an opportunity of seeing the report when you put passages in it to him.

DR. STAHMER: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Haven’t you got another copy of it?

DR. STAHMER: I am sorry, Mr. President, I have no second copy; no.

THE PRESIDENT: Can the witness read German?

MARKOV: No, but anyhow I can understand the contents of the record.

THE PRESIDENT: You mean you can read it?

MARKOV: Yes, I can also read it.

THE PRESIDENT: Can the witness read German, do you mean?

MARKOV: Yes, I can read German.

DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, may I make a suggestion?

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, if you have only got one copy, I think you had better have it back. You can’t have the book passing to and fro like that.

DR. STAHMER: I should like to make the suggestion that the cross-examination be interrupted and the other witness be called, and I will have this material typed in the meantime. That would be a solution. But there are only a few sentences…

THE PRESIDENT: You can read it. Take the book back.

DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, I propose to read only a few short sentences.

[Turning to the witness.] Yesterday you testified, Witness, that the experts restricted or limited themselves to making an autopsy on one corpse only. In this report the following is set down I quote:

“The members of the commission personally performed an autopsy on nine corpses and numerous selected cases were submitted for post-mortem examination.” Is that right?

MARKOV: That is right. Those of the members of the commission who were medical experts, with the exception of Professor Naville, performed each an autopsy on a corpse. Hajek made two autopsies.

DR. STAHMER: In this instance we are not interested in the autopsy, but in the post-mortem examination.

MARKOV: The corpses were examined but only superficially during an inspection which we carried out very hastily on the first day. No individual autopsy was carried out, but the corpses were merely looked at as they lay side by side.

DR. STAHMER: I should like to ask you now what is meant in medical science by the concept “post-mortem examination.”

MARKOV: We differentiate between an exterior inspection, when the corpse has to be undressed and minutely examined externally, and an internal inspection, when the inner organs of the corpse are examined. This was not done with the hundreds of bodies at Katyn, as it was not physically possible. We were there only one forenoon. Therefore, I consider that there was no actual medico-judicial expert examination of these corpses in the real sense of the word.

DR. STAHMER: A little while ago you talked about the trees that were growing there on these graves, and you said that an expert explained the age of the trees by the rings counted on a trunk. In the protocol and the report the following is set down. I quote:

“According to the opinion of the members of the commission and the testimony of forest ranger Von Herff, who was called in as an expert on forestry, they were small pine trees of at least 5 years of age, badly developed because they had been standing in the shade of large trees and had been transplanted to this spot about 3 years ago.”

Now, I would like to ask you, is it correct that you undertook a local inspection and that you convinced yourself on the spot whether the statements made by the forestry expert were actually correct?

MARKOV: Our personal impression and my personal conviction in this question only refer to the fact that in the wood of Katyn there were clearings where small trees were growing and that the afore-mentioned expert showed us a cross section of a tree with its circles. But I do not consider myself competent and cannot give an opinion as to whether the deductions which are set forth in the record are correct or not. Precisely for that reason it was judged necessary to call in a forestry expert, for we doctors were not competent to decide this question. Therefore, these conclusions are merely the conclusions of a competent German expert.

DR. STAHMER: But after having had a first-hand view, did you doubt the truth of these statements?

MARKOV: After the German expert had expressed his opinion at the conference of the delegates, neither I nor the other delegates expressed any opinion as to whether his conclusions were correct or not. These conclusions are set down in the record in the form in which the expert expressed himself.

DR. STAHMER: According to your autopsy report the corpse of the Polish officer which you dissected was clothed and you described the clothing in detail. Was this winter or summer clothing that you found?

MARKOV: It was winter clothing including an overcoat and a woollen shawl around the neck.

DR. STAHMER: In the protocol it says further and I quote:

“Furthermore, Polish cigarettes and matchboxes were found with the dead; in some cases tobacco containers and cigarette holders, and ‘Kosielsk’ was inscribed thereon.” The question is, did you see these objects?

MARKOV: We actually saw these tobacco boxes with the name “Kosielsk” engraved thereon. They were exhibited to us in the glass case which was shown to us in the peasant hut not far from the Katyn wood. I remember them because Butz drew our attention to them.

DR. STAHMER: In your autopsy report, Witness, there is the following remark, and I quote:

“In the clothing documents were found and they were put in the folder Number 827.”

Now, I should like to ask you: How did you discover these documents? Did you personally take them out of the pockets?

MARKOV: These papers were in the pockets of the overcoat and of the jacket. As far as I can remember they were taken out by a German who was undressing the corpse in my presence.

DR. STAHMER: At that time were the documents already in the envelope?

MARKOV: They were not yet in the envelope, but after they had been taken out of the pockets they were put into an envelope which bore the number of the corpse. We were told that this was the usual method of procedure.

DR. STAHMER: What was the nature of the documents?

MARKOV: I did not examine them at all, as I have already !t said, and I refused to do so, but according to the size. I believe that they were certificates of identity. I could distinguish individual letters, but I do not know whether one could read the inscription, for I did not attempt to do so.

DR. STAHMER: In the protocol the following statement is made, and I quote:

“The documents found with the corpses (diaries, letters, and newspapers) were dated from the fall of 1939 until March and 4/1940. The latest date which could be ascertained was the date of a Russian newspaper of 4/22/1940.”

Now, I should like to ask you if this statement is correct and whether it is in accordance with the findings that you made?

MARKOV: Such letters and newspapers were indeed in the glass cases and were shown to us. Some such papers were found by members of the commission who were dissecting the bodies, and if I remember rightly, they described the contents of these documents but I did not do so.

DR. STAHMER: In your examination just a little while ago you stated that only a few scientific details were contained in this protocol and that this was probably done intentionally. I should like to quote from this record as follows:

“Various degrees and types of decomposition were caused by the position of the bodies to one another in the grave. Aside from some mummification on the surface and around the edges of the mass of corpses, some damp maceration was found among the center corpses. The sticking together of the adjacent corpses and the soldering together of corpses through cadaverous acids and fluids which had thickened. and particularly the deformations that obtained from the pressure among the corpses, show that the corpses were buried there right from the beginning.

“Among the corpses, insects or remains of insects which might date back to the time of burial are entirely lacking, and from this it may be gathered that the shooting and the burial took place at a season which was cold and free from insects.”

Now, I should like to ask you if these statements are correct and if they are in line with your findings.

MARKOV: I stated that little was said on the condition of the corpses, and indeed as can be judged by the quotation which I had in mind, only a general phraseology is used concerning the various degrees of decomposition of the corpses, but no concrete or detailed description of the condition of the corpses is made.

As to the insects and their larvae, the assertion of the general report that none were discovered is in flagrant contradiction to the conclusions of Professor Palmieri, which are recorded in his personal minutes concerning the corpse which he himself dissected. In this protocol, which is published in the same German White Book, it is said that there were traces of remains of insects and their larvae in the mouths of the corpses.

DR. STAHMER: Just a little while ago you spoke of the scientific examination of skulls undertaken by Professor Orsos. The record also refers to this matter, and I quote:

“A large number of skulls were examined with respect to the changes they had undergone, which, according to the background and experience of Professor Orsos, would be of great value in fixing the date of death. In this connection, we are concerned with stratified encrustations on the surface of the mush found in the skull as a residue of the brain. These symptoms are not to be found among corpses which have been in their graves for less than 3 years. Such a condition, among other things, was found in a very decided form in the skull of corpse Number 526, which was found near the surface of a large mass grave.”

I should like to ask you now if it is correct that, according to the report of Professor Orsos, such a condition was discovered not only as is said here on the skull of one corpse, but among other corpses also.

MARKOV: I can answer this question quite categorically. We were shown only one skull, the one precisely mentioned in the record under the Number 526. I do not know that other skulls were examined, as the record seems to imply. I am of the opinion that Professor Orsos had no possibility of examining many corpses in the Katyn wood, for he came with us and left with us. That means he stayed in the Katyn wood just as long as I and all the other members of the commission did.

DR. STAHMER: Finally, I should like to quote the conclusion of the summarizing expert opinion, in which it is stated: “From statements made by witnesses, from the letters and correspondence, diaries, newspapers, and so forth, found on the corpses, it may be seen that the shootings took place in the months of March and 4/1940. The following are in complete agreement with the findings made with regard to the mass graves and the individual corpses of the Polish officers, as described in the report.” Is this statement actually correct?

THE PRESIDENT: I did not quite understand the statement. As I heard you read it, it was something like this: From the statements of witnesses, letters, and so forth . . .

DR. STAHMER: “. . . in complete agreement with the findings made with regard to the mass graves and the individual corpses of the Polish officers and described in the report.” That is the end of the quotation.

THE PRESIDENT: It doesn’t say that the following persons are in complete agreement, but that the following facts are in complete agreement. Is that right?

DR. STAHMER: No. My question is: “Is this statement approved by you? Do you agree with it?”

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know, but you read out certain words, which were these: “The following are in complete agreement.” What I want to know is whether that means that the following persons are in complete agreement, or whether the following facts are in complete agreement.

DR. STAHMER: Special facts had been set down, and this is a summarizing expert opinion signed by all the members of the commission. Therefore, we have here a scientific explanation of the real facts.

THE PRESIDENT: Would you just listen to what I read out from what I took down? “From the statements of witnesses, letters, and other documents, it may be seen that the shooting took place in the months of March and 4/1940. The following are in complete agreement.” What I am asking you is this…

[Dr. Stahmer attempted to interrupt.]

Just a moment, Dr. Stahmer, listen to what I say. What I am asking you is: Does the statement mean that the following persons are in complete agreement, or that the following facts are in complete agreement?

DR. STAHMER: No, no. The following people testify that this fact, the fact that the shootings took place in the months of March and 4/1940, agrees with the results of their investigations of the mass graves and of individual corpses. That is what is meant and that is the conclusion. What has been found here is in agreement with that which has been set down and determined scientifically. That is the meaning.

THE PRESIDENT: Go on.

DR. STAHMER: Is this final deduction in accord with your scientific conviction?

MARKOV: I have already indicated that this statement regarding the condition of the corpses is based on the date resulting from testimony by the witnesses and from the available documents, but it is in contradiction to the observations I made on the corpse which I dissected. That means I did not consider that the results of the autopsies corroborated the presumable date of death to be taken from the testimony or the documents. If I had been convinced that the condition of the corpses did indeed correspond to the date of decease mentioned by the Germans, I would have given such a statement in my individual protocol.

When I saw the signed protocol I became suspicious as to the last sentence of the record the sentence which precedes the signatures. I always had doubts whether this sentence was contained in that draft of the protocol which we saw at the conference in Smolensk.

As far as I could understand, the draft of the protocol which had been elaborated in Smolensk only stated that we actually were shown papers and that we heard witnesses; and this was supposed to prove that the killings were carried out in March or 4/1940. I was of the opinion that the fact that the conclusion was not based on medical opinion and not supported absolutely by medical reports and examination, was the reason why the signing of the protocol was postponed and why the record was not signed in Smolensk.

DR. STAHMER: Witness, at the beginning of my examination you stated that you were fully aware of the political significance of your task. Why, then, did you desist from protesting against this report which was not in accord with your scientific conviction?

MARKOV: I have already said that I signed the protocol as I was convinced that the circumstances at this isolated military airfield offered no other possibility, and therefore I could not make any objections.

DR. STAHMER: Why did you not take steps later on?

MARKOV: My conduct after the signing of the protocol corresponds fully to what I am stating here, I repeat. I was not convinced of the truth of the German version. I was invited many times to Berlin by Director Dietz. I was also invited to Sofia by the German Embassy. And in Bulgaria, the Bulgarian Foreign Office also invited me to make a public statement over the radio and to the press; and I was requested to say what conclusions we had come to during our investigation. However, I did not do so, and I always refused to do so. Because of the political situation in which we found ourselves at that moment, I could not make a public statement declaring the German version was wrong.

Concerning that matter there were quite sharp words exchanged between me and the German Embassy in Sofia. And when, a few months later, another Bulgarian representative was asked to be sent as a member of a similar commission for the investigation of the corpses in Vinnitza in the Ukraine, the German Ambassador Beckerly stated quite openly to the Bulgarian Foreign Office that the Germans did not wish me to be sent to Vinnitza.

That indicated that the Germans very well understood my behavior and my opinion on that matter. Concerning this question, Minister Plenipotentiary Saratov, of our Foreign Office, still has shorthand records about conversations which, if the Honored Tribunal considers it necessary, can be sent here from Bulgaria.

Therefore, all my refusals, after I had signed the protocol, to carry on any activity for the purpose of propaganda, fully correspond to what I said here, namely that the conclusions laid down in the collective protocol do not answer my personal conviction. And I will repeat that if I had been convinced that the corpses were buried for 3 years, I would have testified this after having dissected a corpse. But I have left my personal protocol incomplete and this is a quite unusual thing in the case of medico-judicial examination.

DR. STAHMER: The protocol was not signed by you alone, but on the contrary it carries the signatures of 11 representatives of science, whose names you gave yesterday, some of them of world renown. Among these men we find a scientist of a neutral country, Professor Naville.

Did you take the opportunity to get in touch with one of these experts in the meantime with a view of reaching a rectification of the report?

MARKOV: I cannot say on what considerations the other delegates signed the protocol. But they also signed it under the same circumstances as I did. However, when I read the individual protocols, I notice that they also refrained from stating the precise date of the killing of the man whose corpse they had dissected. There was one exception only, as I have already said. That was Professor Niloslavich, who was the only one who asserted that the corpse which he had dissected was that of a man buried for at least 3 years. After the signing of the protocol, I did not have any contact with any of the persons who had signed the collective protocol.

DR. STAHMER: Witness, you gave two versions, one in the protocol which we have just discussed, and another here before the Court. Which version is the correct one?

MARKOV: I do not understand which two versions you are speaking about. Will you please explain it?

DR. STAHMER: In the first version, in the protocol, it is set forth that according to the conclusion which had been made, the shooting must have taken place 3 years ago. Today you testified that the findings were not correct, and between the shooting and the time of your investigations there could only be a space of perhaps 18 months.

MARKOV: I stated that the conclusions of the collective protocol do not correspond with my personal conviction.

DR. STAHMER: “Did not correspond” or “do not correspond with your conviction”?

MARKOV: It did not and it does not correspond with my opinion then and now.

DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, I have no further questions to put to this witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Witness, were any of the bodies which were examined by the members of this delegation exhumed from the ground in your presence?

MARKOV: The corpses which we dissected were selected among the top layers of the graves which had been already exhumed. They were taken out of the graves and given to us for dissection.

THE PRESIDENT: Was there anything to indicate, in your opinion, that the corpses had not been buried in those graves?

MARKOV: As far as traces are concerned, and as far as the layers of corpses were preserved, they were stuck to each other; so that if they had been transferred, I do not believe that this could have been done recently. This could not have been done immediately before our arrival.

THE PRESIDENT: You mean that you think the corpses had been buried in those graves?

MARKOV: I cannot say whether they were put into those graves immediately after death had come, as I have no data to confirm this, but they did not look as if they had just been put there.

THE PRESIDENT: Is it possible, in your opinion as an expert, to fix the date of March or April or such a short period as that, 3 years before the examination which you have made?

MARKOV: I believe that if one relies exclusively on medical data, that is to say, on the state and condition of the corpses, it is impossible, when it is a question of years, to determine the date with such precision and say accurately whether they were killed in March or in April. Therefore, apparently the months of March and April were not based on the medical data, for that would be impossible, but on the testimony of the witnesses and on the documents which were shown

THE PRESIDENT: When you got back to Sofia, you said that the protocol was sent to you for your observations and for your corrections and that you made none. Why was that?

MARKOV: We are concerned with the individual protocol which I compiled. I did not supplement it by making any conclusion, I did not add any conclusion because it was sent to me by the Germans and because in general at that time the political situation in our country was such that I could not declare publicly that the German version was not a true one.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean that your personal protocol alone was sent to you at Sofia?

MARKOV: Yes, only my personal protocol was sent to Sofia.

As to the collective protocol, I brought that back myself to Sofia and handed it over to our Foreign Minister.

THE PRESIDENT: Is your personal protocol, in the words that you drew it up, incorporated in the whole protocol and signed by all the delegates?

MARKOV: In my personal protocol there is only a description of the corpse and of the clothing of the corpse which I dissected.

THE PRESIDENT: That is not the question I asked.

MARKOV: In the general protocol a rough description only is made, concerning the clothing and the degree of decomposition.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, do you mean that your personal protocol . . .

MARKOV: I consider that the personal protocols are more accurate regarding the condition of the corpses, because they were compiled during the dissection and were dictated on the spot to the stenographers.

THE PRESIDENT: Just listen to the question, please. Is your personal protocol, in the words in which you drew it up, incorporated in the collective protocol in the same words?

MARKOV: My own protocol is not included in the general record, but it is included in the White Book which the Germans published together with the general record.

THE PRESIDENT: It is there then, in the report, is it? It is in the White Book?

MARKOV: Yes, quite right. It is included in this book.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire. Yes, Colonel Smirnov, do you have another witness?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, Mr. President. I beg you to allow me to call as a witness, Professor of Medical Jurisprudence Prosorovski.

[The witness Prosorovski took the stand.]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please.

VICTOR IL’ICH PROSOROVSKI (Witness): Prosorovski, Victor Il’ich.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me:

I, citizen of the U.S.S.R.called as a witness in this case solemnly promise and swear before the High Tribunal to say all that I know about this case and to add and withhold nothing.

[The witness repeated the oath.]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Witness, just before questioning you, I beg you to adhere to the following order. After my question, please pause in order to allow the interpreters to make the translation, and speak as slowly as possible.

Will you give the Tribunal very briefly some information about your scientific activity, and your past work as a medico-judicial doctor.

PROSOROVSKI: I am a doctor by profession; professor of medical jurisprudence and a doctor of medical science. I am the Chief Medical Expert of the Ministry of Public Health of the Soviet Union. I am the Director of the Scientific Research Institute for Medical Jurisprudence at the Ministry of Public Health of the U.S.S.R.; my business is mainly of a scientific nature; I am President of the Medico-Judicial Commission of the Scientific Medical Council of the Ministry of Public Health of the U.S.S.R.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: How long did you practice as a medico-judicial expert?

PROSOROVSKI: I practiced for 17 years in that sphere.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: What kind of participation was yours in the investigation of the mass crimes of the Hitlerites against the Polish officers in Katyn?

PROSOROVSKI: The President of the Special Commission for investigation and ascertaining of the circumstances of the shootings by the German Fascist aggressors of Polish officers, Academician Nicolai Ilych Burdenko, offered me in the beginning of 1/1944 the chairmanship of the Medico-Judicial Commission of experts.

Apart from this organizational activity, I participated personally in the exhumations and examination of these corpses.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov, perhaps that would be a good time to break off.

[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]

THE MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the Defendants Hess, Fritzsche, and Von Ribbentrop are absent.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: May I continue the examination of this witness, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please tell me, how far from the town of Smolensk were the burial grounds where the corpses were discovered?

PROSOROVSKI: A commission of medico-legal experts, together with members of the special commission, Academician Burdenko, Academician Potemkin, Academician Tolstoy, and other members of this commission, betook themselves on 1/14/1944 to the burial grounds of the Polish officers in the so-called Katyn wood. This spot is located about 15 kilometers from the town of Smolensk. These burial grounds were situated on a slope at a distance of about 200 meters from the Vitebsk high road. One of these graves was about 60 meters long and 60 meters wide; the other one, situated a small distance from this first grave, was about 7 meters long and 6 meters wide.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: How many corpses were exhumed by the commission you headed?

PROSOROVSKI: In the Katyn wood the commission of medical experts exhumed and examined, from various graves and from various depths, altogether 925 corpses.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: How was the work of exhumation done and how many assistants were employed by you on this work?

PROSOROVSKI: Specialists and medico-legal experts participated in the work of this commission. In September and 10/1943 they had exhumed and examined the corpses of the victims shot by the Germans…

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Where was the examination of the corpses performed?

PROSOROVSKI: They examined them in the town and the neighborhood of Smolensk. Among the members of this commission were Professor Prosorovski; Professor Smolianinov; the eldest and most learned collaborator of the Medico-Legal Research Institute, Dr. Semenovski; Professor of Pathological Anatomy Voropaev; Professor of Legal Chemistry Schwaikova, who was invited for consultations on chemico-legal subjects. To assist this commission, they called also medico-legal experts from the forces. Among them were the medical student Nikolski, Dr. Soubbotin . . .

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I doubt whether the Tribunal is interested in all these names. I ask you to answer the following question: What method of examination was chosen by you? What I mean is, did you strip the corpses of their clothes and were you satisfied with the customary post mortem examination or was every single one of these 925 corpses thoroughly examined?

PROSOROVSKI: After exhumation of the corpses, they were thoroughly searched, particularly their clothing. Then an exterior examination was carried out and then they were subjected to a complete medico-legal dissection of all three parts of the body; that is to say, the skull, the chest, and the abdomen, as well as all the inner organs of these corpses.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please tell me whether the corpses exhumed from these burial grounds bore traces of a previous medical examination?

PROSOROVSKI: Out of the 925 corpses which we examined, only three had already been dissected; and that was a partial examination of the skulls only. On all the others no traces of previous medical examination could be ascertained. They were clothed; and the jackets, trousers, and shirts were buttoned, the belts were strapped, and the knots of ties had not been undone. Neither on the head nor on the body were there any traces of cuts or other traces of medico-legal examination. Therefore this excludes the possibility of their having been subjected to any previous medico-legal examination.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: During the medico-legal examination which was carried out by your commission, did you open the skulls?

PROSOROVSKI: Of course. At the examination of quite a number of corpses the skull was opened and the contents of the skull were examined.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Are you acquainted with the expression pseudocallus?”

PROSOROVSKI: I heard of it when I received a book in 1945 in the Institute of Medico-Legal Science. Before that not a single medical legal expert observed any similar phenomena in the Soviet Union.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Among the 925 skulls which you examined were there many cases of pseudocallus?

PROSOROVSKI: Not one of the medico-legal experts who were examining these 925 corpses observed lime deposits on the inner Side of the cranium or on any other part of the skull.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Therefore, there was no sign of pseudocallus on any of the skulls.

PROSOROVSKI: No.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Was the clothing also examined?

PROSOROVSKI: As already stated, the clothing was thoroughly examined. Upon the request of the Special Commission, and in the presence of its members and of the Metropolitan Nikolai, Academician Burdenko, and others, the medico-legal experts examined the clothing, the pockets of the trousers, of the coats, and of the overcoats. As a rule, the pockets were either turned, torn open, or cut open, and this testified to the fact that they had already been searched. The clothing itself, the overcoats, the jackets, and the trousers as well as the shirts, were moist with corpse liquids. This clothing could not be torn asunder, in spite of violent effort.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Therefore, the tissue of the clothing was solid?

PROSOROVSKI: Yes, the tissue was very solid, and of course, it was besmeared with earth.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: During the examination, did you look into the pockets of the clothing and did you find any documents in them?

PROSOROVSKI: As I said, most of the pockets were turned out or cut; but some of them remained intact. In these pockets, and also under the lining of the overcoats and of the trousers we discovered, for instance, notes, pamphlets, papers, closed and open letters and postcards, cigarette paper, cigarette holders, pipes, and so forth, and even valuables were found, such as ingots of gold and gold coins.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: These details are not very relevant, and therefore I beg you to refrain from giving them. I would like you to answer the following question: Did you discover in the clothing documents dated the end of 1940 and also dated 1941?

PROSOROVSKI: Yes. I discovered such documents, and my colleagues also found some. Professor Smolianinov, for instance, discovered on one of the corpses a letter written in Russian, and it was sent by Sophie Zigon, addressed to the Red Cross in Moscow, with the request to communicate to her the address of her husband, Thomas Zigon. The date of this letter was 9/12/1940. Besides the envelope bore the stamp of a post office in Warsaw of 9/1940, and also the stamp of the Moscow post office, dated 9/28/1940.

Another document of the same sort was discovered. It was a postcard sent from Tarnopol, with the post office cancellation: “Tarnopol, 9/12/1940.”

Then we discovered receipts with dates, one in particular with the name if I am not mistaken of Orashkevitch, certifying to the receipt of money with the date of 4/6/1941, and another receipt in his name, also referring to a money deposit, was dated 5/5/1941. Then, I myself discovered a letter with the date 6/20/1941, with the name of Irene Tutchinski, as well as other documents of ‘the same sort.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: During the medico-legal examination of the corpses, were any bullets or cartridge cases discovered?

Please tell us what was the mark on these cartridge cases? Were .they of Soviet make or of foreign make; and if they were foreign make, which one, and what was the caliber?

PROSOROVSKI: The cause of death of the Polish officers was bullet wounds in the nape of the neck. In the tissue of the brain or in the bone of the skull we discovered bullets which were more or less deformed. As to cartridge cases, we did indeed discover, during the exhumation, cartridge cases of German origin, for on their bases we found the mark G-e-c-o, Geco.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: One minute, Witness.

I will now read an original German document and I beg the permission of the Tribunal to submit a series of documents which have been offered us by our American colleagues, Document Number 402-PS, Exhibit USSR-507. It concerns German correspondence and telegrams on Katyn, and these telegrams are sent by an official of the Government General, Heinrich, to the Government of the Government General.

I submit the original document to the Court. I am only going to read one document, a very short one, in connection with the cartridge cases discovered in the mass graves. The telegram is addressed to the Government of the Government General, care of First Administrative Counsellor Weirauch in Krakow. It is marked: “Urgent, to be delivered at once, secret.

“Part of the Polish Red Cross returned yesterday from Katyn. The employees of the Polish Red Cross have brought with them the cartridge cases which were used in shooting the victims of Katyn. It appears that these are German munitions. The caliber is 7.65. They are from the firm Geco. Letter follows.” signed “Heinrich.”

.[Turning to the witness.] Were the cartridge cases and cartridges which were discovered by you of the same caliber and did they bear the mark of the same firm?

PROSOROVSKI: As I have already stated, the bullets discovered the bullet wounds were 7.65 caliber. The cases discovered during the exhumation did indeed bear the trademark of the firm Geco.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I now ask you to describe in detail the condition of the body tissues and of the inner organs of the corpses exhumed from the graves of Katyn.

PROSOROVSKI: The skin and the inner organs of the corpses were well preserved. The muscles of the body and of the limbs had kept their structure. The muscles of the heart had also kept their characteristic structure. The substance of the brain was, in some cases, putrefied; but in most cases, it had kept its structural characteristics quite definitely, showing a clear distinction between the gray and white matters. Changes in the inner organs were mainly a sagging and shrinking. The hair from the head could be easily pulled out.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: From the examination of the corpses, to what conclusion did you come as to the date of death and date of burial?

PROSOROVSKI: On the basis of the experience I have gained and on the experiences of Smolianinov, Semenovski, and other members of the commission…

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: One moment, Witness. I would like you to tell the Tribunal briefly what these experiences were and how many corpses were exhumed. Did you personally exhume them or were they exhumed in your presence?

PROSOROVSKI: In the course of the great War, I was often medico-legal expert during the exhumation and the examination of corpses of victims who were shot by the Germans. These executions occurred in the town of Krasnodar and its neighborhood, in the town of Kharkov and its neighborhood, in the town of Smolensk and its neighborhood, in the so-called extermination camp of Maidanek, near Lublin, so that all told more than 5000 corpses were exhumed and examined with my personal co-operation.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Considering your experience and your objective observations, to what conclusions did you arrive as to the date of the death and the burial of the victims of Katyn?

PROSOROVSKI: What I have just said applies to me as well as to many of my colleagues who participated in this work. The commission came to the unanimous conclusion that the burial of the Polish officers in the Katyn graves was carried out about 2 years before, if you count from January, the month of 1/1944that is to say that the date was autumn 1941.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Did the condition of the corpses allow the conclusion that they were buried in 1940, objectively speaking?

PROSOROVSKI: The medico-legal examination of the corpses buried in the Katyn wood, when compared with the modifications, changes which were noticed by us during former exhumations on many occasions and also material evidence, allowed us to come to the conclusion that the time of the burial could not have been previous to the autumn of 1941.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Therefore, the year 1940 is out of question?

PROSOROVSKI: Yes, it is completely excluded.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: If I understood you rightly you were also medico-legal expert in the case of other shootings in the district of Smolensk?

PROSOROVSKI: In the district of Smolensk and its environs I have exhumed and examined together with my assistants another 1,173 corpses, besides those of Katyn. They were exhumed from 87 graves.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: How did the Germans camouflage the common graves of the victims which they had shot?

PROSOROVSKI: In the district of Smolensk, in Gadeonovka, the following method was used:

The top layer of earth on these graves was covered with turf, and in some cases, as in Gadeonovka, young trees were planted as well as bushes; all this with a view to camouflaging. Besides, in the so-called Engineers’ Garden of the town of Smolensk, the graves were covered with bricks and paths were laid out.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: So you exhumed more than 5000 corpses in various parts of the Soviet Union.

PROSOROVSKI: Yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: What were the causes of death of the victims in most cases?

PROSOROVSKI In most cases the cause of death was a bullet wound in the head, or in the nape of the neck.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Were the causes of death at Katyn similar to those met with in other parts of the Soviet Union? I am speaking of mass-shootings.

PROSOROVSKI: All shootings were carried out by one and the me method, namely, a shot in the nape of the neck, at point-blank range. The exit hole was usually on the forehead or in the face.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I will read the last paragraph f your account on Katyn, mentioned in the report of the Extraordinary Soviet State Commission:

“The commission of the experts emphasizes the absolute uniformity of the method of shooting the Polish prisoners of war with that used for the shootings of Soviet prisoners of war and Soviet civilians. Such shootings were carried out on a vast scale by the German Fascist authorities during the temporary occupation of territories of the U.S.S.R., for instance, in the towns of Smolensk, Orel, Kharkov, Krasnodar and Voroneszh.”

Do you corroborate this conclusion?

PROSOROVSKI: Yes, this is the typical method used by the Germans to exterminate peace-loving citizens.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I have no further questions to put to this witness, Mr. President.

DR. STAHMER: Where is your permanent residence, Witness?

PROSOROVSKI: I was born in Moscow and have my domicile there.

DR. STAHMER: How long have you been in the Commissariat for Health?

PROSOROVSKI: I have been working in institutions for public health since 1931 and am at present in the Ministry of Public Health. Before that I was a candidate for the chair of forensic medicine at Moscow University.

DR. STAHMER: In this commission were there also foreign scientists?

PROSOROVSKI: In this commission there were no foreign medico-legal experts, but the exhumation and examination of these corpses could be attended by anybody who was interested. Foreign journalists, I believe 12 in number, came to the burial grounds and I showed them the corpses, the graves, the clothing, and so on in short everything they were interested in.

DR. STAHMER: Were there any foreign scientists present?

PROSOROVSKI: I repeat again that no one was present apart from Soviet experts of the medico-legal commission.

DR. STAHMER: Can you give the names of the members of the press?

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, he was giving a long-list of names before and he was stopped by his counsel.

Why do you shake your head?

DR. STAHMER: I did not understand, Mr. President, the one list of names. He gave a list of names of the members of the commission. My question is that: The witness has just said that members of the foreign press were present and that the results of the investigation were presented to them. I am now asking for the names of these members of the foreign press.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, go on.

DR. STAHMER: Will you please give me the names of the members of the press, or at least the names of those who were present and to whom you presented the results of the examination?

PROSOROVSKI: Unhappily I cannot give you those names now here; but I believe that if it is necessary, I would be able to find them. I shall ascertain the names of all those foreign correspondents who were present at the exhumation of the corpses.

DR. STAHMER: The statement about the number of corpses exhumed and examined by you seems to have changed somewhat according to my notes, but I may have misunderstood. Once you mentioned 5000 and another time 925. Which figure is the correct one?

PROSOROVSKI: You did not hear properly. I said that 925 corpses had been exhumed in the Katyn wood, but in general I personally exhumed or was present at the exhumation of over 5000 in many towns of the Soviet Union after the liberation of the territories from the Germans.

DR. STAHMER: Were you actually present at the exhumation?

PROSOROVSKI: Yes.

DR. STAHMER: How long did you work at these exhumations?

PROSOROVSKI: As I told you, on 14 January a group of medico-legal experts left for the site of the burial grounds together with the members of a special commission.

THE PRESIDENT: Can you not just say how long it took the whole exhumation? In other words, to shorten it, can you not say how long it took?

PROSOROVSKI: Very well. The exhumation and part of the examination of the corpses lasted from 1/16/1944 to 1/23/1944.

DR. STAHMER: Did you find only Polish officers?

PROSOROVSKI: All the corpses, with the exception of two which were found in civilian clothing, were in Polish uniforms and were therefore members of the Polish Army.

DR. STAHMER: Did you try to determine from what camp these Polish officers came originally?

PROSOROVSKI: That was not one of my duties. I was concerned only with the medico-legal examination of the corpses.

DR. STAHMER: You did not learn in any other way from what camp they came?

PROSOROVSKI: In the receipts which were found, dated 1941, it was stated that the money was received in camp 10-N. It can therefore be assumed that the camp number was obviously of particular importance.

DR. STAHMER: Did you know of the Kosielsk Camp?

PROSOROVSKI: Only from hearsay. I have not been there.

DR. STAHMER: Do you know that Polish officers were kept prisoners there?

PROSOROVSKI: I can say only what I heard. I heard that Polish officers were there, but I have not seen them myself nor have I been anywhere near there.

DR. STAHMER: Did you learn anything about the fate of these officers?

PROSOROVSKI: Since I did not make the investigations, I cannot say anything about the fate of these officers. About the fate of the officers, whose corpses were discovered in the graves of Katyn, I have already spoken.

DR. STAHMER: How many officers did you find altogether in the burial grounds at Katyn?

PROSOROVSKI: We did not separate the corpses according to their rank; but, in all, there were 925 corpses exhumed and examined.

DR. STAHMER: Was that the majority?

PROSOROVSKI: The coats and tunics of many corpses bore shoulder straps with insignia indicating officers’ rank. But even to-day I could not distinguish the insignia of rank of the Polish officers.

DR. STAHMER: What happened to the documents which were found on the Polish prisoners?

PROSOROVSKI: By order of the special commission the searching of the clothing was done by the medico-legal experts. When these experts discovered documents they looked them through, examined them, and handed them over to the members of the special commission, either to Academician Burdenko or Academician Tolstoy, Potemkin, or any other members of the commission. Obviously these documents are in the archives of the Extraordinary State Commission.

DR. STAHMER: Are you of the opinion that from the medical findings regarding the corpses the time when they were killed can be determined with certainty?

PROSOROVSKI: In determining the date on which these corpses had presumably been buried, we were guided by the experience which we had gathered in numerous previous exhumations and also found support by material evidence discovered by the medico-legal experts. Thus we were able to establish beyond doubt that the Polish officers were buried in the fall of 1941.

DR. STAHMER: I asked whether from the medical findings you could determine this definitely and whether you did so.

PROSOROVSKI: I can again confirm what I have already said. Since we had great experience in mass exhumations, we came to that conclusion, in corroboration of which we also had much material evidence, which enabled us to determine the autumn of 1941 as the time of the burial of the Polish officers.

DR. STAHMER: I have no more questions to put to this witness. Mr. President, an explanation regarding the document which was just submitted; I have here only a copy signed by Heinrich; I have not seen the original.

THE PRESIDENT: I imagine the original is there.

DR. STAHMER: Thank you, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Colonel Smirnov, do you want to reexamine?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, I have no further questions to put to this witness; but with the permission of the Tribunal, I would like to make a brief statement.

We were allowed to choose from among the 120 witnesses whom we interrogated in the case of Katyn, only three. If the Tribunal is interested in hearing any other witnesses named in the reports of the Extraordinary State Commission, we have, in the majority of cases, adequate affidavits which we can submit at the Tribunal’s request. Moreover, any one of these persons can be called to this Court if the Tribunal so desires.

That is all I have to say upon this matter.

Source: Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945 – 1 October 1946. Nuremberg, Germany: William S. Hein & Co., 1947-1949.

Report of Soviet Special Commission

Report by a special Soviet commission, 24 January 1944, concerning the shooting of Polish officer prisoners of war in the forest of Katyn

 

In the wake of the German discovery outside Smolensk of mass graves of Polish officers, their erstwhile Soviet allies, who had perpetrated the crimes, convened an Extraordinary Commission to investigate and place the blame on the Germans. The first report published in English appeared on June 28, 1943, in the daily Soviet War News issued by the Press Department of the Soviet Embassy in London. The Soviet prosecution introduced thirty-one such reports from the Extraordinary State Commission as exhibits for the prosecution at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, including the following labeled USSR-54.

REPORT of the Special Commission for the examination and investigation of the circumstances of the shooting of Polish prisoners of war in the Katyn forest by the German fascist invaders.

The Special Commission for the examination and investigation of the circumstances of the shooting of Polish prisoners of war in the forest of Katyn (near Smolensk) by the German fascist invaders was formed by order of the Special State Commission to examine and investigate the atrocities of the fascist German invaders and their accomplices.

The Commission consists of the following persons:

Member of the Special State Commission, Academician N.N. BURDENKO (President of the Commission);

Member of the on the Special State Commission, Academician ALEKSEJ TOLSTOI;

Member of the Special State Commission, Mythropolitos NIKOLAI;

President of the All-Slavic Committee, Lieutenant General GUNDOROW A.S.;

President of the Executive Committee of the Association of the Red Cross and Red Half Moon, POLESNIKOW S.A.;

People’s Commissar for Education of the RSFSR <Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic>, Academician POTEMKIN W.P.;

Chief of the Forensic Head Office of the Red Army, Colonel-General SMIRNOW E.I.;

President of the Executive Committee for the Region of Smolensk, MEINIKOW R.E..

To deal with the tasks laid before the Commission, the Commission called upon the following forensic experts:

Superior Forensic Expert of the People’s Commissariat for Health Matters of the USSR, Director of the Scientific Research Institute for Forensic Medicine PROZOROWSKI W.I.; head of the Professorship of Forensic Medicine of the 2nd Moscow Medical Institute, Doctor of Medical Sciences, SMOLJANINOW W.M.; eldest scientific expert of the State Scientific Research Institute for Forensic Medicine of the People’s Commissariat for Health Matters of the USSR, SEMENOWSKI P.S.; eldest scientific official of the State Scientific Research Institute for Forensic Medicine of the People’s Commissariat for Health Matters of the USSR, Professor SCHWAIKOWA M.D.; chief pathologist of the Major Front of the Medical Service, Professor WYROPAIJEW D.N..

The extensive material laid before his associates and the forensic medical experts who arrived in the city of Smolensk on 26 September 1943, immediately after the liberation of the city, and who conducted the preliminary study and investigation of the circumstances of all atrocities committed by the Germans, was made available to the Special Commission by Member of the Special State Commission, Professor BURDENKO N.N..

