Bolshevik Central Committee, Meeting. November 5, 1917

Original Source: From the archives of the Central Committee.

Present: Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky, Stalin, Sverdlov, Uritskii, Dzerzhinskii, Kollontai, Bubnov, Sokolnikov, Lomov.

Chairman: Sverdlov.

Order of Business: 1. Rumanian front. 2. Lithuanians. 3. Minsk and northern front. 4. Present situation. 5. Resolution

1. RUMANIAN FRONT

Report submitted by Sverdlov. On the Rumanian front a conference of Social-Democrats of all shades took place. A mixed list was prepared. Submitted to the Central Committee (united). Was approved. They ask what the attitude of our Central Committee is on this. Out of 20 candidates 4 Bolsheviks were put up.

Decided: taking into consideration the decision of the Congress, no blocs are permitted.

2. LITHUANIANS

Report by Sverdlov.

The Lithuanians had a conference in Minsk, where, it appeared, defensists frequently speak in 'the name of the party. In order to counteract this practice, it was decided to elect a temporary center which is to put itself, as well as the entire conference, under the banner of the Bolsheviks. This center should be confirmed.

Comrade Lomov thinks it should be confirmed. But attention should be called to the fact that defensist organizations were also present.

The temporary bureau is approved.

3. MINSK AND NORTHERN FRONT

Report by Sverdlov.

Representatives of several armies of the northern front came and stated that on that front some shady affair is being prepared with regard to the evacuation of the troops into the interior.

It is reported from Minsk that a new Kornilov affair is in preparation there. Because of the character of the garrison Minsk is surrounded by Cossack detachments. There are some negotiations of a suspicious nature going on between the staff and headquarters. Agitation is being conducted among the Ossetians and several parts of the army against the Bolsheviks. At the front, however, sentiment is for the Bolsheviks. They will follow them against Kerenskii. There are no documents at all. They can be obtained by seizing the staff, which is technically altogether possible in Minsk; in that case the local garrison can disarm all the troops around. All the artillery has been driven into the Pinsk marshes. A corps can be sent from Minsk to Petrograd.

4. PRESENT SITUATION

Lenin takes the floor.

He states that since the beginning of September a certain indifference toward the question of uprising has been noted. He says that this is inadmissible, if we earnestly raise the slogan of seizure of power by the Soviets. It is, therefore, high time to turn attention to the technical side of the question. Much time has obviously been lost.

Nevertheless the question is very urgent and the decisive moment is near.

The international situation is such that we must take the initiative.

What is being planned, surrendering as far as Narva and even as far as Petrograd, compels us still more to take decisive action..

The political situation is also effectively working in this direction, On July 16-18, decisive action on our part would have been defeated because we had no majority with us. Since then, our upsurge has been making gigantic strides.

The absenteeism and the indifference of the masses can be explained by the fact that the masses are tired of words and resolutions.

The majority is now with us. Politically, the situation has become entirely ripe for the transfer of power.

The agrarian movement also goes in this direction, for it is clear that enormous efforts are needed to subdue this movement. The slogan of transferring the entire land has become the general slogan of the peasants. The political background is thus ready. It is necessary to speak of the technical side. This is the whole matter. Meanwhile we, together with the defensists, are inclined to consider a systematic preparation for an uprising as something like a political sin.

To wait for the Constituent Assembly, which will obviously not be for us, is senseless, because it would make our task more complex.

We must utilize the regional congress and the proposal from Minsk to begin decisive action.

Comrade Lomov takes the floor, giving information concerning the attitude of the Moscow Regional Bureau and the Moscow Committee, as well as about the situation in Moscow in general.

Comrade Uritskii states that we are weak not only in a technical sense but also in all other spheres of our work.. We have carried a mass of resolutions. Actions, none whatever. The Petrograd Soviet is disorganized, few meetings, etc.

On what forces do we base ourselves?

The workers in Petrograd have 40,000 rifles, but this will not decide the issue; this is nothing.

The garrison after the July days cannot inspire great hopes. However, in any case, if the course is held for an uprising, then it is really necessary to do something in that direction. We must make up our mind with regard to definite action.

Comrade Sverdlov gives information concerning what he knows about the state of affairs throughout Russia.

Comrade Dzerzhinskii proposes that for the purpose of political guidance during the immediate future, a Political Bureau be created, composed of members of the Central Committee.

After an exchange of opinion, the proposal is carried. A Political Bureau of seven is created.

A resolution was accepted, reading as follows [see Resolution below]

Ten express themselves for it, and two against.

The question is then raised of establishing a Political Bureau of the CC It is decided to form a bureau of seven: Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky, Stalin, Sokolnikov, Bubnov.

Resolution

The Central Committee recognizes that the International situation of the Russian Revolution (the mutiny in the navy in. Germany as the extreme manifestation of the growth in all of Europe of the world-wide Socialist revolution; the threat of a peace between the imperialists with the aim of crushing the revolution in Russia) as -well as the military situation (the undoubted decision of the Russian bourgeoisie and of Kerenskii and Co. to surrender Petrograd to the Germans) and the fact that the proletarian parties have gained a majority in the Soviets; all this, coupled with the peasant uprising and with a shift of the people's confidence towards our party (elections in Moscow) ; finally, the obvious preparation for a second Kornilov affair (the withdrawal of troops from Petrograd; the bringing of Cossacks to Petrograd; the surrounding of Minsk by Cossacks, etc.)-places the armed uprising on the order of the day.

Recognizing thus that an armed uprising is inevitable and the time perfectly ripe, the Central Committee proposes to all the organizations of the party to act accordingly and to discuss and decide from this point of view all the practical questions (the Congress of the Soviets of the northern region, the withdrawal of troops from Petrograd, the actions in Moscow and in Minsk, etc.).

Source: V. I. Lenin, Toward the Seizure of Power. The Revolution of 1917, from the July Days to the October Revolution (New York: International Publishers, 1932), Vol. II, pp. 326-28.