On Imminent War
Viacheslav Molotov, Report by the Seventh All-Union Soviet Congress at Moscow. January 28, 1935
Excerpts
But also the relations between these (capitalist) countries are becoming more and more strained, are developing towards an intensification of the struggle for foreign markets, turning ever more frequently into a trade and currency war. Pacifist talks are receding in the background. Pacifists are no longer in fashion. In bourgeois countries the extreme imperialist wire-pullers, who are more and more openly talking of new predatory wars, of the way out of the crisis by means of war, are coming nearer to power.
Notwithstanding all the danger of the unleashing of a new imperialist war for these very dominant classes of capitalist countries, certain countries have already passed over to active deeds. Thus, Japan did not stop before war with China, occupied Manchuria and is making herself at home generally in the country of the great Chinese people.
Not only Japan, but also Germany withdrew from the League of Nations, the meaning of this policy being understood by all. This was done in order to untie their hands in the matter of armaments and war preparations. Just recently the famous Washington agreement on naval armaments, concluded thirteen years ago between
America. England, Japan, and other States, collapsed, since this agreement began to be a hindrance to some one in the race in naval armaments and in the preparation of new military conquests for the Pacific Ocean. The diplomacy and foreign policy of bourgeois countries is more and more serving those who are already now choosing their allies in a war for a new re-division of the world among imperialist powers at the expense of the weaker countries.
We have to take into consideration that the immediate danger of war has increased for the USSR Certain influential circles in Japan have already long since openly been speaking about war against the Soviet Union. It must not be forgotten that there is now in Europe a ruling party openly declaring its historical task to be the seizure of territory in the Soviet-Union.
Not to see a new war approaching means to close one's eyes to the chief danger.
To all this the Soviet Union replied, above all, by strengthening activities in the struggle for peace.
All know the broad initiative of the USSR in the question of non-aggression pacts. For the period under review the Soviet Union concluded pacts with neighboring Baltic States and with a number of European Countries. Through no fault of the USSR she did not succeed in concluding a non-aggression pact with Japan.
Great importance was attached to the proposal of the USSR on he definition of the aggressor. At international conferences and in a number of international agreements can be found references for the need of special measures against an attacking side, against an aggressive state unleashing war. But, notwithstanding this the Governments of bourgeois countries did not show any haste to state clearly whom it is necessary to consider the attacking side, i.e. the country responsible for beginning war. Soviet diplomacy, particularly interested in the defense of peace and in measures against military attacks, had to take up this matter. Soviet diplomacy has fulfilled this task with honor.
Such a proposal was introduced by us for discussion at an international conference. In order immediately to put this matter forward in a practical manner, we proposed that a number of countries should sign such a pact, i.e., an agreement on the definition of an attacking side. As is known, such a pact was signed by all European States bordering on us, also by Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan, and, in addition, by Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.
Our Government always attached great significance to openly putting the question of disarmament, or at least, of the maximum reduction of armaments. Precisely in this sense did Soviet diplomacy work at the international disarmament conference. It can be said that numerous meetings of the international conference on disarmament were fruitless. But no one can say that the Soviet Union did not do everything it possibly could to insist on universal or at least maximum disarmament.
It is not for us to defend the Geneva disarmament conference, but we do not doubt that the efforts of Soviet diplomacy at this conference, which became widely known in many countries, were not without results.
A logical continuation of this policy is our proposal to transform the disarmament conference, from which some wish. to dissociate themselves as soon as possible, into a permanent peace conference, into an organ permanently concerning itself with preventing war. This proposal will still be discussed by other countries at an international conference, and we will insist on it.
During the recent period we were again confronted with the question of our attitude to the League of Nations. It is known that the League of Nations in its time was created by States then still not desirous of recognizing the right of the new Worker-Peasant State to exist, but instead, participating in anti-Soviet military intervention. Strong efforts were made in its time to transform the League of Nations into a weapon directing, the mouth of the cannon on the Soviet Union. For this it had to ensure agreement among the imperialists. But this undertaking did not succeed.
Since then much water has flowed under the bridge. Events of recent times have emphasized those changes which have taken place in the situation of the League of Nations. The most belligerent aggressive elements have begun to leave the League of Nations. The League of Nations has become for them in the given circumstances
confining, inconvenient. But the majority of participants in the League of Nations are now for one or another consideration not interested in the unleashing of war.
We had to draw from this situation our concrete Bolshevist conclusions. Therefore we regarded with sympathy the proposal of thirty States for the entry of the USSR into the League of Nations. In so far as in the question of guaranteeing peace the League of Nations can now play a certain positive role, the Soviet Union could not but recognize the expediency of co-operation with the League of Nations in this matter, although it is not characteristic of us to over-estimate the role of such organizations. Needless to say, the invitation by thirty States to the USSR to join the League of Nat ions by no means lessens the international authority of the Soviet Union, but bespeaks the reverse. We enter this fact in our assets.
The Soviet Government not only showed initiative, but supported the steps of other Governments directed to the defense of peace and international security. In connection with this it is worth while noting the active support we gave to the proposal of France of the so-called Eastern Pact of mutual assistance. This pact should also embrace, besides the USSR, countries such as France, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia.
The signatories of this agreement should render each other every kind of support, including military, in the event of an attack by one of the countries signatory to the pact. During a number of months there have been negotiations among the said countries oil the conclusion of this pact. I will not dwell now on those reasons why Germany and, with her, Poland, till now, refuse to give consent to signing it. But the importance of the Eastern Pact for all advocates of peace in Europe is understood. And, therefore, notwithstanding the obstacles that still exist and the objections of the countries referred to the Soviet Government considers its attitude to this question unchanged. We will regard success in this matter as a step forward in the cause of guaranteeing peace in Europe.