The Special Commission carried out on-the-spot investigations and found that the graves of the Polish prisoners of war shot by the German occupiers are located 15 kilometres from the city of Smolensk, on the Witebsker highway, in the region of the Katyn forest known as “Kosji Gori”, 200 metres southwest of the highway, in the direction of the Dnjipr river.

The graves were excavated by order of the Special Commission, and in the presence of all members of the Special Commission and the forensic experts. A great number of corpses in Polish uniforms were discovered in the graves. According to the calculations of the forensic experts, the number of corpses amounts, in total, to 11,000.

The forensic experts thoroughly examined the disinterred corpses and all objects and exhibits found in the graves and on the corpses.

Simultaneous with the excavation of the graves and the examination of the corpses, the Special Commission carried out interrogations of the numerous witnesses and the local populace, whose testimonies precisely established the time and circumstances of the crime committed by the German occupiers.

The following is clear from the testimonies of the witnesses:

The Katyn Forest

The Katyn forest was always a favourite holiday spot for the people of the city of Smolensk.

Those who lived in the vicinity pastured their livestock in the Katyn forest and cut wood. There were no restrictions or prohibitions against entering the Katyn forest.

This was the case in the Katyn forest until the outbreak of the war. The “Promstrachkasse” combat engineers camp which was only dissolved in July 1941 was still located in the forest in the summer of 1941. Following the occupation of the city of Smolensk by the German invader, quite a different system prevailed in the Katyn forest. The forest began to be guarded by reinforced patrols, and numerous warning notices appeared, stating that all persons who entered the forest without special permits would be shot.

Especially strictly guarded was that part of the Katyn forest known as “Kosji Gori”, as well as the region along the banks of the Dnjepr, where a summer house rest centre for the NKWD offices at Smolensk was located 700 metres from where the graves of the Polish prisoners of war were discovered. After the arrival of the Germans, a German office was created at this location, called “the Staff of the Construction Battalion 537”.

Polish prisoners of war in the region of Smolensk

The Special Commission has established that, prior to the conquest of the city of Smolensk by the German occupiers, Polish prisoners of war, officers and enlisted men, worked on the construction and repair of the highways in the west districts of the region. The Polish prisoners of war were housed in three camps, i.e., camp no. 1ON, no. 2ON, and no. 3ON, which were located approximately 2545 kilometres west of the city of Smolensk.

It has been established, based on the testimony of witnesses and documentary proof, that the above named camps could not be evacuated in time due to the unfavourable conditions after the commencement of military operations.

All Polish prisoners of war, some of the guard personnel, and the camp employees, fell, for this reason, into German captivity.

The former head of camp no. 1ON, Major of Security WETOSCHINIKOW W.M., interrogated by the Special Commission, stated:

“I awaited the order relating to the dissolution of the camp. But <phone> connections with the city of Smolensk were interrupted. Therefore I drove together with a few fellow employees to Smolensk to clarify the situation. I found the situation in Smolensk tense. I turned to the head of railway traffic for the Smolensk stretch of the western railway, Comrade IWANOW, with a request to provide the camp with <train> carriages to evacuate the Polish prisoners of war. Comrade IWANOW answered, however, that I could not count on that. I made attempts to get in connection with Moscow to obtain permission to cover the distance by foot, but I was not successful.

“At this time, Smolensk was already cut off from the camp by the Germans, and I don’t know what happened to the Polish prisoners of war and the guard personnel who remained behind in the camp.”

Engineer IWANOW S.W., head of traffic for the Smolensk stretch of the western railway in July 1941, stated to the Special Commission:

“The administration of the camp for Polish prisoners of war contacted my office with a request to obtain train carriages for the evacuation of the Poles, but we had no carriages available. We were furthermore unable to direct any carriages to the Gusino stretch, since the stretch was already under fire. For this reason, we could not consider the request of the camp administration. Thus, the Polish prisoners of war remained behind in the region of Smolensk.”

That the Polish prisoners of war remained behind in the camps of the region of Smolensk was confirmed by the testimony of the numerous witnesses, who had seen these Poles in the vicinity of the city of Smolensk in the early months of the occupation until the month of September 1941.

The female witness SASCHENEW Marija Akeksandrowna, a teacher at the primary school of the village of Senjkowo, stated to the Special Commission that she had hidden one of the Polish prisoners of war in the attic of her house after he had escaped from the camp.

“The Pole wore a Polish military uniform, which I immediately recognized since I had seen the groups of Polish prisoners of war in 1940-41 on the highways, working under guard. I was very interested in this Pole since he, as it turned out, had been a primary school teacher in Poland before his callup. Since I had myself graduated from teacher’s training college and wanted to be a teacher, I struck up a conversation with him. He told me that he had attended a teacher’s training college in Poland, then went to a military school and became a lieutenant in the reserve. Upon the outbreak of hostilities between Poland and Germany, he was called up for active military service. He was in BreskLitovsk and was taken prisoner by units of the Red Army. He stayed in a camp near Smolensk for over a year.

“When the Germans came and occupied the Polish camp, a hard system prevailed there. The Germans did not consider the Poles to be human beings, and pushed them around and mistreated them in every possible way. There were cases in which Poles were shot without any reason. So he decided to escape. He told me of his own accord that his wife was also a teacher and that he had two brothers and a sister.”

When he went away the following day, he mentioned a name which SASCHNEWA noted in a book. The book, presented <to the Special Commission> by SASHNEWA, “Practical Exercises in the Natural Sciences” by Jagodowsky, contains the following note on the last page:

“LOECK, Jusef and Sophia, city of Smostjie, Agorodnaja Street no. 25.”

The list <of Katyn shooting victims> published by the Germans contains the name LOECK Jusef under no. 3796 as having been shot in the spring of 1940 at Kosji Gori in the Katyn forest.

From the German reports, it therefore appears that LOECK Jusef was shot one year before his acquaintance with the female witness Saschnewa.

The witness DANILENKOW N.W., a farmer from the “Krasnaja Zarja” collective farm and a member of the village council of Katyn, stated:

“In the months of August September 1941, when the Germans came, I met Poles working on the highway in groups of 1520 men each.”

Similar statements were made by the witnesses:

SOLDATENKOW, former village elder of the village of Borock,

KOLATSCHEW A.S., doctor of the city of Smolensk,

OGLOBLIN A.P., priest,

SERGEEW T.I. railway master

SMIRJAGIN P.A., engineer,

MOSKOWSKAJA A.M., resident of the city of Smolensk,

ALEKSEJEW A.M., foreman of the collective farm of the village of Borock,

KUTZEW I.W., technician of the water services,

GORODEZTKIJ W.P., priest,

BASEKINA A.T., bookkeeper,

WITROWA E.N., teacher,

SAWWATEJEW I.W., duty officer at the railway station at Gnesdowo, among others.

The raids in search of Polish prisoners of war

The presence of Polish prisoners of war in the region of Smolensk in the autumn of 1941 was also confirmed by the fact of the German raids in search of prisoners who had escaped from the camps.

The witness KARTOSCHKIN I.M., carpenter, stated:

“The Germans not only searched for Polish prisoners of war in the forests in the autumn of 1941, but there were also police house searches carried out at night in the villages.”

The former village elder Nowie Bateki SACHAROW M.D. testified that the Germans, in the autumn of 1941, “combed” the villages and forests feverishly in search of for Polish prisoners of war.

The witness DANILEKNOW N.W., farmer on the “Krasnaja Zarja” collective farm, stated:

“In our region, special raids were carried out in search of escaped Polish prisoners of war. Such searches were conducted two or three times in my house. After one house search, I asked the village elder, SERGEJEW Konstantin, whom they were looking for in our house. Segejew said that an order had been issued by the German commander to search all houses without exception, since Polish prisoners of war who had escaped from the camps were said to have hidden themselves in our village. Some time later the searches stopped.”

The witness FATJKOW T.E., a farmer at the collective farm, stated:

“Raids in search of Polish prisoners of war were carried out several times. This was in the months of August September 1941. After the month of September 1941, the raids stopped, and no one saw any more Polish prisoners of war.”

The shootings in the Katyn forest

The above mentioned “Staff of the Construction Battalion 537”, located in the summer house at Kosji Gori, did no construction work. Its activity was carefully kept secret.

What this “staff” actually did was testified to by many witnesses, including the female witnesses: ALEKSEJAWA A.M., MICHAILOWA O.A., and KONACHOWSKAJA S.P., residents of the village of Borock of the village council of Katyn.

Upon order of the German commandant of the settlement of Katyn, <transmitted> by the village eldest of the village of Borock, SOLDATENKOW W.J., they were sent to the summer house <of Kosji Gori> to serve “staff” personnel.

After arrival at Kosji Gori, a number of regulations relating to their behaviour were communicated to them through an interpreter. It was most severely prohibited to stray away from the summer house and into the forest, to enter rooms in the summer house without being asked and without the accompaniment of a German soldiers, or to approach the region of the summer house during the night. Only one particular path to the workplace and back was permitted, and only then when accompanied by the soldiers.

ALEKSEJAWA, MICHAILOWA AND KONACHOWSKAJA were instructed in this regard through an interpreter directly by the head of the German office, Lt. Col. ARNES, the women having been called in solely for this purpose.

As to the personnel making up the “staff”, ALEKSEJAWA A.M. stated:

“In the Kosji Gori summer house, there were always about 30 Germans. The oldest of them was Lt. Col. ARNES; his adjutant was Lt. Col. REKST. There were also a Lt. HOTT; a Sgt. LUEMERT; a noncommissioned officer for economic affairs ROSE; his representative ISICKE; Staff Sergeant GRENEWSKY, who headed a power plant; a photographer; a lance corporal, whose family name I can no longer recall; an interpreter from the Volga German republic, his name seems to me to have been Johann, but we called him Iwan; the cook; a German named Gustav; and many others, whose first and last names are not known to me.”

Soon after their entry into service, Aleksejewa, Michailowa, and Konachowskaja began to notice “some sort of dark doings” going on the summer house.

Alekskaja A.M. stated:

“We were warned several times by the interpreter Johann, on behalf of ARNES, that we were to keep quiet and not blabber about anything we saw or heard in the country house. Otherwise, we noticed several things that made us understand that the Germans were carrying on dark doings in this country house.

“At the end of August and during more than half of September 1941, several trucks arrived almost daily at the Kosji Gori summer house. At first, I paid them no attention; later I noted that, when the trucks arrived, they always stopped somewhere on the path leading from the highway to the summer house for half an hour or a full hour. I drew this conclusion because the noise of the motors went silent for some time after the trucks entered the grounds of the country house. At the same time, individual shots began to be fired. One shot followed another in short but regular intervals. Then the shooting stopped and the trucks drove to the country house. German soldiers and noncommissioned officers got down off the trucks. They talked in loud voices, went in the bathroom, and then drank wine. The bathroom was always heated on these days. On the days when the trucks arrived, soldiers also entered the summer house from some other unit. Beds were laid out for these soldiers in the soldiers’ mess hall, which had been opened in one of the rooms. On these days, there was a great deal of cooking in the kitchen, and double portions of spirits were brought to the table.

Shortly before the entry of the trucks, the soldiers went into the forest, probably to where the trucks were stopped.

After half an hour or a full hour, they came back on the trucks, together the soldiers that lived in the country house. I would probably never have observed this or noticed when the noise began and went silent again. But every time the trucks entered, if we (myself, Konachowskaja, and Michailowa) were in the courtyard, we were driven back into the kitchen or not allowed to leave the kitchen if we were in there. Through this circumstance, and through the fact that I several times noted fresh bloodstains on the clothing of two corporals, I was compelled to take careful note of everything that went on in the country house. I then noticed the strange intermediate pauses in the movement of the trucks and their behaviour in the forest. I also noticed that the bloodstains were always on the clothing of the same two men, two corporals. One of them was a big one with red hair; the other, of medium build, was blond. For this reason, I drew the conclusion that the Germans were bringing people to the summer house by truck and then shooting them. I even guessed where everything was happening and, when I left the house or came back to it, I noticed earth thrown up at several places not far from the highway. The places where the earth lay got bigger from day to day. In the course of time the earth at these spots nevertheless took on its usual shape again.

To the question by the Special Commission as to which persons were shot in the forest near the country house, Aleksejewa answered that Polish prisoners of war were shot there; and to confirm her testimony she stated:

“There were days on which the trucks did not enter the country house. The soldiers however left the country house and went into the forest. From there, frequent shots could be heard. After their return, the soldiers always went into the bathroom and then they drank.

“And then there was another such case. Once, I stayed longer than usual in the country house. Michailowa and Konachowskaja had already gone away. I was not yet finished with my work, I had stayed for that reason, when suddenly a soldier came up to me and said I could go. In so doing, he made reference to Rose’s order. The same soldier accompanied me to the highway.

“After I passed the curve in the highway 150200 metres from the country house, I saw a group of about 30 Polish prisoners of war marching along the highway under reinforced guard.

“That they were Poles I already knew, because I had already met Polish prisoners of war on the embankment roadway before the outbreak of the war <between Germany and the USSR> and for some time after the Germans came; the Poles always wore the same uniform, with a characteristic fourcornered cap.

“I remained by the edge of the road to see where they were being taken, and I saw them turn aside at the curve to our Kosji Gori country house.

“Since I had already carefully observed all events from the country house before this time, I took great interest in this event on that day; I turned back a short distance on the embankment roadway, and hid in the bushes by the side of the road to await further events. 20 or 30 minutes later, I heard the characteristic individual shots which were so well known to me.

“Then everything came clear to me, and I went home quickly.

“From this fact, I concluded that the Germans not only shot the Poles during the day, when we were working, but also at night, during our absence.

“This became still more clear to me when I remembered that the entire staff of officers and soldiers living at the country house, except for the guards, slept until late in the day, and only woke up around 12 noon.

“Sometimes we could tell when the Poles were arriving at Kosji Gori, from the tense atmosphere which prevailed in the country house on such days.

“All officers then left the country house; only individual duty officers remained behind in the building, and the duty officer controlled all posts by telephone without interruption…”

Michailowa OA stated:

“In September 1941, very frequent shots could be heard in the Kosji Gori forest. At the beginning, I took no particular notice of the trucks arriving at the country house; they were covered on all four sides, painted green, and accompanied by noncommissioned officers. Later I noticed that these trucks were never parked in our garages, and were not unloaded either. These trucks arrived very often, especially in September 1941.

“Among the noncommissioned officers who always sat in the cabin next to the driver, I noticed one tall one with a pallid complexion and red hair. When these trucks came into the country house, all the noncommissioned officers, as if they were obeying an order, went into the bathroom, washed themselves for a long time, and then drank in the country house.

“Once this tall redhaired German left the truck and went straight into the kitchen, where he asked for water. As he drank the water from the glass, I noticed a bloodstain on the right cuff of his uniform.”

Michailowa O.A. and Konachowskaja S.P. once saw with their own eyes how two Polish prisoners of war were shot after apparently escaping the Germans and had being recaptured.

Michailowa stated the following in this regard:

“Once Konachowskaja and I were working in the kitchen as usual, and we heard noise not far from the house. When we came out of the kitchen, we saw two Polish prisoners of war surrounded by German soldiers, explaining something to noncommissioned officer Rose. Then Lt. Col. Arnes came up and spoke a few words to Rose. We got out of the way, since we were afraid Rose would shoot us for our curiosity. But we were noticed anyway, and the mechanic Linewski chased us away on Roses order into the kitchen, and then he led Poles away from the country house. After a few minutes, we heard shots. The German soldiers and noncommissioned officers, who returned shortly afterwards, were talking to each other excitedly. Konachowskaja and I were driven to leave the kitchen once more by the desire to find out what the Germans had done with the Poles whom they had arrested. Arnes’ adjutant, who went out with us at the same time, asked Rose something in German, whereupon the latter answered in German “Alles in Ordnung <everything OK>”. I understood these words, because they were often used by Germans in conversations with each other. I concluded from all these events that the two Poles had been shot.”

Similar statements were made in this regard by Konachowskaja S.P.:

Intimidated by what was going on in the country house, Alekskaja, Michailowa, and Konachowskaja decided to quit their jobs at the country house on some pretext. They used the salary cut from 9 to 3 marks monthly, implemented at the beginning of January 1942 and, upon Michailowa’s suggestion, did not go to work. The same evening, a car arrived; a man took them to the country house, and locked them in a cold room for punishment. Michailowa was locked up for 8 days; Aleksejewa and Konachowskaja for 3 days.

After they had undergone this punishment, they were all released.

During their work in the country house, Aleksejewa, Michailowa, and Konachowskaja were afraid to exchange their observations of what was going on in the country house.Only in confinement, when they were all locked in, did they exchange their thoughts during the night:

Michailowa stated during the interrogation of 24 December 1943:

“That was the first time we spoke of what was going on in the country house. I told everything I knew, but it turned out that Konachowskaja and Aleksejewa were already aware of all these things. But they were afraid to speak to me about them. Here I found out that the Germans in Kosji Gori were shooting Polish prisoners of war in particular, since Aleksejewa told how she was going home from work once in the autumn of 1941 and personally saw the Germans herding a big group of Polish prisoners of war into the Kosji Gori forest. Some time later she heard shots at that spot.”

Aleksejewa and Konachowskaja testified to the same effect.

Aleksejewa, Michailowa, and Konachowskaja came to the firm conviction, after comparing their observations, that mass shootings of Polish prisoners of war were being carried on at the Kosji Gori country house in August and September 1941.

The testimonies of Aleksejewa are confirmed by the testimony of her father Aleksejew Michail, to whom she reported her observations concerning the crimes being committed by the Germans at the country house in the autumn of 1941 while she was still working there.

“For a long time she didn’t say a single word,” Aleksejew Michail testified, “Only when returned from her work, she complained that it was strange to work there and that she didn’t know how she could get away. When I asked her what made it so strange, she answered that shots could very often be heard in the forest. Once, when she came back home, she told me confidentially that the Germans were shooting Poles in the Kosji Gori forest. After listening to my daughter, I warned her most severely not to speak to anyone else about it. otherwise the Germans would find out about it and our whole family would suffer.”

The testimony concerning the transport of Polish prisoners of war to Kosji Gori in small groups of 2030 men under a guard of 57 German soldiers is made by other witnesses interrogated by the Special Commission: KISSELEW P.G., farmer from the Kosji Gori dairy farm; KRIWOSERZEW M.G., joiner from the station Krasnyi Bor in the Katyn forest: IWANOW S.W., exforeman at Gnesdowo station in the region of the Katyn forest; SAWWATEJEW IW, duty officer at the same station; ALEKSEJEW M.A., president of the collective farm at the village of Borok; OGLOBLIN A.P., priest of the church of Kuprin, and others.

These witnesses also heard shots resounding from the Kosji Gori forest. An especially great breakthrough for the investigation of the events at the Kosji Gori country house in the autumn of 1941 was provided by the professor of astronomy, Director BASILEWSKI B.W., of the observatory at Smolensk. Professor Basilewski was appointed representative of the head of the city (the mayor) by force during the first days of the German occupation of Smolensk, while the lawyer MENSCHAGIN B.G. was appointed head of the city by the Germans, who later took him away with them. MENSCHAGIN was a traitor who enjoyed the special trust of the German command, and especially that of the commandant of Smolensk, von SCHWEZ.

In early September 1941, Basilewski asked Menschagin to ask commandant von Schwez to release the teacher SCHIGLINSKI from prisoner of war camp no. 126. In fulling this request, Menschagin talked to von Schwez, and then told Basilewski that his request could not be granted because, as von Schwez said, “an order had come from Berlin prescribing the immediate application of the strictest regime relating to prisoners of war and permitting no indulgence in this matter.”

“I couldn’t help objecting”, testified witness Basilewski, “‘But What could be stricter than the regime prevailing in the camp now?'” Menschagin looked at me strangely and, coming very close to me, answered softly, “‘It can be <a lot tougher>. The Russians will at least die off by themselves, but as for the prisoners of war, it was simply proposed to exterminate them.'”

“‘How? How am I to understand that?'” I cried.

“You are to understand it literally. There is such an order from Berlin,” answered Menschagin, requesting me, ‘for God’s sake’, not to say a word about it to anyone.”

“Two weeks later, after the above mentioned talk with Menschagin, when I was again received by him, I could not help asking him: ‘What have you heard about the Poles?’

Menschagin hesitated a little and then answered, ‘It’s all up with them. Von Schwez told me that they have been shot somewhere in the vicinity of Smolensk.’

“Since Menschagin noticed my excitement, he warned me again of the need to keep this matter strictly secret, and then he began to explain the German manner of procedure in this matter. He said, ‘the shooting of the Poles was a link in the whole chain of anti-Polish policies carried out by the Germans, which was to be especially tightened up in view of conclusion of the treaty between the Russians and the Poles.'”

Basilewski also told the Special Commission about his conversation with the Special Leader of the 7th Division of the German commander Hirschfeld, a Baltic German who spoke good Russian:

“Hirschfeld cynically explained that the perniciousness and inferiority of the Poles had been historically proven, and that the reduction in Polish population figures would serve to fertilize the soil and provide a guarantee for the expansion of German living space.

“In this connection, Hirschfeld bragged that nothing was left of the intelligentsia in Poland, since they had all been hanged, shot, or taken away to concentration camps.”

The testimony of the witness Basilewski was confirmed by the witness, physics professor Jefimow J.E., interrogated by the Special Commission, to whom Basilewski told of his conversation with Menschagin in the autumn of 1941.

The testimony of Basilewski and Jefimow is strengthened by documentary evidence in the form of handwritten notes by Menschagin, in his own handwriting, jotted down in his notebook.

This notebook, containing 17 full pages, was found in the files of the city administration of Smolensk after its liberation. The fact that this notebook belonged to Menschagin, and was also in his handwriting, is confirmed both by the testimony of Basilewski, who was well familiar with Menschagin’s handwriting, and by graphological reports.

As may be seen from the dates contained in the notebook, the contents concern the period from the early days of August 1941 until November of the same year.

Among the various notes with regards to economic matters (wood, electrical energy, commerce, etc.) there are a number of notes concerning instructions from the commander of Smolensk, made by Menschagin in order not to forget them.

From these notes, it may be clearly seen that the city administration was concerned with a number of matters as the body carrying out all the instructions of the German command.

The first of the three pages of the note book describe the organization of the Ghetto and the system of reprisals to be carried out relating to the Jews. Page 10, dated 15 August 1941, states: “All escaped Polish prisoners of war are to be arrested and brought to the command post.” Page 15, (without date), states:

“Are there any rumours circulating among the populace of shootings of Polish prisoners of war at Kosji Gory (to Umnow)?”

From the initial notes, it may be seen that, on 15 August 1941, the Polish prisoners of war were still in the region of Smolensk, and that they were furthermore being arrested by the German authorities.

The second note proves that the German command, disturbed by the possibility of the existence of rumours among the civilian population about crimes committed by the Germans, gave special instructions to investigate the matter.

Umnow, who is mentioned in the note, was chief of the Russian police in Smolensk during the first months of the occupation.

Beginning of German provocation

In the winter of 1942-43, the general military situation changed fundamentally, and not in favour of the Germans. The military power of the Soviet Union was constantly increasing, and the alliance between the Soviet Union with the Allies was strengthening. The Germans decided to initiate a provocation by taking the atrocities which they themselves had committed in the forest of Katyn and accusing the Soviet authorities of having committed them. They thus intended to divide the Russians and the Poles and wipe away the trace of their crime.

The priest from the village of Kuprino, district Smolensk, A.P. OGLOBLIN, testified:

“The Germans took up this matter after the events at Stalingrad, when they were feeling unsure of themselves. Among the people, it was said that the Germans were attempting to improve their position.”

Concerned with expanding the Katyn provocation, the Germans first began to search for “witnesses” able to offer the testimony desired by the Germans, under the influence of promises, bribes, or threats.

The farmer KISSELEW Parfen Gawrilowitsch, born 1870, who lived closer to the Kosji Gori country house than anyone else, attracted the attention of the Germans. Kisselew was told to report to the Gestapo as early as the end of 1942, and after under the threat of reprisals was requested to offer perjured testimony about the matter, stating that he knew that the Bolsheviks had shot the Polish prisoners of war in the Kosji Gori country house of the NKWD in early 1940.

Kisselew testified in this regard:

“In autumn 1942, two policemen came to my house and said I had to report to the Gestapo at Gnesdowo railway station.

“The same day, I went to the Gestapo, which was housed in a twostory house next to the railway station. In the room which I entered, there was a German officer and an interpreter. The German officer began to interrogate me through the interpreter, asking how long I had lived in the district, what I did, and my financial situation. I told him I had lived in the farmstead next to Kosji Gori since 1907 and worked on my property. About my financial situation, I said I was having difficulties, because I was already old and my sons were in the army.

“After this short conversation, the officer explained to me that the Gestapo had reports stating that members of the KNWD office had shot the Polish prisoners of war in the Katyn forest not far from Kosji Gori in 1940. He asked what testimony I could make about it. I answered that I had never heard anything about the NKWD office carrying out any shootings in the Kosji Gori. I furthermore explained to the officer that I considered it impossible to carry out shootings there, since Kosji Gory was very openly exposed, and thickly populated. The whole populace in the neighbouring villages must surely have known of it.

“The officer answered that I was to make such a statement, since the aforementioned fact had allegedly really taken place. A big reward was promised me for this testimony.

“I repeatedly explained to the officer that I had heard nothing of the shootings, and that something like this could simply not happen at all before the war in our region. The officer nevertheless insisted that I was to make the perjured statement.

“After the first conversation, of which I have already spoken, I was called to the Gestapo for a second time in February 1942.

“At this time, it was known to me that other residents of the neighbouring villages had also been ordered to report to the Gestapo, and they had been ordered to make the same testimony.

“In the Gestapo were the same officer and interpreter who had interrogated me the first time.

“Again they demanded that I should testify that I was an eyewitness to the shootings of Polish officers allegedly carried out in 1940 by the NKWD.

I explained to the Gestapo officer once again that this was a lie, since I had heard nothing of the shootings before the war, and that I would not make the perjured statement. But the interpreter refused to listen to me, took a handwritten document from the table, and read it to me. It said that I, KISSELEW, lived in the farmstead not far from Kosji Gori, and had myself seen employees of the NKWD shooting the Polish officers in 1940.

After the interpreter had read it to me, he suggested that I sign the document. I refused. The interpreter tried to force me to sign by means of threats and insults, Finally he said, ‘Either you sign immediately, or you will be killed. You have to choose!’

“I was now afraid, and signed the document, figuring that the matter was at an end. After the Germans organized the visit to the graves of Katyn by various ‘delegations’, I was forced to speak before the Polish ‘delegation.'”

Kisselew forgot the contents of the statement signed in the Gestapo office, got mixed up, and finally refused to speak. Then the Gestapo had him arrested, and, by beating him for a month a half without mercy, forced him to agree to appear again in public.

In this regard, Kisselew testifies:

“In reality, it happened differently. In the spring of 1943, the Germans announced that they had discovered the graves of the Polish officers in in the Kosji Gori region of the Katyn forest, after having been allegedly shot by the NKWD.

“Soon afterwards, a Gestapo interpreter came to my house and drove me into the Kosji Gori region of the Katyn forest. After leaving my house, the interpreter warned me privately that when I was in the forest, to say everything just exactly as stated in the statement signed in the Gestapo office.

“When we got to the forest, I saw excavated graves and a group of persons unknown to me. The interpreter told me they were ‘Polish delegates’ who were coming to view the graves.

“When we approached the graves, the ‘delegates’ began to ask me various questions in the Russian language relating to the shooting of the Poles.

“But since over a month had passed since I was told to report to the Gestapo, I had forgotten everything contained in the document signed by me. So I got mixed up and finally said that I didn’t know anything about the shooting of the Polish officers.

“The German officer got very angry, and the interpreter pushed and pulled me brutally away from the ‘delegation’. The next day, a car with a Gestapo officer in it came to my house. When the officer found me in the courtyard, he explained that I was under arrest, put me in the car and took me to Smolensk prison.

“After my arrest I was often called for interrogation, but they beat me more than they interrogated me. During my first interrogation they beat me badly and accused me of slandering them. Then they brought me back to my cell.

“In the next interrogation, they told me I had to declare publicly that I was an eyewitness to the shootings of the Polish officers by the Bolsheviks and that I would not get out of prison until the Gestapo was convinced that I would fulfil my task to the best of my ability. I told the officer that I would rather rot in prison than pull the wool over people’s eyes. After that, they beat me very badly.

“These interrogations, in which I was beaten, were repeated. The result was that I completely lost my strength, partially lost my hearing, and could no longer move my right arm.

“Approximately a month after my arrest the German officer called me to him and said, ‘Now, you see, Kisselew, what your obstinacy has cost you. We have decided to carry out a death sentence upon you. Tomorrow you will be driven to the Katyn forest and hanged. I asked the officer not to do that, and tried to convince him that I was unfit for the role of eyewitness to the shootings, because I simply could not lie and would therefore simply get something mixed up again. But the officer stuck to his insistence.

“A few minutes later, soldiers came into the room and began to beat me with rubber truncheons. I could not stand the beatings and mistreatment and agreed to confirm the perjured statement regarding the shooting of the Polish officers by the Bolsheviks. Then I was released from prison. At the same time, they told me that I had to speak in front of the ‘delegates’ at the first request of the Germans in the Katyn forest. Each time, before we drove to the excavated graves in the Katyn forest, the interpreter came to my home, called me out into the courtyard, took me aside so that nobody could hear us, and made me learn everything by heart for half an hour, completely and in detail, that I had to say about the alleged shootings of the Polish officers by the NKWD in 1940.

“I remember that the interpreter told me <to say> approximately the following:

“‘I live on the farmstead in the Kosji Gori region not far from the KNWD country house. In early 1940, I saw how them bringing the Poles into the forest and shooting them there every night.’

I also had to repeat word for word that this was the work of the NKWD.

“After I had learnt by heart everything the interpreter told me, he drove me into the forest to the excavated graves and told me to repeat everything in the presence of the visiting ‘delegation’. My remarks were strictly noted and orchestrated by the Gestapo interpreter.

“Once, when I appeared before a ‘delegation’, they asked me whether I had ever seen the Poles before they were shot by the Bolsheviks.

“I was not prepared for this question, and declared that I had seen the Polish prisoners of war before the beginning of the war engaged in road construction work, which was also true. At this, the interpreter pushed me aside roughly, and chased me home. Please believe me when I say that I was constantly tortured by remorse, because I knew that the Polish officers in reality were shot by the Germans in 1941; there was no other way out for me, since I was afraid of repeated arrest and torture.”

The testimony of Kisselew P.G. regarding his visit to the Gestapo and subsequent arrest and beatings are confirmed by his wife, Kisselewa Asksinija, born 1870, who resides with him; his son, Kisselew Wassili, born 1911; and his daughterinlaw, Kisselewa Maria, born 1918; as well as railway master Sergejew Timotej Iwanowitch, born 1901, who also lives with Kisselew at the farmstead.

The injuries inflicted upon Kisselew by the Gestapo (injured shoulder, significant hearing loss) were confirmed by forensic examination report.

In the search for ‘witnesses’, the Germans then took an interest in the workers at Gnesdowo railway station, located two and half kilometres away from Kosji Gori.

The Polish prisoners of war first arrived at this station in the spring of 1940, and the Germans obviously wished to obtain corresponding testimony from railway workers. To this purpose, the Germans, in the spring of 1943, ordered the former station master of Gnesdowo, IWANOW S.W., and the duty officer SAWWATEJEW I.W., among others, to report to the Gestapo.

Regarding the circumstances of his visit to the Gestapo, Iwanow S.W., born 1882, stated:

“…It was in March 1943. A German officer interrogated me in the presence of an interpreter. He asked me through the interpreter what I did, and what my job was at Gnesdowo before the occupation of the area by the Germans; the officer asked me whether I knew that the Polish prisoners of war arrived by railway in early 1940 in Gnesdowo in large groups.

“I said, that I knew nothing about it.

“The officer then asked me whether I knew that the Polish officers were shot by the Bolsheviks in the year in question, the spring of 1940, soon after their arrival.

“I answered that I knew nothing about it, and that this could not be true, since I had seen the Polish officers who arrived at Gnesdowo in the spring of 1940 doing road construction work in 194041, until the city of Smolensk was taken by the Germans.

“The officer then told me: ‘If a German officer says that the Poles were shot by the Bolsheviks, then that corresponds to the facts. Therefore’, the officer continued, ‘you need have no fear; you may sign the statement with a clear conscience, stating that the Polish prisoners of war were shot by the Bolsheviks, and that you were an eyewitness to it.'”

“I answered that I was an old man, 61 years old, and didn’t want to burden my soul with sins. I could only testify that the Polish officers actually arrived in the spring of 1940 in Gnesdowo.

“The German officer then attempted to convince me to make the desired statement by promising to transfer me from my present job as intermediate station master to another post, and to make me station master at Gnesdowo, which is what I was under the Soviets, as well as taking care of me from a financial point of view.

“The interpreter emphasized that the German command placed great value on my testimony as former railway employee at Gnesdowo, the station nearest the Katyn forest, and that I would not be sorry if I made the desired statement.

“I saw that I was in an extremely difficult position and that a sad fate awaited me, but I still refused to make the perjured statement to the German officer.

“The officer then tricked me. He threatened me to have me beaten or shot, declaring that I did not understand my best interests. But I stood resolutely by my refusal.

“The interpreter then wrote a short statement in the German language, one page long, and told me what it said. The interpreter told me it only contained the fact that the Poles arrived in Gnesdowo. But when I asked to sign my statement not only in German, but in Russian as well, the officer lost his temper, beat me with a rubber truncheon, and threw me out.”

SAWWATEJEW I.W. born 1880, testified:

“…In the Gestapo, I said that the Polish prisoners actually arrived in the spring of 1940 at Gnesdowo with their own railway transport, and that they continued by motor transport, where, I don’t know. I also added that I later saw the Poles several times on the MoscowMinsk highway doing highway repair work in small groups.

“The officer told me that I was mistaken, and that I could not have seen the Poles on the highway, since they had been shot by the Bolsheviks. He asked me to make a statement about this. I refused. After many threats and attempts at persuasion, the officer consulted with the interpreter about something, speaking in the German language. The interpreter then wrote a short statement and presented it to me for signature, saying that it contained <only> the statements I had made. I asked the interpreter if I could read it through for myself, but he interrupted me with insults and ordered me to sign the document immediately and to get out. I hesitated a minute; the interpreter grabbed a rubber truncheon hanging on the wall and raised it to hit me. I then signed the statement which had been placed before me. The interpreter told me to get out, and not to blab anything to anybody or they would have me shot…”

In their search for “witnesses”, the Germans did not stop at the above mentioned persons. They tried to find former NKWD employees and force them to make the perjured statements desired by the Germans. The Germans then arrested the former NKWD garage worker for the region of Smolensk, IGNATIUK E.L., and tried very hard, through threats and beatings, to force a statement out of him saying that he was not a garage worker, but a driver, and had personally driven the Polish prisoners of war to the location of the shootings. IGNATIUK E.L., born 1903, stated:

“During my first interrogation by police chief ALFERTSCHIK, he accused me of antiGerman slander activity, and asked me what my job was with the NKWD. I answered that I was employed in the NKWD office, region of Smolensk, as a worker. During the same interrogation, Alfertschik asked me to make a statement saying that was I employed in the NKWD office not as a worker, but as a driver. When Alfertschik failed to obtain the desired statement, he became enraged and tied me up, him and his adjutant, whom he addressed by the name “Schorsch”, tying a rag around my head and mouth; they took down my pants, laid me on a table and beat me with rubber truncheons. They then called me to interrogation once again, and Alfertschik asked me to make the perjured statement that the Polish prisoners of war were shot in the Katyn forest in 1940 by the Bolsheviks, and that I knew all about it since I had driven the Polish officers to the Katyn forest and was present during the shootings. If I agreed to make such a statement, Alfertschik promised to release me from prison and give me a job in the police, where living conditions were very good; otherwise, he would have me shot. The last time, I was interrogated in the police station by the examining magistrate ALEXANDROW, who, like Alfertschik, demanded the desired perjured statement from me. But I refused.

“After this interrogation, they beat me repeatedly and brought me to the Gestapo. In the Gestapo, they demanded that I make the perjured statement about the shooting of the Polish officers in the Katyn forest in 1940, that it was done by the Soviets, and that as a driver I allegedly had to know all about it.”

In the book published by the German Foreign Office, containing material falsified by the Germans on the “Katyn affair”, the above mentioned KISSELEW P.G., among others, is presented as a “witness”. The following persons are also cited as “witnesses”:

GODOSOW (identical with GODUNOW), born 1877;

SILWERSTOW GRIGORI, born 1891;

ANDREJEW IWAN, born 1917;

SHIGULEW MICHAIL, born 1915;

KRIWOSERZEW IWAN, born 1915, and

SACHAROW MATWEJ, born 1893.

It has been proven by investigation that the first two of the above mentioned persons (GODOSOW and SILWERSTOW) died in 1943 before the liberation of the region of Smolensk by the Red Army; the three following persons, ANDREJEW, SHIGULEW, and KRIWOSERZEW), either fled with the Germans or were taken away with the Germans by force. The last named SACHAROW MATWEJ, former railway carriage coupler at Smolensk railway station, who worked as village elder in Nowye Bateki, was found and interrogated by the Special Commission. Sacharow explained the manner in which the Germans obtained the perjured statement on the “Katyn affair”.

“In early March 1943,” Sacharow stated, “a Gestapo worker from Gnesdowo, whose name I can no longer remember, came to my house and said that a German officer wanted to see me. When I got to the Gestapo, the officer told me through an interpreter: ‘We know that you worked as a railway carriage coupler at Smolensk railway station, and therefore you must testify that the railway carriages with the Polish prisoners of war came through the city of Smolensk to Gnesdowo station in 1940, and that the Poles were then shot in the forest in the region of Kosji Gori’. To this, I answered that the carriages with the Poles in them actually came through the city of Smolensk in 1940 headed west, but which station they got off at, was not known to me. The officer told me that if I didn’t make the statement of my own free will, he would force me to. With these words, he took a rubber truncheon from the wall and began to beat me. Then they laid me on a bench, and the officer and interpreter both beat me. I no longer know how many times they hit me, because I lost consciousness. When I came to, the officer asked me to sign the statement. I allowed myself to be intimidated by their blows and threats to shoot me, made perjured testimony, and signed the statement. I was then released by the Gestapo. A few days after my order to report to the Gestapo, it was about midMarch 1943, the interpreter came to my house and said I had to go to a German general and confirm my statement. When we got to the general, the general asked me whether I confirmed my statement. I said yes, because the interpreter had told me on the way that if I didn’t confirm my statement, I would get even worse than the first time I went to the Gestapo. Out of fear of torture, I answered that I did confirm my statement. The interpreter ordered me to raise by right arm and told me that I had just sworn an oath, and could go home.”

