V. Obolenskii-Osinskii, How We Got Control of the State Bank. November 6, 1918

Original Source: Ekonomicheskaia zhizn', No. 1, 6 November 1918.

The Paris Commune is generally blamed for not having taken possession of the French National Bank. The Soviet Government did not repeat this mistake. Already during November 1917, the Russian State Bank, which had regulated the money circulation and which had been a pivot of the entire banking system--i.e., was the bank of all banks--was seized and made subordinate to the proletarian government.

It so happened that I was to take part in this peculiar episode during the November days ...

The Soviet of People's Commissars insisted upon a complete subordination of the bank and a transfer of ten million rubles which were required for urgent operations. The personnel of the bank, together with its manager, Shipov, refused to recognize the Soviet Government: they insisted upon "autonomy" in their work and refused to transfer the money. This was the argument of these gentlemen: "In conformity with the regulations of the bank, the money of the bank cannot be used for the needs of the state. If the Soviet of People's Commissars needs money it must arrange that a special assignment be officially granted to it; that is, that a special order be issued by the State Treasury transferring ten million rubles from the treasury's account to the account of the Soviet of People's Commissars. Only then can the money be transferred. Such an order of procedure is required by the existing bank regulations and if the latter are not followed, the bank's machinery is bound to collapse."

After prolonged negotiations, Comrade Menzhinskii (then Commissar of Finance) made an attempt to seize the money from the bank and to compel the clerks by armed force to issue the ten million rubles. A detachment of sailors and soldiers accompanied by a hand and beaded by Muraviev approached the bank. But as a result of this "parade" the minor employees and the guard of the bank, who had previously been on the side of the Soviet Government, remonstrated, fearing that the bank would be tooted. In order to avoid a strike of all bank employees, it was necessary "to withdraw" the detachment.

It was then decided to change our tactics and to try to break tip the sabotage from within. Shipov was dismissed and the writer was appointed commissar of the bank with the duties of manager. At the same time and upon the advice of some of the higher officials of the bank (these latter expressed a more or less conciliatory attitude toward the Soviet Government in contrast to the junior clerks, who were absolutely irreconcilable and hostile) a decree was prepared which ordered the bank authorities to transfer ten million rubles from the account of the State Treasury to the Soviet of People's Commissars without waiting for an official order regarding this transfer from the Department of the State Treasury. In this way it was hoped to avoid breaking the bank regulations and the accepted order of procedure.

On November 24 or 25 Comrades Menzhinskii, Axelrod (Menzhinskii's assistant), Smirnov, and I came to the bank with this decree. Shipov was not there, but mysterious whispering and exchanges of glances went on among the personnel. --Menzhinskii handed over the decree to one of Shipov's assistants. The latter refused to comply with it and, pleading ill health, asked to be dismissed from his post. The second assistant also refused, without giving any ground for his refusal. Yet on the previous day these two men had recommended that we adopt this plan in order to settle the conflict. They were both dismissed on the same day.

Directly after the conversation with Shipov's assistants the directors of the various departments of the bank were called to the office of the new manager of the bank and were told to appear the next morning at 10: 00 A.M. with their reports. This invitation was received with irony by some, and with apparent misgiving by others. In reply they read a written declaration in which they stated that they continued to refuse to recognize the Soviet Government and insisted upon noninterference in the affairs of the bank and the removal from it of "outsiders."

It was evident that the strike could not be avoided. In the evening we gathered new forces and first of all brought into our "fighting group" Comrade Piatakov, who had just arrived from Kiev. Piatakov was immediately appointed assistant manager of the bank.

When we came to the bank next morning it reminded us of a desert. All officials, except four or five men, were on strike ... The Junior clerks, such as accountants, ... came to work but were unable to proceed by themselves. All messengers and caretakers were at their posts also.

Our position was exceedingly difficult.. There were people among us who were acquainted with the banking system from books and manuals, we had specialists in the theory of the banking system (Piatakov), and we found later former employees of private banks (Comrade Solovei), but there was not a single man among us who knew the technical procedure ... of the Russian State Bank.

We took possession of an enormous machinery, the working of which was practically unknown to us. How the work was carried on, where things were to be found, what were the basic parts of the business machinery-all these were a closed book to us. We entered the enormous corridors of this bank as if we were penetrating a virgin forest ...

