Maksim Litvinov, Address before the Central Executive Committee of the USSR. December 29, 1933

Excerpts

The guiding principle of our foreign policy has been put very briefly, but very expressively, by Comrade Stalin: We desire no foreign land, but we shall not surrender a single inch of our own land to any one. Once we do not desire any foreign lands, then we cannot want war. As for our own land, we have every possibility of defending it and of preventing any attempt at its invasion. Our growing armed forces could teach a lesson to any of our near or distant neighbors which would prevent them for decades from again attempting to invade us, but this would be an unproductive waste of our means and energies. It would distract us for a time from our fundamental work of constructing socialism.

We are therefore doing everything possible to defend our territory by peaceful means, even though this may not be a radical means for removing the threat of aggression against its. We consider that even military activities commenced outside the immediate frontiers of our Union may be a menace to its, hence we not only continue but are intensifying our struggle for peace, which has always been and still is the basic problem of our diplomacy. As Comrade Molotov rightly said: This struggle corresponds with the desire of the masses of the people of all countries.

During, the last year we have extended the system of Non-Aggression Pacts. Such pacts are now in force between the USSR and not only all our neighbors, with the exception of Japan and China, but also with France and Italy. We have made a further step towards tile intensification of the significance and effectiveness of the Non-Aggression Pacts by proposing an exhaustive definition of the idea of aggression itself. This proposal of ours is already contained in agreements with a solid chain of our neighbors from Finland to Afghanistan and with all the three countries of the Little Entente.

The definition of aggression which we have given is generally recognized to be a valuable contribution to the science of international law, and also of international practice; at the same time, it forms an excellent measure for determining the absence or presence in any State of aggressive, annexationist aims. We shall, therefore, continue to struggle for the universal recognition of this definition.

The maintenance of peace cannot depend simply on our efforts, but demands the co-operation of other Countries. Endeavoring, therefore, to establish and maintain friendly relations with all countries, we pay special attention to the consolidation of our relations with those countries which, like us, give proof or their sincere endeavor to preserve peace and are ready to oppose those who violate peace. We have never refused and we do not refuse to participate in organized international co-operation aimed at consolidating peace.

Not being doctrinaires, we do not refuse to utilize existing or future international organizations and combinations, providing we have or shall have reason to consider that they would serve the purpose of preserving peace.

In the light of all that I have said you will readily understand, Comrades, the significance of the development of our relations with the separate countries.

I shall begin with an event, chronologically the latest in this development, but by its importance at the present moment occupying first place, that is to say, the re-establishment of our diplomatic relations with the great trans-Atlantic Republic. During fifteen years this Republic was the only one of the big Powers who persistently refused, not only formal recognition of' the Soviet Union, but acknowledgement of its existence. She refused to recognize the fact of the October (November) Revolution and the changes brought about by it. For the USA there still existed somewhere in space the Provisional Government of Kerenskii, with whose agents she continued to have official relations.

The reason for this persistence in ignoring the USSR was not that the USA had more serious disputes with us than had other countries or because she had suffered any more from our revolutionary legislation. No, in essence she simply continued the struggle declared by the whole capitalist world after the October Revolution against the new Soviet State which had declared as its aim the creation of a Socialist country. This was a struggle against the peaceful coexistence of two social systems ...

Having ceased to act as the champion of the whole capitalist world, and having come into contact with us, the USA at once became convinced that there were no national or State antagonisms between her and our Union, and that outstanding questions could be readily settled. Moreover, being herself interested in the preservation of peace, the USA has recognized relations with us as a powerful factor in the preservation of this peace and has correspondingly valued cooperation with us in this direction.

We, on our part, also estimate the establishment of relations with America primarily from the standpoint of its significance in the cause of peace. I may remark, in passing, that in re-establishing relations with the USA we have maintained the fundamental principle underlying our restoration of relations with all capitalist countries. The fact that there have been no sacrifices on either side is, indeed, an important guarantee for further consolidation of our relations with tile USA

The frank exchange of opinions between President Roosevelt and myself has convinced us both of the possibility of the closest relations between our two countries. It is but just to mention the far-sightedness of President Roosevelt who, immediately he came to power and perhaps even before, realized the fruitlessness of any further struggle against us on behalf of capitalism, and envisaged the advantage of relations with us in the interest of the USA and of world peace.