It has been proven that the Germans attempted to obtain the desired statements from other persons as well, including the former assistant director of Smolensk prison, KAWERSNEW N.S.; a worker in the same prison, KOWALEW W.G.; and others, by persuading, threatening and mistreating the above mentioned persons. Since the search for for “witnesses” failed to bear fruit, the Germans distributed the following leaflet in the neighbouring villages, an original of which is contained in the files of the Special Commission:

“NOTICE TO THE CIVIL POPULATION

“Who can testify to the mass shootings of Polish prisoners of war and priests <!!??> committed by the Bolsheviks in 1940 in the Kosji Gori forest on the GnesdowoKatyn highway?

Who saw motor transports from Gnesdowo to Kosji Gori?

Who heard about the shootings or was personally an eyewitness?

Who knows residents capable of testifying in this regard?

All information in this connection will be rewarded.

All communications should be sent to the German police, Museumstrasse 6, or, in Gnesdowo, to the German police, House no. 105 (at the railway station).

3 May 1943

FOSS

Lieutenant, Field Police

The same notice was published in the newspaper “DER NEUE WEG” (no. 35 (157) of 6 May 1943, published by the Germans, in the city of Smolensk.

That the Germans promised a reward for the desired testimony about the “Katyn affair” was proven by the Special Commission through the interrogation of witnesses and residents of the city of Smolensk:

SOKOLOWA O.E., PUSCHTSCHINA E.A., BYTSCHKOW J.J., BONDAREW G.T., USTINOW E.P., and many others.

The falsification of the graves at Katyn

Simultaneously to the search for “witnesses”, the Germans began a corresponding falsification of the graves in the Katyn forest. They began to remove all documents dated later than April 1940, i.e., originating from the time at which, according to the German provocative slanders, the Poles had been shot by the Bolsheviks from the clothing of the Poles shot by the Germans, that is, all exhibits able to disprove these provocative slanders.

The investigations of the Special Commission have proven that the Germans used approximately 500 Russian prisoners of war recruited from camp no. 126 for this purpose. The Special Commission has numerous witness testimonies at its disposal relating to this matter.

The testimonies of the doctors from the above named camp merit special attention; the doctor of medicine TSCHISCHOW A.T., who worked in camp no. 126 during the occupation of Smolensk, stated:

“In early March 1943, a group totalling 500 men of the strongest prisoners of war were selected in the prisoner of war camp no. 126 in Smolensk in order, it was stated, to send them to construction work. Not one of these prisoners of war ever returned to the camp.”

The doctor of medicine CHMYROW W.A., who also worked in the camp during the German occupation, stated:

“It is known to me that, approximately in the second half of February or the beginning of March 1943, approximately 500 Red Army prisoners of war from our camp were transported in an undisclosed direction. These prisoners of war were said to be going to do construction work, and therefore the Germans selected the most powerfully built men.”

Similar statements were made by the nurses SENKOWSKAJA O.G., TIMOFEJEWA A.J., the female witnesses ORLOVA P.M., DOBROSERDOVA E.G., and the witness KOTSCHETKOW W.S..

Where these 500 Soviet prisoners of war were actually sent from camp no. 126 is clear from the testimony of the female witness MOSKOWSKAJA A.M..

MOSKOSKAJA ALEKSANDRA MICHAILOWNA, who live on the outskirts of the city of Smolensk and worked in the kitchen of one of the German troop divisions during the occupation, made a statement on 5 October 1943 to the Special Commission for the Examination of the Atrocities of the German Invaders, with the request to be called upon to give important eyewitness testimony.

She told the Special Commission that once, in March 1943, upon entering her shed, located in the farm on the banks of the Dnjepr, she found an unknown person, who, as it turned out, was a Russian prisoner of war.

MOSKOWSKAJA A.M. (born 1922) stated:

“From conversation with him, I learned the following:

“His name was JEGOROW, first name Nikolai, from Leningrad.

“Since the end of 1941, he had lived in German concentration camps for prisoners of war in the city of Smolensk.

“In early March 1943, he was sent to the Katyn forest with a column of 100 prisoners of war from the camp. There they were all ordered, including Jegorow, to excavate graves containing corpses in Polish officers’s uniforms, to drag these corpses out of the graves, and to remove all documents, photographs, and other objects from their pockets. It was strictly prohibited to leave anything in their pockets. Two prisoners of war were shot because the German officer found some papers on the corpses after the prisoners had already examined them. All objects, documents, and letters removed from the clothing were examined by the German officers. Then the prisoners of war were ordered to put some of these papers back in the pockets of the corpses; the rest were thrown onto a pile of objects and documents removed from the corpses, and burnt soon afterwards. Furthermore, other papers were produced from a chest or box that the Germans had brought with them; these papers were placed in the pockets of the corpses of the Polish officers. All the prisoners of war lived in the Katyn forest under fearful conditions and under strict guard.

“In early April 1943, all the work planned by the Germans was finished; the prisoners of war were not forced to go to work for three days.

“In the night, the Germans woke them all up and took them somewhere. The guard was reinforced. Jegorow was suspicious, and took particular note of everything that happened. They walked 3 to 4 hours in an unknown direction. They stopped in a meadow in the forest in front of a ditch. Jegorow watched as the Germans separated a group of prisoners of war from the rest of the human mass, forced them to the ditch, and then shot them.

“The prisoners of war were excited, and started shouting and moving about. Not far from Jegorow, a few prisoners jumped a guard, and the other guards ran to this spot.

“Jegorow took advantage of the momentary confusion to run into the darkness of the woods; at the same time, he heard shouts and shots behind him.

“After this fearful tale, which will remain seared into my memory for an entire lifetime, I felt sorry for Jegorow and invited him into my apartment so he could warm up and hide until he regained his strength. But Jegorow refused. He said he absolutely had to leave that night in order to cross the front line. But he didn’t leave that night. The next morning, I found him still in the shed. As it turned out, he had made repeated attempts to go away during the night, but after he had gone fifty steps he felt weak and was forced to return. It was probably the result of the continual malnutrition in the camp and the starvation during the last few days. We agreed that he would stay one or two days with me, in order to recover his strength. I gave him food and went to work.

“When I came back that evening, my neighbours, BARANOWA MARIA IWANOWNA and KABANOWSKAJA KATHERINA VIKTOROWNA, told me that the German police had discovered a Red Army prisoner of war in my shed during their patrol, whom they took away with them.”

Since a prisoner of war had been found in Moskowskaja’s shed, she was told to report to the Gestapo, where she was accused of hiding a prisoner of war. During her interrogation by the Gestapo, Moskowskaja denied her relations with this prisoner of war and claimed that she knew nothing of his presence in her shed. Since Moskowskaja did not admit her guilt and the prisoner of war Jegorow did not betray her, she was released by the Gestapo.

Jegorow also told Moskowskaja that a group of prisoners of war working in the Katyn forest, in addition to digging up the bodies were further occupied with bringing corpses from other locations. The corpses transported to the Katyn forest were piled up in the graves, together with the corpses which had previously been dug up.

The fact that a great number of corpses of persons shot by the Germans at other locations were transported to the graves at Katyn is also confirmed by the testimony of the mechanic SUCHATSCHEW.

SUCHATSCHEW P.F. (born 1912), a mechanical engineer from “Roskglawchjleb”, who worked for the Germans as a machinist in the city mills of Smolensk, filed a request on 8.10.43 to be permitted to testify.

When he appeared, he stated:

“In the mill, during the second half of March 1943, I once talked to a German driver who spoke a little Russian. After it came out that he was carrying meal for a division in the village of Sawenky and would be coming back to Smolensk the next day, I asked him to take him with me in order that I might have the opportunity to buy fats. In so doing, I was calculating that riding in a German truck would eliminate the risk of my being stopped at a checkpoint.

“The German driver agreed for a sum of money. We left the same day at about 10:00 P.M., taking the SmolenskWitebsk highway.

“There were two of us in the truck: me and the German driver. It was a bright night; the moon was shining, but the fog hindered visibility. About 2223 kilometres from Smolensk, there was a curve at a destroyed bridge with a rather steep embankment. We left the highway and travelled down the embankment; then a truck suddenly appeared out of the fog. Either our brakes were not very good or the driver was not very experienced; we could not brake the truck, and, since the road was rather narrow, we had a collision with the truck coming in the opposite direction. The collision was not a bad one, since the driver of the oncoming truck succeeded in swerving out of the way, as a result only scraping the sides of both trucks. The oncoming truck turned over however, and fell down the embankment. Our truck stayed where it was. The driver and I got out of the driver’s seat and went to the overturned truck.

“I immediately smelt a very strong stench of corpses, which probably came from the truck. I came closer, and saw that the truck was loaded with a cargo covered with tarpaulins and tied down with ropes. The ropes broke due to the fall, and part of the cargo fell out. It was a cruel cargo.

“They were human corpses in military uniforms. As I remember, 67 men, including a German driver and 2 Germans armed with machine guns, stood around the truck. The others were Russian prisoners of war, since they spoke Russian and were clothed correspondingly.

“The Germans began to curse my driver, then they tried to get the truck back up onto its wheels again. After two minutes, another two trucks arrived at the scene of the accident and stopped there. From these trucks came a group of Germans and Russian prisoners of war, a total of 10 men, and came up to us. Using our combined strength, we began to lift the truck. I took the opportunity and quietly asked one of the Russian prisoners of war: ‘What’s that?’ Just as quietly, he answered: ‘I don’t know how many nights we’ve already spent transporting corpses into the Katyn forest’.”

“The overturned truck was still not upright when a German noncommissioned officer approached me and my driver, and ordered us to drive on immediately.

“Since we had not suffered any real damage during the collision, my driver turned the truck back onto the highway and then drove on.

“As we drove past the two trucks that had arrived later and were covered with tarpaulins, I smelt a fearful stench of corpses.”

SUCHATSCHEW’s testimony is confirmed by the testimony of Jegorow Wladimir Afansjewitsch, who served in the police during the occupation.

Jegorow testified that, at the end of March and the early days of April 1943, as he guarded the bridges in the line of duty at the intersection of the MoscowMinsk and SmolenskWitebsk highways, he repeatedly observed large trucks covered with tarpaulins, exuding the stench of corpses, passing in the direction of Smolensk. Several persons, some of who carried weapons and doubtlessly were German, always sat in the truck cabins and on top of the tarpaulins.

Jegorow mentioned his observations to the chief of police at the police station in the village of Archipowka, Golownew Kuzma Demjanowitsch, who advised him to keep quiet about it and added: “That has nothing to do with us, we don’t need to get mixed up in German affairs.”

That the Germans transported corpses by truck to the Katyn forest was also stated by JAKOWLEWSOKOLOW FLOR MAKSINOWITSCH, born 1896, former supply agent for the canteen of the Smolensk Trusts for dining rooms, and chief of the police district of Katyn during the German occupation.

He reported that, in early April 1943, he personally observed four trucks covered with tarpaulins on which sat several men armed with machine guns and weapons, turning off the highway into the Katyn forest. A strong stench of corpses was perceptible from the trucks.

All the above mentioned eyewitness testimony permits the conclusion that the Germans also shot Poles at other locations. In bringing the corpses to the Katyn forest, the Germans pursued a triple objective: first, to wipe out all traces of their own crimes; second, to blame all their crimes on the Soviets, and third, to multiple the number of “victims of Bolshevism” in the graves in the Katyn forest.

“Visits” to the graves at Katyn

In April 1943, after the German invaders had finished all preparatory measures at the graves in the Katyn forest, they began a widespread agitation in the press and radio, attempting to blame the Soviets for the atrocities which they had themselves committed against the Polish prisoners of war. One of their methods of provocative agitation consisted of organizing “visits” to the graves at Katyn by the residents of Smolensk and neighbouring areas, as well as by “delegations” from the countries occupied by the German invaders and in a position of subservience to them.

The Special Commission interrogated a number of witnesses who participated in the “visit” to the graves at Katyn.

The witness, SUBKOW K.P., an anatomical pathologist working in Smolensk in his capacity as forensic expert, testified to the Special Commission:

“…The clothing on the corpses, especially the officers’ greatcoats, boots, and belts, held together rather well. The metallic parts of their clothing, such as belt buckles, buttons, hooks, boot nails, etc. were not completely rusted and still retained their metallic lustre at places. The tissue of the corpses made available for examination, the tissue of the face, neck, and hands, was chiefly grey in colour, in individual cases greenish brown; but there was no complete decomposition of the tissues, there was no putrefaction. In individual cases, tendons lay exposed, whitish in colour; a number of muscles were visible. During my stay at the excavations, people were working on the floor of a deep ditch, separating the bodies and carrying them up out of the grave. They used spades and other tools to do so, grabbing the corpses with their hands, and dragging them by the arms, feet, and clothing from one place to another. In no individual case could one observe that the bodies fell apart, or that individual parts of them came away.

“With respect to the above, I came to the conclusion that the period of time during which the corpses had remained in the earth absolutely could not amount to three years, as the Germans claimed, but must be much less. Since I know that the decomposition of bodies in mass graves, especially without coffins, occurs much more rapidly than in individual graves, I came to the conclusion that the mass shootings of the Poles must have been carried out about one and a half years ago, and must date from the autumn of 1941 or early 1942.

“As a result of visiting the excavations, I became firmly convinced that this gigantic atrocity was the act of the Germans.”

Testimonies that the clothing on the corpses, the metal parts, the shoes and the corpses themselves, were well preserved, were offered by all the witnesses who had participated in “visits” to the graves at Katyn and were then heard by the Special Commission, i.e.,: the foreman of the Smolensk water pipeline network, KUTZEW J.S.; the female head of the school at Katyn, WETROVA E.N.; the female telephonist of the Smolensk transport office, SCHTSCHEDROVA N.G.; the resident of the village of Borok, ALEZEJEW M.A.; the resident of the village of Nowye Bateki, KRISWOSERZEW N.G.; the duty officer at Gnesdowo station, SAWWATEJEW J.W.; the female resident of Smolensk, PUSCHTSCHINA E.A.; the doctor of medicine from the 2nd hospital at Smolensk, SIDORUK T.A.; the doctor of medicine from the same hospital, KESSAREW P.M., and others.

German attempts to wipe away the traces of their crime

The “visits” organized by the Germans failed to achieve their aim. All persons who visited the graves became convinced that they were witnessing the gross and obvious provocation of the German fascists.

Therefore measures were taken by the Germans to silence all doubters.

The Special Commission interrogated a number of witnesses who have reported how the Germans persecuted persons who doubted the truth of the provocation or did not believe it. They were fired from their jobs, arrested, and threatened with shooting. The Commission has established two cases of shooting of persons who “couldn’t keep their mouths shut”. This tactic of violence was carried out against the former German policeman SAGAINOW and against JEGOREW A.M., who participated in the excavations in the Katyn forest.

Testimonies relating to the persecution by the Germans of those persons who expressed doubt after visiting the graves in the Katyn forest were offered by:

The female attendant at pharmacy no. 1 of Smolensk, SUBAREWA M.S.; the assistant to the doctor of hygiene for the Health Division of the Stalinist District of Smolensk, KOSLOWA W.F.; and others.

The former head of the Katyn police district, JAKOWLEWSOKOLOW F.M. testified:

“A situation arose which caused the most serious disquiet among the German command, and urgent instructions were issued to all local police offices to prohibit all harmful talk and to arrest all those persons who expressed mistrust regarding the ‘Katyn affair'”.

“Such instructions were personally issued to me, as head of the police district, by the following persons: at the end of May 1943, by the German commander of the Katyn village, Lt. Col. BRAUN, and, at the beginning of June, by the head of the police district of Smolensk, KAMANEZKII.

“I issued instructions to the police in my district stating that all persons expressing mistrust, and all doubters of the truthfulness of the German communications on the shooting of the Polish prisoners of war by the Bolsheviks, were to be arrested and brought to police headquarters.

“In forwarding these instructions from the German authorities, I hypocritically concealed the fact that I was myself convinced that the ‘Katyn affair’ was a German provocation. I became completely convinced of it after participating in the ‘excursion’ in the Katyn forest.”

When the German occupation troops noticed that the “excursions” by the local populace to the graves at Katyn were not successful, they issued an order in the summer of 1943 to fill in the graves.

Before their withdrawal from Smolensk, the Germans hastily began to wipe away the traces of their atrocities. The country house occupied by the “Staff of the Construction Battalion 537” was burnt to the ground. The Germans searched for the three girls, Aleksejewa, Michailowa, and Konachowskaja, in the village of Borok, in order to take them with them or to annihilate them. They also sought their “chief witness” KISSELEW P.G., who was, however, successful in concealing himself and his family. The Germans burnt his house.

They also attempted to arrest other “witnesses”: the former foreman of Gnesdowo station, IWANOW S.W.; the former duty officer of the same station, SAWWATEJEW J.W.; and the former railway carriage coupler at the station at Smolensk, SACHAROW M.D.

.

During the very last days before the withdrawal from Smolensk the German fascist occupiers also searched for the professors Basilewski and Jefimow. These only succeeded in escaping kidnapping or death by hiding themselves in the nick of time.

But the German fascist invaders were still not successful in covering their traces and concealing their crime.

Forensic examination of the exhumed corpses proves with irrefutable clarity that the shooting of the Polish prisoners of war was committed by the Germans themselves.

We proceed now to the files of the forensic expert Commission

Files of the forensic expert Commission

By order of the Special Commission for the examination and investigation of the circumstances of the shooting of the Polish officer prisoners of war by the German fascist invaders in the Katyn forest (in the vicinity of the city of Smolensk), the forensic investigative commission, consisting of: the superior forensic expert of the People’s Commissariat for Health Matters of the USSR, Director of the State Scientific Research Institute for Forensic Medicine of the People’s Commissariat for Health Matters of the USSR, W.J. PROZOROWSKI;

Professor for Forensic Medicine of the 2nd Moscow State Medical Institute, Dr. W.M. SMOLJANINOW;

Professor of anatomical pathology, Dr. D.N. WYROPAIJEW;

the eldest Scientific Official of the anatomical medical division of the State Scientific Research Institute for Forensic Medicine of the People’s Commissariat for Health Matters of the USSR, Dr. P.S. SEMENOWSKI;

the eldest Scientific Official of the anatomical medical division of the State Scientific Research Institute for Forensic Medicine of the People’s Commissariat for Health Matters of the USSR, Professor Ph.D. SCWAIKOW;

with the participation of:

the head forensic medical expert of the West front, Major of the medical services, NIKOLSKI;

the forensic medical expert for Army N., Captain of the medical services, BUSSOEDOW:

the chief of the anatomical pathology laboratory 92, Major of the medical services, SUBBOTIN;

the Major of the medical services, OGLOBIN;

Doctor of medicine and Lt. Col. of Medicine, SADYKOW;

Lt. of Medicine PUSCHKARJOWA;

The exhumation and forensic examination of the corpses of the Polish prisoners of war from the grounds of Kosji Gori in the Katyn forest, 15 kilometres from the city of Smolensk, was carried out in the period from 16 to 23 January 1944. The bodies of the Polish prisoners of war were buried in a common grave measuring 60 x 60 x 3 m, in addition to another grave measuring 7 x 6 x 3.5 m. From the graves, 925 bodies were exhumed and examined. The exhumation and forensic examination of the bodies were carried out to determine the following:

a) the identity of the dead

b) the cause of death

c) the length of time they had been in the ground.

The circumstances of the matter (see document of the Special Commission);

Objective data: (see the record of the forensic medical examination of the bodies).

CONCLUSION

The forensic medical expert commission, based on the findings of the forensic medical examination of the bodies, came to the following conclusion:

Following the excavation of the graves and exposure of the corpses, it was established that:

a) among the great number of bodies of the Polish prisoners of war were corpses in civilian clothing, the number of which, compared to the total number of the examined bodies (2:925 of the exhumed bodies) is slight; the bodies wore military footwear;

b) the clothing of the dead prisoners of war testifies to their belonging to the officers and noncommissioned officers of the Polish army;

c) incisions in the pockets, which were turned inside out, as well as in the boots, were discovered during the examination, revealing, as a rule, traces of previous examination of the articles of clothing (military greatcoats, trousers, etc.) on the bodies;

d) in some cases, the pockets of the articles of clothing bore no incisions. In these cases, just in the pockets which had been cut or torn open, inside the jacket linings, trouserbands, foot rags and socks, newspaper clippings, brochures, prayer books, postage stamps, opened and unopened letters, receipts, medals, and other documents such as valuables (1 gold piece, golden dollars, tobacco pipes, pocket knives, cigarette paper, handkerchiefs and other articles, were discovered;

e) some of the documents (which were not subjected to any particular examination) exhibited dates from the period between 12 November 1940 to 20.6.1941;

f) the material of the clothing, especially the military greatcoats, jackets, trousers, and underwear, are well preserved and could only be torn by hand with difficulty;

g) a small number of bodies (20:925 of the exhumed bodies) had their hands tied behind their backs with white braided cord;

h) the condition of the clothing on the bodies, particularly the fact that the jackets, shirts,military belts, trousers, and underwear were buttoned up, boots or shoes tied, neckerchiefs and neckties bound around the necks, suspenders buttoned up and the shirts tucked into the trousers, shows that no exterior examination of the torso and limbs had been undertaken;

The wellpreserved condition skin tissues of the head, and the nonexistence of any incisions therein or in the skin tissues of the chest or abdomen (except for 3:925 cases), or other signs of expert activity, shows that the bodies had not been subjected to forensic examination, a conclusion confirmed by an examination of the bodies exhumed by the forensic expert commission.

The exterior and interior examination of the 925 bodies justifies the statement that the bodies exhibit gunshot wounds on the head and neck. In four cases, these are accompanied by damage to the skull caused by a hard, heavy object. In addition, some cases of injury to the abdomen, together with injuries to the head, were established. As a rule, there was one entry hole, more rarely two, in the back of the head near the nape of the neck, in the cavity in the nape of the neck, or the edge of the same cavity. In some cases, the entry wounds are on the back of the neck, at the height of the 1st, 2nd, or 3rd cervical vertebra. Most frequently, the exit holes are in the forehead, but, more rarely, in the temple or crown of the head, or in the face or neck. In 27 cases, the bullets remained in the body (without exit holes). At the terminus of the entry wound channel, under the soft tissues of the skull or bones thereof, in the cerebral membranes, or in the cerebral matter, deformed, slightly deformed, or severely deformed jacketed bullets were discovered, such as are used as ammunition for submachine guns, mostly of 7.65 m, The number of entry holes in the bones of the neck justifies the conclusion that, during the shooting, firearms of two different calibres were used, most frequently, of less than 8 mm, i.e, 7.65 mm or less; in a few cases, calibres of more than 8 mm, i.e., 9 mm, were used.

The state of the fractures of the bones of the skull, and, in many cases, residues of gunpowder discovered on the exit holes or immediately close by, show that the shots were fired at point blank range, or very close range. The superimposition of the entry and exit holes shows that the holes must have been fired from behind when the head was bent down. The entry channel traversed vital parts of the brain, or immediately adjacent to these, so that the destruction of the tissues of the brain must have caused death.

The injuries observed in the bones of the top of the skull, caused by a blunt, hard, and heavy object inflicted simultaneously with the gunshot wounds to the head, could not, by themselves, come into question as the cause of death. The forensic examinations, carried out during the period from 16 to 23 January 1944, revealed that the 925 bodies were neither in a state of decomposition nor putrefaction, i.e., they were in the initial stages of the loss of moisture (most frequently and particularly visible in the chest or abdominal regions; fat and wax separation was most particularly visible in bodies which had lain in direct contact with the ground); i.e, the tissues of the bodies exhibited a loss of moisture and a separation of fat and wax. Particularly worthy of note is the fact that the muscles of the torso and limbs retained their macroscopic condition perfectly, while their former colour was almost perfectly retained; the interior organs of the chest and abdomen were also well preserved in relation to their configuration; the heart muscle, upon incision, clearly retained its usual structure and colour. The brain exhibited characteristic structural conditions, with a clearly recognizable border between white and grey matter.

In addition to their macroscopic investigation of the tissues and bodily organs, the Forensic Expert Commission took material for the subsequent microscopic and chemical laboratory examination. The condition of the earth at the burial site must have played a certain role in the preservation of the tissues and bodily organs.

After the excavation of the graves and exposure of the corpses, the condition of the bodies, following exposure to the air for a period, began to influenced by the warmth and moisture of the spring and summer of 1943, a factor which could strongly encourage the process of decomposition. But the degree of moisture loss, and the fat and wax separation in the bodies, the especially good preservation of the muscles and interior organs, as well as the articles of clothing, justify us in stating that the bodies had only been buried a short time. If we compare the condition of the bodies in the graves at Kosji Gory with the bodies found at other burial sites in the city of Smolensk and the near vicinity (GEDEONOWKA, MAGALENSCHTISCHINA, READOWKA, camp 126 at KRASNYI BOR, etc.) (see the Report of the Forensic Medical Expert Commission of 22 October 1943), we must conclude that the bodies of the Polish prisoners of war in the Kosji Gory region were interred about 2 years ago. This is also confirmed by the findings of the documents in the articles of clothing, indicating that an earlier point in time for burial cannot be considered (see point e, page 48, and documentary table of contents).

Based on the findings of the examination, the Forensic Medical Expert Commission has established that:

1) the killings of the officer and noncommissioned officer prisoners of war took place by shooting;

2) that the shootings took place during a period approximately 2 years ago, that is, in the months of SeptemberDecember 1941;

3) that the valuables and documents dating from 1941 and discovered by the Forensic Expert Commission in the articles of clothing on the bodies, are proof that the German fascist authorities failed to carry out a thorough examination of the bodies in the spring and summer of 1943; the documents discovered prove that the shootings took place after the month of June 1941;

4) that the Germans dissected only a very small number of the bodies of Polish prisoners of war in 1943;

5) that the manner and type of shooting of the Polish prisoners of war is identical with the shooting of peaceful Soviet citizens and Soviet prisoners of war. This type of shooting was practised by the German fascist authorities on a broad scale in the temporarily occupied regions of the USSR, including the cities of Smolensk, Orel, Kharkow, Krasnodar, and Woronesch.

The Superior Forensic Official of the People’s Commissariat for Health Matters of the USSR, Director of the State Scientific Research Institute for Health Medicine of the People’s Commissariat for Health Matters of the USSR, W.J. PROZOROWSKI;

Professor of forensic medicine at the 2nd Moscow State Medical Institute, Dr. W.M. SMOLJANINOW;

Professor of anatomical pathology, Dr. D.N. WYROPAEW;

The eldest scientific official of the Thanatological Division of the State Scientific Research Institute for Forensic Medicine of the People’s Commissariat for Health Matters of the USSR, Dr. P.S. SEMENOWSKI;

The eldest scientific official of the forensic medical division of the State Scientific Research Institute for Forensic Medicine of the People’s Commissariat for Health Matters of the USSR, Prof. M.D. SCHWAIKOWA.

Smolensk, 24 January 1944.

Documents found on the corpses

In addition to the information proven in the documents of the forensic medical report, the time of the shootings of the Polish prisoners of war by the Germans (autumn 1941, not the spring of 1940, as claimed by the Germans), was also established by documents discovered during the excavation of the graves, dating not only from the second half of 1940, but also from the spring and summer (March -June) of 1941.

Among the documents discovered by the forensic experts, the following merit particular attention:

1) on body 92:

A letter from Warsaw in the Russian language addressed to the Central Office for Prisoners of War, Moscow, Kuibuschewstreet no. 12. In the letter, “Sophie” asks “Sigon”, to let her know the whereabouts of her husband, Thomas Sigon. The letter is dated 12.9.1940. The envelope bears German postage cancellation “Warsaw IX40”, and cancellation “Moscow Post Office 9 Expedition 28/IX40”, as well a notice written in red ink, in the Russian language, reading “Find camp and deliver 15/XI40” (signature illegible).

2) on body 4:

A registered postcard no. 0112 from Tarnopol with cancellation “Tarnopol 12/X40”. The manuscript text and address are obliterated.

3) on body 101:

Receipt no. 10293 dated 19.XII.1939, issued in camp Koselsk, for pawn of a gold watch accepted by LEWANDOWSKY EDUARD ADAMOWITSCH. The reverse of this receipt bears a note dated 14 March 1941, stating that the watch had been sold to “Juwelirtorg”.

4) on body 46:

A receipt issued in Starobelskyi camp on 16.XII.1939 for the pawn of a gold watch accepted by ARASCHKEWITSCH WLADIMIR RUDOLPHOWITSCH. The reverse of the receipt bears a note dated 25 March 1941, stating that the watch had been sold to “Juwelirtorg”.

5) on body 71:

A devotional image of paper with a picture of Jesus, discovered between pages 144 and 145 of a Catholic prayer book. The reverse of the devotional image bears a legible note with signature “Jadvinja” and date “4 April 1941”.

6) on body 46:

A receipt issued in camp no. 1ON on 5 May 1941 for the deposit of a sum of money in the amount of 225 rubles accepted by ARASCHKEWITSCH.

7) on the same body (46):

A receipt issued in camp no. 1ON on 6 April 1941 for the deposit of a sum of money in the amount of 102 rubles accepted by ARASCHKEWITSCH.

8) on body 101:

A receipt issued in camp no. 1ON on 18 May 1941 for the deposit of a sum of money in the amount of 175 rubles accepted by LEWANDOWSKY.

9) on body 53:

An unforwarded postcard in the Polish language with the address:

Warsaw, Bagatelja 15, house 47,

Irene Kutschinskaja, date: 20 June 1941.

Sender: Stanislav Kutschinskij.

Conclusions

From the totality of material available to the Special Commission, particularly from the testimonies of the 100 witnesses interrogated by the Commission, the facts of the case as examined by the forensic experts, and the documents and valuables taken from the graves in the Katyn forest, the following conclusions may be drawn with irrefutable clarity:

1. The Polish prisoners of war in the three camps west of Smolensk were housed there until the beginning of the war, were engaged in road construction work, and remained there even after the invasion of Smolensk by the German conqueror, until September 1943.

2. In the autumn of 1941, mass shootings of Polish prisoners of war taken from the above mentioned camps were carried out by the German occupying power in the Katyn forest.

3. The mass shootings of the Polish prisoners of war in the Katyn forest was carried out by the German armed forces under the cover name “Staff 537 of the Construction Battalion”, led by Lt. Col. Arnes and his associates Lt. Reckst and Lt. Hott.

4. As a result of the deterioration of the general military situation for Germany in early 1943, the German occupier took measures, provocative in nature and intended to attribute their own crime to the Soviets, with a view to causing hostility between the Russians and the Poles;

5. To this purpose,

a) the German fascist invaders attempted, through the use of persuasion, threats, and barbaric tortures, to find “witnesses” among the Soviet citizens from whom perjured statements were extorted to the effect that the Polish prisoners of war had been shot by the Soviets in the spring of 1940;

b) the German occupation authorities, in the spring of 1943, transported the corpses of Polish prisoners of war from other locations and shot by them at other sites, and laid them in the excavated graves of the Katyn forest in an attempt to wipe away the traces of their own bestiality and to increase the number of the “victims of Bolshevism” in the Katyn forest;

c) while the German occupation authorities spread their provocation, they used approximately 500 Russian prisoners of war for the job of excavating the graves at Katyn in order to remove all documents and exhibits which might prove German authorship of the crime. The Russian prisoners of war were shot immediately after termination of this work.

6. The findings of the Forensic Expert Commission have established beyond doubt:

a) the time of the shootings: the autumn of 1941;

b) the German executioners, in shooting the Polish prisoners of war, used the same methods (pistol shots in the back of the neck), as in the mass shootings of Soviet citizens in other cities, particularly, Orel, Woronesch,Krasnodar, and Smolensk.

7. The conclusions drawn from the statements of eyewitnesses and the forensic report on the shootings of the Polish prisoners of war by the Germans in the autumn of 1941 are fully confirmed by the exhibits and documents discovered in the graves at Katyn.

8. In shooting the Polish prisoners of war in the Katyn forest, the German fascist invaders were pursuing a consistent policy of the physical extermination of the Slavic peoples.

President of the Special Commission, Member of the Special State Commission, Academician BURDENKO;

Member of the Special State Commission, Academician ALEKSEJ TOLSTOI;

Member of the Special State Commission, Mythropolitos NIKOLAI;

President of the All-Slavic Committee, Lieutenant General GUNDOROW A.S.;

President of the Executive Committee of the Association of the Red Cross and Red Half Moon, S.A. POLESNIKOW;

People’s Commissar for Education of the RSFSR, Academician W.P. POTEMKIN;

Chief of the Forensic Head Office of the Red Army, Colonel-General E.J. SMIRNOW;

President of the Executive Committee for the Region of Smolensk, R.E. MEINIKOW.

Smolensk, 24 January 1944

Report by a Special Soviet Commission, 24 January 1944, concerning the shooting of Polish officer prisoners of war in the forest of Katyn. The executions had been carried out in autumn 1941 by the German “Staff of the Construction Battalion 537”. In spring 1943 the Germans, by blackmailing witnesses into giving false evidence and by other means, had tried to make it appear that the Soviet NKVD was responsible for the shooting of the 11,000 victims.

Description

Brochure in the Russian language from the year 1944. 56 pages in octavo format, later bound. Signature of German translation.

REPORT

of the Special Commission for the examination and investigation of the circumstances of the shooting of Polish prisoners of war in the Katyn forest by the German fascist invaders.

The Special Commission for the examination and investigation of the circumstances of the shooting of Polish prisoners of war in the forest of Katyn (near Smolensk) by the German fascist invaders was formed by order of the Special State Commission to examine and investigate the atrocities of the fascist German invaders and their accomplices.

The Commission consists of the following persons:

Member of the Special State Commission, Academician N.N. BURDENKO (President of the Commission);

Member of the on the Special State Commission, Academician ALEKSEJ TOLSTOI;

Member of the Special State Commission, Mythropolitos NIKOLAI;

President of the AllSlavic Committee, Lieutenant General GUNDOROW A.S.;

President of the Executive Committee of the Association of the Red Cross and Red Half Moon, POLESNIKOW S.A.;

People’s Commissar for Education of the RSFSR , Academician POTEMKIN W.P.;

Chief of the Forensic Head Office of the Red Army, CoronelGeneral SMIRNOW E.I.;

President of the Executive Committee for the Region of Smolensk, MEINIKOW R.E..

To deal with the tasks laid before the Commission, the Commission called upon the following forensic experts:

Superior Forensic Expert of the People’s Commissariat for Health Matters of the USSR, Director of the Scientific Research Institute for Forensic Medicine PROZOROWSKI W.I.; head of the Professorship of Forensic Medicine of the 2nd Moscow Medical Institute, Doctor of Medical Sciences, SMOLJANINOW W.M.; eldest scientific expert of the State Scientific Research Institute for Forensic Medicine of the People’s Commissariat for Health Matters of the USSR, SEMENOWSKI P.S.; eldest scientific official of the State Scientific Research Institute for Forensic Medicine of the People’s Commissariat for Health Matters of the USSR, Professor SCHWAIKOWA M.D.; chief pathologist of the Major Front of the Medical Service, Professor WYROPAIJEW D.N..

The extensive material laid before his associates and the forensic medical experts who arrived in the city of Smolensk on 26 September 1943, immediately after the liberation of the city, and who conducted the preliminary study and investigation of the circumstances of all atrocities committed by the Germans, was made available to the Special Commission by Member of the Special State Commission, Professor BURDENKO N.N..

The Special Commission carried out on-the-spot investigations and found that the graves of the Polish prisoners of war shot by the German occupiers are located 15 kilometres from the city of Smolensk, on the Witebsker highway, in the region of the Katyn forest known as “Kosji Gori”, 200 metres southwest of the highway, in the direction of the Dnjipr river.

The graves were excavated by order of the Special Commission, and in the presence of all members of the Special Commission and the forensic experts. A great number of corpses in Polish uniforms were discovered in the graves. According to the calculations of the forensic experts, the number of corpses amounts, in total, to 11,000.

The forensic experts thoroughly examined the disinterred corpses and all objects and exhibits found in the graves and on the corpses.

Simultaneous with the excavation of the graves and the examination of the corpses, the Special Commission carried out interrogations of the numerous witnesses and the local populace, whose testimonies precisely established the time and circumstances of the crime committed by the German occupiers.

The following is clear from the testimonies of the witnesses:

The Katyn Forest

The Katyn forest was always a favourite holiday spot for the people of the city of Smolensk.

Those who lived in the vicinity pastured their livestock in the Katyn forest and cut wood. There were no restrictions or prohibitions against entering the Katyn forest.

This was the case in the Katyn forest until the outbreak of the war. The “Promstrachkasse” combat engineers camp which was only dissolved in July 1941 was still located in the forest in the summer of 1941. Following the occupation of the city of Smolensk by the German invader, quite a different system prevailed in the Katyn forest. The forest began to be guarded by reinforced patrols, and numerous warning notices appeared, stating that all persons who entered the forest without special permits would be shot.

Especially strictly guarded was that part of the Katyn forest known as “Kosji Gori”, as well as the region along the banks of the Dnjepr, where a summer house rest centre for the NKWD offices at Smolensk was located 700 metres from where the graves of the Polish prisoners of war were discovered. After the arrival of the Germans, a German office was created at this location, called “the Staff of the Construction Battalion 537”.

Polish prisoners of war in the region of Smolensk

The Special Commission has established that, prior to the conquest of the city of Smolensk by the German occupiers, Polish prisoners of war, officers and enlisted men, worked on the construction and repair of the highways in the west districts of the region. The Polish prisoners of war were housed in three camps, i.e., camp no. 1ON, no. 2ON, and no. 3ON, which were located approximately 2545 kilometres west of the city of Smolensk.

It has been established, based on the testimony of witnesses and documentary proof, that the above named camps could not be evacuated in time due to the unfavourable conditions after the commencement of military operations.

All Polish prisoners of war, some of the guard personnel, and the camp employees, fell, for this reason, into German captivity.

The former head of camp no. 1ON, Major of Security WETOSCHINIKOW W.M., interrogated by the Special Commission, stated:

“I awaited the order relating to the dissolution of the camp. But connections with the city of Smolensk were interrupted. Therefore I drove together with a few fellow employees to Smolensk to clarify the situation. I found the situation in Smolensk tense. I turned to the head of railway traffic for the Smolensk stretch of the western railway, Comrade IWANOW, with a request to provide the camp with carriages to evacuate the Polish prisoners of war. Comrade IWANOW answered, however, that I could not count on that. I made attempts to get in connection with Moscow to obtain permission to cover the distance by foot, but I was not successful.

“At this time, Smolensk was already cut off from the camp by the Germans, and I don’t know what happened to the Polish prisoners of war and the guard personnel who remained behind in the camp.”

Engineer IWANOW S.W., head of traffic for the Smolensk stretch of the western railway in July 1941, stated to the Special Commission:

“The administration of the camp for Polish prisoners of war contacted my office with a request to obtain train carriages for the evacuation of the Poles, but we had no carriages available. We were furthermore unable to direct any carriages to the Gusino stretch, since the stretch was already under fire. For this reason, we could not consider the request of the camp administration. Thus, the Polish prisoners of war remained behind in the region of Smolensk.”

