Vladimir Lenin, Theses for Peace. January 20, 1918

As the Brest-Litovsk talks reached an impasse, Lenin drafted these “Theses for Peace” (January 20, 1918) to frame what he saw as the unavoidable choice facing the Soviet government: either accept a harsh “annexation peace” dictated by Germany or launch an immediate “revolutionary war.” The excerpt below is presented because it captures Lenin’s strategic reasoning at the decisive moment when delaying tactics were running out.

Original Source: Pravda, No. 34, 24 February 1918, pp. 2-3.

1. The condition of the Russian Revolution at the present moment is such that practically all the workers and a large majority of the peasants are on the side of the Soviet Government and the social revolution. In that respect the success of the Socialist Revolution in Russia seems assured.

2. At the same time the civil war which was caused by the furious resistance of the propertied classes, who realize full well that this is their last and final fight for private property in land and instruments of production, has not reached its highest point. In the end the Soviet Government will win the fight, but it will take much time and a good deal of energy, and a certain period of disorganization and chaos incidental to every war and especially civil war is inevitable before the bourgeoisie is finally crushed.

3. Furthermore, the resistance of the bourgeoisie in its less active and non-military forms such as sabotage, bribing tramps and other hirelings of the bourgeoisie to join the Socialist ranks with the purpose of undermining their cause, etc., etc., this resistance has proved to be so obstinate and capable of assuming such varying forms that it will take time, several months perhaps to put it down. Without a decisive victory over this passive and veiled resistance of the bourgeoisie and its adherents the success of the Socialist Revolution is impossible.

4. Finally, the task of organizing Russia on a socialistic basis is so huge and difficult that its solution, owing to the abundance of the petit bourgeois in the midst of the Socialist proletariat and on account of the low cultural level of the latter, will take a considerable time.

5. All these factors taken together show clearly that to make a success of socialism in Russia a certain time, some months at least, is necessary during which the Socialist Government can have a free hand, first to overcome the bourgeoisie of its own country and then to lay the basis for extensive and deep-rooted organizational work.

6. The situation in which the Socialist Revolution in Russia finds itself is to be taken as the point of departure for every definition of the international task confronting the new Soviet Government, because the international situation as it stands during the fourth year of war precludes the possibility of predicting the time of the outbreak of revolutions and the overthrow of the imperialistic governments of Europe (including the German Government). That there will be a Socialist revolution in Europe there is no doubt. All our hopes in the final triumph of socialism are based on this certainty, which is in the nature of a scientific prediction. Our propaganda work in general and our fraternization in particular should be strengthened and developed in order to help bring about the Socialist revolution. But it would be a mistake for the Socialist Government in Russia to formulate its policy on the supposition that within the next six months (or thereabouts ) there will be a European, to be more specific, a German Socialist revolution. It is impossible to make such predictions, and every attempt to do so is a blind gamble.

7. The Brest-Litovsk negotiations have made it clear by now (January 20, 1918) that the war party in Germany has the upper hand and has sent us what amounts to an ultimatum ... either to continue the war or to accept a peace of annexation, that is to say, that we give tip all the territory we have seized, while the Germans retain all that they have seized. In addition they impose on us an indemnity in the (concealed) form of paying for the support of the prisoners. This amounts to about three billion rubles and is to be paid over a period of several years.

8. The Russian Socialist Government is confronted with a question which requires an immediate solution, either to accept the annexation peace or to start at once a revolutionary war. No other solution is in fact possible. We cannot put off the decision; we have already done everything possible and impossible to drag out the negotiations.

9. When we consider the arguments for an immediate revolutionary war we find first of all the argument that a separate peace now is virtually an understanding with German imperialists, an imperialistic transaction, etc., and that, therefore, such a peace would signify a complete break with the fundamental principles of proletarian internationalism.