We consider our relations with the great Turkish Republic as a model of relations with foreign States. For over ten years these relations have improved from year to year and have attained real friendship, rendering complete satisfaction to both sides and instilling in them a feeling of complete security for the section, of the frontier between the two countries. The policy of friendship and mutual confidence has provided the basis for fruitful co-operation on the international arena ...

In discussing the gradual considerable improvement of our relations with other countries, we must before all mention France. After the signature of the Pact of Non-Aggression, our relations with France, during the past year, have improved rapidly. This is due partly to the absence of any State political antagonisms between us, and also to our common desire to work actively for the preservation of world peace.

We have the advantage of the continuity of our Government and foreign policy, whilst in France Governments change frequently with a possible change in political orientation; inasmuch as the French people sincerely desire peace, and it is this that unites us with France, we need not fear very much that any change in Government will hinder the successful development of friendly relations.

The recent visit to the USSR of M. Herriot, one of the most outstanding and brilliant representatives of the French nation, and one who reflects their peace-loving sentiments, as well as the official visit of representatives of French aviation, led by the Minister for Air, M. Pierre Cot have given a new impulse to Franco-Soviet rapprochement. I certainly hope that all this is but an introductory step towards the further development of Franco-Soviet relations, and I am sure that this development will become all the more rapid as the elements menacing peace accumulate. It is, however, necessary to note that our relations with France still require a certain economic strengthening which, I hope, will be effected by the Trade Agreement about to be concluded.

Our relations with Italy continue to be characterized by their stability. In the course of ten years, there have been no fluctuations, no conflicts, either political or economic. During this period we have had not a few instances of valuable diplomatic co-operation on the part of Italy. We have also utilized Italian technical aid in various branches of our construction, and economic relations between the two countries have developed to our mutual advantage.

My recent visit to Italy, and my reception there, demonstrate the endeavor of both countries to develop their relations in all branches, and we have come to this conclusion with the head of the Italian Government, M. Mussolini, after an exchange of opinion on questions of current policy and of the best methods of preserving universal peace. Our efforts to maintain and develop simultaneously relations with all the large countries is a not unimportant contribution to the maintenance of general peace.

Unfortunately, this endeavor has not yet been realized, or completely realized, in regard to Great Britain. Our relations with the latter cannot boast either of stability or continuity. There are no objective reasons for this, and I am certain that the British people, as a whole, desire to live in peace and friendship with us. But there are elements there who are still rapt in the sweet dream of a general capitalist struggle against the socialist country-a dream from which the USA has just shaken free.

They will be unable to destroy or even to shake our socialist country, and, consequently, in view of the well-known practical character and common sense of the British, one cannot help being astonished that amongst them there should still be such Quixotic snipers and partisans. In so far as it depends upon us as we are ready, and we should like to have as good relations with Great Britain as with other countries.

We are convinced that sincere and good relations between the Great Powers are not only a necessary condition, but are a guarantee, for general peace. It is expected that a temporary Trade Agreement will be signed shortly which, removing as it will certain misunderstandings, we may hope will make possible better relations between ourselves and Great Britain.

We, of course, attach very great importance to our relations with our nearest neighbors, particularly with the largest of these-with Poland. Here, too, we note very considerable progress. The conclusion of a Pact of Non-Aggression and of the Convention Defining an Aggressor could not but result in a strengthening of our mutual confidence and understanding. The political perturbations which have occurred in Europe during the past year, resulting in our common danger and common anxieties, have created a community of interests between ourselves and Poland ...

What I have said regarding the influence of the treaties of Non-Aggression and of the Definition of an Aggressor on our relations with Poland are equally applicable to our relations with the other neighboring States on our western frontier, namely, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. These countries are becoming more and more convinced of the absolute sincerity of our aspirations for peace, of our good will towards them, and of our interest in the preservation of their full economic and political independence ...

In giving a review of our relations with the outside world, I have certainly not lost sight of such big States as Germany and Japan. I devote to them a special place in my review precisely because they occupy a very important place in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. The latest phase of the development in the relationships between these two countries permits me to hope that they will have no grievance against me for singling them out for special attention.

If I am not mistaken they have even recognized that they are of common race. This has become quite possible since the idea of race has ceased to be regarded as an ethnological and anthropological conception, and has become something in the nature of the designation of a militant organization.

For ten years we had the closest economic and political relations with Germany. We were the only great country which wished to have nothing to do with the Versailles Treaty, and its consequences. We renounced the rights and advantages which this treaty reserved for us.