That the Polish prisoners of war remained behind in the camps of the region of Smolensk was confirmed by the testimony of the numerous witnesses, who had seen these Poles in the vicinity of the city of Smolensk in the early months of the occupation until the month of September 1941.

The female witness SASCHENEW Marija Akeksandrowna, a teacher at the primary school of the village of Senjkowo, stated to the Special Commission that she had hidden one of the Polish prisoners of war in the attic of her house after he had escaped from the camp.

“The Pole wore a Polish military uniform, which I immediately recognized since I had seen the groups of Polish prisoners of war in 1940-41 on the highways, working under guard. I was very interested in this Pole since he, as it turned out, had been a primary school teacher in Poland before his callup. Since I had myself graduated from teacher’s training college and wanted to be a teacher, I struck up a conversation with him. He told me that he had attended a teacher’s training college in Poland, then went to a military school and became a lieutenant in the reserve. Upon the outbreak of hostilities between Poland and Germany, he was called up for active military service. He was in BreskLitovsk and was taken prisoner by units of the Red Army. He stayed in a camp near Smolensk for over a year.

“When the Germans came and occupied the Polish camp, a hard system prevailed there. The Germans did not consider the Poles to be human beings, and pushed them around and mistreated them in every possible way. There were cases in which Poles were shot without any reason. So he decided to escape. He told me of his own accord that his wife was also a teacher and that he had two brothers and a sister.”

When he went away the following day, he mentioned a name which SASCHNEWA noted in a book. The book, presented by SASHNEWA, “Practical Exercises in the Natural Sciences” by Jagodowsky, contains the following note on the last page:

“LOECK, Jusef and Sophia, city of Smostjie, Agorodnaja Street no. 25.”

The list published by the Germans contains the name LOECK Jusef under no. 3796 as having been shot in the spring of 1940 at Kosji Gori in the Katyn forest.

From the German reports, it therefore appears that LOECK Jusef was shot one year before his acquaintance with the female witness Saschnewa.

The witness DANILENKOW N.W., a farmer from the “Krasnaja Zarja” collective farm and a member of the village council of Katyn, stated:

“In the months of August September 1941, when the Germans came, I met Poles working on the highway in groups of 1520 men each.”

Similar statements were made by the witnesses:

SOLDATENKOW, former village elder of the village of Borock,

KOLATSCHEW A.S., doctor of the city of Smolensk,

OGLOBLIN A.P., priest,

SERGEEW T.I. railway master

SMIRJAGIN P.A., engineer,

MOSKOWSKAJA A.M., resident of the city of Smolensk,

ALEKSEJEW A.M., foreman of the collective farm of the village of Borock,

KUTZEW I.W., technician of the water services,

GORODEZTKIJ W.P., priest,

BASEKINA A.T., bookkeeper,

WITROWA E.N., teacher,

SAWWATEJEW I.W., duty officer at the railway station at Gnesdowo, among others.

The raids in search of Polish prisoners of war

The presence of Polish prisoners of war in the region of Smolensk in the autumn of 1941 was also confirmed by the fact of the German raids in search of prisoners who had escaped from the camps.

The witness KARTOSCHKIN I.M., carpenter, stated:

“The Germans not only searched for Polish prisoners of war in the forests in the autumn of 1941, but there were also police house searches carried out at night in the villages.”

The former village elder Nowie Bateki SACHAROW M.D. testified that the Germans, in the autumn of 1941, “combed” the villages and forests feverishly in search of for Polish prisoners of war.

The witness DANILEKNOW N.W., farmer on the “Krasnaja Zarja” collective farm, stated:

“In our region, special raids were carried out in search of escaped Polish prisoners of war. Such searches were conducted two or three times in my house. After one house search, I asked the village elder, SERGEJEW Konstantin, whom they were looking for in our house. Segejew said that an order had been issued by the German commander to search all houses without exception, since Polish prisoners of war who had escaped from the camps were said to have hidden themselves in our village. Some time later the searches stopped.”

The witness FATJKOW T.E., a farmer at the collective farm, stated:

“Raids in search of Polish prisoners of war were carried out several times. This was in the months of August September 1941. After the month of September 1941, the raids stopped, and no one saw any more Polish prisoners of war.”

The shootings in the Katyn forest

The above mentioned “Staff of the Construction Battalion 537”, located in the summer house at Kosji Gori, did no construction work. Its activity was carefully kept secret.

What this “staff” actually did was testified to by many witnesses, including the female witnesses: ALEKSEJAWA A.M., MICHAILOWA O.A., and KONACHOWSKAJA S.P., residents of the village of Borock of the village council of Katyn.

Upon order of the German commandant of the settlement of Katyn, by the village eldest of the village of Borock, SOLDATENKOW W.J., they were sent to the summer house to serve “staff” personnel.

After arrival at Kosji Gori, a number of regulations relating to their behaviour were communicated to them through an interpreter. It was most severely prohibited to stray away from the summer house and into the forest, to enter rooms in the summer house without being asked and without the accompaniment of a German soldiers, or to approach the region of the summer house during the night. Only one particular path to the workplace and back was permitted, and only then when accompanied by the soldiers.

ALEKSEJAWA, MICHAILOWA AND KONACHOWSKAJA were instructed in this regard through an interpreter directly by the head of the German office, Lt. Col. ARNES, the women having been called in solely for this purpose.

As to the personnel making up the “staff”, ALEKSEJAWA A.M. stated:

“In the Kosji Gori summer house, there were always about 30 Germans. The oldest of them was Lt. Col. ARNES; his adjutant was Lt. Col. REKST. There were also a Lt. HOTT; a Sgt. LUEMERT; a noncommissioned officer for economic affairs ROSE; his representative ISICKE; Staff Sergeant GRENEWSKY, who headed a power plant; a photographer; a lance corporal, whose family name I can no longer recall; an interpreter from the Volga German republic, his name seems to me to have been Johann, but we called him Iwan; the cook; a German named Gustav; and many others, whose first and last names are not known to me.”

Soon after their entry into service, Aleksejewa, Michailowa, and Konachowskaja began to notice “some sort of dark doings” going on the summer house.

Alekskaja A.M. stated:

“We were warned several times by the interpreter Johann, on behalf of ARNES, that we were to keep quiet and not blabber about anything we saw or heard in the country house. Otherwise, we noticed several things that made us understand that the Germans were carrying on dark doings in this country house.

“At the end of August and during more than half of September 1941, several trucks arrived almost daily at the Kosji Gori summer house. At first, I paid them no attention; later I noted that, when the trucks arrived, they always stopped somewhere on the path leading from the highway to the summer house for half an hour or a full hour. I drew this conclusion because the noise of the motors went silent for some time after the trucks entered the grounds of the country house. At the same time, individual shots began to be fired. One shot followed another in short but regular intervals. Then the shooting stopped and the trucks drove to the country house. German soldiers and noncommissioned officers got down off the trucks. They talked in loud voices, went in the bathroom, and then drank wine. The bathroom was always heated on these days. On the days when the trucks arrived, soldiers also entered the summer house from some other unit. Beds were laid out for these soldiers in the soldiers’ mess hall, which had been opened in one of the rooms. On these days, there was a great deal of cooking in the kitchen, and double portions of spirits were brought to the table.

Shortly before the entry of the trucks, the soldiers went into the forest, probably to where the trucks were stopped.

After half an hour or a full hour, they came back on the trucks, together the soldiers that lived in the country house. I would probably never have observed this or noticed when the noise began and went silent again. But every time the trucks entered, if we (myself, Konachowskaja, and Michailowa) were in the courtyard, we were driven back into the kitchen or not allowed to leave the kitchen if we were in there. Through this circumstance, and through the fact that I several times noted fresh bloodstains on the clothing of two corporals, I was compelled to take careful note of everything that went on in the country house. I then noticed the strange intermediate pauses in the movement of the trucks and their behaviour in the forest. I also noticed that the bloodstains were always on the clothing of the same two men, two corporals. One of them was a big one with red hair; the other, of medium build, was blond. For this reason, I drew the conclusion that the Germans were bringing people to the summer house by truck and then shooting them. I even guessed where everything was happening and, when I left the house or came back to it, I noticed earth thrown up at several places not far from the highway. The places where the earth lay got bigger from day to day. In the course of time the earth at these spots nevertheless took on its usual shape again.

To the question by the Special Commission as to which persons were shot in the forest near the country house, Aleksejewa answered that Polish prisoners of war were shot there; and to confirm her testimony she stated:

“There were days on which the trucks did not enter the country house. The soldiers however left the country house and went into the forest. From there, frequent shots could be heard. After their return, the soldiers always went into the bathroom and then they drank.

“And then there was another such case. Once, I stayed longer than usual in the country house. Michailowa and Konachowskaja had already gone away. I was not yet finished with my work, I had stayed for that reason, when suddenly a soldier came up to me and said I could go. In so doing, he made reference to Rose’s order. The same soldier accompanied me to the highway.

“After I passed the curve in the highway 150200 metres from the country house, I saw a group of about 30 Polish prisoners of war marching along the highway under reinforced guard.

“That they were Poles I already knew, because I had already met Polish prisoners of war on the embankment roadway before the outbreak of the war and for some time after the Germans came; the Poles always wore the same uniform, with a characteristic fourcornered cap.

“I remained by the edge of the road to see where they were being taken, and I saw them turn aside at the curve to our Kosji Gori country house.

“Since I had already carefully observed all events from the country house before this time, I took great interest in this event on that day; I turned back a short distance on the embankment roadway, and hid in the bushes by the side of the road to await further events. 20 or 30 minutes later, I heard the characteristic individual shots which were so well known to me.

“Then everything came clear to me, and I went home quickly.

“From this fact, I concluded that the Germans not only shot the Poles during the day, when we were working, but also at night, during our absence.

“This became still more clear to me when I remembered that the entire staff of officers and soldiers living at the country house, except for the guards, slept until late in the day, and only woke up around 12 noon.

“Sometimes we could tell when the Poles were arriving at Kosji Gori, from the tense atmosphere which prevailed in the country house on such days.

“All officers then left the country house; only individual duty officers remained behind in the building, and the duty officer controlled all posts by telephone without interruption…”

Michailowa OA stated:

“In September 1941, very frequent shots could be heard in the Kosji Gori forest. At the beginning, I took no particular notice of the trucks arriving at the country house; they were covered on all four sides, painted green, and accompanied by noncommissioned officers. Later I noticed that these trucks were never parked in our garages, and were not unloaded either. These trucks arrived very often, especially in September 1941.

“Among the noncommissioned officers who always sat in the cabin next to the driver, I noticed one tall one with a pallid complexion and red hair. When these trucks came into the country house, all the noncommissioned officers, as if they were obeying an order, went into the bathroom, washed themselves for a long time, and then drank in the country house.

“Once this tall redhaired German left the truck and went straight into the kitchen, where he asked for water. As he drank the water from the glass, I noticed a bloodstain on the right cuff of his uniform.”

Michailowa O.A. and Konachowskaja S.P. once saw with their own eyes how two Polish prisoners of war were shot after apparently escaping the Germans and had being recaptured.

Michailowa stated the following in this regard:

“Once Konachowskaja and I were working in the kitchen as usual, and we heard noise not far from the house. When we came out of the kitchen, we saw two Polish prisoners of war surrounded by German soldiers, explaining something to noncommissioned officer Rose. Then Lt. Col. Arnes came up and spoke a few words to Rose. We got out of the way, since we were afraid Rose would shoot us for our curiosity. But we were noticed anyway, and the mechanic Linewski chased us away on Roses order into the kitchen, and then he led Poles away from the country house. After a few minutes, we heard shots. The German soldiers and noncommissioned officers, who returned shortly afterwards, were talking to each other excitedly. Konachowskaja and I were driven to leave the kitchen once more by the desire to find out what the Germans had done with the Poles whom they had arrested. Arnes’ adjutant, who went out with us at the same time, asked Rose something in German, whereupon the latter answered in German “Alles in Ordnung “. I understood these words, because they were often used by Germans in conversations with each other. I concluded from all these events that the two Poles had been shot.”

Similar statements were made in this regard by Konachowskaja S.P.:

Intimidated by what was going on in the country house, Alekskaja, Michailowa, and Konachowskaja decided to quit their jobs at the country house on some pretext. They used the salary cut from 9 to 3 marks monthly, implemented at the beginning of January 1942 and, upon Michailowa’s suggestion, did not go to work. The same evening, a car arrived; a man took them to the country house, and locked them in a cold room for punishment. Michailowa was locked up for 8 days; Aleksejewa and Konachowskaja for 3 days.

After they had undergone this punishment, they were all released.

During their work in the country house, Aleksejewa, Michailowa, and Konachowskaja were afraid to exchange their observations of what was going on in the country house.Only in confinement, when they were all locked in, did they exchange their thoughts during the night:

Michailowa stated during the interrogation of 24 December 1943:

“That was the first time we spoke of what was going on in the country house. I told everything I knew, but it turned out that Konachowskaja and Aleksejewa were already aware of all these things. But they were afraid to speak to me about them. Here I found out that the Germans in Kosji Gori were shooting Polish prisoners of war in particular, since Aleksejewa told how she was going home from work once in the autumn of 1941 and personally saw the Germans herding a big group of Polish prisoners of war into the Kosji Gori forest. Some time later she heard shots at that spot.”

Aleksejewa and Konachowskaja testified to the same effect.

Aleksejewa, Michailowa, and Konachowskaja came to the firm conviction, after comparing their observations, that mass shootings of Polish prisoners of war were being carried on at the Kosji Gori country house in August and September 1941.

The testimonies of Aleksejewa are confirmed by the testimony of her father Aleksejew Michail, to whom she reported her observations concerning the crimes being committed by the Germans at the country house in the autumn of 1941 while she was still working there.

“For a long time she didn’t say a single word,” Aleksejew Michail testified, “Only when returned from her work, she complained that it was strange to work there and that she didn’t know how she could get away. When I asked her what made it so strange, she answered that shots could very often be heard in the forest. Once, when she came back home, she told me confidentially that the Germans were shooting Poles in the Kosji Gori forest. After listening to my daughter, I warned her most severely not to speak to anyone else about it. otherwise the Germans would find out about it and our whole family would suffer.”

The testimony concerning the transport of Polish prisoners of war to Kosji Gori in small groups of 2030 men under a guard of 57 German soldiers is made by other witnesses interrogated by the Special Commission: KISSELEW P.G., farmer from the Kosji Gori dairy farm; KRIWOSERZEW M.G., joiner from the station Krasnyi Bor in the Katyn forest: IWANOW S.W., exforeman at Gnesdowo station in the region of the Katyn forest; SAWWATEJEW IW, duty officer at the same station; ALEKSEJEW M.A., president of the collective farm at the village of Borok; OGLOBLIN A.P., priest of the church of Kuprin, and others.

These witnesses also heard shots resounding from the Kosji Gori forest. An especially great breakthrough for the investigation of the events at the Kosji Gori country house in the autumn of 1941 was provided by the professor of astronomy, Director BASILEWSKI B.W., of the observatory at Smolensk. Professor Basilewski was appointed representative of the head of the city (the mayor) by force during the first days of the German occupation of Smolensk, while the lawyer MENSCHAGIN B.G. was appointed head of the city by the Germans, who later took him away with them. MENSCHAGIN was a traitor who enjoyed the special trust of the German command, and especially that of the commandant of Smolensk, von SCHWEZ.

In early September 1941, Basilewski asked Menschagin to ask commandant von Schwez to release the teacher SCHIGLINSKI from prisoner of war camp no. 126. In fulling this request, Menschagin talked to von Schwez, and then told Basilewski that his request could not be granted because, as von Schwez said, “an order had come from Berlin prescribing the immediate application of the strictest regime relating to prisoners of war and permitting no indulgence in this matter.”

“I couldn’t help objecting”, testified witness Basilewski, “‘But What could be stricter than the regime prevailing in the camp now?'” Menschagin looked at me strangely and, coming very close to me, answered softly, “‘It can be . The Russians will at least die off by themselves, but as for the prisoners of war, it was simply proposed to exterminate them.'”

“‘How? How am I to understand that?'” I cried.

“You are to understand it literally. There is such an order from Berlin,” answered Menschagin, requesting me, ‘for God’s sake’, not to say a word about it to anyone.”

“Two weeks later, after the above mentioned talk with Menschagin, when I was again received by him, I could not help asking him: ‘What have you heard about the Poles?’

Menschagin hesitated a little and then answered, ‘It’s all up with them. Von Schwez told me that they have been shot somewhere in the vicinity of Smolensk.’

“Since Menschagin noticed my excitement, he warned me again of the need to keep this matter strictly secret, and then he began to explain the German manner of procedure in this matter. He said, ‘the shooting of the Poles was a link in the whole chain of anti-Polish policies carried out by the Germans, which was to be especially tightened up in view of conclusion of the treaty between the Russians and the Poles.'”

Basilewski also told the Special Commission about his conversation with the Special Leader of the 7th Division of the German commander Hirschfeld, a Baltic German who spoke good Russian:

“Hirschfeld cynically explained that the perniciousness and inferiority of the Poles had been historically proven, and that the reduction in Polish population figures would serve to fertilize the soil and provide a guarantee for the expansion of German living space.

“In this connection, Hirschfeld bragged that nothing was left of the intelligentsia in Poland, since they had all been hanged, shot, or taken away to concentration camps.”

The testimony of the witness Basilewski was confirmed by the witness, physics professor Jefimow J.E., interrogated by the Special Commission, to whom Basilewski told of his conversation with Menschagin in the autumn of 1941.

The testimony of Basilewski and Jefimow is strengthened by documentary evidence in the form of handwritten notes by Menschagin, in his own handwriting, jotted down in his notebook.

This notebook, containing 17 full pages, was found in the files of the city administration of Smolensk after its liberation. The fact that this notebook belonged to Menschagin, and was also in his handwriting, is confirmed both by the testimony of Basilewski, who was well familiar with Menschagin’s handwriting, and by graphological reports.

As may be seen from the dates contained in the notebook, the contents concern the period from the early days of August 1941 until November of the same year.

Among the various notes with regards to economic matters (wood, electrical energy, commerce, etc.) there are a number of notes concerning instructions from the commander of Smolensk, made by Menschagin in order not to forget them.

From these notes, it may be clearly seen that the city administration was concerned with a number of matters as the body carrying out all the instructions of the German command.

The first of the three pages of the note book describe the organization of the Ghetto and the system of reprisals to be carried out relating to the Jews. Page 10, dated 15 August 1941, states: “All escaped Polish prisoners of war are to be arrested and brought to the command post.” Page 15, (without date), states:

“Are there any rumours circulating among the populace of shootings of Polish prisoners of war at Kosji Gory (to Umnow)?”

From the initial notes, it may be seen that, on 15 August 1941, the Polish prisoners of war were still in the region of Smolensk, and that they were furthermore being arrested by the German authorities.

The second note proves that the German command, disturbed by the possibility of the existence of rumours among the civilian population about crimes committed by the Germans, gave special instructions to investigate the matter.

Umnow, who is mentioned in the note, was chief of the Russian police in Smolensk during the first months of the occupation.

Beginning of German provocation

In the winter of 1942-43, the general military situation changed fundamentally, and not in favour of the Germans. The military power of the Soviet Union was constantly increasing, and the alliance between the Soviet Union with the Allies was strengthening. The Germans decided to initiate a provocation by taking the atrocities which they themselves had committed in the forest of Katyn and accusing the Soviet authorities of having committed them. They thus intended to divide the Russians and the Poles and wipe away the trace of their crime.

The priest from the village of Kuprino, district Smolensk, A.P. OGLOBLIN, testified:

“The Germans took up this matter after the events at Stalingrad, when they were feeling unsure of themselves. Among the people, it was said that the Germans were attempting to improve their position.”

Concerned with expanding the Katyn provocation, the Germans first began to search for “witnesses” able to offer the testimony desired by the Germans, under the influence of promises, bribes, or threats.

The farmer KISSELEW Parfen Gawrilowitsch, born 1870, who lived closer to the Kosji Gori country house than anyone else, attracted the attention of the Germans. Kisselew was told to report to the Gestapo as early as the end of 1942, and after under the threat of reprisals was requested to offer perjured testimony about the matter, stating that he knew that the Bolsheviks had shot the Polish prisoners of war in the Kosji Gori country house of the NKWD in early 1940.

Kisselew testified in this regard:

“In autumn 1942, two policemen came to my house and said I had to report to the Gestapo at Gnesdowo railway station.

“The same day, I went to the Gestapo, which was housed in a twostory house next to the railway station. In the room which I entered, there was a German officer and an interpreter. The German officer began to interrogate me through the interpreter, asking how long I had lived in the district, what I did, and my financial situation. I told him I had lived in the farmstead next to Kosji Gori since 1907 and worked on my property. About my financial situation, I said I was having difficulties, because I was already old and my sons were in the army.

“After this short conversation, the officer explained to me that the Gestapo had reports stating that members of the KNWD office had shot the Polish prisoners of war in the Katyn forest not far from Kosji Gori in 1940. He asked what testimony I could make about it. I answered that I had never heard anything about the NKWD office carrying out any shootings in the Kosji Gori. I furthermore explained to the officer that I considered it impossible to carry out shootings there, since Kosji Gory was very openly exposed, and thickly populated. The whole populace in the neighbouring villages must surely have known of it.

“The officer answered that I was to make such a statement, since the aforementioned fact had allegedly really taken place. A big reward was promised me for this testimony.

“I repeatedly explained to the officer that I had heard nothing of the shootings, and that something like this could simply not happen at all before the war in our region. The officer nevertheless insisted that I was to make the perjured statement.

“After the first conversation, of which I have already spoken, I was called to the Gestapo for a second time in February 1942.

“At this time, it was known to me that other residents of the neighbouring villages had also been ordered to report to the Gestapo, and they had been ordered to make the same testimony.

“In the Gestapo were the same officer and interpreter who had interrogated me the first time.

“Again they demanded that I should testify that I was an eyewitness to the shootings of Polish officers allegedly carried out in 1940 by the NKWD.

I explained to the Gestapo officer once again that this was a lie, since I had heard nothing of the shootings before the war, and that I would not make the perjured statement. But the interpreter refused to listen to me, took a handwritten document from the table, and read it to me. It said that I, KISSELEW, lived in the farmstead not far from Kosji Gori, and had myself seen employees of the NKWD shooting the Polish officers in 1940.

After the interpreter had read it to me, he suggested that I sign the document. I refused. The interpreter tried to force me to sign by means of threats and insults, Finally he said, ‘Either you sign immediately, or you will be killed. You have to choose!’

“I was now afraid, and signed the document, figuring that the matter was at an end. After the Germans organized the visit to the graves of Katyn by various ‘delegations’, I was forced to speak before the Polish ‘delegation.'”

Kisselew forgot the contents of the statement signed in the Gestapo office, got mixed up, and finally refused to speak. Then the Gestapo had him arrested, and, by beating him for a month a half without mercy, forced him to agree to appear again in public.

In this regard, Kisselew testifies:

“In reality, it happened differently. In the spring of 1943, the Germans announced that they had discovered the graves of the Polish officers in in the Kosji Gori region of the Katyn forest, after having been allegedly shot by the NKWD.

“Soon afterwards, a Gestapo interpreter came to my house and drove me into the Kosji Gori region of the Katyn forest. After leaving my house, the interpreter warned me privately that when I was in the forest, to say everything just exactly as stated in the statement signed in the Gestapo office.

“When we got to the forest, I saw excavated graves and a group of persons unknown to me. The interpreter told me they were ‘Polish delegates’ who were coming to view the graves.

“When we approached the graves, the ‘delegates’ began to ask me various questions in the Russian language relating to the shooting of the Poles.

“But since over a month had passed since I was told to report to the Gestapo, I had forgotten everything contained in the document signed by me. So I got mixed up and finally said that I didn’t know anything about the shooting of the Polish officers.

“The German officer got very angry, and the interpreter pushed and pulled me brutally away from the ‘delegation’. The next day, a car with a Gestapo officer in it came to my house. When the officer found me in the courtyard, he explained that I was under arrest, put me in the car and took me to Smolensk prison.

“After my arrest I was often called for interrogation, but they beat me more than they interrogated me. During my first interrogation they beat me badly and accused me of slandering them. Then they brought me back to my cell.

“In the next interrogation, they told me I had to declare publicly that I was an eyewitness to the shootings of the Polish officers by the Bolsheviks and that I would not get out of prison until the Gestapo was convinced that I would fulfil my task to the best of my ability. I told the officer that I would rather rot in prison than pull the wool over people’s eyes. After that, they beat me very badly.

“These interrogations, in which I was beaten, were repeated. The result was that I completely lost my strength, partially lost my hearing, and could no longer move my right arm.

“Approximately a month after my arrest the German officer called me to him and said, ‘Now, you see, Kisselew, what your obstinacy has cost you. We have decided to carry out a death sentence upon you. Tomorrow you will be driven to the Katyn forest and hanged. I asked the officer not to do that, and tried to convince him that I was unfit for the role of eyewitness to the shootings, because I simply could not lie and would therefore simply get something mixed up again. But the officer stuck to his insistence.

“A few minutes later, soldiers came into the room and began to beat me with rubber truncheons. I could not stand the beatings and mistreatment and agreed to confirm the perjured statement regarding the shooting of the Polish officers by the Bolsheviks. Then I was released from prison. At the same time, they told me that I had to speak in front of the ‘delegates’ at the first request of the Germans in the Katyn forest. Each time, before we drove to the excavated graves in the Katyn forest, the interpreter came to my home, called me out into the courtyard, took me aside so that nobody could hear us, and made me learn everything by heart for half an hour, completely and in detail, that I had to say about the alleged shootings of the Polish officers by the NKWD in 1940.

“I remember that the interpreter told me approximately the following:

“‘I live on the farmstead in the Kosji Gori region not far from the KNWD country house. In early 1940, I saw how them bringing the Poles into the forest and shooting them there every night.’

I also had to repeat word for word that this was the work of the NKWD.

“After I had learnt by heart everything the interpreter told me, he drove me into the forest to the excavated graves and told me to repeat everything in the presence of the visiting ‘delegation’. My remarks were strictly noted and orchestrated by the Gestapo interpreter.

“Once, when I appeared before a ‘delegation’, they asked me whether I had ever seen the Poles before they were shot by the Bolsheviks.

“I was not prepared for this question, and declared that I had seen the Polish prisoners of war before the beginning of the war engaged in road construction work, which was also true. At this, the interpreter pushed me aside roughly, and chased me home. Please believe me when I say that I was constantly tortured by remorse, because I knew that the Polish officers in reality were shot by the Germans in 1941; there was no other way out for me, since I was afraid of repeated arrest and torture.”

The testimony of Kisselew P.G. regarding his visit to the Gestapo and subsequent arrest and beatings are confirmed by his wife, Kisselewa Asksinija, born 1870, who resides with him; his son, Kisselew Wassili, born 1911; and his daughterinlaw, Kisselewa Maria, born 1918; as well as railway master Sergejew Timotej Iwanowitch, born 1901, who also lives with Kisselew at the farmstead.

The injuries inflicted upon Kisselew by the Gestapo (injured shoulder, significant hearing loss) were confirmed by forensic examination report.

In the search for ‘witnesses’, the Germans then took an interest in the workers at Gnesdowo railway station, located two and half kilometres away from Kosji Gori.

The Polish prisoners of war first arrived at this station in the spring of 1940, and the Germans obviously wished to obtain corresponding testimony from railway workers. To this purpose, the Germans, in the spring of 1943, ordered the former station master of Gnesdowo, IWANOW S.W., and the duty officer SAWWATEJEW I.W., among others, to report to the Gestapo.

Regarding the circumstances of his visit to the Gestapo, Iwanow S.W., born 1882, stated:

“…It was in March 1943. A German officer interrogated me in the presence of an interpreter. He asked me through the interpreter what I did, and what my job was at Gnesdowo before the occupation of the area by the Germans; the officer asked me whether I knew that the Polish prisoners of war arrived by railway in early 1940 in Gnesdowo in large groups.

“I said, that I knew nothing about it.

“The officer then asked me whether I knew that the Polish officers were shot by the Bolsheviks in the year in question, the spring of 1940, soon after their arrival.

“I answered that I knew nothing about it, and that this could not be true, since I had seen the Polish officers who arrived at Gnesdowo in the spring of 1940 doing road construction work in 194041, until the city of Smolensk was taken by the Germans.

“The officer then told me: ‘If a German officer says that the Poles were shot by the Bolsheviks, then that corresponds to the facts. Therefore’, the officer continued, ‘you need have no fear; you may sign the statement with a clear conscience, stating that the Polish prisoners of war were shot by the Bolsheviks, and that you were an eyewitness to it.'”

“I answered that I was an old man, 61 years old, and didn’t want to burden my soul with sins. I could only testify that the Polish officers actually arrived in the spring of 1940 in Gnesdowo.

“The German officer then attempted to convince me to make the desired statement by promising to transfer me from my present job as intermediate station master to another post, and to make me station master at Gnesdowo, which is what I was under the Soviets, as well as taking care of me from a financial point of view.

“The interpreter emphasized that the German command placed great value on my testimony as former railway employee at Gnesdowo, the station nearest the Katyn forest, and that I would not be sorry if I made the desired statement.

“I saw that I was in an extremely difficult position and that a sad fate awaited me, but I still refused to make the perjured statement to the German officer.

“The officer then tricked me. He threatened me to have me beaten or shot, declaring that I did not understand my best interests. But I stood resolutely by my refusal.

“The interpreter then wrote a short statement in the German language, one page long, and told me what it said. The interpreter told me it only contained the fact that the Poles arrived in Gnesdowo. But when I asked to sign my statement not only in German, but in Russian as well, the officer lost his temper, beat me with a rubber truncheon, and threw me out.”

SAWWATEJEW I.W. born 1880, testified:

“…In the Gestapo, I said that the Polish prisoners actually arrived in the spring of 1940 at Gnesdowo with their own railway transport, and that they continued by motor transport, where, I don’t know. I also added that I later saw the Poles several times on the MoscowMinsk highway doing highway repair work in small groups.

“The officer told me that I was mistaken, and that I could not have seen the Poles on the highway, since they had been shot by the Bolsheviks. He asked me to make a statement about this. I refused. After many threats and attempts at persuasion, the officer consulted with the interpreter about something, speaking in the German language. The interpreter then wrote a short statement and presented it to me for signature, saying that it contained the statements I had made. I asked the interpreter if I could read it through for myself, but he interrupted me with insults and ordered me to sign the document immediately and to get out. I hesitated a minute; the interpreter grabbed a rubber truncheon hanging on the wall and raised it to hit me. I then signed the statement which had been placed before me. The interpreter told me to get out, and not to blab anything to anybody or they would have me shot…”

In their search for “witnesses”, the Germans did not stop at the above mentioned persons. They tried to find former NKWD employees and force them to make the perjured statements desired by the Germans. The Germans then arrested the former NKWD garage worker for the region of Smolensk, IGNATIUK E.L., and tried very hard, through threats and beatings, to force a statement out of him saying that he was not a garage worker, but a driver, and had personally driven the Polish prisoners of war to the location of the shootings. IGNATIUK E.L., born 1903, stated:

“During my first interrogation by police chief ALFERTSCHIK, he accused me of antiGerman slander activity, and asked me what my job was with the NKWD. I answered that I was employed in the NKWD office, region of Smolensk, as a worker. During the same interrogation, Alfertschik asked me to make a statement saying that was I employed in the NKWD office not as a worker, but as a driver. When Alfertschik failed to obtain the desired statement, he became enraged and tied me up, him and his adjutant, whom he addressed by the name “Schorsch”, tying a rag around my head and mouth; they took down my pants, laid me on a table and beat me with rubber truncheons. They then called me to interrogation once again, and Alfertschik asked me to make the perjured statement that the Polish prisoners of war were shot in the Katyn forest in 1940 by the Bolsheviks, and that I knew all about it since I had driven the Polish officers to the Katyn forest and was present during the shootings. If I agreed to make such a statement, Alfertschik promised to release me from prison and give me a job in the police, where living conditions were very good; otherwise, he would have me shot. The last time, I was interrogated in the police station by the examining magistrate ALEXANDROW, who, like Alfertschik, demanded the desired perjured statement from me. But I refused.

“After this interrogation, they beat me repeatedly and brought me to the Gestapo. In the Gestapo, they demanded that I make the perjured statement about the shooting of the Polish officers in the Katyn forest in 1940, that it was done by the Soviets, and that as a driver I allegedly had to know all about it.”

In the book published by the German Foreign Office, containing material falsified by the Germans on the “Katyn affair”, the above mentioned KISSELEW P.G., among others, is presented as a “witness”. The following persons are also cited as “witnesses”:

GODOSOW (identical with GODUNOW), born 1877;

SILWERSTOW GRIGORI, born 1891;

ANDREJEW IWAN, born 1917;

SHIGULEW MICHAIL, born 1915;

KRIWOSERZEW IWAN, born 1915, and

SACHAROW MATWEJ, born 1893.

It has been proven by investigation that the first two of the above mentioned persons (GODOSOW and SILWERSTOW) died in 1943 before the liberation of the region of Smolensk by the Red Army; the three following persons, ANDREJEW, SHIGULEW, and KRIWOSERZEW), either fled with the Germans or were taken away with the Germans by force. The last named SACHAROW MATWEJ, former railway carriage coupler at Smolensk railway station, who worked as village elder in Nowye Bateki, was found and interrogated by the Special Commission. Sacharow explained the manner in which the Germans obtained the perjured statement on the “Katyn affair”.

“In early March 1943,” Sacharow stated, “a Gestapo worker from Gnesdowo, whose name I can no longer remember, came to my house and said that a German officer wanted to see me. When I got to the Gestapo, the officer told me through an interpreter: ‘We know that you worked as a railway carriage coupler at Smolensk railway station, and therefore you must testify that the railway carriages with the Polish prisoners of war came through the city of Smolensk to Gnesdowo station in 1940, and that the Poles were then shot in the forest in the region of Kosji Gori’. To this, I answered that the carriages with the Poles in them actually came through the city of Smolensk in 1940 headed west, but which station they got off at, was not known to me. The officer told me that if I didn’t make the statement of my own free will, he would force me to. With these words, he took a rubber truncheon from the wall and began to beat me. Then they laid me on a bench, and the officer and interpreter both beat me. I no longer know how many times they hit me, because I lost consciousness. When I came to, the officer asked me to sign the statement. I allowed myself to be intimidated by their blows and threats to shoot me, made perjured testimony, and signed the statement. I was then released by the Gestapo. A few days after my order to report to the Gestapo, it was about midMarch 1943, the interpreter came to my house and said I had to go to a German general and confirm my statement. When we got to the general, the general asked me whether I confirmed my statement. I said yes, because the interpreter had told me on the way that if I didn’t confirm my statement, I would get even worse than the first time I went to the Gestapo. Out of fear of torture, I answered that I did confirm my statement. The interpreter ordered me to raise by right arm and told me that I had just sworn an oath, and could go home.”

It has been proven that the Germans attempted to obtain the desired statements from other persons as well, including the former assistant director of Smolensk prison, KAWERSNEW N.S.; a worker in the same prison, KOWALEW W.G.; and others, by persuading, threatening and mistreating the above mentioned persons. Since the search for for “witnesses” failed to bear fruit, the Germans distributed the following leaflet in the neighbouring villages, an original of which is contained in the files of the Special Commission:

“NOTICE TO THE CIVIL POPULATION

“Who can testify to the mass shootings of Polish prisoners of war and priests committed by the Bolsheviks in 1940 in the Kosji Gori forest on the GnesdowoKatyn highway?

Who saw motor transports from Gnesdowo to Kosji Gori?

Who heard about the shootings or was personally an eyewitness?

Who knows residents capable of testifying in this regard?

All information in this connection will be rewarded.

All communications should be sent to the German police, Museumstrasse 6, or, in Gnesdowo, to the German police, House no. 105 (at the railway station).

3 May 1943

FOSS

Lieutenant, Field Police

The same notice was published in the newspaper “DER NEUE WEG” (no. 35 (157) of 6 May 1943, published by the Germans, in the city of Smolensk.

That the Germans promised a reward for the desired testimony about the “Katyn affair” was proven by the Special Commission through the interrogation of witnesses and residents of the city of Smolensk:

SOKOLOWA O.E., PUSCHTSCHINA E.A., BYTSCHKOW J.J., BONDAREW G.T., USTINOW E.P., and many others.

The falsification of the graves at Katyn

Simultaneously to the search for “witnesses”, the Germans began a corresponding falsification of the graves in the Katyn forest. They began to remove all documents dated later than April 1940, i.e., originating from the time at which, according to the German provocative slanders, the Poles had been shot by the Bolsheviks from the clothing of the Poles shot by the Germans, that is, all exhibits able to disprove these provocative slanders.

The investigations of the Special Commission have proven that the Germans used approximately 500 Russian prisoners of war recruited from camp no. 126 for this purpose. The Special Commission has numerous witness testimonies at its disposal relating to this matter.

The testimonies of the doctors from the above named camp merit special attention; the doctor of medicine TSCHISCHOW A.T., who worked in camp no. 126 during the occupation of Smolensk, stated:

“In early March 1943, a group totalling 500 men of the strongest prisoners of war were selected in the prisoner of war camp no. 126 in Smolensk in order, it was stated, to send them to construction work. Not one of these prisoners of war ever returned to the camp.”

The doctor of medicine CHMYROW W.A., who also worked in the camp during the German occupation, stated:

“It is known to me that, approximately in the second half of February or the beginning of March 1943, approximately 500 Red Army prisoners of war from our camp were transported in an undisclosed direction. These prisoners of war were said to be going to do construction work, and therefore the Germans selected the most powerfully built men.”

Similar statements were made by the nurses SENKOWSKAJA O.G., TIMOFEJEWA A.J., the female witnesses ORLOVA P.M., DOBROSERDOVA E.G., and the witness KOTSCHETKOW W.S..

Where these 500 Soviet prisoners of war were actually sent from camp no. 126 is clear from the testimony of the female witness MOSKOWSKAJA A.M..

MOSKOSKAJA ALEKSANDRA MICHAILOWNA, who live on the outskirts of the city of Smolensk and worked in the kitchen of one of the German troop divisions during the occupation, made a statement on 5 October 1943 to the Special Commission for the Examination of the Atrocities of the German Invaders, with the request to be called upon to give important eyewitness testimony.

She told the Special Commission that once, in March 1943, upon entering her shed, located in the farm on the banks of the Dnjepr, she found an unknown person, who, as it turned out, was a Russian prisoner of war.

MOSKOWSKAJA A.M. (born 1922) stated:

“From conversation with him, I learned the following:

“His name was JEGOROW, first name Nikolai, from Leningrad.

“Since the end of 1941, he had lived in German concentration camps for prisoners of war in the city of Smolensk.