This reasoning is fallacious. Workmen who lose a strike and accept conditions not favorable to themselves but favorable for the capitalist do not thereby betray socialism. They betray socialism who bargain with the capitalists, accepting favors for part of the workmen in exchange for conditions] that are favorable to the capitalists. Agreements of this kind are unacceptable.

He betrays socialism who calls the war against German imperialism a defensive and righteous war and who, at the same time, accepts the help of Anglo-French imperialists and conceals from the people the secret agreements concluded with these imperialists. But he who hides nothing from the people, makes no secret agreements with imperialists, but agrees, because of temporary inability to go on with the war, to sign a peace treaty unfavorable to the weak nation and favorable to one group of imperialists does not in any way betray socialism.

10. Another argument for an immediate war is that by concluding peace we become agents of German imperialism because we free German troops on our front in addition to millions of prisoners, etc. This argument is equally fallacious. A revolutionary war at this time would place us in the position of agents of Anglo-French imperialism in so far as we should be aiding the cause of the latter. The English have offered our Supreme Commander Krylenko one hundred rubles a month for every one of our soldiers if we continue to fight. Even if we do not accept a penny from them, we should still be helping them by detaining German troops. No matter which way we turn we cannot wholly escape this or that imperialistic group. That is impossible without the complete destruction of world imperialism. The only true inference to be drawn from this is that from the time a socialist government is established in any one country questions must be determined not with reference to preferability of any one imperialistic group but solely from the point of view of what is best for the development and the consolidation of the socialist revolution which has already begun. In other words our tactics must be based not on the consideration of whether it is more expedient to help one or the other of the imperialist groups but solely on the question of safeguarding the socialist revolution in one country until the others are ready to join.

11. It is said that the German Social-Democrats who are opposed to the war have become "defeatists" and beg us not to give in to German imperialism. To this our reply is that we accepted "defeatism" only with reference to our own imperialistic bourgeoisie but we always opposed a victory over the imperialism of other countries if that victory had to be obtained through a union, real or formal, with a "friendly" imperialistic power. The argument is thus a repetition of the preceding one. If the German Left-Wing Socialists should make us a proposal to delay a separate peace for a definite period and guarantee to us that during that time Germany would have a revolution, then we should have a different situation. But they have no such proposition to make. On the contrary, they say this: "Resist as long as you can and then decide in accordance with the best interests of the Russian Socialist Revolution, because at present it is impossible to say anything positive about the German revolution."

12. It is said that in our party declaration we "promised" that we should wage a revolutionary war and that the conclusion of a separate peace is therefore a failure to keep our word. This is not true. We talked of the necessity for a Socialist government during the period of imperialism "to prepare to wage" a revolutionary war. We advocated this in opposition to the theory of abstract pacifism, against the theory which absolutely rejects the "defense of the fatherland," and, finally, against the selfish instincts of certain groups of soldiers, but we never assumed the obligation to wage a revolutionary war regardless of whether time and conditions were favorable for such a war.

We should by all means prepare now for a revolutionary war. We live up to our promises now as we have in the past whenever it is possible to carry them out immediately. We have abrogated the secret treaties, we have offered all nations a just peace, and we have prolonged in various ways the peace negotiations so as to give other nations a chance to join.

The question whether it is possible to undertake at once a revolutionary war must be answered solely from the point of view of actual conditions and the interest of the Socialist Revolution which has already begun.

13. If we summarize the arguments for an immediate revolutionary war we shall find that the policy advocated in them is capable of giving satisfaction to those who crave the romantic and the beautiful but who fail completely to take into consideration the objective correlation of class forces, and the real conditions within which the Socialist Revolution is developing.

14. There is no doubt that at the present time (and probably during the next few weeks and months) our army is in no condition to stop a German offensive. In the first place, it is very tired and very hungry, owing to the unprecedented disruption of the army supplies, etc. ; secondly, on account of the shortage of horses our artillery is absolutely doomed; thirdly, in view of the impossibility of protecting the coast from Reval to Riga which gives the enemy a good chance to get possession of what remains of Livonia, then Estonia, to attack our troops in the rear, and to occupy Petrograd.