Germany occupied first place in our foreign trade, and Germany like ourselves, gained considerable advantages from the political an economic relations which were established between us. With these relations as a support, Germany could speak with her former victors in a bolder and more assured manner. She succeeded in freeing herself from certain of the more burdensome consequences of the Versailles Treaty. She sought closer relations with all the former victors although she did not always succeed in this.

She concluded the Locarno Treaty with France, a treaty which is nothing other than a Pact of Non-Aggression, and even more than that, since it also provides for outside guarantors. In Locarno, she also concluded with Poland an Arbitration Treaty, which is also nothing but a Pact of Non-Aggression. Germany entered into the League of Nations, accepting the Covenant, which is also a Pact of Non-Aggression, providing in addition, for sanctions.

We, on our side, as soon as we found it possible, also concluded a Pact of Non-Aggression with France and Poland. These treaties and pacts on both sides should not, and in fact did not, worsen our relations with Germany, which were in no way based on hostility to other countries. Nevertheless, our relations with Germany, during the last year have become, it may be said, unrecognizable.

In Germany speeches and declarations were made, and acts took place, which were not only not in consonance with our former relations but rather gave one cause to think that these relations had been transformed into their very opposite. The causes for this have been as follows: With the change of Government in Germany which took place in 1932, a political leader obtained office and subsequently took the helm who, at the time of our very best relations with Germany, openly opposed these relations and advocated a rapprochement with the West for a joint attack upon the Soviet Union.

He organized a new political club where this idea was propagated, and the worked zealously for its realization. On coming to power he made an attempt, true unsuccessful, to realize this idea formally. Subsequently, a coup d'etat occurred in Germany which brought a new party into power which propagated the most extreme anti-Soviet ideas. The founder of this party developed in detail his conception of the foreign policy of Germany in a literary work.

According to this conception, Germany had to re-conquer not only everything she had lost by the Versailles Treaty, not only had she to conquer lands where there were German minorities, but by fire and sword she had to carve a way for herself for expansion eastwards, without stopping at the frontiers of the Soviet Union, and subject to her will the peoples of the USSR.

There have been, in addition, not a few anti-Soviet negotiations and proposals with the above ideas at their base entered into by people, not indeed occupying State posts, but, nevertheless, in very responsible positions ... All this is what has made our former relations with Germany unrecognizable.

I considered it necessary to say this openly since, on the German side, attempts are often made to ascribe to us the initiative for the change in our relations and to explain it as the result of our displeasure at the present regime which persecutes Communists, at others. We, of course, have our own opinion about the German regime. We, of course, sympathize with the sufferings of our German comrades, but we Marxists are the last who can be reproached with allowing our feelings to dictate our policy.

The whole world knows that we can and do maintain good relations with capitalist States of any regime, including the Fascist. We do not interfere in the internal affairs of Germany, as we do not interfere in that of other countries, and our relations with her are conditioned not by her internal but by her external policy ...

I am asked by representatives of the German Government what exactly is it that we want from Germany and what she must do to set our doubts at rest regarding her loyalty. To this I generally reply, let her not do what she is doing. Let the German Government look into what her numerous agents and emissaries are doing, and let her tell them that they should not do it.

But we also make the following declaration: We desire to have with Germany, as with other States, the best of relations. Nothing but good can result from such relations, both for the Soviet Union and Germany. We on our side are not striving to expand either on the west, or on the east, or in any other direction. We have no feelings of hostility towards the German people and are not preparing to attack either their territory or their rights, and whatever we may do we shall never encourage other States to make such attacks.

We should be glad if Germany could say the same to its and if there were no facts which could contradict them. We would desire to be assured that such declarations referred, not only to the present moment, but also to that time when she will have stronger forces for realizing, those aggressive ideas which her present leaders preached before their rise to power, and which some of them preach even now.

I shall not be mistaken, Comrades, if I assume that you are most of all interested at the present time in regard to our relations with Japan. These relations are arresting the attention, not only of the Soviet Union, but of the whole world, since the policy of Japan is, at the present time, the heaviest storm cloud on the international political horizon. I shall permit myself, therefore, to deal in brief with the development of our relations with Japan.