“In early March 1943, he was sent to the Katyn forest with a column of 100 prisoners of war from the camp. There they were all ordered, including Jegorow, to excavate graves containing corpses in Polish officers’s uniforms, to drag these corpses out of the graves, and to remove all documents, photographs, and other objects from their pockets. It was strictly prohibited to leave anything in their pockets. Two prisoners of war were shot because the German officer found some papers on the corpses after the prisoners had already examined them. All objects, documents, and letters removed from the clothing were examined by the German officers. Then the prisoners of war were ordered to put some of these papers back in the pockets of the corpses; the rest were thrown onto a pile of objects and documents removed from the corpses, and burnt soon afterwards. Furthermore, other papers were produced from a chest or box that the Germans had brought with them; these papers were placed in the pockets of the corpses of the Polish officers. All the prisoners of war lived in the Katyn forest under fearful conditions and under strict guard.

“In early April 1943, all the work planned by the Germans was finished; the prisoners of war were not forced to go to work for three days.

“In the night, the Germans woke them all up and took them somewhere. The guard was reinforced. Jegorow was suspicious, and took particular note of everything that happened. They walked 3 to 4 hours in an unknown direction. They stopped in a meadow in the forest in front of a ditch. Jegorow watched as the Germans separated a group of prisoners of war from the rest of the human mass, forced them to the ditch, and then shot them.

“The prisoners of war were excited, and started shouting and moving about. Not far from Jegorow, a few prisoners jumped a guard, and the other guards ran to this spot.

“Jegorow took advantage of the momentary confusion to run into the darkness of the woods; at the same time, he heard shouts and shots behind him.

“After this fearful tale, which will remain seared into my memory for an entire lifetime, I felt sorry for Jegorow and invited him into my apartment so he could warm up and hide until he regained his strength. But Jegorow refused. He said he absolutely had to leave that night in order to cross the front line. But he didn’t leave that night. The next morning, I found him still in the shed. As it turned out, he had made repeated attempts to go away during the night, but after he had gone fifty steps he felt weak and was forced to return. It was probably the result of the continual malnutrition in the camp and the starvation during the last few days. We agreed that he would stay one or two days with me, in order to recover his strength. I gave him food and went to work.

“When I came back that evening, my neighbours, BARANOWA MARIA IWANOWNA and KABANOWSKAJA KATHERINA VIKTOROWNA, told me that the German police had discovered a Red Army prisoner of war in my shed during their patrol, whom they took away with them.”

Since a prisoner of war had been found in Moskowskaja’s shed, she was told to report to the Gestapo, where she was accused of hiding a prisoner of war. During her interrogation by the Gestapo, Moskowskaja denied her relations with this prisoner of war and claimed that she knew nothing of his presence in her shed. Since Moskowskaja did not admit her guilt and the prisoner of war Jegorow did not betray her, she was released by the Gestapo.

Jegorow also told Moskowskaja that a group of prisoners of war working in the Katyn forest, in addition to digging up the bodies were further occupied with bringing corpses from other locations. The corpses transported to the Katyn forest were piled up in the graves, together with the corpses which had previously been dug up.

The fact that a great number of corpses of persons shot by the Germans at other locations were transported to the graves at Katyn is also confirmed by the testimony of the mechanic SUCHATSCHEW.

SUCHATSCHEW P.F. (born 1912), a mechanical engineer from “Roskglawchjleb”, who worked for the Germans as a machinist in the city mills of Smolensk, filed a request on 8.10.43 to be permitted to testify.

When he appeared, he stated:

“In the mill, during the second half of March 1943, I once talked to a German driver who spoke a little Russian. After it came out that he was carrying meal for a division in the village of Sawenky and would be coming back to Smolensk the next day, I asked him to take him with me in order that I might have the opportunity to buy fats. In so doing, I was calculating that riding in a German truck would eliminate the risk of my being stopped at a checkpoint.

“The German driver agreed for a sum of money. We left the same day at about 10:00 P.M., taking the SmolenskWitebsk highway.

“There were two of us in the truck: me and the German driver. It was a bright night; the moon was shining, but the fog hindered visibility. About 2223 kilometres from Smolensk, there was a curve at a destroyed bridge with a rather steep embankment. We left the highway and travelled down the embankment; then a truck suddenly appeared out of the fog. Either our brakes were not very good or the driver was not very experienced; we could not brake the truck, and, since the road was rather narrow, we had a collision with the truck coming in the opposite direction. The collision was not a bad one, since the driver of the oncoming truck succeeded in swerving out of the way, as a result only scraping the sides of both trucks. The oncoming truck turned over however, and fell down the embankment. Our truck stayed where it was. The driver and I got out of the driver’s seat and went to the overturned truck.

“I immediately smelt a very strong stench of corpses, which probably came from the truck. I came closer, and saw that the truck was loaded with a cargo covered with tarpaulins and tied down with ropes. The ropes broke due to the fall, and part of the cargo fell out. It was a cruel cargo.

“They were human corpses in military uniforms. As I remember, 67 men, including a German driver and 2 Germans armed with machine guns, stood around the truck. The others were Russian prisoners of war, since they spoke Russian and were clothed correspondingly.

“The Germans began to curse my driver, then they tried to get the truck back up onto its wheels again. After two minutes, another two trucks arrived at the scene of the accident and stopped there. From these trucks came a group of Germans and Russian prisoners of war, a total of 10 men, and came up to us. Using our combined strength, we began to lift the truck. I took the opportunity and quietly asked one of the Russian prisoners of war: ‘What’s that?’ Just as quietly, he answered: ‘I don’t know how many nights we’ve already spent transporting corpses into the Katyn forest’.”

“The overturned truck was still not upright when a German noncommissioned officer approached me and my driver, and ordered us to drive on immediately.

“Since we had not suffered any real damage during the collision, my driver turned the truck back onto the highway and then drove on.

“As we drove past the two trucks that had arrived later and were covered with tarpaulins, I smelt a fearful stench of corpses.”

SUCHATSCHEW’s testimony is confirmed by the testimony of Jegorow Wladimir Afansjewitsch, who served in the police during the occupation.

Jegorow testified that, at the end of March and the early days of April 1943, as he guarded the bridges in the line of duty at the intersection of the MoscowMinsk and SmolenskWitebsk highways, he repeatedly observed large trucks covered with tarpaulins, exuding the stench of corpses, passing in the direction of Smolensk. Several persons, some of who carried weapons and doubtlessly were German, always sat in the truck cabins and on top of the tarpaulins.

Jegorow mentioned his observations to the chief of police at the police station in the village of Archipowka, Golownew Kuzma Demjanowitsch, who advised him to keep quiet about it and added: “That has nothing to do with us, we don’t need to get mixed up in German affairs.”

That the Germans transported corpses by truck to the Katyn forest was also stated by JAKOWLEWSOKOLOW FLOR MAKSINOWITSCH, born 1896, former supply agent for the canteen of the Smolensk Trusts for dining rooms, and chief of the police district of Katyn during the German occupation.

He reported that, in early April 1943, he personally observed four trucks covered with tarpaulins on which sat several men armed with machine guns and weapons, turning off the highway into the Katyn forest. A strong stench of corpses was perceptible from the trucks.

All the above mentioned eyewitness testimony permits the conclusion that the Germans also shot Poles at other locations. In bringing the corpses to the Katyn forest, the Germans pursued a triple objective: first, to wipe out all traces of their own crimes; second, to blame all their crimes on the Soviets, and third, to multiple the number of “victims of Bolshevism” in the graves in the Katyn forest.

“Visits” to the graves at Katyn

In April 1943, after the German invaders had finished all preparatory measures at the graves in the Katyn forest, they began a widespread agitation in the press and radio, attempting to blame the Soviets for the atrocities which they had themselves committed against the Polish prisoners of war. One of their methods of provocative agitation consisted of organizing “visits” to the graves at Katyn by the residents of Smolensk and neighbouring areas, as well as by “delegations” from the countries occupied by the German invaders and in a position of subservience to them.

The Special Commission interrogated a number of witnesses who participated in the “visit” to the graves at Katyn.

The witness, SUBKOW K.P., an anatomical pathologist working in Smolensk in his capacity as forensic expert, testified to the Special Commission:

“…The clothing on the corpses, especially the officers’ greatcoats, boots, and belts, held together rather well. The metallic parts of their clothing, such as belt buckles, buttons, hooks, boot nails, etc. were not completely rusted and still retained their metallic lustre at places. The tissue of the corpses made available for examination, the tissue of the face, neck, and hands, was chiefly grey in colour, in individual cases greenish brown; but there was no complete decomposition of the tissues, there was no putrefaction. In individual cases, tendons lay exposed, whitish in colour; a number of muscles were visible. During my stay at the excavations, people were working on the floor of a deep ditch, separating the bodies and carrying them up out of the grave. They used spades and other tools to do so, grabbing the corpses with their hands, and dragging them by the arms, feet, and clothing from one place to another. In no individual case could one observe that the bodies fell apart, or that individual parts of them came away.

“With respect to the above, I came to the conclusion that the period of time during which the corpses had remained in the earth absolutely could not amount to three years, as the Germans claimed, but must be much less. Since I know that the decomposition of bodies in mass graves, especially without coffins, occurs much more rapidly than in individual graves, I came to the conclusion that the mass shootings of the Poles must have been carried out about one and a half years ago, and must date from the autumn of 1941 or early 1942.

“As a result of visiting the excavations, I became firmly convinced that this gigantic atrocity was the act of the Germans.”

Testimonies that the clothing on the corpses, the metal parts, the shoes and the corpses themselves, were well preserved, were offered by all the witnesses who had participated in “visits” to the graves at Katyn and were then heard by the Special Commission, i.e.,: the foreman of the Smolensk water pipeline network, KUTZEW J.S.; the female head of the school at Katyn, WETROVA E.N.; the female telephonist of the Smolensk transport office, SCHTSCHEDROVA N.G.; the resident of the village of Borok, ALEZEJEW M.A.; the resident of the village of Nowye Bateki, KRISWOSERZEW N.G.; the duty officer at Gnesdowo station, SAWWATEJEW J.W.; the female resident of Smolensk, PUSCHTSCHINA E.A.; the doctor of medicine from the 2nd hospital at Smolensk, SIDORUK T.A.; the doctor of medicine from the same hospital, KESSAREW P.M., and others.

German attempts to wipe away the traces of their crime

The “visits” organized by the Germans failed to achieve their aim. All persons who visited the graves became convinced that they were witnessing the gross and obvious provocation of the German fascists.

Therefore measures were taken by the Germans to silence all doubters.

The Special Commission interrogated a number of witnesses who have reported how the Germans persecuted persons who doubted the truth of the provocation or did not believe it. They were fired from their jobs, arrested, and threatened with shooting. The Commission has established two cases of shooting of persons who “couldn’t keep their mouths shut”. This tactic of violence was carried out against the former German policeman SAGAINOW and against JEGOREW A.M., who participated in the excavations in the Katyn forest.

Testimonies relating to the persecution by the Germans of those persons who expressed doubt after visiting the graves in the Katyn forest were offered by:

The female attendant at pharmacy no. 1 of Smolensk, SUBAREWA M.S.; the assistant to the doctor of hygiene for the Health Division of the Stalinist District of Smolensk, KOSLOWA W.F.; and others.

The former head of the Katyn police district, JAKOWLEWSOKOLOW F.M. testified:

“A situation arose which caused the most serious disquiet among the German command, and urgent instructions were issued to all local police offices to prohibit all harmful talk and to arrest all those persons who expressed mistrust regarding the ‘Katyn affair'”.

“Such instructions were personally issued to me, as head of the police district, by the following persons: at the end of May 1943, by the German commander of the Katyn village, Lt. Col. BRAUN, and, at the beginning of June, by the head of the police district of Smolensk, KAMANEZKII.

“I issued instructions to the police in my district stating that all persons expressing mistrust, and all doubters of the truthfulness of the German communications on the shooting of the Polish prisoners of war by the Bolsheviks, were to be arrested and brought to police headquarters.

“In forwarding these instructions from the German authorities, I hypocritically concealed the fact that I was myself convinced that the ‘Katyn affair’ was a German provocation. I became completely convinced of it after participating in the ‘excursion’ in the Katyn forest.”

When the German occupation troops noticed that the “excursions” by the local populace to the graves at Katyn were not successful, they issued an order in the summer of 1943 to fill in the graves.

Before their withdrawal from Smolensk, the Germans hastily began to wipe away the traces of their atrocities. The country house occupied by the “Staff of the Construction Battalion 537” was burnt to the ground. The Germans searched for the three girls, Aleksejewa, Michailowa, and Konachowskaja, in the village of Borok, in order to take them with them or to annihilate them. They also sought their “chief witness” KISSELEW P.G., who was, however, successful in concealing himself and his family. The Germans burnt his house.

They also attempted to arrest other “witnesses”: the former foreman of Gnesdowo station, IWANOW S.W.; the former duty officer of the same station, SAWWATEJEW J.W.; and the former railway carriage coupler at the station at Smolensk, SACHAROW M.D.

.

During the very last days before the withdrawal from Smolensk the German fascist occupiers also searched for the professors Basilewski and Jefimow. These only succeeded in escaping kidnapping or death by hiding themselves in the nick of time.

But the German fascist invaders were still not successful in covering their traces and concealing their crime.

Forensic examination of the exhumed corpses proves with irrefutable clarity that the shooting of the Polish prisoners of war was committed by the Germans themselves.

We proceed now to the files of the forensic expert Commission

Files of the forensic expert Commission

By order of the Special Commission for the examination and investigation of the circumstances of the shooting of the Polish officer prisoners of war by the German fascist invaders in the Katyn forest (in the vicinity of the city of Smolensk), the forensic investigative commission, consisting of: the superior forensic expert of the People’s Commissariat for Health Matters of the USSR, Director of the State Scientific Research Institute for Forensic Medicine of the People’s Commissariat for Health Matters of the USSR, W.J. PROZOROWSKI;

Professor for Forensic Medicine of the 2nd Moscow State Medical Institute, Dr. W.M. SMOLJANINOW;

Professor of anatomical pathology, Dr. D.N. WYROPAIJEW;

the eldest Scientific Official of the anatomical medical division of the State Scientific Research Institute for Forensic Medicine of the People’s Commissariat for Health Matters of the USSR, Dr. P.S. SEMENOWSKI;

the eldest Scientific Official of the anatomical medical division of the State Scientific Research Institute for Forensic Medicine of the People’s Commissariat for Health Matters of the USSR, Professor Ph.D. SCWAIKOW;

with the participation of:

the head forensic medical expert of the West front, Major of the medical services, NIKOLSKI;

the forensic medical expert for Army N., Captain of the medical services, BUSSOEDOW:

the chief of the anatomical pathology laboratory 92, Major of the medical services, SUBBOTIN;

the Major of the medical services, OGLOBIN;

Doctor of medicine and Lt. Col. of Medicine, SADYKOW;

Lt. of Medicine PUSCHKARJOWA;

The exhumation and forensic examination of the corpses of the Polish prisoners of war from the grounds of Kosji Gori in the Katyn forest, 15 kilometres from the city of Smolensk, was carried out in the period from 16 to 23 January 1944. The bodies of the Polish prisoners of war were buried in a common grave measuring 60 x 60 x 3 m, in addition to another grave measuring 7 x 6 x 3.5 m. From the graves, 925 bodies were exhumed and examined. The exhumation and forensic examination of the bodies were carried out to determine the following:

a) the identity of the dead

b) the cause of death

c) the length of time they had been in the ground.

The circumstances of the matter (see document of the Special Commission);

Objective data: (see the record of the forensic medical examination of the bodies).

CONCLUSION

The forensic medical expert commission, based on the findings of the forensic medical examination of the bodies, came to the following conclusion:

Following the excavation of the graves and exposure of the corpses, it was established that:

a) among the great number of bodies of the Polish prisoners of war were corpses in civilian clothing, the number of which, compared to the total number of the examined bodies (2:925 of the exhumed bodies) is slight; the bodies wore military footwear;

b) the clothing of the dead prisoners of war testifies to their belonging to the officers and noncommissioned officers of the Polish army;

c) incisions in the pockets, which were turned inside out, as well as in the boots, were discovered during the examination, revealing, as a rule, traces of previous examination of the articles of clothing (military greatcoats, trousers, etc.) on the bodies;

d) in some cases, the pockets of the articles of clothing bore no incisions. In these cases, just in the pockets which had been cut or torn open, inside the jacket linings, trouserbands, foot rags and socks, newspaper clippings, brochures, prayer books, postage stamps, opened and unopened letters, receipts, medals, and other documents such as valuables (1 gold piece, golden dollars, tobacco pipes, pocket knives, cigarette paper, handkerchiefs and other articles, were discovered;

e) some of the documents (which were not subjected to any particular examination) exhibited dates from the period between 12 November 1940 to 20.6.1941;

f) the material of the clothing, especially the military greatcoats, jackets, trousers, and underwear, are well preserved and could only be torn by hand with difficulty;

g) a small number of bodies (20:925 of the exhumed bodies) had their hands tied behind their backs with white braided cord;

h) the condition of the clothing on the bodies, particularly the fact that the jackets, shirts,military belts, trousers, and underwear were buttoned up, boots or shoes tied, neckerchiefs and neckties bound around the necks, suspenders buttoned up and the shirts tucked into the trousers, shows that no exterior examination of the torso and limbs had been undertaken;

The wellpreserved condition skin tissues of the head, and the nonexistence of any incisions therein or in the skin tissues of the chest or abdomen (except for 3:925 cases), or other signs of expert activity, shows that the bodies had not been subjected to forensic examination, a conclusion confirmed by an examination of the bodies exhumed by the forensic expert commission.

The exterior and interior examination of the 925 bodies justifies the statement that the bodies exhibit gunshot wounds on the head and neck. In four cases, these are accompanied by damage to the skull caused by a hard, heavy object. In addition, some cases of injury to the abdomen, together with injuries to the head, were established. As a rule, there was one entry hole, more rarely two, in the back of the head near the nape of the neck, in the cavity in the nape of the neck, or the edge of the same cavity. In some cases, the entry wounds are on the back of the neck, at the height of the 1st, 2nd, or 3rd cervical vertebra. Most frequently, the exit holes are in the forehead, but, more rarely, in the temple or crown of the head, or in the face or neck. In 27 cases, the bullets remained in the body (without exit holes). At the terminus of the entry wound channel, under the soft tissues of the skull or bones thereof, in the cerebral membranes, or in the cerebral matter, deformed, slightly deformed, or severely deformed jacketed bullets were discovered, such as are used as ammunition for submachine guns, mostly of 7.65 m, The number of entry holes in the bones of the neck justifies the conclusion that, during the shooting, firearms of two different calibres were used, most frequently, of less than 8 mm, i.e, 7.65 mm or less; in a few cases, calibres of more than 8 mm, i.e., 9 mm, were used.

The state of the fractures of the bones of the skull, and, in many cases, residues of gunpowder discovered on the exit holes or immediately close by, show that the shots were fired at point blank range, or very close range. The superimposition of the entry and exit holes shows that the holes must have been fired from behind when the head was bent down. The entry channel traversed vital parts of the brain, or immediately adjacent to these, so that the destruction of the tissues of the brain must have caused death.

The injuries observed in the bones of the top of the skull, caused by a blunt, hard, and heavy object inflicted simultaneously with the gunshot wounds to the head, could not, by themselves, come into question as the cause of death. The forensic examinations, carried out during the period from 16 to 23 January 1944, revealed that the 925 bodies were neither in a state of decomposition nor putrefaction, i.e., they were in the initial stages of the loss of moisture (most frequently and particularly visible in the chest or abdominal regions; fat and wax separation was most particularly visible in bodies which had lain in direct contact with the ground); i.e, the tissues of the bodies exhibited a loss of moisture and a separation of fat and wax. Particularly worthy of note is the fact that the muscles of the torso and limbs retained their macroscopic condition perfectly, while their former colour was almost perfectly retained; the interior organs of the chest and abdomen were also well preserved in relation to their configuration; the heart muscle, upon incision, clearly retained its usual structure and colour. The brain exhibited characteristic structural conditions, with a clearly recognizable border between white and grey matter.

In addition to their macroscopic investigation of the tissues and bodily organs, the Forensic Expert Commission took material for the subsequent microscopic and chemical laboratory examination. The condition of the earth at the burial site must have played a certain role in the preservation of the tissues and bodily organs.

After the excavation of the graves and exposure of the corpses, the condition of the bodies, following exposure to the air for a period, began to influenced by the warmth and moisture of the spring and summer of 1943, a factor which could strongly encourage the process of decomposition. But the degree of moisture loss, and the fat and wax separation in the bodies, the especially good preservation of the muscles and interior organs, as well as the articles of clothing, justify us in stating that the bodies had only been buried a short time. If we compare the condition of the bodies in the graves at Kosji Gory with the bodies found at other burial sites in the city of Smolensk and the near vicinity (GEDEONOWKA, MAGALENSCHTISCHINA, READOWKA, camp 126 at KRASNYI BOR, etc.) (see the Report of the Forensic Medical Expert Commission of 22 October 1943), we must conclude that the bodies of the Polish prisoners of war in the Kosji Gory region were interred about 2 years ago. This is also confirmed by the findings of the documents in the articles of clothing, indicating that an earlier point in time for burial cannot be considered (see point e, page 48, and documentary table of contents).

Based on the findings of the examination, the Forensic Medical Expert Commission has established that:

1) the killings of the officer and noncommissioned officer prisoners of war took place by shooting;

2) that the shootings took place during a period approximately 2 years ago, that is, in the months of SeptemberDecember 1941;

3) that the valuables and documents dating from 1941 and discovered by the Forensic Expert Commission in the articles of clothing on the bodies, are proof that the German fascist authorities failed to carry out a thorough examination of the bodies in the spring and summer of 1943; the documents discovered prove that the shootings took place after the month of June 1941;

4) that the Germans dissected only a very small number of the bodies of Polish prisoners of war in 1943;

5) that the manner and type of shooting of the Polish prisoners of war is identical with the shooting of peaceful Soviet citizens and Soviet prisoners of war. This type of shooting was practised by the German fascist authorities on a broad scale in the temporarily occupied regions of the USSR, including the cities of Smolensk, Orel, Kharkow, Krasnodar, and Woronesch.

The Superior Forensic Official of the People’s Commissariat for Health Matters of the USSR, Director of the State Scientific Research Institute for Health Medicine of the People’s Commissariat for Health Matters of the USSR, W.J. PROZOROWSKI;

Professor of forensic medicine at the 2nd Moscow State Medical Institute, Dr. W.M. SMOLJANINOW;

Professor of anatomical pathology, Dr. D.N. WYROPAEW;

The eldest scientific official of the Thanatological Division of the State Scientific Research Institute for Forensic Medicine of the People’s Commissariat for Health Matters of the USSR, Dr. P.S. SEMENOWSKI;

The eldest scientific official of the forensic medical division of the State Scientific Research Institute for Forensic Medicine of the People’s Commissariat for Health Matters of the USSR, Prof. M.D. SCHWAIKOWA.

Smolensk, 24 January 1944.

Documents found on the corpses

In addition to the information proven in the documents of the forensic medical report, the time of the shootings of the Polish prisoners of war by the Germans (autumn 1941, not the spring of 1940, as claimed by the Germans), was also established by documents discovered during the excavation of the graves, dating not only from the second half of 1940, but also from the spring and summer (March -June) of 1941.

Among the documents discovered by the forensic experts, the following merit particular attention:

1) on body 92:

A letter from Warsaw in the Russian language addressed to the Central Office for Prisoners of War, Moscow, Kuibuschewstreet no. 12. In the letter, “Sophie” asks “Sigon”, to let her know the whereabouts of her husband, Thomas Sigon. The letter is dated 12.9.1940. The envelope bears German postage cancellation “Warsaw IX40”, and cancellation “Moscow Post Office 9 Expedition 28/IX40”, as well a notice written in red ink, in the Russian language, reading “Find camp and deliver 15/XI40” (signature illegible).

2) on body 4:

A registered postcard no. 0112 from Tarnopol with cancellation “Tarnopol 12/X40”. The manuscript text and address are obliterated.

3) on body 101:

Receipt no. 10293 dated 19.XII.1939, issued in camp Koselsk, for pawn of a gold watch accepted by LEWANDOWSKY EDUARD ADAMOWITSCH. The reverse of this receipt bears a note dated 14 March 1941, stating that the watch had been sold to “Juwelirtorg”.

4) on body 46:

A receipt issued in Starobelskyi camp on 16.XII.1939 for the pawn of a gold watch accepted by ARASCHKEWITSCH WLADIMIR RUDOLPHOWITSCH. The reverse of the receipt bears a note dated 25 March 1941, stating that the watch had been sold to “Juwelirtorg”.

5) on body 71:

A devotional image of paper with a picture of Jesus, discovered between pages 144 and 145 of a Catholic prayer book. The reverse of the devotional image bears a legible note with signature “Jadvinja” and date “4 April 1941”.

6) on body 46:

A receipt issued in camp no. 1ON on 5 May 1941 for the deposit of a sum of money in the amount of 225 rubles accepted by ARASCHKEWITSCH.

7) on the same body (46):

A receipt issued in camp no. 1ON on 6 April 1941 for the deposit of a sum of money in the amount of 102 rubles accepted by ARASCHKEWITSCH.

8) on body 101:

A receipt issued in camp no. 1ON on 18 May 1941 for the deposit of a sum of money in the amount of 175 rubles accepted by LEWANDOWSKY.

9) on body 53:

An unforwarded postcard in the Polish language with the address:

Warsaw, Bagatelja 15, house 47,

Irene Kutschinskaja, date: 20 June 1941.

Sender: Stanislav Kutschinskij.

Conclusions

From the totality of material available to the Special Commission, particularly from the testimonies of the 100 witnesses interrogated by the Commission, the facts of the case as examined by the forensic experts, and the documents and valuables taken from the graves in the Katyn forest, the following conclusions may be drawn with irrefutable clarity:

1. The Polish prisoners of war in the three camps west of Smolensk were housed there until the beginning of the war, were engaged in road construction work, and remained there even after the invasion of Smolensk by the German conqueror, until September 1943.

2. In the autumn of 1941, mass shootings of Polish prisoners of war taken from the above mentioned camps were carried out by the German occupying power in the Katyn forest.

3. The mass shootings of the Polish prisoners of war in the Katyn forest was carried out by the German armed forces under the cover name “Staff 537 of the Construction Battalion”, led by Lt. Col. Arnes and his associates Lt. Reckst and Lt. Hott.

4. As a result of the deterioration of the general military situation for Germany in early 1943, the German occupier took measures, provocative in nature and intended to attribute their own crime to the Soviets, with a view to causing hostility between the Russians and the Poles;

5. To this purpose,

a) the German fascist invaders attempted, through the use of persuasion, threats, and barbaric tortures, to find “witnesses” among the Soviet citizens from whom perjured statements were extorted to the effect that the Polish prisoners of war had been shot by the Soviets in the spring of 1940;

b) the German occupation authorities, in the spring of 1943, transported the corpses of Polish prisoners of war from other locations and shot by them at other sites, and laid them in the excavated graves of the Katyn forest in an attempt to wipe away the traces of their own bestiality and to increase the number of the “victims of Bolshevism” in the Katyn forest;

c) while the German occupation authorities spread their provocation, they used approximately 500 Russian prisoners of war for the job of excavating the graves at Katyn in order to remove all documents and exhibits which might prove German authorship of the crime. The Russian prisoners of war were shot immediately after termination of this work.

6. The findings of the Forensic Expert Commission have established beyond doubt:

a) the time of the shootings: the autumn of 1941;

b) the German executioners, in shooting the Polish prisoners of war, used the same methods (pistol shots in the back of the neck), as in the mass shootings of Soviet citizens in other cities, particularly, Orel, Woronesch,Krasnodar, and Smolensk.

7. The conclusions drawn from the statements of eyewitnesses and the forensic report on the shootings of the Polish prisoners of war by the Germans in the autumn of 1941 are fully confirmed by the exhibits and documents discovered in the graves at Katyn.

8. In shooting the Polish prisoners of war in the Katyn forest, the German fascist invaders were pursuing a consistent policy of the physical extermination of the Slavic peoples.

President of the Special Commission, Member of the Special State Commission, Academician BURDENKO;

Member of the Special State Commission, Academician ALEKSEJ TOLSTOI;

Member of the Special State Commission, Mythropolitos NIKOLAI;

President of the AllSlavic Committee, Lieutenant General GUNDOROW A.S.;

President of the Executive Committee of the Association of the Red Cross and Red Half Moon, S.A. POLESNIKOW;

People’s Commissar for Education of the RSFSR, Academician W.P. POTEMKIN;

Chief of the Forensic Head Office of the Red Army, CoronelGeneral E.J. SMIRNOW;

President of the Executive Committee for the Region of Smolensk, R.E. MEINIKOW.

Smolensk, 24 January 1944

Speculator Sentenced To Be Shot

P. Barashev, A Case Is Heard: Not Subject To Appeal!. February 18, 1972

 

Original Source: Pravda, 18 February 1972, p. 6.

Tashkent and Moscow – … The Tashkent base of the Cooperative Wholesale and Mail Order House is an inter-republic base, serving the rural trade of Uzbekistan, Turkmenia, Kirghizia, Tadzhikistan and a number of provinces of Kazakhstan. In addition, the base sends out the items won in lotteries. Its work covers a huge territory, and the base handles a considerable amount of goods. Pilferers took advantage of these circumstances …

Rugs, woolen kerchiefs, embroidery thread, silks, beads and other items are in great demand in Central Asia. Knowing this, officials of the base took bribes from store directors for each item they supplied the stores. For example: For a single Pavlovskii-Posad kerchief they demanded two to five rubles over and above the price. The thieves reckoned with seasonal demand. The pilfering formula then went as follows: The director of the store had to find somewhere to get each five-ruble note left at the base and himself get as least as much again. He could not take the 10 “lost” rubles as he stood behind the counter; that would be risky. So most of the goods were sold to speculators, who in turn also added their bite to the price. The result was that the consumer paid triple for the item …

This “collective” had its own conception of honesty. Before hiring this or that rogue, director Nurmukhamedov would invite him into his office and demand a bribe. The job of warehouse chief, for example, cost 5, 000 rubles. And when he hired a new man, the director, in the presence of a third party, used to force the new employee to swear on a wafer: “Break this wafer and swear by this bread that you will not deceive me, but will turn over to me half of the take. ”

For the uninitiated, let us recall that by Moslem custom an oath taken on a wafer of bread is as sacred as an oath sworn on the Koran …

The head of the gang kept strict records of the bribes. The investigators’ case charged and the court trial proved that during 1969 Nurmukhamedov received from R. Gaziyev, chief of Warehouse No. 2, alone: 325 rubles in January; 1, 000 in February; 550 in March; 140 in April; 220 in May; 175 in June; 890 in July; 1, 160 in August; 835 in September; 970 in October –

At that point the record broke off, for Nurmukhamedov was arrested …

Theft of 366, 000 rubles of the people’s money through bribes and swindling was proved. Of this sum, Nurmukhamedov stole more than 130, 000 rubles …

The sentence was pronounced. Final and not subject to appeal. Ismail Nurmukhamedov, head of the gang of bribe-takers and speculators, was sentenced to the supreme penalty, death by shooting. Other participants in the crime were sentenced to long terms in strict-regime colonies, with confiscation of the property they had stolen …

Source: Current Digest of the Soviet Press. Vol. XXIV, No. 7/15 (1972)

The Corrupt Society

Konstantin Simis, USSR–The Corrupt Society.

 

But even though the KGB has full knowledge of the fact that the ruling elite is infected with corruption, the members of that elite remain inviolate. The fact is that, since its inception, the Soviet regime has been tolerant of the ruling elite’s improbity.

The exposure of the ruling clique of Georgia is a case in point. The dubious dealings of the Georgian elite (headed by one Vasilii Mzhavanadze, First Secretary of the republic’s Central Committee and a Candidate Member of the Politbiuro) were exposed as a result of the efforts of its Minister for Internal Affairs, Eduard Shevardnadze. He was at least in part motivated by ambition, but he apparently did feel genuine hatred for corruption and was truly pained by the decadence he witnessed. “Once, the Georgians were known throughout the world as a nation of warriors and poets; now they are known as swindlers,” he commented bitterly at a closed meeting. (This information comes from notes taken by one of the participants in that meeting.)

For several years agents of Shevardnadze’s Ministry for Internal Affairs shadowed all the leading functionaries in the party and state apparatus of Georgia, as well as their families, gathering much compromising evidence. This was not a particularly difficult task, since a reckless orgy of corruption was raging almost openly in Georgia.

There was a trade in the highest posts in the party and state apparatus, which had become so blatant that the underground millionaire Babunashvili was able to order for himself the post of Minister of Light Industry. Babunashvili headed a highly ramified illegal company that produced and marketed fabrics, but his ambition was not satisfied either by his multimillion-ruble income or by his business activities, and he decided that he wanted to cap his career by combining in a single person (himself) both sides of Soviet organized crime: the corrupter (underground business) and the corrupted (government).

The newspaper The Dawn of the East reported on February 28, 1973, that the plenum of the Communist Party of Georgia had remarked on this state of affairs. The article noted that “the not-unknown schemer Babunashvili was able to ‘order’ a ministerial chair,” and it went on to say that this was not an isolated incident. But the newspaper made no mention whatsoever of who received the bribes resulting in ministerial appointments. These bribes went to the person with a determining voice in deciding on ministerial appointments, the First Secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee and Candidate Member of the Politbiuro, and to the one with whom those decisions had to be cleared, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

At that time I knew a number of young people in Tbilisi who did not occupy very lofty posts-they were junior officers in the Council of Ministers and in the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet-but whose jobs allowed them access to top secret information about the behind-the-scenes life of the ruling apparat. It was they who told me of the trade in ministerial and deputy ministerial posts in Georgia, and assured me that the situation was just the same in Azerbaijan.

At the time there were more people ready and able to pay several hundred thousand rubles for a ministerial post than there were vacancies, so when a post did open up, a competition was begun. The first move was nomination by an official sufficiently high up to be entitled to make such a nomination, such as a Secretary in the republic’s party Central Committee, personnel chief to the Central Committee or the Chairman of the Council of Ministers or one of his deputies. A decisive factor in these nominations was often a clan linkage between the candidate and his patron; in Central Asian and Transcaucasian republics, family ties are one of the most important factors determining the composition of the ruling apparat.

Even at this early stage the size of the bribe to be paid for the nomination would have been discussed, but the real battle began only when it became clear just who the possible candidates were. Then, as my informants told me, amused, something very like an auction would sometimes take place behind the scenes, although the victor was not always the highest bidder. That is because the competition was not merely among the aspirants for the vacant post; it was also a competition among the recipients of their bribes, so the most influential patron had the best chance of winning.

All my information points to a going rate in those years for ministerial posts ranging from 100,000 rubles for the not very prestigious (or lucrative) post of Minister for Social Security up to 250,000 to 300,000 rubles for such bottomless feeding troughs as the Ministry of Trade or the Ministry of Light Industry. Not cheap, of course, but once installed in his post, the minister would be able to derive considerable income from it by peddling, in his turn, jobs as sector and territory chiefs (which, in a ministry like that of Light Industry, could fetch 100,000 to 125,000 rubles).

The top functionaries in the apparatus of the party Central Committee and the Council of Ministers divided the republic up into zones of influence. This division would more often than not be on the basis of tribal origin, for even today the old tribal fragmentation of Georgia plays an important role in influencing the life of the republic. A Mingrelian, an Imeretian, a Svanetian, or an Adzhar considers himself a Mingrelian, an Imeretian, a Svanetian, or an Adzhar first and a Georgian second; when he enters the ruling elite, he naturally becomes the protector of his fellow tribesmen and his region-which becomes his fiefdom. He places his relatives and devoted friends in key positions, and, of course, receives regular tribute payments through his prot»g»s.

Following the purge of the ruling apparat, this phenomenon was shamefacedly mentioned at a plenum of the Georgian Central Committee: “Several leading officials divide the republic into spheres of influence; they take under their patronage individual districts, towns and Party organizations; each has his own ‘favorites’ ” (Dawn of the East, February 28, 1973).

A special mark was left on corruption among the Georgian elite by the wives of the first and second secretaries of the party Central Committee, Mzhavanadze and Vasilii Churkin. They were both named Tamara and were known in Georgia as “the Tsarinas Tamara.” (A Tsarina Tamara ruled Georgia in the twelfth century, and her memory has survived in popular folklore.)

The two Tamaras played a tangible role in the administration of the republic-and of course in the corruption too. It was well known that with their assistance one could be nominated to a lucrative or prestigious post. It was equally well known that the influential ladies were loath to accept Soviet rubles in payment for their services; they preferred either foreign hard currency or merchandise such as precious stones (but only very large ones), paintings by important artists, or antiques.

Underground businessmen enjoyed the particular good graces of the two Central Committee wives; it was through these millionaires that the Tamaras’ collections of precious stones and works of art grew. Each Tamara had her own clients, among whom was to be the underground multimillionaire N. A. Laziashvili, a client of Tamara Mzhavanadze.

After the exposures and the purge Laziashvili was put on trial, and his case was written up in the republic and even the national press. They wrote about the scale of his criminal activities and about the millions he had made from them; they did not write about his having been a welcome visitor at the home of the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the republic’s Communist party or about his having maintained ongoing business connections with the Secretary’s wife.

The two Tamaras were the talk of the whole republic, yet when Mzhavanadze and his clique were exposed, the plenum of the party Central Committee mentioned them only in the following delicate way: “Family members began to act as surrogates for their high-ranking husbands, and problems of state came to be resolved within a narrow circle of family members and friends” (Dawn of the East, February 28, 1973).

Shevardnadze made careful and unhurried preparations for his exposure of the corrupt ruling elite. An official from the Ministry of Internal Affairs who was a participant in the operation told me that even within the ministry apparat no one was informed about the minister’s intentions. Shevardnadze had to conceal those intentions from everyone, but especially from the republic’s KGB, which was led by a general who was utterly loyal to Mzhavanadze. When Shevardnadze issued instructions that surveillance was to include members of the ruling elite, he explained this as necessary in order to expose criminals who had wormed their way into the trust of honest Communists in responsible positions.

Finally Shevardnadze considered that the time was ripe. He had received intelligence reports from Moscow stating the flight number, date, and arrival time in Tbilisi of a big-time speculator on the Moscow black market in foreign currency, who, he had also been informed, usually carried precious stones for Tamara Mzhavanadze. Shevardnadze asked his colleagues in the Moscow Ministry for Internal Affairs to let the speculator board the plane in Moscow without touching her, and promised them that she would be taken when she disembarked in Tbilisi airport. My informant from the Georgian ministry who had participated in this affair told me that the operation had been carefully worked out in every detail: the speculator was to be stopped as she descended the stairs from the airplane in Tbilisi by a special group of agents responsible directly to the minister and taken for searching and questioning to the ministry. When the precious stones were discovered she would be given the chance of providing detailed information about whom the stones were destined for in exchange for the promise of a light sentence at her trial. (Trade in precious stones is a very serious crime, punishable by long prison terms or even by death.)