15. There is no doubt whatsoever that, were the question put to a vote peasants, who constitute the majority in the army, would come out for a peace of annexation rather than for an immediate revolutionary war. The formation of a Socialist army, with the Red Guard as its nucleus, has only just begun. To attempt now, with the present democratization of the army, to force a war against the wishes of a majority of the soldiers would be hazardous. It will take months and months to create an army imbued with socialist principles.

16. The poorest peasantry in Russia would support a socialist revolution led by the working class, but it is not in a position now to wage a revolutionary war. It would be a fatal blunder to overlook the actual strength of the different classes. The question of revolutionary war, therefore, stands as follows: If a revolution should break out in Germany during the next three or four months, then perhaps the tactics of an immediate revolutionary war would not ruin our Socialist Revolution. If on the other hand the German revolution does not take place and we go on with the war, Russia would be so badly defeated that she would be forced to sign an even worse separate peace; such a peace would be signed not by a socialist government but by some other, by some kind of coalition between the bourgeois Rada arid the followers of Chernov or some similar government, for after the first shock of defeat the peasant army which is so badly worn. out by the war would overthrow the Workers' Socialist Government in a few weeks.

17. Under the circumstances it would be very bad policy to risk the fate of the Socialist Revolution on the chance that a revolution might break out in Germany by a certain date. Such a policy would be adventurous. We have no right to take such chances.

18. The German revolution will in no way suffer objectively if we conclude a separate peace. It is probable that the triumph of chauvinism will weaken it for a time, but the position of Germany will remain very critical. The war with England and America will go on for a long time; the aggressive imperialism of both groups has unmasked itself finally and completely. Under such conditions a Socialist Soviet Republic in Russia will be a model for all other peoples and excellent material for propaganda purposes. On the one side there will be the bourgeois system engaged in a strife between two coalitions of confessed plunderers, and on the other side. a Socialist Soviet Republic living in peace.

19. In concluding a separate peace now we rid ourselves as far as present circumstances permit of both imperialistic groups fighting each other. We can take advantage of their strife, which makes it difficult for them to reach an agreement at our expense, and -use that period when our hands are free to develop and strengthen the Socialist Revolution. We can reorganize Russia on the basis of the dictatorship of the proletariat, nationalize the banks and large industries, bring about a moneyless exchange of products between the city and the small peasant cooperatives in the village. All these are economically feasible provided we have a few months peace to work out these projects. Such a reorganization would make socialism unconquerable in Russia and in the whole world and would at the same time lay the basis for the formation of a powerful workers' and peasants' Red Army.

20. A truly revolutionary war at this moment would be a war between a socialist republic and the bourgeois countries. Such a war would have to be fully approved by the socialist army and have as its object the overthrow of the bourgeoisie in other countries. For the time being, however, we cannot make this our object. In reality we should be fighting now for the liberation of Poland, Lithuania, and Courland. There is not a single Marxist who, while adhering to the foundations of Marxism and socialism, would not say that the interests of socialism are above the right of nations to self-determination. Our Socialist Republic has done and is doing everything possible to give real self-determination to Finland, the Ukraine, etc. But if the concrete circumstances are such that the safety of the Socialist Republic is being endangered in order to prevent the violation of the right of self-determination of a few nations (Poland, Lithuania, and Courland), there is no question but that the interests of the Socialist Republic must predominate. If that is true, then he who says "we cannot sign a shameful and humiliating peace; we cannot hand over Poland, etc.," fails to perceive that if we make peace on condition of the liberation of Poland we are only strengthening German imperialism against England, Belgium, Serbia, and the other countries. Peace on condition of the liberation of Poland, Lithuania, and Courland would be a "patriotic" peace from the Russian point of view, but it would be none the less a peace with annexationists and with the German imperialists.

Source: V. I. Lenin, Selected Works in Two Volumes (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1952), Vol. 2, book 1, pp. 385-87, 390-92.