Since the conclusion of the Peking Agreement, right up to the end of 1931, the best of neighborly relations existed between Japan and ourselves. There were no conflicts, no serious misunderstandings, and when such arose they were resolved by peaceful diplomatic means. There was no talk about threats from one side or the other. Our attitude to Japan was so trustful (since at that time there was no occasion for mistrust) that we left our Far Eastern frontier almost without any defense. The position began to change when Japan started her military operations in Manchuria. Together with the whole world, we could not but consider these operations as a violation on the part of Japan of numerous obligations which she had voluntarily undertaken in her international treaties.

The Japanese Government, as you will remember, then offered explanations for her operations which explained nothing and convinced nobody. She simultaneously gave us official assurances that her troops would not proceed beyond a definite line in Manchuria itself, and that, in any case, our interests, in particular the interests of the Chinese Eastern Railroad, would under no circumstances suffer.

These assurances were then continuously repeated as the Japanese troops advanced farther, right up to the complete occupation of the whole of Manchuria and to the formation of the so-called independent Manchukuo. These actions, as you know, were characterized by the entire external world, including also the League of Nations, to which Japan herself belonged, as a violation of such agreements as the Washington Nine-Power Pact, the League of Nations Covenant, and the Kellogg Pact.

The occupation of' Manchuria was, however, also a violation of the Portsmouth Treaty, confirmed by the Peking Agreement, in virtue of which Japan had no right to maintain troops in Manchuria beyond a defined very small number. We refused to participate in international action at that time, firstly because we did not believe

In the sincerity and consistency of the States which participated in these actions and, above all, because we did not seek, as we do not seek now, an armed conflict with y Japan. We were only trying to obtain from Japan one thing: the observance of our commercial interests in the Chinese Eastern Railroad, since we have no other interests in Manchuria.

Despite all the solemn promises and assurances, the representatives of Japan in Manchuria, nevertheless, soon began a direct attack on our interests, endeavoring to render impossible the management of the Chinese Eastern Railroad jointly with the Chinese or Manchurians, as provided for in our agreements. They disrupted the work of the line itself, resorted for this purpose to provocative, violent acts, and submitted to the Soviet side of the administration quite unfounded arbitrary claims.

The whole world was surprised at our composure and our long patience, but we have had firmly decided not to digress from our policy of peace, refraining from any hostile acts and confining ourselves to protests, which remained, however, without any effect. But the more calm and patient our attitude, the more insolent and provocative became the actions of the Japanese forces in Manchuria. A definite impression was created that they were consciously trying to provoke us to stronger action than protests.

Not desiring to lend ourselves to such provocation, we proposed to Japan, on May 2, 1933, that she should purchase from us the Chinese Eastern Railroad. The entire railroad, track, rolling stock, station premises and other accessories of the line were built with the hard-earned money of the peoples of our Union and thus formed their in alienable property. We only desired one thing, that the present value of the line should be returned to its real owners.

It seemed as though Japan accepted our proposal for the purchase of the railroad. When, however, we entered upon the concrete negotiations regarding the conditions of sale, it turned out that Japan did not want to buy the railroad, but wanted to receive it as a present. She offered a paltry ridiculous sum, naively assuming that we wished to sell the railroad just as a matter of form, but that in reality we were prepared to give it away for nothing. Such negotiations could not, of course, lead to anything concrete, although we fixed a minimum price for the line ...

The negotiations have not been resumed since that time, but the unlawful acts on the railroad continue, and the work of the line is being paralyzed. Moreover, our declarations and protests against these unlawful acts remain without a reply from Japan, who is vainly trying to convince us that she is in no way involved in these deeds, for which only "independent Manchukuo is ostensibly responsible. We have our own opinion of the "independence of Manchukuo. So, by the way, has the whole world. Manchukuo is not yet recognized by a single State, and is considered by everybody exclusively as a puppet of the Japanese Government and the Japanese command in Manchuria.

If any perfectly objective proofs thereof were needed, it was recently provided by TASS, which published the well-known documents, the authenticity of which is not open to doubt. It is clear from these documents that the forcible measures against Soviet employees of the railroad, ostensibly taken by the Manchurian Courts of Justice, were dictated by the Japanese military and administrative agents, who, in this way, hoped to secure the railroad for next to nothing.

We, therefore, declared to the Japanese Government that we could not recognize her references to the Manchurian authorities, nor could we recognize the responsibility of any one but the Japanese Government for the violation of our rights and interests in the Chinese Eastern Railroad.

What is in question, however, is not the Chinese Eastern Railroad alone. Side by side with the infringement of our rights on the line, the question of war against the Soviet Union for the seizure of the Maritime Provinces and the entire Far Eastern Region is being discussed by statesmen, including official representatives of the Japanese Government, as well as by the Press.