But that plan was never carried out. When the plane had landed and taxied to a halt near the terminal building a group of men in civilian clothes were waiting, all looking very much alike (as plainclothes policemen do the world over). They had identified the woman from photographs and were about to act when a huge black limousine drove up to the foot of the stairs, a limousine well known to every operative agent in Tbilisi. Tamara Mzhavanadze stepped out of it, embraced her Moscow guest as she came down the stairs, and ushered her into the car.

All the agents could do was to stare at the departing limousine of the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia. There was no sense in following it to learn the Moscow speculator’s destination; it was clear enough that she was being driven directly to the private residence of the First Secretary, which the operatives-or anyone else for that matter-could not enter uninvited.

It was then decided that the gem dealer would be arrested after her departure from the Secretary’s house, even though she would no longer have the compromising merchandise in her possession. There was a hope that she might be intimidated into providing the needed evidence. Even this plan failed. The guest was driven by Tamara Mzhavanadze right back to the staircase leading to the Moscow flight and was seen off with another warm embrace. Tamara stood on the tarmac until the airplane had taxied to the runway and taken off, all the while casting contemptuous glances at the group of agents.

The fact that Tamara Mzhavanadze went to the airport herself to meet the speculator with her precious stones (a thing she had never done before) proved that there had been a leak close to Shevardnadze and that the Mzhavanadze family had already been informed of the action being planned against it. Delays were dangerous, so Shevardnadze decided to go to Moscow immediately and submit his dossier of compromising evidence to Brezhnev.

It was toward the end of the summer of 1972. The First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia was, as was his wont, passing the summer in his country residences-in the mountains on Lake Ritsa and in Gagra on the Black Sea coast.

On August 10, the republic’s newspaper reported that the First Secretary had received the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Israeli Communist Party and his wife, who were vacationing in Georgia and whom he “warmly and fraternally welcomed.” After he had fraternally welcomed the Israeli party Secretary and his wife, Mzhavanadze, according to a newspaper report of September 20, received a delegation from the German Democratic Republic. On the thirtieth a sudden extraordinary plenary session of the Georgian Central Committee was convened, which “complied with Mzhavanadze’s request that he be permitted to retire on pension, for reasons of age” and elected Shevardnadze as First Secretary of the Central Committee on instructions from Moscow.

Virtually the entire ruling apparat of Georgia (both party and state) was removed for reasons of health, pensioned off, or, indeed, dismissed without any reason being given. Thirteen members of the government of the republic were removed; the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, all the top people in the apparat of the party Central Committee, the President of the Supreme Court and the Public Prosecutor of Georgia. The decrees removing all these officials from their posts were published in the republic’s Russian-language newspaper, Dawn of the East, during 1972 and 1973.

But that was the limit of the purge. Not a single one of the ousted bribe takers faced a trial, and nearly all of them retained their party membership and, consequently, the possibility of again occupying leading posts in industry or in the ruling apparat. Mzhavanadze himself lost his candidate membership of the Politbiuro (on December 1972 at a plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU), although he remained a member of the Communist party, and was granted a special pension of the kind usually provided for members and candidate members of the Politbiuro who have fallen out of favor, a pension amounting to about five times the maximum pension available to ordinary citizens.

Only Churkin, the Second Secretary of the Georgian Party Central Committee, was expelled from the party. Despite that he was given a post of the nomenklatura, the schedule of positions that can be held only by party members, subject to ratification by the party Obkom or the Central Committee. He was named to the post of Deputy Chairman of the Consumers’ Union of the Kalininskaia region in the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic (RSFSR).

The principal intermediaries in the transfer of the bribes, the two Tamaras, were also let off scot-free. The ones who landed up in court were the givers of the bribes, those who had purchased posts and academic credentials. Similar trials were held in Georgia between 1974 and 1977.

In the 1970s a bitter struggle developed between two clans within the ruling elite of Uzbekistan. On one side was the clan of one Sharaf Rashidov, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the republic’s Communist party and a Candidate Member of the Politbiuro. Opposing it was the clan within which Mankul Kurbanov and Yaggar Nasreddinova (respectively Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Uzbekistan and Chairwoman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet) had joined forces.

The main tactic employed by both sides in this struggle was sending revelatory denunciations to Moscow. Each clan had its own protectors (who acted by no means selflessly) within the apparat of the Moscow Central Committee, through whom it tried to compromise its opponents in the eyes of Brezhnev and other secretaries of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Denunciations fell fast and furious, each clan accusing the other of bribery, disruption of work, and falsifying triumphant reports about the fulfillment of the plans for the cotton harvest. (Cotton is Uzbekistan’s principal crop and is of national importance). It must be said that these denunciations were quite true: there was wholesale corruption in the ruling circles of the republic.

From court cases later heard in Tashkent at local assizes of the USSR Supreme Court (in which Moscow defense attorneys participated) and from informants privy to information about the party and state rulers of Uzbekistan, I know that the leaders of that republic were paid regular tribute by chairmen of collective farms and managers of state farms, tribute in cash and in sheep, whole herds of which would be driven for them from mountain pastures into the capital. The owners of underground private enterprises made monthly protection payments in the form of money, gemstones, and, very often, in accordance with Asian tastes and traditions, valuable handmade rugs.

Each major official had his own sphere of influence and his own clientele by whom he was paid regular tribute in return for protection. For example, all the little shops and stalls in the Alai bazaar in the old part of Tashkent paid their tribute to Kurbanov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

But there was one underground business sector that made its payments to everyone: to the secretaries of the republic Central Committee, to the government leaders, to the Minister for Internal Affairs, to the head of the Department to Combat the Misappropriation of Socialist Property, and to many others besides. That sector was concerned with the cultivation and preparation of illegal drugs, the most dangerous-and the most profitable-business of all.

Source: Konstantin Simis, USSR: The Corrupt Society (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), pp. 52-60.

The Forty Days of Kengir

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago, 1918-1956 (1973)

 

Solzhenitsyn’s riveting and renowned exposé of the Soviet prison camp system shook many convinced Communists, East and West, to the core. Here he describes the brutal conditions under which the prisoners lived, and their determination to retain some vestige of humanity by rising against and expelling the camp administration in May and June 1954.

For the Special Camps there was another side to Beria’s fall: by raising their hopes it confused, distracted, and disarmed the katorzhane. Hopes of speedy change burgeoned — and the prisoners lost their interest in hunting stoolies, and sitting in the hole for them, in strikes and rebellions. Their anger cooled. Things seemed to be improving anyway, and all they had to do was wait.

There was another aspect, too. The epaulets with blue borders (but without air force wings), hitherto the most respected, the least questionable in the armed forces at large, had suddenly become a stigma, not just in the eyes of prisoners or prisoners’ relatives (who gives a damn for them?), but even perhaps in the eyes of the government.

In that fateful year, 1953, MVD officers lost their second wage (“for their stars”), which meant that henceforward they received only one salary, plus increments for length of service, polar allowances, and of course bonuses. This was a great blow to their pockets, but a still greater one to their expectations: did it mean that they were less needed?

The fall of Beria made it urgent for the security ministry to prove its devotion and its usefulness in some signal way. But how?

The mutinies which the security men had hitherto considered a menace now shone like a beacon of salvation. Let’s have more disturbances and disorders, so that measures will have to be taken. Then staffs, and salaries, will not be reduced.

In less than a year the guards at Kengir opened fire several times on innocent men. There was one incident after another: and it cannot have been unintentional.* [*The camp authorities, of course, acted similarly to speed up events in other places, for instance in Norilsk.]

They shot Lida, the young girl from the mortar-mixing gang who hung her stockings out to dry near the boundary fence.

They winged the old Chinaman — nobody in Kengir remembered his name, and he spoke hardly any Russian, but everybody knew the waddling figure with a pipe between his teeth and the face of an elderly goblin. A guard called him to a watchtower, tossed a packet of makhorka near the boundary fence, and when the Chinaman reached for it, shot and wounded him.

There was a similar incident in which the guard threw some cartridges down from the tower, ordered a prisoner to pick them up, and shot him.

Then there was the famous case of the column returning to camp from the ore-dressing plant and being fired on with dumdum bullets, which wounded sixteen men. (Another couple of dozen concealed light wounds to keep their names out of reports and avoid the risk of punishment.)

This the zeks did not take quietly — it was the Ekibastuz story over again. Kengir Camp Division No. 3 did not turn out for work three days running (but did take food), demanding punishment of the culprits.

A commission arrived and persuaded them that the culprits would be prosecuted (as though the zeks would be invited to the trial to check! . . . ). They went back to work.

But in February, 1954, another prisoner was shot at the woodworking plant — “the Evangelist,” as all Kengir remembered him (Aleksandr Sisoyev, I think his name was). This man had served nine years and nine months of his tenner. His job was fluxing arc-welding rods and he did this work in a little shed which stood near the boundary fence. He went out to relieve himself near the shed — and while he was at it was shot from a watchtower. Guards quickly ran over from the guardhouse and started dragging the dead man into the boundary zone, to make it look as though he had trespassed on it. This was too much for the zeks, who grabbed picks and shovels and drove the murderers away from the murdered man. (All this time near the woodworking plant stood a saddled horse belonging to Security Officer Belyaev — known as “the Wart” because he had one on his left cheek. Captain Belyaev was an enterprising sadist, and engineering a murder like this was just his style.)

The woodworking plant was in an uproar. The prisoners said that they would carry the dead man into camp on their shoulders. The camp officers would not permit it. “Why did you kill him?” shouted the prisoners. The bosses had their explanation ready: the dead man himself was to blame — he had started it by throwing stones at the tower. (Can they have had time to read his identity card; did they know that he had three months more to go and was an Evangelical Christian? . . . )

The march back was grim, and there were reminders that the bosses meant business. Machine-gunners lay here and there in the snow, ready to shoot (only too ready, as the men of Kengir had learned). Machine-gunners were also posted on the roofs of the escort troops’ quarters.

This was at the same Camp Division, No. 3, which had already seen sixteen men wounded at once. Although only one man was killed on this occasion, they felt more painfully than ever that they were defenseless, doomed. Nearly a year had gone by since Stalin’s death, but his dogs had not changed. In fact, nothing at all had changed.

In the evening after supper, what they did was this. The light would suddenly go out in a section, and someone invisible said from the doorway: “Brothers! How long shall we go on building and taking our wages in bullets? Nobody goes to work tomorrow!” The same thing happened in section after section, hut after hut.

A note was thrown over the wall to the Second Camp Division; they had some experience by now, and had thought about it often enough, so that they were able to call a strike there, too. In the Second Camp Division, which was multinational, the majority had tenners and many were coming to the end of their time — but they joined in just the same.

In the morning the men’s Camp Divisions, 2 and 3, did not report for work.

This bad habit — striking without refusing the state’s bread and slops — was becoming more and more popular with prisoners, and less and less popular with their bosses. They had an idea: warders and escort troops went unarmed into the striking Camp Divisions, where two of them at a time took hold of a single zek and tried shoving and jostling him out of the hut. (Far too humane a method: only thieves deserve to be nannied like this, not enemies of the people. But since Beria’s execution, no general or colonel dared take the lead and order machine-gunners to fire into a camp.) This was wasted labor: the prisoners just went off to the latrines, or sloped about the camp ground — anything rather than report for work.

They held out like this for two days. The simple idea of punishing the guard who had killed “the Evangelist” did not seem at all simple, or just, to the bosses. Instead, a colonel from Karaganda, with a large retinue, went around the camp on the second night of the strike, confident that he was in no danger, roughly waking everybody up. “How long do you intend to carry on slacking?”* [*”Slacking” was a word much used in official language after the Berlin disturbances of June, 1953. If ordinary people somewhere in Belgium fight for a raise, it’s called “the righteous anger of the people,” but if simple people in our country struggle for black bread they are “slackers.”] Then, knowing nobody there, he pointed at random: “You there — outside! . . . And you . . . And you . . . Outside!” And these chance people the valiant and forceful manager of men consigned to jail, imagining that this was the most sensible way to deal with slackers. The Latvian Will Rosenberg, when he saw this senseless high-handedness, said to the colonel: “I’ll go, too!” “Go on, then,” the colonel readily agreed. He probably did not even realize that this was a protest, or that there were any grounds for protest.

That same night it was announced that the liberal feeding policy was at an end and that those who did not go out to work would be put on short rations. Camp Division No. 2 went to work in the morning. No. 3 didn’t turn out for the third morning running. The jostling and shoving tactics were now applied to them, but with heavier forces: all the officers serving in Kengir, those who had come in to help, and those who were with investigating commissions, were mobilized. The officers picked a hut and entered in strength, dazzling the prisoners with the coming and going of white fur hats and the brilliance of their epaulets, made their way, stooping, among the bunks, and with no sign of distaste sat down in their clean breeches on dirty pillows stuffed with shavings. “Come on, move up a bit — can’t you see I’m a lieutenant colonel!” The lieutenant colonel kept this up, shifting his seat with arms akimbo, until he shoved the owner of the mattress out into the passageway, where warders grabbed him by his sleeves and hustled him along to the work-assignment area or, if he was still too stubborn, into jail. (The limited capacity of the two Kengir jails was a great nuisance to the staff: they held about five hundred men.)

The strike was mastered, regardless of cost to the dignity and privileges of officers. This sacrifice was forced on them by the ambiguities of the time. They had no idea what was required of them, and mistakes could be dangerous! If they showed excessive zeal and shot down a crowd, they might end up as henchmen of Beria. But if they weren’t zealous enough, and didn’t energetically push the strikers out to work — exactly the same thing could happen.* [*Colonel Chechev, for one, was defeated by this conundrum. He retired after the February events and we lose track of him-to discover him later living on his pension in Karaganda. We do not know how soon the camp commander, Colonel Yevsigneyev, left Ozerlag. “An excellent manager … a modest comrade,” he became deputy head of the Bratsk hydroelectric station. (No hint of this in Yevtushenko’s poem.)] Moreover, by their massive personal participation in putting down the strike, the MVD officers demonstrated as never before the importance of their epaulets to the defense of holy order, the impossibility of reducing staffs, and their individual bravery.

All previously proved methods were also employed. In March and April, several contingents of prisoners were transferred to other camps. (The plague crept further!) Some seventy men (Tenno among them) were sent to maximum security prisons, with the classic formula: “All measures of correction exhausted, corrupts other prisoners, not suitable for labor camp.” Lists of those dispatched to maximum security jails were posted in the camp to deter others. And to make the self-financing system — Gulag’s New Economic Policy, as it were — a more satisfactory substitute for freedom and justice, a wide selection of foodstuffs was delivered to the previously ill-stocked sale points. They even — incredibly! — started giving prisoners advances so that they could buy these provisions. (Gulag giving the natives credit! Who had ever heard of such a thing!)

So, for the second time in Kengir, a ripening abscess was lanced before it could burst.

But then the bosses went too far. They reached for the biggest stick they could use on the 58’s — for the thieves! (Why, indeed, should they dirty their hands and sully their epaulets when they had the “class allies”?)

The bosses now renounced the whole principle of the Special Camps, acknowledged that if they segregated political prisoners they had no means of making themselves understood, and just before the May Day celebrations brought in and distributed throughout the mutinous No. 3 Camp Division 650 men, most of them thieves, some of them petty offenders (including many minors). “A healthy batch is joining us!” the bosses spitefully warned the 58’s. “Now you won’t dare breathe.” And they called on the new arrivals to “put our house in order!”

The bosses understood well enough how the restorers of order would begin: by stealing, by preying on others, and so setting every man against his fellows. And the bosses smiled the friendly smile which they reserve for such people when the thieves heard that there was a women’s camp nearby and asked in their impudent beggar’s whine for a “look at the women, boss man!”

But here again we see how unpredictable is the course of human emotions and of social movements! Injecting in Kengir No. 3 a mammoth dose of tested ptomaine, the bosses obtained not a pacified camp but the biggest mutiny in the history of the Gulag Archipelago.

Though they seem to be so scattered and so carefully sealed off, the islands of Gulag are linked by the transit prisons, so that they breathe the same air and the same vital fluids flow in their veins. Thus the massacre of stoolies, the hunger strikes, the strikes, the disturbances in the Special Camps, had not remained unknown to the thieves. By 1954, so we are told, it was noticeable in transit prisons that the thieves came, to respect the politicals.

If this is so — what prevented us from gaining their respect earlier? All through the twenties, thirties, and forties, we blinkered Philistines, preoccupied as we were with our own importance to the world, with the contents of our duffel bags, with the shoes or trousers we had been allowed to retain, had conducted ourselves in the eyes of the thieves like characters on the comic stage: when they plundered our neighbors, intellectuals of world importance like ourselves, we shyly looked the other way and huddled together in our corners; and when the submen crossed the room to give us the treatment, we expected, of course, no help from neighbors, but obligingly surrendered all we had to these ugly customers in case they bit our heads off. Yes, our minds were busy elsewhere, and our hearts were trained for other things! We had never expected to meet an enemy so vile and so cruel! We who were racked by the twists and turns of Russian history, were ready to die only in public, beautifully, with the whole world looking on, and only for the final salvation of all mankind. It might have been better if we had been far less clever. Perhaps when we first stepped into the cell of a transit prison we should have been prepared, every man of us in the place, to take a knife between the ribs and slump in a wet corner on the slime around the latrine bucket, in a sordid brawl with those ratmen whom the boys in blue had thrown in to gnaw our flesh. If we had, perhaps we should have suffered far fewer losses, found our courage sooner, and, who knows, shoulder to shoulder with these very same thieves smashed Stalin’s camps to smithereens? What reason, indeed, had the thieves to respect us? . . .

Well, then, when they arrived in Kengir the thieves had already heard a thing or two; they came expecting to find a fighting spirit among the politicals. And before they could get their bearings, and exchange doggy compliments with the camp authorities, their atamans were visited by some calm, broad-shouldered lads who sat down to talk about life and told them this: “We are representatives. You’ve heard all about the chopping in the Special Camps, or if you haven’t we’ll tell you. We can make knives as good as yours now. There are six hundred of you, two thousand six hundred of us. Think it over, and take your choice. If you try squeezing us we’ll cut the lot of you up.”

Now, this was a wise step, if ever there was one, and long overdue — rounding on the thieves with everything they had. Seeing them as the main enemy!

Of course, nothing would have suited the boys in blue better than a free-for-all. But the thieves looked at the odds and saw that it wouldn’t pay to take on the newly emboldened 58’s one against four. Their protectors, after all, were beyond the camp limits, and a fat lot of use anyway! What thief had ever respected them? Whereas the alliance which our lads offered was a novel and jolly adventure, which might also, they thought, clear a way over the fence into the women’s camp.

Their answer, then, was: “No, we’re wiser than we used to be. We’re with you fellows!”

The conference has not been recorded for history and the names of its participants are not preserved in protocols. This is a pity. They were clever lads.

In their first huts while they were still in the quarantine period, the healthy contingent held a housewarming party — making bonfires of their bunks and lockers on the cement floor, and letting smoke pour through the windows. They expressed their disapproval of locks on hut doors by stuffing the keyholes with wood chips.

For two weeks the thieves behaved as though they were at a health resort: they reported for work, but all they did was sun themselves. The bosses, of course, would not dream of putting them on short rations, but for lack of funds could not pay wages to those of whom they had such bright hopes. Soon, however, vouchers turned up in the possession of the thieves, and they went to the stall to buy food. The bosses were heartened by this sign that the healthy element had begun thieving after all. But they were ill-informed, they were mistaken: a collection in aid of the thieves had been taken up among the politicals (also, no doubt, part of the compact — otherwise the thieves would not have been interested) and this was how they had come by their vouchers! An event too far out of the ordinary for the bosses to guess at it!

No doubt the novelty and unfamiliarity of the game made it great fun for the criminals, especially the juveniles: treating “Fascists” politely, not entering their sections without permission, not sitting down on their bunks without invitation.

Paris in the last century took some of its criminals (it seems to have had plenty of them) into the militia, and called them the mobiles. A very apt description! They are such a mobile breed that they cannot rest quietly inside the shell of an ordinary humdrum existence, but inevitably break it. They had made it a rule not to steal, and it was unethical to slog away for the government, but they had to do something! The young cubs amused themselves By snatching off warders’ caps, prancing over the hut roofs and over the high wall from Camp Division No. 3 to No. 2 during evening roll call, confusing the count, whistling, hooting, scaring the towers at night. They would have gone further and climbed into the women’s camp if the service yard and its sentries had not been in the way.

When disciplinary officers, or education officers, or security men, looked in for a friendly chat with thieves in their hut, the juveniles hurt their feelings badly by pulling notebooks and purses out of their pockets, or suddenly leaning out from a top bunk and switching godfather’s cap peak-backward. Gulag had never encountered such conduct — but then the whole situation was unprecedented! They had always in the past regarded their foster fathers in Gulag as fools, and the more earnestly those turkey cocks believed that they were successfully reforging the thieves, the more the thieves despised them. They were ready to burst with scornful laughter as they stepped onto a platform or before a microphone to talk about beginning a new life behind a wheelbarrow. But so far there had been no point in quarreling with the bosses. Now, however, the compact with the politicals turned the newly released forces of the thieves against the bosses alone.

Thus the Gulag authorities, because they had only the mean intelligence of bureaucrats, and lacked the higher intellectual powers of human beings, had themselves prepared the Kengir explosion: to begin with, by the senseless shootings, and then by pouring the thieves into the camp like petrol fumes into an overheated atmosphere.

Events followed their inevitable course. It was impossible for the politicals not to offer the thieves a choice between war and alliance. It was impossible for the thieves to refuse an alliance. And it was impossible for the alliance, once concluded, to remain inactive — if it had, it would have fallen apart and civil war would have broken out.

They had to start something, no matter what! And since those who start something are strung up if they are 58’s, with nooses around their necks, whereas if they are thieves they are only mildly rebuked in their political discussion period, the thieves made the obvious suggestion: we’ll start, and you join in!

It should be noted that the whole Kengir camp complex formed a single rectangle, with one common outer fence, and was subdivided across its width into separate camp areas. First came Camp Division No. 1 (the women’s camp), then the service yard (we have already talked about the industrial importance of its workshops), then No. 2, then No. 3, and then the prison area, with its two jailhouses, an old and a new building in which not only inmates of the camp but free inhabitants of the settlement were locked up from time to time.

The obvious first objective was to capture the service yard, in which all the camp’s food stores were also situated. They began the operation in the afternoon of a nonworking day (Sunday, May 16, 1954). First the mobiles climbed onto the roofs of their huts and perched at intervals along the wall between Camp Divisions 2 and 3. Then at the command of their leaders, who stayed up aloft, they jumped down into Camp Division No. 2 with sticks in their hands, formed up in a column, and marched in line along the central road. This ran along the axis of No. 2 right up to the inner gates of the service yard, which brought them to a halt.

All these quite undisguised operations took a certain time, during which the warders managed to get themselves organized and obtain instructions. And here is something extremely interesting! The warders started running around to the huts of the 58’s, appealing to these men whom they had treated like dirt for thirty-five years: “Look out, lads! The thieves are on their way to break into the women’s camp. They are going to rape your wives and daughters! Come and help us. Let’s stop them at it!” But a treaty is a treaty, and those who, not knowing about it, seemed eager to follow the bosses were stopped. Normally the 58’s would have risen to this bait, but this time the warders found no helpers among them.

Just how the warders would have defended the women’s camp against their favorites, no one knows — but first they had to think of defending the storerooms around the service yard. The gates of the service yard were flung open and a platoon of unarmed soldiers came out to meet the attackers, with Belyaev the Wart leading them from behind — perhaps devotion to duty had kept him inside the camp on a Sunday out of zeal, or perhaps he was officer of the day. The soldiers started pushing the mobiles away, and broke their lines. Without resorting to their clubs, the thieves began retreating to their own Camp Division No. 3, scaling the wall once again, from which the rear guard covered their retreat by throwing stones and mud bricks at the soldiers.

No thief, of course, was arrested as a result of this. The authorities still saw it as nothing but high-spirited mischief, and let the camp Sunday quietly run its course. Dinner was handed around without incident, and in the evening as soon as it was dark they started showing a film, Rimsky-Korsakov, using a space near the mess hall as an open-air cinema.

But before the gallant composer could withdraw from the conservatory in protest against oppression and persecution, the tinkle of broken glass could be heard from the lamps around the boundary zone: the mobiles were shooting at them from slingshots to put out the lights over the camp area. They swarmed all over Camp Division No. 2 in the darkness, and their shrill bandit whistles rent the air. They broke the service yard gate down with a beam, and from there made a breach in the wall with a section of railway line and were through to the women’s camp. (There were also some of the younger 58’s with them.)

In the light of the flares fired from the towers, our friend Captain Belyaev, the security officer, broke into the service yard from outside the camp, through the guardhouse, with a platoon of Tommy-gunners, and for the first time in the history of Gulag opened fire on the “class allies”! Some were killed and dozens wounded. Behind them came red tabs to bayonet the wounded. Behind them again, observing the usual division of punitive labor, already adopted in Ekibastuz, in Norilsk, and in Vorkuta, ran warders with iron crowbars, and with these they battered the wounded to death. (That night the lights went up in the operating room of the hospital in Camp Division No. 2, and Fuster, the surgeon, a Spanish prisoner, went to work.)

The service yard was now firmly held by the punitive forces, and machine-gunners were posted there. But the Second Camp Division (the mobiles had played their overture, and the politicals now came onto the stage) erected a barricade facing the service yard gate. The Second and Third Camp Divisions had been joined together by a hole in the wall, and there were no longer any warders, any MVD authority, in them.

But what of those who had succeeded in breaking through to the women’s camp, and were now cut off there? Events outsoared the casual contempt which the thieves feel for females. When shots rang out in the service yard, those who had broken into the women’s camp ceased to be greedy predators and became comrades in misfortune. The women hid them. Unarmed soldiers came in to catch them, then others with guns. The women got in the way of the searchers, and resisted attempts to move them. The soldiers punched the women and struck them with their gun butts, dragged some of them off to jail (thanks to someone’s foresight, there was a jailhouse in the women’s camp area), and shot at some of the men.

Finding its punitive force under strength, the command brought into the women’s camp some “black tabs” — soldiers from a construction battalion stationed in Kengir. But they would have nothing to do with this “unsoldierly work” and had to be taken away.

At the same time, here in the women’s camp was the best political excuse which the executioners could offer their superiors in self-defense! They were not at all stupid! Whether they had read something of the sort or thought of it for themselves, on Monday they let photographers into the women’s camp, together with two or three of their own apes, disguised as prisoners. The impostors started pulling women about, while the photographers took pictures. Obviously it was to save defenseless women from such bullying that Captain Belyaev had been compelled to open fire!

In the morning hours on Monday, there was growing tension on both sides of the barricade and the broken gates to the service yard. The yard had not been cleared of bodies. Machine-gunners lay at their guns, which were trained on the gate. In the liberated men’s camps they were breaking bunks to arm themselves, and making shields out of boards and mattresses. Prisoners shouted across the barricade at the butchers, who shouted back. Something had to give; the position was far too precarious. The zeks on the barricade were thinking of taking the offensive themselves. Some emaciated men took their shirts off, got up on the barricade, pointed to their bony chests and ribs, and shouted to the machine-gunners: “Come on, then, shoot! Strike down your fathers! Finish us off!”

Suddenly a soldier ran into the yard with a note for the officer. The officer gave orders for the bodies to be taken up and the red tabs left the yard with them.

For five minutes the barricade was silent and mistrustful. Then the first zeks peeped cautiously into the yard. It was empty, except for the black prison caps lying around, dead men’s caps with stitched-on number patches.

(They discovered later that the order to clear the yard had been given by the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Kazakh Republic, who had just flown in from Alma-Ata. The bodies carried away were driven out into the steppe and buried, to rule out postmortem examination if someone later called for it.)

Shouts of “Hurrah” went through the ranks, and they poured into the yard and on into the women’s camp. They enlarged the breach. Then they freed the women in the jailhouse — and the whole camp was united! The whole of the main camp area was free–Mily No. 4 Division (the camp jail) was left.

There were four red-tabbed sentries on every tower — no lack of ears to cram with insults! Prisoners stood facing the towers and shouted at them (the women, naturally, louder than anyone): “You’re worse than Fascists!. . . Bloodsuckers!. . . Murderers!”

A priest or two were of course easily found in the camp — and there in the morgue a requiem was sung for those who had been killed or died later from their wounds.

How can we say what feelings wrung the hearts of those eight thousand men, who for so long and until yesterday had been slaves with no sense of fellowship, and now had united and freed themselves, not fully perhaps, but at least within the rectangle of those walls, and under the gaze of those quadrupled guards? Even the bedridden fast in locked huts at Ekibastuz was felt as a moment of contact with freedom! This now was the February Revolution! So long suppressed, the brotherhood of man had broken through at last! We loved the thieves! And the thieves loved us! (There was no getting away from it: they had sealed the friendship in blood! They had departed from their code!) Still more, of course, we loved the women, and now we were living as human beings should, there were women at our side once more, and they were our sisters and shared our fate.

Proclamations appeared in the mess hall: “Arm yourselves as best you can, and attack the soldiers first!” The most passionate among them hastily scrawled their slogans on scraps of newspaper (there was no other paper) in black or colored letters: “Bash the Chekists, boys!” “Death to the stoolies, the Cheka’s stooges!” Here, there, everywhere you turned there were meetings and orators. Everybody had suggestions of his own. Come on, think — you’re permitted to think now: Who gets your vote? What demands shall we put forward? What is it we want? Put Belyaev on trial — that’s understood! Put the murderers on trial! — goes without saying. What else? … No locking huts; take the numbers off! But beyond that?… Beyond that came the most frightening thing — the real reason why they had started it all, what they really wanted. We want freedom, of course, just freedom — but who can give it to us? The judges who condemned us in Moscow. As long as our complaints are against Steplag or Karaganda, they will go on talking to us. But if we start complaining against Moscow . . . we’ll all be buried in this steppe.

Well, then — what do we want? To break holes in the walls? To run off into the wilderness? . . .

Those hours of freedom! Immense chains had fallen from our arms and shoulders! No; whatever happened, there could be no regrets! That one day made it all worthwhile!

Late on Monday, a delegation from command HQ arrived in the seething camp. The delegation was quite well disposed, they did not glare savagely at the prisoners, they had no Tommy-gunners with them, no one would ever take them for henchmen of the bloody Beria. Our side learned that generals had flown in from Moscow — Bochkov, from Gulag HQ, and the Deputy Procurator General, Vavilov. (They had served in Beria’s time, but why reopen old wounds?) They found the prisoners’ demands fully justified! (We simply gasped: justified? We aren’t rebels, then? No, no, they’re quite justified!) “Those responsible for the shooting will be made to answer for it!” “But why did they beat up women?” “Beat up women?” The delegation was shocked. “That can’t be true.” Anya Mikhalevich brought in a succession of battered women for them to see. The commission was deeply moved: “We’ll look into it, never fear!” “Beasts!” Lyuba Bershadskaya shouts at the general. There were other shouts: “No locks on huts!” “We won’t lock them any more.” “Take the numbers off!” “Certainly we’ll take them off,” comes the assurance from a general whom the prisoners had never laid eyes on (and would never see again). “The holes in the wall between camp areas must remain!” They were getting bolder. “We must be allowed to mix with each other.” “All right, mix as much as you like,” the general agreed. “Let the holes remain.” Right, brothers, what else do we want? We’ve won, we’ve won! We raised hell for just one day, enjoyed ourselves, let off steam — and we won! Although some among us shake their heads and say, “It’s a trick, it’s all a trick,” we believe it! We believe our bosses; they’re not so bad, on the whole! We believe because that’s our easiest way out of the situation. . . .

All that the downtrodden can do is go on hoping. After every disappointment they must find fresh reason for hope.

So on Tuesday, May 18, all the Kengir Camp Divisions went out to work, reconciling themselves to thoughts of their dead.

That morning the whole affair could still have ended quietly. But the exalted generals assembled in Kengir would have considered such an outcome a defeat for themselves. They could not seriously admit that prisoners were in the right! They could not seriously punish soldiers of the MVD! Their mean understanding could draw only one moral: the walls between Camp Divisions were not strong enough! They must ring them with hoops of fire!

And that day the zealous commanders harnessed for work people who had lost the habit years or decades ago. Officers and warders donned aprons; those who knew how to handle them took up trowels; soldiers released from the towers wheeled barrows and carried hods; discharged soldiers who had stayed around the camps hauled and handed up mud bricks. And by evening the breaches were bricked up, the broken lamps were replaced, prohibited zones had been marked along inside walls and sentries posted at the ends with orders to fire!

When the columns of prisoners returned to camp in the evening after giving a day’s work to the state, they were hurried in to supper before they knew what was happening, so that they could be locked up quickly. On orders from the general, the jailers had to play for time that first evening — that evening of blatant dishonesty after yesterday’s promises; later on the prisoners would get used to it and slip back into the rut.

But before nightfall the long-drawn whistles heard on Sunday shrilled through the camp again — the Second and Third Camp Divisions were calling to each other like hooligans on a spree. (These whistles were another useful contribution from the thieves to the common cause.) The warders took fright, and fled from the camp grounds without finishing their duties. Only one officer slipped up. Medvedev, a first lieutenant in the quartermaster service, stayed behind to finish his business and was held prisoner till morning.

The .camp was in the hands of the zeks, but they were divided. The towers opened fire with machine guns on anyone who approached the inside walls. They killed several and wounded several. Once again zeks broke all the lamps with slingshots, but the towers lit up the camp with flares. This was where the Second Camp Division found a use for the quartermaster: they tied him, with one of his epaulets torn off, to a table, and pushed it up to the strip near the boundary fence, with him yelling to his people: “Don’t shoot, it’s me! This is me, don’t shoot!”

They battered at the barbed wire, and the new fence posts, with long tables, but it was impossible, under fire, either to break through the barrier or to climb over it — so they had to burrow under. As always, there were no shovels, except those for use in case of fire, inside the camp. Kitchen knives and mess tins were put into service.

That night — May 18-19 — they burrowed under all the walls and again united all the divisions and the service yard. The towers had stopped shooting now, and there were plenty of tools in the service yard. The whole daytime work of the epauleted masons had gone to waste. Under cover of night they broke down the boundary fences, knocked holes in the walls, and widened the passages, so that they would not become traps (in the next few days they made them twenty meters wide).

That same night they broke through the wall around the Fourth Camp Division — the prison area — too. The warders guarding the jails fled, some to the guardhouse, some to the towers, where ladders were let down for them. The prisoners wrecked the interrogation offices. Among those released from the jail were those who on the morrow would take command of the rising: former Red Army Colonel Kapiton Kuznetsov (a graduate of the Frunze Academy, no longer young; after the war he had commanded a regiment in Germany, and one of his men had run away to the Western part — this was why he had been imprisoned; he was in the camp jail for “slanderous accounts of camp life” in letters sent out through free workers); and former First Lieutenant Gleb Sluchenkov (he had been a prisoner of war, and some said a Vlasovite).

In the “new” jailhouse were some inhabitants of the Kengir settlement, minor offenders. At first they thought that nationwide revolution had broken out, and rejoiced in their unexpected freedom. But they quickly discovered that the revolution was too localized, and the minor offenders loyally returned to their stone sack and dutifully lived there without guards throughout the rebellion — though they did go to eat in the mutinous zeks’ mess hall.

Mutinous zeks! Who three times already had tried to reject this mutiny and this freedom. They did not know how to treat such gifts, and feared rather than desired them. But a force as relentless as the surf breaking on the shore had carried them helplessly into this rebellion.

What else could they do? Put their faith in promises? They would be cheated again, as the slavemasters had shown so clearly the day before, and so often in the past. Should they kneel in submission? They had spent years on their knees and earned no clemency. Should they give themselves up and take their punishment today? Today, or after a month of freedom, punishment would be equally cruel at the hands of those whose courts functioned like clockwork: if quarters were given out, it would be all around, with no one left out!

The runaway escapes to enjoy just one day of freedom! In just the same way, these eight thousand men had not so much raised a rebellion as escaped to freedom, though not for long! Eight thousand men, from being slaves, had suddenly become free, and now was their chance to … live! Faces usually grim softened into kind smiles.* [*A hostile witness, Makeyev, noted this.] Women looked at men, and men took them by the hand. Some who had corresponded by ingenious secret ways, without even seeing each other, met at last! Lithuanian girls whose weddings had been solemnized by priests on the other side of the wall now saw their lawful wedded husbands for the first time — the Lord had sent down to earth the marriages made in heaven! For the first time in their lives, no one tried to prevent the sectarians and believers from meeting for prayer. Foreigners, scattered about the Camp Divisions, now found each other and talked about this strange Asiatic revolution in their own languages. The camp’s food supply was in the hands of the prisoners. No one drove them out to work line-up and an eleven-hour working day.

The morning of May 19 dawned over a feverishly sleepless camp which had torn off its number patches. Posts with broken lamps sprawled against the wire fences. Even without their help the zeks moved freely from zone to zone by the trenches dug under the wires. Many of them took their street clothes from the storerooms and put them on. Some of the lads crammed fur hats on their heads; shortly there would be embroidered shirts, and on the Central Asians bright-colored robes and turbans. The gray-black camp would be a blaze of color.

Orderlies went around the huts summoning us to the big mess hall to elect a commission for negotiations with the authorities and for self-government, as it modestly and timidly described itself.

For all they knew, they were electing it just for a few hours, but it was destined to become the government of Kengir camp for forty days.

Had all this taken place two years earlier, if only for fear that He would find out, the bosses of Steplag would not have delayed a moment before giving the classic order “Don’t spare the bullets!” and shooting the whole crowd penned within these walls. If it had proved necessary to knock off four thousand — or all eight thousand — they would not have felt the slightest tremor, because they were shockproof.

But the complexity of the situation in 1954 made them vacillate. Even Vavilov, even Bochkov, sensed that a new breeze was stirring in Moscow. Quite a few prisoners had been shot in Kengir already, and they were still wondering how to make it look legal. So a delay was created, which meant time for the rebels to begin their new life of independence.

In its very first hours the political line of the revolt had to be determined: to be or not to be? Should it follow in the wake of the simple-hearted messages scrawled over the columns of the robot press: “Bash the Chekists, boys”?

As soon as he left the jail and began to take charge — whether through force of circumstances, or because of his military skill, or on the advice of friends, or moved by some inner urge — Kapiton Ivanovich immediately adopted the line of those orthodox Soviet citizens who were not very numerous in Kengir and were usually pushed into the background. “Cut out all this scribbling” (of leaflets), “nip the evil of counter-revolution in the bud, frustrate those who want to take advantage of events in our camp!” These phrases I quote from notes kept by another member of the commission, A. F. Makeyev, of an intimate discussion in Pyotr Akoyev’s storeroom. The orthodox citizens nodded approval of Kuznetsov: “Yes, if we don’t stop those leaflets, we shall all get extra time.”