From all this it has seen what is the basis of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. The basis of our foreign policy is supporting peace and developing peaceful relations with all countries ...
The role of the USSR as a firm factor in universal peace is now widely recognized. It has become a rule for other countries to appeal to the Soviet Union in those cases when it is a question of guaranteeing peace. And this is understandable.
Not a single country, not even one of the smallest States on the borders of the USSR, has grounds for entertaining a feeling of unrest in relation to the Soviet Union, which is far from what can be said of certain other big States. The authority and might of the Worker-Peasant State in international relations now serves one cause-the cause of universal peace. The Soviet Union has become the one to express the vital interests of the toilers of all countries in the realm of international relations. Whatever our class enemies may say, the political of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the USSR in the given conditions, when the danger of war becomes more and more acute, consists in the fact that throughout the world there not a more reliable bulwark in the cause of peace than our worker-peasant power.
Our relations with other countries depend not only upon us but upon the foreign policies of these States. And all of you know how many contradictions there are in the policies of the bourgeois States ...
An example of the best development of friendly relations are our relations with Turkey. The last years have constituted not only a period of development of Soviet-Turkish economic and cultural relations, but a striking political demonstration of Soviet-Turkish friendship. Only recently, before the Soviet Revolution, Turkey, with her Constantinople and Straits, was the object of predatory imperialist aspirations of Russian reactionaries and liberals of all shades, representing the Russia of merchants, landlords, and manufacturers.
Between that epoch and Soviet Power an abyss has developed. The Soviet Power, as the power of workers and peasants, has proceeded and still proceeds from another policy which excludes the policy plans of conquest.
Our relations with Great Britain have on the whole developed normally ...
In our relations with France there must be noted considerable improvement during the past period. The entire international situation, and especially the changes which have taken place in Europe, made most real the problem of insuring peace and security, in regard to which both the Soviet Union and France showed special interest. It must be emphasized that for the immediate future the significance this problem has by no means decreased, and therefore the intended rapprochement has a favorable soil for development. Things will depend mostly on the consistency of the parties interested in carrying out the intended line.
As concerns Poland, we have in sufficient and evident form shown our desire for the further development of Soviet-Polish relations. However, we cannot say that we are satisfied with the results already achieved in this connection. But we can firmly say that we intend to continue the course for the development of Soviet-Polish good neighborly relations.
It is impossible to close our eyes to the changes that have taken place in Soviet-German relations with the coming to power of National-Socialism. As for ourselves we can say that we have not had and do not have any other wish than to continue further good relations with Germany also. In the path of Soviet-German relations, however, serious difficulties have arisen during the past period ...
Of course, it is not the super-nationalistic racial theories of the German nation as "masters" of the whole world which are the hindrance to the development of Soviet-German relations. Although we have not a high opinion of these "theories" we do not hide our deep respect for the German people, as one of the great nations of the modern epoch. We-internationalists-have proved in fact the deep respect of the Soviet power both for large and small nations, both for the nations of the Soviet Union and also for the nations of other countries. In this lies one of the signs of the great strength of the principles of the Soviet power. On the contrary, in reactionary racial theories we see a sign of doom ...
And so it is not a matter of these theories," but of that which lies at the base of the foreign policy of modern Germany. We are forced to put this question directly, as clarity in our mutual relations can only be of benefit. One circumstance draws our special attention. I have in mind the statement of Herr Hitler on Russia in his book My Struggle, which is now being especially widely spread through Germany...
And we ask after this-does Hitler's statement on Russia, which is now being repeated in newer and newer editions of his book, remain in force? Does there remain in force the statement made by Herr Hitler on the necessity of passing to a "policy of territorial conquest" in the East of Europe and of "when we (National-Socialists) speak of new lands in Europe, then we can in the first place have in mind only Russia and the border states subordinate to her? Evidently this statement remains in force, as only on this surmise does a great deal become clear in the present relations of the German Government to the Soviet Union and also to the project of the Eastern Pact.
That is just why we do not consider it possible to pass these statements of Herr Hitler by. Let the toilers of the Soviet Union know how matters stand. All we want is clarity on this question. And as the above statements of Herr Hitler apparently remain in force, we will reckon with this fact and from it draw conclusions for ourselves.
Finally, about our relations with Japan.
Throughout the whole of this period we displayed in these relations patience and the requisite compliance, aiming at avoiding each and every cause for sharpening Soviet-Japanese relations. Such was our attitude towards the solution of disputed questions in the economic sphere, when the question was one of the areas and the methods of fishing in Soviet waters by Japanese citizens, when the question was one of Japanese concessions in Sakhalin, and so on. All know that, guided by its peace policy, the Soviet Government made a proposal to the Chinese Eastern Railroad in Manchuria to Japan and Manchukuo, having it in view to remove in this way excuses for all kinds of conflicts. In this question the Soviet Government maintained dignified yet flexible position and secured from the other side a withdrawal of the original unacceptable proposals. The negotiations for the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railroad are now, apparently, approaching a near conclusion. We hope that our exertions towards improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations and the insuring of peace in the Far East will yield positive results.
But we have no ground whatever for complacency. The aggressive militant elements in Japan are not putting away their weapons.
In all its foreign policy, the Soviet Government has proceeded from peace-loving aims and the desire to have normal relations and necessary commercial ties with other states. As a result of this policy we have secured the strengthening of our international position and an indisputable growth in the international authority of the Soviet Union.
In contradistinction to certain other countries, our foreign policy has been distinguished by perfect clarity and consistency. Our participation in international agreements has always been distinguished by the fact that our signature can be depended on. We have a right to expect the same clarity on the part of other states as well.
Source: Documents on International Affairs, Vol. 1 (1934), p. 405