The matter is not merely confined to conversations, but a considerable number of Japanese troops have been concentrated in Manchuria, near our frontier, war material is being brought tip, roads and railroads are being built. Thus, not only is the violent seizure of our line threatened by Japan, but there is a direct threat to our frontiers.

In such a state of affairs there was nothing left for our Government to do except to start strengthening our frontiers, transferring thereto the necessary forces and taking other military measures. But while we are taking exclusively defensive measures, Japan, as is known, is feverishly preparing for war, which can be no other than aggressive, since no one is threatening the safety of Japan ...

Our policy is clear. We do not aspire to make use of a favorable situation, we do not aspire to wage war under any circumstances. We say to Japan:

We do not threaten you, we do not want your land or other territories lying on your side of our frontiers, we want to live in peace with you as we have done up to the present, respecting your rights and interests and asking only that you adopt the same attitude toward our rights and interests. Your first step to prove your peaceful disposition should be a cessation of repressive police measures on the Chinese Eastern Railroad, the restoration of our violated rights, and then a calm continuation of the negotiations for a fair commercial price for the railroad.

The second step in demonstrating Japan's desire for peace should be the signing of the Pact of Non-Aggression which we proposed two years ago. We should like to entertain the hope that Japan will act in accordance with the counsel of her level-headed patriots and not with that of the militarist adventurers.

After my exposition of the relations of the Soviet Union with other countries, it remains for me to say a few words about our relation to an international organization of which the Soviet Union is a member-the Disarmament Conference. This Conference is still formally reckoned among the living. The appellation of corpse, which I applied to it in America, is nevertheless no exaggeration. The question now is whether to sign its death certificate or to try and galvanize the corpse. Such galvanization is possible and the Conference may come to life again, but it will no longer be a disarmament conference, but a conference for additional armaments.

We went to the Conference to take part in the framing of guarantees of peace, of common safety, but the rearmament of any State whatever can in no sense be considered such a guarantee. When they tell us additional armaments for some and disarmament for others, we fear that only the first part of this formula will be carried out, without the second; for it is quite clear that they will not succeed in disarming to any extent precisely those nations which are already making practical use of their arms and openly threatening to employ them on a still larger scale in the near future. It will be impossible to demand that only those Governments shall disarm against which such threats are directed.

It will again be possible to talk seriously of disarmament only when the Governments of the world cease to treat Pacts of Non-Aggression like scraps of paper, cynically suggesting that "The more the better," and when they sincerely give up war as a method of settling international disputes. Then from the dusty archives of the League of Nations will be hauled out the Soviet proposals on disarmament, and the discussions will indeed deal with real disarmament, complete and universal, and not with quotas of armaments.

Comrades, in my report I have tried to acquaint you with the present tendencies in international relations, with the alignment of forces around the pressingly real question "war or peace?" and to set forth the role of the USSR in the struggle of these forces. The creatively peaceful character of this role is hardly doubted by any one now. But not all other countries have yet declared their position in this struggle and their attitude towards the Soviet Union. A characteristic feature of the situation is that the peaceful intentions other Governments have come to be estimated according to their attitude towards the Soviet Union ...

Whilst agreeing to co-operate with other countries, and bearing in mind that the continuity of our policy provides the highest guarantee for the fulfillment of our international obligations, we must not forget, however, that we are dealing with capitalist States, with Governments which are unstable and subject to frequent change; we must remember that we are faced with the possibility of the advent to power of groups and people who, in order to vent their class hatred toward our country, are sometimes prepared to sacrifice even their own national State interests.

Being compelled to be on the alert in our defense, we will strengthen and perfect, to an even greater degree than formerly, our Red Army, Red Navy, and Red Air Force, the chief means of defending our security. We must bear in mind that, in the event of the failure of the combined forces of the friends of peace, violation of the peace may be directed against us in the first place.

We shall, therefore, remember that, against our will, a time may arrive when we may have to justify the declaration of Comrade Stalin that: we will not give up a single inch of our territory. In defense of every inch of our Soviet land, be it in the West or in the East, not only the Red military forces but also the Red peoples of our immense Union will participate. That they are led by the Red Party, the Communist Party of the USSR, and its inspirer and leader, Comrade Stalin, guarantees them the same successes in war as they have had in peace.

Source: Documents on International Affairs, Vol. I (1933), p. 425.