In the first hours, during the night, as he went around the huts haranguing himself hoarse, again at the meeting in the mess hall next morning, and on many subsequent occasions, whenever he encountered extremist sentiments and the bitter rage of men whose lives were trodden so deep into the mire that they felt they had nothing more to lose, Kuznetsov endlessly, tirelessly repeated the same words:

“Anti-Sovietism will be the death of us. If we display anti-Soviet slogans we shall be crushed immediately. They’re only waiting for an excuse to crush us. If we put out leaflets like that, they will be fully justified in shooting. Our salvation lies in loyalty. We must talk to Moscow’s representatives in a manner befitting Soviet citizens!”

Then, in a louder voice: “We shall not permit such behavior on the part of a few provocateurs!” (However, while he was making these speeches, people on the bunks were loudly kissing. They didn’t take in much of what he said.)

When a train carries you in the wrong direction and you decide to jump off, you have to jump with the motion of the train, and not against it. The inertial force of history is just as hard to resist. By no means everyone wanted it that way, but the reasonableness of Kuznetsov’s line was immediately perceived, and it prevailed. Very soon slogans were hung up all over the camp, in big letters easily legible from the towers and the guardhouse:

“Long live the Soviet Constitution!”
“Long live the Presidium of the Central Committee!”
“Long live the Soviet regime!”
“The Central Committee must send one of its members and review our cases!”
“Down with the murdering Beria-ites!”
“Wives of Steplag officers! Aren’t you ashamed to be the wives of murderers?”

Although it was clear as could be to the majority in Kengir that all the millions of acts of rough justice, near and distant, had taken place under the watery sun of that very constitution, and had been sanctioned by a Politburo consisting of the very same members, all they felt able to do was write “long live” that constitution and that Politburo. As they reread their slogans, the rebel prisoners now felt themselves on firm legal ground and began to be less anxious: their movement was not hopeless.

Over the mess hall, where the elections had just taken place, a flag was raised which the whole settlement could see. It hung there long afterward: white, with a black border, and the red hospitalers’ cross in the middle. In the international maritime code this flag means:

“Ship in distress! Women and children on board.”

Twelve men were elected to the Commission, with Kuznetsov at their head. The members of the Commission assumed individual responsibilities, and created the following departments:

Agitation and propaganda (under the Lithuanian Knopkus, who had been sent for punishment from Norilsk after the rising there).
Services and maintenance.
Food.
Internal security (Gleb Sluchenkov).
Military.
Technical (perhaps the most remarkable branch of this camp government).

Former Major Mikheyev was made responsible for contacts with the authorities. The Commission also had among its members one of the atamans of the thieves, and he, too, was in charge of something. There were also some women (apparently, Shakhnovskaya, an economist and Party member already gray; Suprun, an elderly teacher from the Carpathians; and Lyuba Bershadskaya).

But did the real moving spirits behind the revolt join this Commission? It seems that they did not. The centers, especially the Ukrainian Center (not more than a quarter of those in the whole camp were Russian), evidently kept themselves to themselves. Mikhail Keller, a Ukrainian partisan, who from 1941 had fought alternately against the Germans and the Soviet side, and had publicly axed a stoolie in Kengir, appeared at meetings of the Commission as an observer from the other staff.

The Commission worked openly in the offices of the Women’s Camp Division, but the Military Department moved its command post (field staff) out to the bathhouse in Camp Division No. 2. The departments set to work. The first few days were particularly hectic: there was so much planning and arranging to be done.

First of all they had to fortify their position. (Mikheyev, in expectation of the inevitable military action to crush them, was against creating defenses of any kind, but Sluchenkov and Knopkus insisted.) Great piles of mud bricks had risen, where the breaches in the inner walls were widened and cleared. They used these bricks to make barricades facing all the guard points — exits from within, entrances from without — which remained in the hands of the jailers, and any one of which might open at any minute to admit the punitive force. There were plenty of coils of barbed wire in the service yard. With this they made entanglements and scattered them about the threatened approaches. Nor did they omit to put out little boards saying: “Danger! Minefield!”

This was one of the first of the Technical Department’s bright ideas. The department’s work was surrounded by great secrecy. In the occupied service yard the Technical Department set aside secret premises, with a skull and crossbones drawn on the door, and the legend “High Tension — 100,000 volts.” Only the handful of men who worked there were allowed in. So that even the prisoners did not get to know what the Technical Department’s activities were. A rumor was very soon put about that it was making secret weapons of a chemical nature. Since both zeks and bosses knew very well what clever engineers there were in the camp, it was easy for a superstitious conviction to get around that they could do anything, even invent a weapon which no one had yet thought of in Moscow. As for making a few miserable mines, using the reagents which were there in the service yard — what was to stop them? So the boards saying “Minefield” were taken seriously.

Another weapon was devised: boxes of ground glass at the entrance to every hut (to throw in the eyes of the Tommy-gunners).

The teams were kept just as they had been, but were now called platoons, while the huts were called detachments, and detachment commanders were named, subordinate to the Military Department. Mikhail Keller was put in charge of all guard duties. Vulnerable places were occupied, according to a precise roster, by pickets, which were reinforced for the night hours. A man will not run away and in general will show more courage in the presence of a woman: with this masculine psychological trait in mind, the rebels organized mixed pickets. Besides the many loud-mouthed women in Kengir, there proved to be many brave ones, especially among the Ukrainian girls, who were the majority in the women’s camp.

Without waiting this time for master’s kind permission, they began taking the window bars down themselves. For the first two days, before the bosses thought of cutting the power supply to the camp, the lathes were still working in the shops and they made a large number of pikes from these window bars by grinding down and sharpening their ends. The smiths and the lathe operators worked without a break in those first days, making weapons: knives, halberds, and sabers (which were particularly popular with the thieves; they decorated the hilts with jingles and colored leather). Others were seen with bludgeons in their hands.

The pickets shouldered pikes as they went to take up their posts for the night. The women’s platoon, on their way at night to rooms provided in the men’s camp, so that they could rush out to meet the attackers if the alarm was raised (it was naively assumed that the butchers would be ashamed to hurt women), also bristled with pikes.

All this would have been impossible, would have been ruined by mockers or lechers, if the stern and cleansing wind of rebellion had not been blowing through the camp. In our age these pikes, these sabers, were children’s toys, but for these people, prison — prison behind them, and prison before them — was no game. The pikes were playthings, but this was what fate had sent — their first chance to defend their freedom. In the puritanical air of that revolutionary springtime, when the presence of women on the barricades itself became a weapon, men and women behaved with proper dignity, and with dignity carried their pikes, points skyward.

If anyone during those days entertained hopes of vile orgies, it was the blue-epauleted bosses, on the other side of the fence. Their calculation was that left alone for a week, the prisoners would drown in their debauchery. That was the picture they painted for the inhabitants of the settlement — prisoners mutinying for the sake of sexual indulgence. (Obviously, there was no other lack they could feel in their comfortable existence.)* [*After the mutiny the bosses had the effrontery to carry out a general medical examination of all the women. When they discovered that many were still virgins they were flabbergasted. Eh? What were you thinking of? All those days together! … In their judgment of events they could not rise above their own moral plane.]

The main hope of the authorities was that the thieves would start raping women, that the politicals would intervene, and that there would be a massacre. But once again the MVD psychologists were wrong! And we ourselves may well be surprised. All witnesses agree that the thieves behaved like decent people, but in our sense of the term, not in their own traditional sense. On their side, the politicals and the women themselves emphasized by their behavior that they regarded the thieves as friends, and trusted them. What lay below these attitudes need not concern us here. Perhaps the thieves kept remembering their comrades bloodily murdered that first Sunday.

If we can speak of the strength of the Kengir revolt at all, its strength was in this unity.

Nor did the thieves touch the food stores, which, for those who know them, is no less surprising. Although there was enough food for many months in the storerooms, the Commission, after due consideration, decided to leave the allowances of bread and other foodstuffs as before. The honest citizen’s fear of eating more than his share of public victuals, and having to answer for this waste! As though the state owed the prisoners nothing for all those hungry years! On the other hand (as Mikheyev recalls), when there was a shortage outside the camp, the supply section of the camp administration asked the prisoners to release certain foodstuffs. There was some fruit, intended for those on higher norms (free workers!), and the zeks released it.

The camp bookkeepers allocated foodstuffs on the old norms, the kitchen took them and cooked them, but in the new revolutionary atmosphere did not pilfer, nor did emissaries from the thieves appear with instructions to bring the stuff for the people. Nothing extra was ladled out for the trusties. And it was suddenly found that though the norms were the same, there was noticeably more to eat!

If the thieves sold things (things previously stolen in other places), they did not, as had been their custom, immediately come along to take them back again. “Things are different now,” they said.

The stalls belonging to the local Workers’ Supply Department went on trading inside the camp. The staff guaranteed the safety of the cashier (a free woman). She was allowed into the camp and went around the stalls with two girls, collecting the takings (in vouchers) from the salespeople. (But the vouchers, of course, soon ran out, and the bosses did not let new stocks through into the camp.)

The supply of three items needed in the camp remained in the hands of the bosses: electricity, water, and medicines. They did not, of course, control the air supply. As for medicines, they gave the camp not a single powder nor a single drop of iodine in forty days. The electricity they cut off after two or three days. The water supply they left alone.

The Technical Department began a fight for light. Their first idea was to fix hooks to fine wires and sling them forcibly over the outside cable, which ran just beyond the camp wall — and in this way they stole current for a few days, until the tentacles were discovered and cut. This had given the Technical Department time to try out a windmill, abandon it, and begin installing in the service yard (in a spot concealed from prying eyes on the towers, or low-flying observation planes) a hydroelectric station, worked by … a water tap. A motor which happened to be in the yard was converted into a generator, and they started supplying the camp telephone network, the lighting in staff headquarters, and . . . the radio transmitter! (The huts were lit by wood splints.) This unique hydroelectric station went on working till the last day of the revolt.

In the very early days of the mutiny, the generals would come into the camp as though they owned it. True, Kuznetsov was not at a loss. When the first parleys took place he ordered his men to bring the bodies from the morgue and loudly ordered: “Caps off!” The zeks bared their heads, and the generals, too, had to take off their peaked caps in the presence of their victims. But the initiative remained with Gulag’s General Bochkov. After approving the election of a commission (“You can’t talk to everybody at once”), he demanded that the negotiators tell him first how their cases had been investigated (and Kuznetsov began lengthily and perhaps eagerly presenting his story); and further insisted that prisoners should stand up to speak. When somebody said, “The prisoners demand . . .” Bochkov touchily retorted that “Prisoners cannot demand, they can only request!” And “The prisoners request” became the established formula.

Bochkov replied to the prisoners’ requests with a lecture on the building of socialism, the unprecedentedly rapid progress of the economy, and the successes of the Chinese revolution. That complacent irrelevancy, that driving of screws into the brain which always leaves us weak and numb. He had come into the camp* to look for evidence that the use of firearms had been justified. (They would shortly declare that in fact there had been no shootings in the camp: this was just a lie told by the gangsters; nor had there been any beatings.) He was simply amazed that they should dare ask him to infringe the “instruction concerning the separate housing of men and women prisoners.” (They talk this way about their instructions, as though they were laws for and from all time.)

Shortly, other, more important generals arrived in Douglas aircraft: Dolgikh (at that time allegedly head of Gulag) and Yegorov (Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs for the U.S.S.R.).

A meeting was called in the mess hall, and some two thousand prisoners assembled. Kuznetsov gave the orders: “Silence, please! All stand! Attention!” and respectfully invited the generals to sit on the dais, while he, as befitted his subordinate rank, stood to one side! (Sluchenkov behaved differently. When one of the generals casually spoke of enemies present, Sluchenkov answered in a clear voice: “How many of your sort turned out to be enemies? Yagoda was a public enemy, Yezhov was a public enemy, Abakumov was a public enemy, Beria was a public enemy. How do we know that Kruglov is any better?”)

Makeyev, to judge from his notes, drew up a draft agreement in which the authorities promised not to transfer people to other camps, or otherwise victimize them, and to begin a thorough investigation, while the zeks in return agreed to return to work immediately. However, when he and his supporters started going around the huts and asking prisoners to accept his draft, they were jeered at as “bald-headed Komsomols,” “procurement agents,” and “lackeys of the Cheka.” They got a particularly hostile reception in the women’s camp, and found that the separation of the men’s and women’s divisions was by now the last thing the zeks would agree to. (Makeyev angrily answered his opponents: “Just because you’ve had your hand on some wench’s tits, d’you think the Soviet regime is a thing of the past? The Soviet regime will get its own way, whatever happens!”)

The days ran on. They never took their eyes off the camp grounds — soldiers’ eyes from the towers, and warders’ eyes, too (the warders, knowing the zeks by sight, were supposed to identify them and remember who did what), and even the eyes of airmen (perhaps equipped with cameras) — and the generals were regretfully forced to conclude that there were no massacres, no pogroms, no violence in there, that the camp was not disintegrating of its own accord, and that there was no excuse to send troops in to the rescue.

The camp stood fast and the negotiations changed their character. Golden-epauleted personages, in various combinations, continued coming into the camp to argue and persuade. They were all allowed in, but they had to pick up white flags, and between the outer gate of the service yard (now the main entrance) and the barricade, they had to undergo a body search, with some Ukrainian girl slapping the generals’ pockets in case there was a pistol or a hand grenade in them. In return, the rebel staff guaranteed their personal safety! . . .

They showed the generals around, wherever it was allowed (not, of course, around the secret sector of the service yard), let them talk to prisoners, and called big meetings in the Camp Divisions for their benefit. Their epaulets flashing, the bosses took their seats in the presidium as of old, as though nothing were amiss.

The prisoners put up speakers. But speaking was so difficult! Not only because each of them, as he spoke, was writing his future sentence, but also because in their experience of life and their ideas of truth, the grays and the blues had grown too far apart, and there was hardly any way of penetrating, of letting some light into, those plump and prosperous carcasses, those glossy, melon-shaped heads. They seem to have been greatly angered by an old Leningrad worker, a Communist who had taken part in the Revolution. He asked them what chance Communism had when officers got fat on the output of camp workshops, when they had lead stolen from the separating plant and made into shot for their poaching trips; when prisoners had to dig their kitchen gardens for them; when carpets were laid in the bathhouse for the camp commander’s visits, and an orchestra accompanied his ablutions.

To cut out some of this disorganized shouting, the discussions sometimes took the form of direct negotiations on the loftiest diplomatic model. Sometime in June a long mess table was placed in the women’s camp, and the golden epaulets seated themselves on a bench to one side of it, while the Tommy-gunners allowed in with them as a bodyguard stood at their backs. Across the table sat the members of the Commission, and they, too, had a bodyguard — which stood there, looking very serious, armed with sabers, pikes, and slingshots. In the background crowds of prisoners gathered to listen to the powwow and shout comments. (Refreshments for the guests were not forgotten! Fresh cucumbers were brought from the hothouses in the service yard, and kvass from the kitchen. The golden epaulets crunched cucumbers unselfconsciously. . . . )

The rebels had agreed on their demands (or requests) in the first two days, and now repeated them over and over again:

• Punish the Evangelist’s murderer.
• Punish all those responsible for the murders on Sunday night in the service yard.
• Punish those who beat up the women.
• Bring back those comrades who had been illegally sent to closed prisons for striking.
• No more number patches, window bars, or locks on hut doors.
• Inner walls between Camp Divisions not to be rebuilt.
• An eight-hour day, as for free workers.
• An increase in payment for work (here there was no question of equality with free workers).
• Unrestricted correspondence with relatives, periodic visits.
• Review of cases.

Although there was nothing unconstitutional in any of these demands, nothing that threatened the foundations of the state (indeed, many of them were requests for a return to the old position), it was impossible for the bosses to accept even the least of them, because these bald skulls under service caps and supported by close-clipped fat necks had forgotten how to admit a mistake or a fault. Truth was unrecognizable and repulsive to them if it manifested itself not in secret instructions from higher authority but on the lips of common people.

Still, the obduracy of the eight thousand under siege was a blot on the reputation of the generals, it might ruin their careers, and so they made promises. They promised that nearly all the demands would be satisfied — only, they said (to make it more convincing), they could hardly leave the women’s camp open, that was against the rules (forgetting that in the Corrective Labor Camps it had been that way for twenty years), but they could consider arranging, should they say, meeting days. To the demand that the Commission of Inquiry (into the circumstances of the shooting) should start its work inside the camp, the generals unexpectedly agreed. (But Sluchenkov guessed their purpose, and refused to hear of it: while making their statements, the stoolies would expose everything that was happening in the camp.) Review of cases? Well, of course, cases would be re-examined, but prisoners would have to be patient. There was one thing that couldn’t wait at all — the prisoners must get back to work! to work! to work!

But the zeks knew that trick by now: dividing them up into columns, forcing them to the ground at gunpoint, arresting the ringleaders.

No, they answered across the table, and from the platform. No! shouted voices from the crowd. The administration of Steplag have behaved like provocateurs! We do not trust the Steplag authorities! We don’t trust the MVD!

“Don’t trust even the MVD?” The vice-minister was thrown into a sweat by this treasonable talk. “And who can have inspired in you such hatred for the MVD?”

A riddle, if ever there was one.

“Send us a member of the Central Committee Presidium! A member of the Presidium! Then we’ll believe you!” shouted the zeks.

“Be careful,” the generals threatened. “You’ll make it worse for yourselves!”

At this Kuznetsov got up. He spoke calmly and precisely, and he held himself proudly.

“If you enter the camp with weapons,” he warned them, “don’t forget that half of those here had a hand in the capture of Berlin. They can cope even with your weapons!”

Kapiton Kuznetsov! Some future historian of the Kengir mutiny must help us to understand the man better. What were his thoughts, how did he feel about his imprisonment? What stage did he imagine his appeal to have reached? How long was it since he had asked for a review, if the order of release (with rehabilitation, I believe) arrived from Moscow during the rebellion? His pride in keeping the mutinous camp in such good order—was it only the professional pride of a military man? Had he put himself at the head of the movement because it captured his imagination? (I reject that explanation.) Or, ‘ knowing his powers of leadership, had he taken over to restrain the movement, tame the flood, and channel it, to lay his chastened comrades at their masters’ feet? (That is my view.) In meetings and discussions, and through people of lesser importance, he had opportunities to tell those in charge of the punitive operation anything he liked, and to hear things from them. On one occasion in June, for instance, the artful dodger Markosyan was sent out of camp on an errand for the Commission. Did Kuznetsov exploit such opportunities? Perhaps not. His position may have been a proud and independent one.

Two bodyguards—two enormous Ukrainian lads—accompanied Kuznetsov the whole time with knives in their belts.

To defend him? To settle scores?

(Makeyev claims that during the rebellion Kuznetsov also had a temporary wife—another Ukrainian nationalist.)

Gleb Sluchenkov was about thirty. Which means that he must have been captured by the Germans when he was nineteen or so. Like Kuznetsov, he now went around in his old uniform, which had been kept in storage, acting or overacting the old soldier. He had a slight limp, but the speed of his movements made it unimportant.

In the negotiations he was precise to the point of curtness. The authorities had the idea of calling all “former juvenile offenders” out of the camp (youngsters jailed before they were eighteen, some of them now twenty or twenty-one) and releasing them. This may not have been a trick—at about this time they were releasing such prisoners or reducing their sentences all over the country. Sluchenkov’s answer was:

“Have you asked the minors whether they want to move from one camp to another, and leave their comrades in the lurch?” (In the Commission, too, he insisted that “These kids carry out our guard duties—we can’t hand them over!” This, indeed, was the unspoken reason why the generals wanted to release these youngsters while Kengir was in revolt: and for all we know, they would have shoved them in cells outside the camp.) The law-abiding Makeyev nonetheless began rounding up former juveniles for the “discharge tribunal,” and he testifies that out of 409 persons with a claim to be released, he only succeeded in collecting thirteen who were willing to leave. If we bear in mind Makeyev’s sympathy with the authorities, and his hostility to the rising, his testimony is amazing: four hundred youngsters in the bloom of youth, and in their great majority not politically minded, renounced not merely freedom but salvation! And stayed with the doomed revolt . . .

Sluchenkov’s reply to threats that troops would be used to put down the revolt was “Send them in! Send as many Tommy-gunners as you like! We’ll throw ground glass in their eyes and take their guns from them! We’ll trounce your Kengir troops. Your bowlegged officers we’ll chase all the way to Karaganda—we’ll ride into Karaganda on your backs! And once there, we’re among friends!”

There is other evidence about him which seems reliable. “Anybody who runs away will get this in the chest!”—flourishing a hunting knife in the air. “Anybody who doesn’t turn out to defend the camp will get the knife,” he announced in one hut. The inevitable logic of any military authority and any war situation.

The newborn camp government, like all governments through the ages, was incapable of existing without a security service, and Sluchenkov headed this (occupying the security officer’s room in the women’s camp). Since there could be no victory over the outside forces, Sluchenkov realized that this post meant certain execution. In the course of the revolt he told people in the camp that the bosses had secretly urged him to provoke a racial blood-bath (the golden epaulets were banking heavily on this) and so provide a plausible excuse for troops to enter the camp. In return the bosses promised Sluchenkov his life. He rejected their proposal. (What approaches were made to others? They haven’t told us.) Moreover, when a rumor went around the camp that a Jewish pogrom was imminent, Sluchenkov gave warning that the rumor-mongers would be publicly flogged. The rumor died down.

A clash between Sluchenkov and the loyalists seemed inevitable. And it happened. It should be said that all these years, in all the Special Camps, orthodox Soviet citizens, without even consulting each other, unanimously condemned the massacre of the stoolies, or any attempt by prisoners to fight for their rights. We need not put this down to sordid motives (though quite a few of the orthodox were compromised by their work for the godfather) since we can fully explain it by their theoretical views. They accepted all forms of repression and extermination, even wholesale, provided they came from above—as a manifestation of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Even impulsive and uncoordinated actions of the same kind but from below were regarded as banditry, and what is more, in its “Banderist” form (among the’ loyalists you would never get one to admit the right of the Ukraine to secede, because to do so was bourgeois nationalism). The refusal of the katorzhane to be slave laborers, their indignation about window bars and shootings, depressed and frightened the docile camp Communists.

In Kengir as elsewhere, there was a nest of loyalists. (Genkin, Apfelzweig, Talalayevsky, and evidently Akoyev. We have no more names.) There was also a malingerer who spent years in the hospital pretending that “his leg kept going around.” Intellectual methods of struggle such as this were deemed permissible. In the Commission itself Makeyev was an obvious example. All of them were reproachful from the beginning: “You shouldn’t have started it”; when the passages under the walls were blocked off, they said that they shouldn’t have tunneled; it was all a stunt thought up by the Banderist scum, and the thing to do now was to back down quickly. (Anyway, the sixteen killed were not from their camp, and it was simply silly to shed tears over the Evangelist.) All their bile and bigotry is blurted out in Makeyev’s notes. Everything and everybody in sight is bad, and there are dangers on every hand; it’s either a new sentence from the bosses, or a knife in the back from the Banderists. “They want to frighten us all with their bits of iron and drive us to our deaths.” Makeyev angrily calls the Kengir revolt a “bloody game,” a “false trump,” “amateur dramatics” on the part of the Banderists, and more often than any of these, “the wedding party.” The hopes and aims of the leaders, as he sees them, were fornication, evasion of work, and putting off the day of reckoning. (That there was a reckoning to be paid, he tacitly assumes to be just.)

This very accurately expresses the attitude of the loyalists in the fifties to the freedom movement in the camps. Whereas Makeyev was very cautious, and was indeed among the leaders of the revolt, Talalayevsky poured out such complaints quite openly, and Sluchenkov’s internal security service locked him in a cell in the Kengir jailhouse for agitation hostile to the rebels.

Yes, this really happened. The rebels who had liberated the jail now set up one of their own. The old, old ironical story. True, only four men were put inside for various reasons (usually for dealings with the bosses), and none of them was shot (instead, they were presented with the best of alibis for the authorities).

This incident apart, the jailhouse—a particularly gloomy old place, built in the thirties—was put on display to a wide public: it had windowless solitary-confinement cells, with nothing but a tiny skylight; legless beds, mere wooden boards on the cement floor, where it was still colder and damper than elsewhere in the cold cell; and beside each bed, which means down on the floor, a rough earthenware bowl like a dog dish.

To this place the Agitation Department organized sightseeing trips for their fellow prisoners who had never been inside and perhaps never would be. They also took there visiting generals (who were not greatly impressed). They even asked that sightseers from among the free inhabitants of the settlement be sent along: with the prisoners absent, they could in any case do nothing at the work sites. The generals actually sent such a party — not, of course, ordinary workingmen, but hand-picked personnel who found nothing to excite indignation.

In reply, the authorities offered to arrange a prisoners’ outing to Rudnik (Divisions 1 and 2 of Steplag), since according to camp rumors a revolt had broken out there, too. (Incidentally, for their own good reasons both slaves and slavemasters shunned the word “revolt,” or still worse, “rising,” replacing them with the bashful euphemism “horseplay.”) The delegates went, and saw for themselves that all was as it had been, that prisoners were going to work.

Their hopes largely depended on strikes like their own spreading. Now the delegates returned with cause for despondency.

(The authorities, in fact, had taken them there only just in time. Rudnik was of course worked up. Prisoners had heard from free workers all sorts of facts and fantasies about the Kengir revolt. In the same month [June] it so happened that many appeals for judicial review were turned down simultaneously. Then some half-crazy lad was wounded in the prohibited area. And there, too, a strike started, the gates between Camp Divisions were knocked down, and prisoners poured out onto the central road. Machine guns appeared on the towers. Somebody hung up a placard with anti-Soviet slogans on it, and the rallying cry “Freedom or death!” But this was taken down and replaced by one with legitimate demands and an undertaking to make up for losses caused by the stoppage once the demands were satisfied. Lorries came to fetch flour from the storerooms; the prisoners wouldn’t let them have it. The strike lasted for something like a week, but we have no precise information about it: this is all at third hand, and probably exaggerated.)

There were weeks when the whole war became a war of propaganda. The outside radio was never silent: through several loudspeakers set up at intervals around the camp it interlarded appeals to the prisoners with information and misinformation, and with a couple of trite and boring records that frayed everybody’s nerves.

Through the meadow goes a maiden, She whose braided hair I love.

(Still, to be thought worthy even of that not very high honor — having records played to them — they had to rebel. Even rubbish like that wasn’t played for men on their knees.) These records also served, in the spirit of the times, as a. jamming device—drowning the broadcasts from the camps intended for the escort troops.

On the outside radio they sometimes tried to blacken the whole movement, asserting that it had been started with the sole aim of rape and plunder. (In the camp itself the zeks just laughed, but the free inhabitants of the settlement also listened, willy-nilly, to the loudspeakers. Of course, the slavemasters could not rise to any other explanation—an admission that this rabble was capable of seeking justice was far beyond the reach of their minds.) At other times they tried telling filthy stories about members of the Commission. (They even said that one of the “old ones,” when he was being transported by barge to the Kolyma, had made a hole below the waterline and sunk the boat with three hundred zeks in it. The emphasis was on the fact that it was poor zeks he had drowned, practically all of them 58’s, too, and not the escort troops; how he had survived himself was not clear.) Or else they would taunt Kuznetsov, telling him that his discharge had arrived, but was now canceled. Then the appeals would begin again. Work! Work! Why should the Motherland keep you for nothing? By not going to work you are doing enormous damage to the state! (This was supposed to pierce the hearts of men doomed to eternal katorgat) Whole trainloads of coal are standing in the siding, there’s nobody to unload it! (Let them stand there—the zeks laughed—you’ll give way all the sooner! Yet it didn’t occur even to them that the golden epaulets could unload it themselves if it troubled them so much.)

The Technical Department, however, gave as good as it got. Two portable film projectors were found in the service yard. Their amplifiers were used for loudspeakers, less powerful, of course, than those of the other side. They were fed from the secret hydroelectric station! (The fact that the camp had electricity and radio greatly surprised and troubled the bosses. They were afraid that the rebels might rig up a transmitter and start broadcasting news about their rising to foreign countries. Rumors to this effect were also put around inside the camp.)

The camp soon had its own announcers (Slava Yarimovskaya is one we know of). Programs included the latest news, and news features (there was also a daily wall newspaper, with cartoons). “Crocodile Tears” was the name of a program ridiculing the anxiety of the MVD men about the fate of women whom they themselves had previously beaten up. Then there were programs for the escort troops. Apart from this, prisoners would approach the towers at night and shout to the soldiers through megaphones.

But there was not enough power to put on programs for the only potential sympathizers to be found in Kengir—the free inhabitants of the settlement, many of them exiles. It was they whom the settlement authorities were trying to fool, not by radio but, in some place which the prisoners could not reach, with rumors that bloodthirsty gangsters and insatiable prostitutes (this version went down well with the women)* were ruling the roost inside the camp; that over there innocent people were being tortured and burned alive in furnaces. (In that case, it was hard to see why the authorities did not intervene! . . . ) [*When it was all over and the women’s column was marched through the settlement on the way to work, married women, Russian women, gathered along the roadside and shouted at them: “Prostitutes! Dirty whores! Couldn’t do without it, could you …!” and other, still stronger remarks. The same thing happened next day, but the women prisoners had left the camp prepared, and replied to these insulting creatures with a bombardment of stones. The escort troops just laughed.]

How could the prisoners call out through the walls, to the workers one, or two, or three kilometers away: “Brothers! We want only justice! They were murdering us for no crime of ours, they were treating us worse than dogs! Here are our demands”?

The thoughts of the Technical Department, since they had no chance to outstrip modern science, moved backward instead to the science of past ages. Using cigarette paper (there was everything you could think of in the service yard; we have talked about that already:* for many years it provided the Dzhezkazgan officers with their own Moscow tailor’s shop, and a workshop for every imaginable article of consumer goods), they pasted together an enormous air balloon, following the example of the Montgolfier brothers. [*Part III, Chapter 22.] A bundle of leaflets was attached to the balloon, and slung underneath it was a brazier containing glowing coals, which sent a current of warm air into the dome of the balloon through an opening in its base. To the huge delight of the assembled crowd (if prisoners ever do feel happy they are like children), the marvelous aeronautical structure rose and was airborne. But alas! The speed of the wind was greater than the speed of its ascent, and as’ it was flying over the boundary fence the brazier caught on the barbed wire. The balloon, denied its current of warm air, fell and burned to ashes, together with the leaflets.

After this failure they started inflating balloons with smoke.

With a following wind they flew quite well, exhibiting inscriptions in large letters to the settlement:

“Save the women and old men from being beaten!”
“We demand to see a member of the Presidium.”

The guards started shooting at these balloons.

Then some Chechen prisoners came to the Technical Department and offered to make kites. (They are experts.) They succeeded in sticking some kites together and paying out the string until they were over the settlement. There was a percussive device on the frame of each kite. When the kite was in a convenient position, the device scattered a bundle of leaflets, also attached to the kite. The kite fliers sat on the roof of a hut waiting to see what would happen next. If the leaflets fell close to the camp, warders ran to collect them; if they fell farther away, motorcyclists and horsemen dashed after them. Whatever happened, they tried to prevent the free citizens from reading an independent version of the truth. (The leaflets ended by requesting any citizen of Kengir who found one to deliver it to the Central Committee.)

The kites were also shot at, but holing was less damaging to them than to the balloons. The enemy soon discovered that sending up counter-kites to tangle strings with them was cheaper than keeping a crowd of warders on the run.

A war of kites in the second half of the twentieth century! And all to silence a word of truth.

(Perhaps it will help the reader to place the events at Kengir chronologically if we recall what was happening outside during the days of the mutiny. The Geneva Conference on Indochina was in session. The Stalin Peace Prize was conferred on Pierre Cot. Another progressive French man, the writer Sartre, arrived in Moscow to join in the life of our progressive society. The third centenary of the reunification of Russia and the Ukraine was loudly and lavishly celebrated.* [*The Ukrainians at Kengir declared it a day of mourning.] On May 31 there was a solemn parade on Red Square. The Ukrainian S.S.R. and the Russian S.F.S.R. were awarded the Order of Lenin. On June 6 a monument to Yuri Dolgoruky was unveiled in Moscow. A Trade Union Congress opened on June 8 [but nothing was said there about Kengir]. On the tenth a new state loan was launched. The twentieth was Air Force Day, and there was a splendid parade at Tushino. These months of 1954 were also marked by a powerful offensive on the literary front, as people call it: Surkov, Kochetov, and Yermilov came out with very tough admonitory articles. Kochetov even asked: “What sort of times are we living in?” And nobody answered: “A time of prison camp risings!” Many incorrect plays and books were abused during this period. And in Guatemala the imperialistic United States met with the rebuff it deserved.)

There were Chechen exiles in the settlement, but it is unlikely that they made the other kites. You cannot accuse the Chechens of ever having served oppression. They understood perfectly the meaning of the Kengir revolt, and on one occasion brought a bakery van up to the gates. Needless to say, the soldiers drove them away.

(There is more than one side to the Chechens. People among whom they live—I speak from my experience in Kazakhstan— find them hard to get along with; they are rough and arrogant, and they do not conceal their dislike of Russians. But the men of Kengir only had to display independence and courage—and they immediately won the good will of the Chechens! When we feel that we are not sufficiently respected, we should ask ourselves whether we are living as we should.)

In the meantime the Technical Department was getting its notorious “secret” weapon ready. Let me describe it. Aluminum corner brackets for cattle troughs, produced in the workshops and awaiting dispatch, were packed with a mixture of sulfur scraped from matches and a little calcium carbide (every box of matches had been carried off to the room with the 100,000-volt door). When the sulfur was lit and the brackets thrown, they hissed and burst into little pieces.

But neither these star-crossed geniuses nor the field staff in the bathhouse were to choose the hour, place, and form of the decisive battle. Some two weeks after the beginning of the revolt, on one of those dark nights without a glimmer of light anywhere, thuds were heard at several places around the camp wall. This time it was not escaping prisoners or rebels battering it down; the wall was being demolished by the convoy troops themselves! There was commotion in the camp, as prisoners charged around with pikes and sabers, unable to make out what was happening and expecting an attack. But the troops did not take the offensive.

In the morning it turned out that the enemy without had made about a dozen breaches in the wall in addition to those already there and the barricaded gateway. (Machine-gun posts had been set up on the other side of the gaps, to prevent the zeks from pouring through them.)* [*The precedent is said to have been set by Norilsk; there, too, they made breaches in the wall, to lure out the fainthearted, who would be used to stir up the thieves, and so provide an excuse to introduce troops and restore order.] This was of course the preliminary for an assault through the breaches, and the camp was a seething anthill as it prepared to defend itself. The rebel staff decided to pull down the inner walls and the mud-brick outhouses and to erect a second circular wall of their own, specially reinforced with stacks of brick where it faced the gaps, to give protection against machine-gun bullets.

How things had changed! The troops were demolishing the boundary wall, the prisoners were rebuilding it, and the thieves were helping with a clear conscience, not feeling that they were contravening their code.

Additional defense posts now had to be established opposite the gaps, and every platoon assigned to a gap, which it must run to defend should the alarm be raised at night. Bangs on the buffer of a railroad car, and the usual whistles, were the agreed-upon alarm signals.

The zeks quite seriously prepared to advance against machine guns with pikes. Those who shied at the idea to begin with soon got used to it.

There was one attack in the daytime. Tommy-gunners were moved up to one of the gaps, opposite the balcony of the Steplag Administration Building, which was packed with important personages sheltering under broad army epaulets or the narrow ones of the Public Prosecutor’s department, and holding cameras or even movie cameras. The soldiers were in no hurry. They merely advanced just far enough into the breach for the alarm to be given, whereupon the rebel platoons responsible for the defense of the breach rushed out to man the barricade—brandishing their pikes and holding stones and mud bricks—and then, from the balcony, movie cameras whirred and pocket cameras clicked (taking care to keep the Tommy-gunners out of the picture). Disciplinary officers, prosecutors, Party officials, and all the rest of them—Party members to a man, of course—laughed at the bizarre spectacle of the impassioned savages with pikes. Well-fed and shameless, these grand personages mocked their starved and cheated fellow citizens from the balcony, and found it all very funny.* [* These photographs must still exist somewhere, gummed to reports on the punitive operation. Perhaps somebody will not be swift enough to destroy them before posterity sees them.]

Then warders, too, stole up to the gaps and tried to slip nooses with hooks over the prisoners, as though they were hunting wild animals or the abominable snowman, hoping to drag out a talker.

But what they mainly counted on now were deserters, rebels with cold feet. The radio blared away. Come to your senses! Leave the camp through the gaps in the wall! At those points we shall not fire! Those who come over will not be tried for mutiny!

The Commission’s response, over the camp radio, was this: Anybody who wants to run away can go right ahead, through the main gate if he likes; we are holding no one back!

One who did so was … a member of the Commission itself, former Major Makeyev, who walked up to the main guardhouse as though he had business there. (As though, not because they would have detained him, nor because they had the means of shooting him in the back—but because it is almost impossible to play the traitor with your comrades looking on and howling their contempt!)* [*Even ten years later he was so ashamed that in his memoirs, which were probably designed to serve as an apologia, he writes that he chanced to put his head out of the gate, where the other side pounced on him and tied his hands. . . .] For three weeks he had kept up a pretense; now at last he could give free rein to his defeatism, and his anger with the rebels for wanting the freedom which he, Makeyev, did not want. Now, working off his debts to the bosses, he broadcast an appeal to surrender, and reviled those who favored holding out longer. Here are some sentences from his own written account of this broadcast: “Somebody has decided that freedom can be won with the help of sabers and pikes. They want to expose to bullets people who won’t take their bits of iron. . . . We have been promised a review of our cases. The generals are patiently negotiating with us, but Sluchenkov regards this as a sign of weakness on their part. The Commission is a screen for gangster debauchery…. Conduct the negotiations in a manner worthy of political prisoners, and do not (!!) prepare for senseless resistance.”

The holes in the wall gaped for weeks; the wall had not remained whole so long while the revolt was on. And in all those weeks only about a dozen men fled from the camp.

Why? Surely the rest did not believe in victory. Were they not appalled by the thought of the punishment ahead? They were. Did they not want to save themselves for their families’ sake? They did! They were torn, and thousands of them perhaps had secretly considered this possibility. The invitation to the former juveniles had a firm legal base. But the social temperature on this plot of land had risen so high that if souls were not transmuted, they were purged of dross, and the sordid laws saying that “we only live once,” that being determines consciousness, and that every man’s a coward when his neck is at stake, ceased to apply for that short time in that circumscribed place. The laws of survival and of reason told people that they must all surrender together or flee individually, but they did not surrender and they did not flee! They rose to that spiritual plane from which executioners are told: “The devil take you for his own! Torture us! Savage us!”