We gathered in the center of the huge, empty building, in Shipov's office, and started our preliminary and feverish work. First of all we appointed some of our number to conduct negotiations with the accountants and to find out the particular responsibility of each and every employee. Then we immediately sent messengers to workers' organizations, hospital insurance boards, etc., asking them "to lend" us their bookkeepers and other workers who NA, ere acquainted with the mechanism of banking. We also searched for workers among the Soviet and party organizations and found many.

Having acquainted ourselves with the position of the various offices in the bank, its divisions, and the staff of higher officials, we proceeded to seize the most important strategic points and "to capture" the responsible members of the personnel.

Our first task was to get hold of the cash office of the bank and, therefore, our first captives were to be the custodians of the keys of the cash office and the seals of the bank with which the locks were stamped. The first day we did not know even how many repositories there were in the bank, how many keys existed, and who took charge of them. Lenin with his typical capacity for seizing the bull by the horns told us on the first day that as long as we did not get the keys of the vaults, we were merely talking about the seizure of the bank.

On the second day of the strike we 'got hold of the custodians of the keys and seals from the main cash office, that is, the manager of the Petersburg Office of the bank, a wicked member of the Black Hundred; the head cashier, Zheleznov; and the head bookkeeper, Kirov. We brought these men to the bank under a guard of a special detachment of sailors whom we had at our disposal. We questioned them and offered to allow them to resume work, but received a negative answer. We then demanded the surrender of the keys and threatened the men with arrest. The keys were handed over, and on the third day of the strike the cash office was triumphantly opened in presence of its keepers both old and new. In a similar manner the officials who took charge of the main vault of the bank (the vault was even more important than the cash office) were also brought to the bank and made to surrender the keys. Some of these employees consented to work for us and rendered us considerable assistance.

On the same evening the keys to the bank's millions were brought to Smolnyi and solemnly emptied from a special chamois bag on the table before Lenin. Lenin, however, was not satisfied with our first step and demanded from us money and not the keys ...

Under such difficulties we could not even think of issuing money to the Soviet of People's Commissars during the first two or three days. We had to delay this operation all the more because the accountants who worked for us were as yet far from firm in their sympathies with the Soviet Government. Some of them worked simply from the sense of professional duty; they considered the bank to be a necessary public institution, similar to that of water supply, sewerage, and so forth. We could, of course, obtain the money by force (we were now in possession of the keys), but such "expropriation" might have offended the professional feelings of the accountants and caused a strike among them.

However, three days after the opening of the cash office and less than a week after the removal of Shipov and Co., money was issued to the Soviet of People's Commissars.

As far as the formal side of the matter was concerned, we used the same method to which we had resorted when cashing the treasury orders. The decree of the Soviet of People's Commissars was put in the cash box and five million rubles were taken out. As far as we were concerned the operation in no way differed from the method applied to the treasury orders. But for the accountants of the main cash office and for the newly appointed "head cashier" our action appeared to be equivalent to expropriation. We had to strain our patience to the utmost it) order to make the cashier enter this issue of money in the ledger and to make the accountants actually count the money in a steel room and bring it from there on a little pushcart to the cash office. I remember that during this procedure, which was accompanied by grumbling on the part of the accountants, I lost my head, ran downstairs to get the guard of Semenovskii Regiment ready "to exercise its influence." At last the money was brought to the cash office. Comrade Gorbunov, the Secretary of the Soviet of People's Commissars, began to count it. The time seemed to drag on terribly. There was no guard, and angry murmurs were already heard from the accountants. Piatakov left the room to look for the guard and did not return. Our nerves were overstrained. Suddenly the door flew open and two dozen armed soldiers entered the room and lined up along the table on which the money lay. The murmurs-ceased. The soldiers put the money in bags and dragged them to the car. The money was sent to Smolnyi.

As far as the grumbling of the accountants was concerned we quieted them down on the same day by a tactful move: we asked them to elect two cashiers among them who would take charge in Smolnyi of the actual distribution of this money. We said that in this way the accountants would be in a position to see for themselves that the money was being spent on public needs and twenty-five rubles each was distributed among the Soviet workers, as the rumors said ...

Source: James Bunyan and H.H. Fisher, ed., Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1918; Documents and Materials (Stanford: Stanford University Press; H. Milford, Oxford University Press, 1934), pp. 319-323.