And the operation, so beautifully planned, to make the prisoners scatter like rats through the gaps in the wall till only the most stubborn were left, who would then be crushed—this operation collapsed because its inventors had the mentality of rats themselves.

In the rebel wall newspaper, next to a drawing of a woman showing a child a pair of handcuffs in a glass case—”like the ones they kept your father in”—appeared a cartoon of the “Last Renegade” (a black cat running through one of the holes in the wall).

Cartoonists can always laugh, but the people in the camp had little to laugh about. The second, third, fourth, fifth week went by. . . . Something which, according to the laws of Gulag, could not last an hour had lasted for an incredibly, indeed an agonizingly long time—half of May and almost the whole of June. At first people were intoxicated with the joy of victory, with freedom, meetings, and schemes, then they believed the rumors that Rudnik had risen; perhaps Churbay-Nura, Spassk—all Steplag would follow. In no time at all Karaganda would rise! The whole Archipelago would erupt and fall in ash over the face of the land! But Rudnik put its hands behind its back, lowered its head, and reported as before for its eleven-hour shifts, contracting silicosis, with never a thought for Kengir, or even for itself.

No one supported the island of Kengir. It was impossible by now to take off into the wilderness: the garrison was being steadily reinforced; troops were under canvas out on the steppe. The whole camp had been encircled with a double barbed-wire fence outside the walls. There was only one rosy spot on the horizon: the lord and master (they were expecting Malenkov) was coming to dispense justice. He would come, kind man, and exclaim, and throw up his hands: “However could they live in such conditions? and why did you treat them like this? Put the murderers on trial! Shoot Chechev and Belyaev! Sack the rest….” But it was too tiny a spot, and too rosy.

They could not hope for pardon. All they could do was live out their last few days of freedom, and submit to Steplag’s vengeance.

There are always hearts which cannot stand the strain. Some were already morally crushed, and were in an agony of suspense for the crushing proper to begin. Some quietly calculated that they were not really involved, and need not be if they went on being careful. Some were newly married (what is more, with a proper religious ceremony—a Western Ukrainian girl, for instance, will not marry without one, and thanks to Gulag’s thoughtfulness, there were priests of all religions there). For these newlyweds the bitter and the sweet succeeded each other with a rapidity which ordinary people never experience in their slow lives. They observed each day as their last, and retribution delayed was a gift from heaven each morning.

The believers… prayed, and leaving the outcome of the Kengir revolt in God’s hands, were as always the calmest of people. Services for all religions were held in the mess hall according to a fixed timetable. The Jehovah’s Witnesses felt free to observe their rules strictly and refused to build fortifications or stand guard. They sat for hours on end with their heads together, saying nothing. (They were made to wash the dishes.) A prophet, genuine or sham, went around the camp putting crosses on bunks and foretelling the end of the world. Conveniently for him, a severe cold spell set in, of the sort that a shift in the wind sometimes brings to Kazakhstan even in summer. The old women he had gathered together sat, not very warmly dressed, on the cold ground shivering and stretching out their hands to heaven. Where else could they turn?

Some knew that they were fatally compromised and that the few days before the troops arrived were all that was left of life. The theme of all their thoughts and actions must be how to hold out longer. These people were not the unhappiest. (The unhappiest were those who were not involved and who prayed for the end.)

But when all these people gathered at meetings to decide whether to surrender or to hold on, they found themselves again in that heated climate where their personal opinions dissolved, and ceased to exist even for themselves. Or else they feared ridicule even more than the death that awaited them.

“Comrades,” the majestic Kuznetsov said confidently, as though he knew many secrets, and all to the advantage of the prisoners, “we have defensive firepower, and the enemy will suffer fifty percent of our own losses.”

He also said: “Even our destruction will not be in vain.”

(In this he was absolutely right.-The social temperature had its effect on him, too.)

And when they voted for or against holding out, the majority were for.

Then Sluchenkov gave an ominous warning. “Just remember, if anyone remains in our ranks now and wants to surrender later, we shall settle accounts with him five minutes before he gets there!”

One day the outside radio broadcast an “order of the day to Gulag”: for refusal to work, for sabotage, for this, that, and the other, the Kengir Camp Division of Steplag was to be disbanded and all prisoners sent to Magadan. (Clearly, the planet was getting too small for Gulag. And those who had been sent to Magadan previously—what were they there for?) One last chance to go back to work . . .

Once more their last chance ran out, and things were as before.

All was as it had been, and the dreamlike existence of these eight thousand men, suspended in midair, was rendered all the more startlingly improbable and strange by the regularity of the camp routine; fresh linen from the laundry; haircuts; clothes and shoes repaired. There were even conciliation courts for disputes. Even . . . even a release procedure!

Yes. The outside radio sometimes summoned prisoners due for release: these were either foreigners from some country which had earned the right to gather in its citizens, or else people whose sentence was (or was said to be?) nearing its end. Perhaps this was the administration’s way of picking up “tongues” without the use of warders’ ropes and hooks? The Commission sat on it, but had no means of verification, and let them all go.

Why did it drag on so long? What can the bosses have been waiting for? For the food to run out? They knew it would last a long time. Were they considering opinion in the settlement? They had no need to. Were they carefully working out their plan of repression? They could have been quicker about it. (True, it was learned later that they had sent for a “special purposes”—meaning punitive—regiment from somewhere around Karaganda. It’s a job not everyone can do.) Were they having to seek approval for the operation up top? How high up? There is no knowing on what date and at what level the decision was taken.

On several occasions the main gate of the service yard suddenly opened—perhaps to test the readiness of the defenders? The duty picket sounded the alarm, and the platoons poured out to meet the enemy. But no one entered the camp grounds.

The only field intelligence service the defenders had were the observers on the hut roofs. Their anticipations were based entirely on what the fence permitted them to see from the rooftops.

In the middle of June several tractors appeared in the settlement. They were working, shifting something perhaps, around the boundary fence. They began working even at night. These nocturnal tractor operations were baffling. Just in case, the prisoners started digging ditches opposite the gaps, as an additional defense. (They were all photographed or sketched from an observation plane.)

The unfriendly roar made the night seem blacker.

Then suddenly the skeptics were put to shame! And the defeatists! And all who had said that there would be no mercy, and that there was no point in begging. The orthodox alone could feel triumphant. On June 22 the outside radio announced that the prisoners’ demands had been accepted! A member of the Presidium of the Central Committee was on his way!

The rosy spot turned into a rosy sun, a rosy sky! It is, then, possible to get through to them! There is, then, justice in our country! They will give a little, and we will give a little. If it comes to it, we can walk about with number patches, and the bars on the windows needn’t bother us, we aren’t thinking of climbing out. You say they’re tricking us again? Well, they aren’t asking us to report for work beforehand!

Just as the touch of a stick will draw off the charge from an electroscope so that the agitated gold leaf sinks gratefully to rest, so did the radio announcement reduce the brooding tension of that last week.

Even the loathsome tractors, after working for a while on the evening of June 24, stopped their noise.

Prisoners could sleep peacefully on the fortieth night of the revolt. He would probably arrive tomorrow; perhaps he had come already.. . .* [*Perhaps he really had come? Perhaps it was he who had given the instructions?] Those short June nights are too short to have your sleep out, and you are fast asleep at dawn. It was like that summer thirteen years before.

In the early dawn of Friday, June 25, parachutes carrying flares opened out in the sky, more flares soared from the watchtowers, and the observers on the rooftops were picked off by snipers’ bullets before they could let out a squeak! Then cannon fire was heard! Airplanes skimmed the camp, spreading panic. Tanks, the famous T-34’s, had taken up position under cover of the tractor noise and now moved on the gaps from all sides. (One of them, however, fell into a ditch.) Some of the tanks dragged concatenations of barbed wire on trestles so that they could divide up the camp grounds immediately. Behind others ran helmeted assault troops with Tommy guns. (Both Tommy-gunners and tank crews had been given vodka first. However special the troops may be, it is easier to destroy unarmed and sleeping people with drink inside you.) Operators with walkie-talkies came in with the advancing troops. The generals went up into the towers with the snipers, and from there, in the daylight shed by the flares (and the light from a tower set on fire by the zeks with their incendiary bombs), gave their orders: “Take hut number so-and-so!… That’s where Kuznetsov is!” They did not hide in observation posts, as they usually do, because no bullets threatened them.* [*They only hid from history. Who were these war lords, so swift and so sure? Why has our country not saluted their glorious victory at Kengir? With some difficulty we can discover the names not of the most important there, but of some by no means unimportant: for instance, Colonel Ryazantsev, head of the Security Operations Section; Syomushkin, head of the Political Department of Steplag. …. Please help! Add to the list.]

From a distance, from their building sites, free workers watched the operation.

The camp woke up—frightened out of its wits. Some stayed where they were in their huts, lying on the floor as their one chance of survival, and because resistance seemed senseless. Others tried to make them get up and join in the resistance. Yet others ran right into the line of fire, either to fight or to seek a quicker death.

The Third Camp Division fought—the division which had started it all. (It consisted mainly of 58’s with a large majority of Banderists.) They hurled stones at the Tommy-gunners and warders, and probably sulfur bombs at the tanks…. Nobody thought of the powdered glass. One hut counterattacked twice, with shouts of “Hurrah.”

The tanks crushed everyone in their way. (Alia Presman, from Kiev, was run over—the tracks passed over her abdomen.) Tanks rode up onto the porches of huts and crushed people there (including two Estonian women, Ingrid Kivi and Makhlapa.)* [*In one of the tanks sat Nagibina, the camp doctor, drunk. She was there not to help but to watch-it was interesting.] The tanks grazed the sides of huts and crushed those who were clinging to them to escape the caterpillar tracks. Semyon Rak and his girl threw themselves under a tank clasped in each other’s arms and ended it that way. Tanks nosed into the thin board walls of the huts and even fired blank shells into them. Faina Epstein remembers the corner of a hut collapsing, as if in a nightmare, and a tank passing obliquely over the wreckage and over living bodies; women tried to jump and fling themselves out of the way: behind the tank came a lorry, and the half-naked women were tossed onto it.

The cannon shots were blank, but the Tommy guns were shooting live rounds, and the bayonets were cold steel. Women tried to shield men with their own bodies—and they, too, were bayoneted! Security Officer Belyaev shot two dozen people with his own hand that morning; when the battle was over he was seen putting knives into the hands of corpses for the photographer to take pictures of dead gangsters, Suprun, a member of the Commission, and a grandmother, died from a wound in her lung. Some prisoners hid in the latrines, and were riddled with bullets there.* [*Attention, Bertrand Russell and Jean-Paul Sartre, with your War Crimes Tribunal! Attention, philosophers. Here’s material for you! Why not hold a session? They can’t hear me.]

Kuznetsov was arrested in the bathhouse, his command post, and made to kneel. Sluchenkov was lifted high in the air with his hands tied behind his back and dashed to the ground (a favorite trick with the thieves).

Then the sound of shooting died away. There were shouts of “Come out of your huts; we won’t shoot.” Nor did they—they merely beat prisoners with their gun butts.

As groups of prisoners were taken, they were marched through the gaps onto the steppe and between files of Kengir convoy troops outside. They were searched and made to lie flat on their faces with their arms stretched straight out. As they lay there thus crucified, MVD fliers and warders walked among them to identify and pull out those whom they had spotted earlier from the air or from the watchtowers. (So busy were they with all this that no one had leisure to open Pravda that day. It had a special theme—a day in the life of our Motherland: the successes of steelworkers; more and more crops harvested by machine. The historian surveying our country as it was that day will have an easy task.)

Curious officers could now inspect the secrets of the service yard —see where the electric power had come from, and what “secret weapons” there were.

The victorious generals descended from the towers and went off to breakfast. Without knowing any of them, I feel confident that their appetite that June morning left nothing to be desired and that they drank deeply. An alcoholic hum would not in the least disturb the ideological harmony in their heads. And what they had for hearts was something installed with a screwdriver.

The number of those killed or wounded was about six hundred, according to the stories, but according to figures given by the Kengir Division’s Production Planning Section, which became known some months later, it was more than seven hundred.* [*On January 9, 1905, the number killed was about 100. In 1912, in the famous massacre on the Lena goldfields, which shocked all Russia, there were 270 killed and 250 wounded.] When they had crammed the camp hospital with wounded, they began taking them into town. (The free workers were informed that the troops had fired only blanks, and that prisoners had been killing each other.)

It was tempting to make the survivors dig the graves, but to prevent the story from spreading too far, this was done by troops. They buried three hundred in a corner of the camp, and the rest somewhere out on the steppe.

All day on June 25, the prisoners lay face down on the steppe in the sun (for days on end the heat had been unmerciful), while in the camp there was endless searching and breaking open and shaking out. Later bread and water were brought out onto the steppe. The officers had lists ready. They called the roll, put a tick by those who were still alive, gave them their bread ration, and consulting their lists, at once divided the prisoners into groups.

The members of the Commission and other suspects were locked up in the camp jail, which was no longer needed for sightseers. More than a thousand people were selected for dispatch either to closed prisons or to Kolyma (as always, these lists were drawn up partly by guesswork, so that many who had not been involved at all found their way into them).

May this picture of the pacification bring peace to the souls of those on whom the last chapters have grated. Hands off, keep away! No one will have to take refuge in the “safe deposit,” and the punitive squads will never face retribution!

On June 26, the prisoners were made to spend the whole day taking down the barricades and bricking in the gaps.

On June 27, they were marched out to work. Those trains in the sidings would wait no longer for working hands!

The tanks which had crushed Kengir traveled under their own power to Rudnik and crawled around for the zeks to see. And draw their conclusions . . .

The trial of the rebel leaders took place in autumn, 1955, in camera, of course, and indeed we know nothing much about it. . . . Kuznetsov, they say, was very sure of himself, and tried to prove that he had behaved impeccably and could have done no better. We do not know what sentences were passed. Sluchenkov, Mikhail Keller, and Knopkus were probably shot. I say probably because they certainly would have been shot earlier—but perhaps 1955 softened their fate?

Back in Kengir all was made ready for a life of honest toil. The bosses did not fail to create teams of shock workers from among yesterday’s rebels. The “self-financing” system flourished. Food stalls were busy, rubbishy films were shown. Warders and officers again sneaked into the service yard to have things made privately —a fishing reel, a money box—or to get the clasp mended on a lady’s handbag. The rebel shoemakers and tailors (Lithuanians and Western Ukrainians) made light, elegant boots for the bosses, and dresses for their wives. As of old, the zeks at the separating plant were ordered to strip lead from the cables and bring it back to the camp to be melted down for shot, so that the comrade officers could go hunting antelopes.

By now disarray had spread throughout the Archipelago and reached Kengir. Bars were not put back at the windows, huts were no longer locked. The “two-thirds” parole system was introduced, and there was even a quite unprecedented re-registration of 58’s —the half-dead were released.

The grass on graves is usually very thick and green.

In 1956 the camp area itself was liquidated. Local residents, exiles who had stayed on in Kengir, discovered where they were buried—and brought steppe tulips to put on their graves.

Whenever you pass the Dolgoruky monument, remember that it was unveiled during the Kengir revolt—and so has come to be in some sense a memorial to Kengir.

Source: Gulag Archipelago, 1918-1956: an experiment in literary investigation (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), Vol. 3, 285-331.

The “Zvezda” Affair

Andrei Zhdanov, On the Errors of the Soviet Literary Journals, ZVEZDA and LENINGRAD. August 20, 1946

 

Original Source: Kul’tura i zhizn’, 20 August 1946.

Comrades!

From the ruling of the Central Committee it is clear that the grossest error of the journal Zvezda is the opening of its pages to the literary “creations” of Zoshchenko and Akhmatova. I think there is no need for me to cite here the “work” of Zoshchenko, “Adventures of a Monkey.” Evidently you have all read it and know it better than I. The meaning of this “work” by Zoshchenko consists in this, that he depicts Soviet people as idlers and monsters, as silly and primitive people. Zoshchenko takes absolutely no interest in the labor of the Soviet people, their exertions and heroism, their high social and moral qualities. With him this theme is always absent. Zoshchenko, like the philistine and vulgarian that he is, chose as his permanent theme digging in the basest and pettiest sides of life. This digging in the trivialities of life is not accidental. It is characteristic of all vulgar philistine writers, and hence of Zoshchenko. Gorky said a lot about this in his time. You remember how at the congress of Soviet writers in 1934 Gorky branded–excuse my saying so–“men of letters” who see nothing beyond the soot in the kitchen and bathhouse.

For Zoshchenko “Adventures of a Monkey” is not something that goes beyond the framework of his usual writings. This “work” has come into the focus of criticism only as the clearest reflection of the whole negative tendency that exists in the “creative genius” of Zoshchenko. It is known that since the time of his return to Leningrad from evacuation Zoshchenko has written several things characterized by the fact that he is incapable of finding in the life of the Soviet people one positive phenomenon, one positive type. As in the “Adventures of a Monkey,” Zoshchenko is accustomed to mock at Soviet life. Soviet ways, Soviet people, covering this mockery with a mask of vacuous diversion and pointless humor.

/ If you read attentively and think over the story “Adventures of a Monkey” you will see that Zoshchenko casts the monkey in the role of supreme judge of our social customs and forces one to read something on the order of a moral lesson to the Soviet people. The monkey is presented as some sort of rational element, whose job is to evaluate the behavior of the people. Zoshchenko needed to give a deliberately deformed, caricatured and vulgar picture of the life of the Soviet people in order to insert in the mouth of the monkey the nasty, poisonous, anti-Soviet maxim to the effect that it is better to live in the zoo than at liberty, and that it is easier to breathe in a cage than among the Soviet people.

Is it possible to reach a lower stage of moral and political decline, and how can the people of Leningrad tolerate on the pages of their journals such filth and indecency?

If “works” of this sort are presented to Soviet readers by the journal Zvezda, how weak must be the vigilance of those citizens of Leningrad in the leadership of Zvezda for it to have been possible to place in this journal works that arc poisoned with the venom of zoological hostility to the Soviet order. Only the dregs of literature could produce such “works” and only blind and apolitical people could give them entry.

They say that Zoshchenko’s story went the rounds of the Leningrad platforms. How greatly must the leadership of ideological work in Leningrad have weakened for such things to have taken place!

Zoshchenko, with his loathsome moral, succeeded in penetrating to the pages of a big Leningrad journal, and in settling himself there with all the conveniences. And the journal Zvezda is an organ whose duty it is to educate our youth. But how can a journal reckon with this task, which gives shelter to such a vulgarian and un-Soviet writer as Zoshchenko? Can it be that Zoshchenko’s physiognomy is unknown to the editorial board of Zvezda?!

Yet, quite recently, in the beginning of 1944, Zoshchenko’s tale, “Before Sunrise,” written at the height of the liberation war of the Soviet people against the German invaders, was subjected to sharp criticism in the journal Bolshevik. In this tale Zoshchenko turned his vulgar and mean little soul inside out, doing so with delight, with relish, with the desire to show every one: look, sec what a hooligan I am.

It would be hard to find in our literature anything more repulsive than the “moral” preached by Zoshchenko in “Before Sunrise,” which depicts people and himself as vile, lewd beasts without shame or conscience. And this moral he presented to Soviet readers in that period when our people were pouring out their blood in a war of unheard of difficulty, when the life of the Soviet state hung by a hair, when the Soviet people endured countless sacrifices in the name of victory over the Germans. But Zoshchenko, having dug himself in Alma-Ata, deep in the rear, did nothing at that time to help the Soviet people in its struggle with the German invaders. With complete justice Zoshchenko was publicly spanked in the Bolshevik as a libeler and vulgarian alien to Soviet literature. He spat on public opinion then, and here, before two years have passed, before the ink with which the Bolshevik review was written has dried, the same Zoshchenko makes his triumphal entry into Leningrad and begins strolling freely in the pages of Leningrad journals. Not only Zvezda, but the journal Leningrad also prints him eagerly. They eagerly and readily present him with theatrical auditoriums. More than that, they give him the opportunity to occupy a leading position in the Leningrad division of the Writers’ Union and play an active role in the literary affairs of Leningrad. On what basis do you allow Zoshchenko to stroll in the gardens and parks of Leningrad literature? Why have the party activists of Leningrad, its writers’ organization permitted these shameful things?

The thoroughly rotten and corrupt sociopolitical and literary physiognomy of Zoshchenko was not formed in the most recent period. His contemporary “works” are by no means an accident. They are only the continuation of that whole literary “heritage” of Zoshchenko which takes its start in the 1920^.

Who was Zoshchenko in the past? He, was one of the organizers of the literary group of the so-called “Serapion brothers.” What was the sociopolitical physiognomy of Zoshchenko in the period of organizing the “Serapion brothers”? Permit me to turn to the journal LITERATURNYE ZAPISKI No. 3 for 1922, in which the founders of this group set forth their credo. Among other revelations, there also in a piece called “About Myself and About Something Else.”

Feeling no constraint before anyone or anything Zoshchenko strips publicly and quite frankly expresses his political, literary “views.” Listen to what he said there:

In general it is very troublesome to be a writer. Let us say, that ideology … Nowadays a writer is required to have an ideology … such a nuisance, really, to me …

What sort of an “exact ideology” can I have, you will say, if not one party attracts me as a whole?

From the point of view of party people I am an unprincipled man. All right. I myself shall speak for myself:

I am not a Communist, not an S.R., not a monarchist, but simply a Russian and furthermore a politically immoral one …

I give you my honest word–I don’t know to this day, well, here, let’s say, Guchkov … what party is Guchkov in? The devil knows what party he’s in. I know; he’s not a Bolshevik, but whether he is an S.R. or a Cadet–I don’t know and I don’t want to know. Etc., etc.

What will you say, comrades, of such an “ideology”? Twenty-five years have passed since Zoshchenko published this “confession” of his. Has he changed since then? Not noticeably. During two and a half decades not only has he not learned anything and not only has he not changed in any way, but, on the contrary, with cynical frankness he continues to remain a preacher of ideological emptiness and vulgarity, an unprincipled and conscienceless literary hooligan. This means that now, as then, Zoshchenko does not like Soviet ways, Now, as then, he is alien, and hostile to Soviet Literature if, with all this, Zoshchenko has become practically the coryphaeus of literature in Leningrad if he is exalted in the Leningrad Parnassus, then one can only be amazed at the lack of principle, looseness, slackness and unsqueamishness achieved by the people who pave the way for Zoshchenko and sing eulogies to him. Permit me to bring in another illustration of the physiognomy of the so-called “Serapion brothers.” In the same LITERATURNYE ZAPISKI No. 3 for 1922, another Serapionist, Lev Lunts, also tries to provide an ideological grounding for that tendency” harmful and alien to Soviet literature, which the “Serapion brothers” group represented. Lunts writes:

We have gathered in days of revolutionary, in days of powerful political tension. “He who is not with us is against us!”–we are told from right and left–whom are you with, Serapion brothers–with the Communists or against the Communists, for the revolution or against the revolution? Whom are we with, Serapion brothers? We arc with the hermit Serapion. Too long and painfully has public opinion ruled Russian literature …, . We do not want utilitarianism. We do not write for propaganda. Art is real, like life itself, and like life itself, it is without purpose and without meaning, it exists because it cannot not exist.

Such is the role which the “Serapion brothers” relegate to art, taking from it its ideological content, its social significance, proclaiming the ideological emptiness of art, art for -art’s sake, art without purpose and without meaning. This is indeed the preachment of rotten apoliticism, philistinism and vulgarity. What conclusion follows from this? If Zoshchenko docs not like Soviet ways, what is your bidding: that one adapt himself to Zoshchenko? It is not up to us to reconstruct our tastes. It is not up to us to reconstruct our way of life and our social order for Zoshchenko. Let him reform. But he does not want to reform–let him get out of Soviet literature. In Soviet literature there is no place for rotten, empty, un-ideological and vulgar works. ã This then was the point of departure of the Central Committee in adopting its decision on the journals Zvezda and Leningrad.

The bourgeois world is not pleased by our successes both within our country and in the international arena. As a result of the second world war the positions of socialism have been fortified. The question of socialism has been placed on the order of the day in many European countries. This displeases imperialists of all hues; they arc afraid of socialism, afraid of our socialist country, which is a model for the whole of advanced humanity. The imperialists and their ideological henchmen, their writers and journalists, their politicians and ‘ diplomats strive in every way to slander our country, to present it in a wrong light, to slander socialism. In these conditions the task of Soviet literature is not only to reply, blow for blow, to all this base slander and the attacks on our Soviet culture, on socialism, but also boldly to lash and attack bourgeois culture, which is in a state of stagnation and corruption.

However outwardly beautiful the form that clothes the creations of the fashionable modern bourgeois western European and American writers, and also film and theatrical producers, still they cannot rescue or raise up their bourgeois culture, for its moral foundation is rotten and baneful, for this culture has been put at the service of private capitalist property, at the service of the egoistic, selfish interests of the bourgeois upper layers of society. The whole host of bourgeois writers, film and theatrical producers is striving to distract the attention of the advanced layers in society from the acute questions of the political and social struggle and divert their attention into the channel of vulgar ideologically empty literature and art, replete with gangsters, chorus girls, eulogies of adultery and of the doings of all sorts of adventurers and rogues.

Does it become us, representatives of advanced Soviet culture, Soviet patriots, to play the role of worshipers of bourgeois culture or the role of pupils?! Certainly our literature, which reflects a social order higher than any bourgeois democratic order and a culture many times higher than bourgeois culture, has the right to teach others a new universal morality. Where do you find a people and a country like ours? Where do you find such magnificent qualities in people as our people displayed in the Great Patriotic War and as they display every day in their labors of transition to peacetime development and restoration of their economy and culture? Every day raises our people higher and higher. Today we are not what we were yesterday, and tomorrow we will not be what we are today. We are already not the same Russians we were before 1917, and our Russia is different, and our character. We have changed and grown together with the great transformations that have radically altered the face of our country.

To exhibit these new high qualities of the Soviet people, to exhibit our people not only as it is today, but also to give a glimpse of its tomorrow, to help illumine with a searchlight the road ahead–such is the task of every conscientious Soviet writer. The writer cannot jog along at the tail of events, he must march in the forward ranks of the people, pointing out to them their path of development. Guided by the method of socialist realism, conscientiously and attentively studying our reality, striving to penetrate deeper into the essence of the processes of our development, the writer must educate the people and arm it ideologically. While selecting the best feelings and qualities of the Soviet man and revealing his tomorrow, we must at the same time show our people what they must not be, we must castigate the remnants of yesterday, remnants that hinder the Soviet people in their forward march. Soviet writers must help the people, the state, and the party to educate our youth to be cheerful and confident of their own strength, unafraid of any difficulties.

No matter how bourgeois politicians and writers strive to conceal from their own peoples the truth about the achievements of the Soviet order and Soviet culture, no matter how they try to erect an iron curtain, through which it would be impossible for the truth about the Soviet Union to penetrate abroad, no matter how they endeavor to belittle the actual growth and dimensions of Soviet culture–all these attempts are doomed to collapse. We know very well the power and advantage of our culture. Suffice it to recall the stunning successes of our cultural delegations abroad, our physical culture parade, etc. Is it for us to bow low before every foreignism or occupy a position of passive defense?

If the feudal social order and then the bourgeoisie in the period of their flowering could create an art and a literature that affirmed the establishment of the new order and hymned its flowering, then we, who represent a new, socialist order, the embodiment of all the best in the history of human civilization and culture, are all the more in a position to create the most advanced literature in the world, which will leave far behind the best examples of the creative genius of former times. Comrades, what does the Central Committee want and demand? The Central Committee of the party wants the Leningrad activists and the Leningrad writers to understand well that the time has come when it is necessary to raise our ideological work to a high level. The young Soviet generation is faced with the task of intensifying the power and might of the Socialist Soviet order, of fully utilizing the motive forces of Soviet society for a new, unheard of blossoming of our well being and culture. For these great tasks the young generation must be educated to be steadfast, cheerful, unafraid of obstacles, ready to meet these obstacles and overcome them. Our people must be educated people of a high ideological level, with high cultural and moral demands and tastes. To this end our literature, our journals must not stand aside from the tasks of contemporary life, but must help the party and the people

Soviet writers and all our ideological workers are today posted in the advanced line of fire, for in conditions of peaceful development there is no reduction, but on the contrary, there is an expansion of the tasks of the ideological front and principally of literature. The people, the state, the party want, not the withdrawal of literature from contemporary life, but its active invasion into all aspects of Soviet existence. Bolsheviks value literature highly. They see clearly its great historical mission and role in the strengthening of the moral and political unity of the people, in the welding and education of the people. The Central Committee of the Party wants us to have an abundance of spiritual culture, for in this wealth of culture it sees one of the main tasks of socialism.

The Central Committee of the Party is confident that the Leningrad detachment of Soviet literature is morally and politically healthy and will speedily correct its errors and occupy its proper place in the ranks of Soviet literature.

The Central Committee is confident that the shortcomings in the work of the Leningrad writers will be overcome and that the ideological work of the Leningrad party organization will, in the shortest period, be raised to the height that is required today in the interests of the party, the people, the state.

Source: Andrei Zhdanov, Essays on Literature, Philosophy, and Music (New York: International Publishers, 1950), pp. 15-45 (excerpts).

 

Antipatriotic Acts

I. Laptev, Antipatriotic Acts Under the Guise of ‘Scientific’ Criticism. September 2, 1947

 

Original Source: Pravda, 2 September 1947.

Certain English and American journals with pretentious scientific names have been carrying in recent years a wrathful, slanderous, and completely unscientific propaganda against progressive Soviet biological science. The February issue of the English journal Discovery contains an article, “Revolution in Soviet Science” by a scientific reactionary, C. D. Darlington. This member of the Royal Society has seen fit, by a single stroke of the pen, to liquidate Russian biological science, just as the fascist politicians have in, their time “abolished,” on paper, the Soviet Union, transforming it into a … “geographic concept.” Darlington has maliciously declared that Timiriazev’s discoveries “are nothing but the requirements of William of Occam,” of a medieval scholastic. Darlington calls Michurin “an importer of plants” from Canada and USA. He attacks T. D. Lysenko in the same style.

The slanderous article of Darlington has provoked a justified resentment among English scientists. Angry letters with sharp protests against this article, against the despicable slanderous attacks on Soviet scientists, poured into the editorial office of Discovery. H. G. Creighton wrote about the article of Darlington: “the political irritation and the vindictive anticommunist and anti-Soviet wrath have blinded his objectivity and have led him to some very unscientific arguments against Lysenko.” Another American scientist, M. Hamilton, declared to the editor that, “a disagreement in the field of genetics cannot serve as a justification for dirty political insinuations,” and that Darlington has pleased by his articles only those who “in the depth of their soul hate science and all that it has given and gives to mankind.”

One can add nothing to these truthful and objective evaluations of Darlington’s article. They clearly show the inner motivation of the attacks on Lysenko and other Soviet biological scientists.

Darlington is seconded in USA by a certain Professor Karl Sax, who is angered by a mere mention of dialectic materialism and its application in the field of genetics. He is displeased especially because Soviet scientists consider fideism, i.e., the “doctrine” which replaces knowledge by faith, to be foolishness. He endorses the racists demagogic assertions well known to the Soviet people, that our country is “totalitarian” and that biological science in it is “suppressed.”

Karl Sax’s effort appears in the American journal Science. It is notable that in USA, as well as in England, a series of scientists have protested against Sax’s reactionary political insinuations. Dunn, a professor of Columbia University, in his reply to K. Sax in the same journal declared: “The progress of the biological research in the Soviet Union gives us a very valuable lesson. Great individuals have arisen in Soviet biology, valuable discoveries have been made and continue to be made now in the midst of war” (Science,1944, No. 2561, p. 67).

J. Somerville, an American scientist who attended the discussion of the problems of genetics in USSR in 1939, wrote: “So long as representatives of the state act according to the principles of dialectic materialism, there can be no question of scientific conclusions made under dictation, or of an artificial limitation of scientific activity. The dialectic materialism is a philosophic doctrine which not only does not hold science in contempt but considers it the basic source of its own principles” (Philosophy of Science, 1945, Vol. 12, No. I).

In the light of all this, a feeling of deep indignation is provoked by the debut of A. Zhebrak, a member of the Belorussian Academy of Sciences, on the pages of the journal Science with an anti-patriotic article, “Soviet Biology,” directed against progressive Soviet biological science.

One could expect that the Soviet scientist, A. Zhebrak, would stand against the dirty slander on Soviet science made by reactionary English and American “scientists,” such attacks on Soviet science as, according to the justified remark of the English biologist Haldane, came in the past “from Hitler’s friends.” Unfortunately, we see the exact opposite. Under the guise of polemics with Professor Sax, A. Zhebrak has completely adopted the latter’s stand. Together with the most reactionary foreign scientists, he humiliates and defames our progressive Soviet biological science and its eminent modern representative, Academician T. D. Lysenko.

First of all, A. Zhebrak has completely misrepresented Soviet biological science before the American reader. In dealing with problems of plant physiology, genetics, and selection, he has deliberately omitted to mention such leaders of science as Timiriazev, Michurin, and Williams, whose work is the basis of that of the modern Soviet investigators in this field. Not a word is said about such world-renowned scientific institutions as Lenin’s All-Soviet Academy of Agricultural Sciences, the Institute of Genetics of the Academy of Sciences of USSR, and others.

Solidarity with the reactionary K. Sax is undignified for a Soviet scientist, A. Zhebrak. Writes A. Zhebrak: “Unfortunately, Professor Sax … regards modern biology, and particularly genetics, as synonymous with the name of the academician Lysenko. In criticizing the mistaken views of Lysenko, he apparently holds the opinion that he criticizes not only the academician Lysenko but also the very basis of Soviet biology and the relation of the Soviet government to science.”

One must have lost the feeling of patriotism and of scientific honesty to declare that a scientist known to the whole world, a pioneer in the field of genetics, academician Lysenko, has no relation to Soviet biology … What a feeling of patriotic indignation will be the answer to this of every Soviet peasant, every writer in socialist agriculture, who for a number of years has been getting good harvests on the basis of scientific methods developed by T. D. Lysenko!

A. Zhebrak has needed this in order that, having given over the Soviet scientist T. D. Lysenko for the amusement of the corrupt capitalist press, he might represent himself a devoted ally of Darlingtons, Saxes and their like, who chose to “criticize” T. D. Lysenko in order to fight for reactionary idealism against dialectic materialism.

The political meaning of this fight is obvious to everyone. Reactionary biologists know it well. None other than Robert Simpson, in an article. directed against Lysenko and entitled “Science-According to the Totalitarian Model,” has declared, “The dual role of Lysenko in politics and science calls for a fearless inquiry by scientific men into the dangers of science becoming subservient to the state … It’s time to break a few lances.” Simpson is worried because the Soviet land has found methods to get an abundance of grain, milk, meat, wool, and fur. He is worried because capitalism is unable to give this abundance to the people.

Zhebrak, as a Soviet scientist, ought to have unmasked the class meaning of the struggle taking place in connection with problems of genetics. But, blinded by bourgeois prejudices, by a contemptible subservience to bourgeois science, he has adopted the view of the enemy camp. To please this camp, he has dishonored representatives of Russian science in a foreign journal which specializes in maligning Soviet scientists. For A. Zhebrak there exists such a thing as “pure science.” Zhebrak writes: “together with American scientists, we, working in the same field of science in Russia, are building a general biology on a worldwide scale.”

So, this is the source of the anti-patriotism of this “scientist”! So, neither does progressive Soviet biological science exist in nature, nor is there a reactionary idealistic biology. So, there exists only a single biology “on a world-wide scale.” This explains the alliance of Zhebrak with Darlington, Sax, and other obscurantists of the reactionary capitalistic camp.

A national exclusiveness is remote from Soviet scientists. In their investigations, they generalize everything progressive which is given by the foremost scientists of foreign lands. They develop science on the basis of comradely criticism and self-criticism. They are imbued with the spirit of life-giving Soviet patriotism, the spirit of Soviet national pride in their science, science which develops on the only solid foundation, dialectic materialism-science which serves the interests of the people. A Soviet scientist is proud to wage an unrelenting struggle with that “science” which is profoundly inimical to dialectic materialism, which serves not the people but the fooling of people, and the strengthening of the power of exploiters.

The antipatriotic act of A. Zhebrak is aggravated by a personal attack on the academician T. D. Lysenko. With a petit. bourgeois impertinence, he declares on the pages of an American journal that academician Lysenko was rewarded by the government “not for his opinions or experiments in the field of genetics” but only “for his work in the field of agricultural practices.” Knowingly misrepresenting the orders of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of USSR regarding the bestowal of high government rewards on the academician Lysenko for eminent scientific attainments, for theoretical scientific works, which have a first-rate importance in the practice of socialist construction, A. Zhebrak is calumniating Soviet science by this dishonest declaration. More than that, he makes the absurd assertion that the work of academician Lysenko ” … founded in reality on naive and purely speculative conclusions, is unable to interfere with successful development of genetics in USSR.” It follows that, according to Zhebrak, Lysenko acts as a brake on progressive development of genetics! A. Zhebrak has gone too far.

How disgusting is the role of Zhebrak in taking it upon himself to please the reactionaries of the whole world by defamation of his compatriot scientist in the pages of a foreign journal inimical to us! Only a man who has lost all sense of social duty could take such a step.

One could close the discussion of this antipatriotic attack by Zhebrak, but we have before us another issue of the American journal Science, Vol. 105, No. 2718, for 1947. It has an article by N. P. Dubinin (Institute of Experimental Biology of the Academy of Sciences of USSR), entitled “The work of Soviet biologists: theoretical genetics.”

First of all, one is put on one’s guard by the fact that this journal, inimically disposed toward Soviet biologists, gives a front place to Dubinin’s article. But the answer comes easily. All the founders of Soviet biology are ignored in the article. Whom does Dubinin regard as Soviet biologists? It happens that here are lauded such “Soviet biologists” as Dobzhanskii, Timofeev-Rezovskii–open enemies of the Soviet people.

Dobzhanskii, for example, is now working in USA in the field of slander against Soviet biologists and “creates the style” in this anti-Soviet campaign. With a feeling of loathing and indignation one reads further in this article praises for a series of similar personages. The whole Michurin trend in biology is ignored by Dubinin. Every Soviet biologist will resolutely rise against such an obviously wrong, clearly antipatriotic, representation of Soviet biology.

What do the above facts mean? They mean that a certain backward part of our Soviet intelligentsia still carries a slavish servility for bourgeois science, which is profoundly foreign to Soviet patriotism. We are proud of our country, of victorious socialism, and of our progressive Soviet science. It is necessary to pull out decisively and pitilessly the rotten roots of obsequiousness and slavishness toward bourgeois culture. Only in such a way can one accomplish successfully the great task set before Soviet science by Comrade Stalin, namely, to exceed in the briefest possible time the attainments of science in foreign lands.

To the court of public opinion with those who act as a brake on the accomplishment of this task, those who defame our progressive Soviet science by their antipatriotic acts!

Source: Journal of Heredity (1948), Vol. 39, pp. 19-21.