Molotov Conflict with Khrushchev

Viacheslav Molotov, Conflict with Khrushchev. 1957

The development of the virgin lands began prematurely. It was unquestionably an absurd undertaking. On such a large scale it was adventurism. I never opposed cultivating the virgin lands, although Khrushchev charged me with being the principal opponent of the virgin lands project. From the very start I supported cultivation on a limited, rather than on a grand, scale. To do it in a big way demanded tremendous resources, huge investments and expenditures, which could have yielded faster returns had they been used in the areas already settled and cultivated. That was the only sensible approach. Look, you have a million rubles and no more. Should the money be allocated to the virgin lands or to settled regions with unused potential? I proposed investing the funds in the non-black-earth regions and opening up the virgin lands gradually. Alas, the resources were scattered over a vast area, and as a result each locality got very little. Moreover, storage facilities and good roads were lacking. The harvest could neither be stored nor shipped out. It rotted.

At a session of the Politbiuro I said: Listen, we have just received crop data from the TsSU on the harvest in those areas we call the virgin lands. The yield is two or three centners per hectare. The average yield over a period of five to ten years in the arid lands is five or six centners. A small yield, but the infrastructure is already there. If we till ten million hectares in areas where crop prospects are better and the area more manageable than the twenty million hectares of virgin lands, then we shall get a harvest...

Khrushchev exploded: "So, you are against the Virgin Lands Program!" "What do you mean, against the Virgin Lands Program? We must make the necessary calculations. Otherwise how can we conduct affairs of state?"

Khrushchev was so carried away with his idea that he was like a runaway roan! An idea alone solves nothing conclusively; it may be helpful, but only to a limited extent. You have to make the right calculations, weigh alternatives, consult experts, sound out the people. You can't just shout, get going! get a move on! He bit off more than he could chew--about 40 to 45 million hectares of virgin lands to be opened up. This was unmanageable, absurd, and unnecessary. Fifteen to 17 million hectares would probably have produced better results and would have made more sense.

Khrushchev reminded me of a livestock dealer. A small-time livestock dealer. A man of little culture, certainly. A regular livestock trader, a man who deals in cattle.

Stalin's mistake was that he had not trained anyone to fill his position. Khrushchev took over, not by chance. Of course he was not the right man for the top office. But we had no unity in our group, and we had no program. We merely agreed to have him removed, but at the same time we were totally unprepared to assume power.

I certainly opposed opening up the virgin lands on such a vast scale. Even today I think it was a bad idea. I suggested the project be done at half the size. There weren't enough people nor enough machinery. The counterargument: "We'll take the necessary resources from the other regions."

I opposed economic decentralization in the form of Sovnarkhozy and wrote a letter to the Politbiuro arguing that the project lacked preparation.

I opposed division of the party into rural and urban branches as contravening both the constitution and the party statutes. All that was sheer idiocy.

[1-1-79, 12-9-82]

Khrushchev gathered writers together one day at Stalin's remote dacha, two hundred kilometers from Moscow. There he announced for all to hear that he had differences of opinion with me. His move particularly displeased me because he announced it at a nonparty gathering. It all started with an article in the journal Kommunist in 1955, where I argued that we had constructed only the foundations of socialism in our country. Shortly before that I had gathered reporters and distributed the article to them. There were some queries on the article. But I said I believed that socialism in our country was not yet complete ...

Under Khrushchev, Molotov was reproached for saying that in our country, only the "basis of socialism" had been constructed and not "socialism basically," and he confessed his mistake in the journal of the Central Committee, Kommunist.

No, I had to. They forced me to. At a session of the Supreme Soviet I delivered a report on the international situation. By the way, I still believe that both conclusions were correct. Then, a letter signed by Pospelov and Rumiantsev was published. They contended that "socialism basically" and its "basis" had been built long ago. I then said at the Politbiuro: "I don't see any contradiction in terms there. One can say that both "socialism basically" and "basis" have been built. "Basis" is a narrower concept, which places greater emphasis on the economic side of things. "Basis" or "basically"--just so much talmudic hairsplitting. I wrote that both formulations were correct, consequently there could be no objections to my position as being incorrect, because "basis" is the same as "basically." To see a difference between the two one would have to be a pedant.

At that time Khrushchev started undermining you.

Why started? He had always been doing that.

They seem to have been eager to incriminate you somehow. They launched a campaign against you.

Not just over some issue or another. Not just any issue. This question was absolutely crucial. To say that socialism had triumphed completely and definitely was to oversimplify our achievements, and this contradicted Marxism-Leninism. No one wants to dig into this now, but exasperation with this situation is sure to mount. Younger people will take up the issue and agree that the wrong conclusion had been drawn.

Was Khrushchev adept in matters of theory?

No. He was extremely weak in that regard. We were all "practicals," all practitioners. Before the Revolution we read all the books and newspapers, now we read nothing. Had I not spent so long in prison and exile, I wouldn't know many things either! I read publications written by our opponents too, and we had to participate in heated discussions ...

[2-19-71, 12-12-72]

You were attacked after Stalin's death," said Shota Ivanovich. "But you were right.

Of course I was right. Khrushchev made Pospelov and another one, Satiukov, I believe, write a letter to the effect that Molotov was in error on this issue. The letter was distributed to all Politbiuro members and discussed at the next Politbiuro session. I responded in writing, confirming my viewpoint. I wrote: My point is, "basically" the victory of socialism and the "basis" of the victory of socialism have both been achieved. I said that in our country the basis of socialism had been built, and in another place I said that in our country socialism had basically triumphed. Is there a difference or not? Basically or basis? In essence, no, but of course... So I wrote in reply that I see no difference in the two wordings.

Khrushchev said, "How's that!? It only shows Molotov belittles the accomplishments of socialism." And so on, and so forth ... Everyone would nod in agreement. I thought, why the hell should I harp on these differences. "To hell with you," I said. But the written document is and has remained in my possession.

Now you can find the nuances in books written by our scholars. It is all right to say "basically." Indeed, "the basis" had been achieved first, but later socialism was built "basically." But this is utter talmudism ... real nonsense. The trouble, I say, is that in the present situation it is impossible to offer a definition of socialism. There is no complete clarity on this question. One can only depict distinct stages, fundamental phases.

[3-8-75]

Ô Khrushchev and the XXth Congress Ô

Everyone knew that Khrushchev was going to deliver that report at the XXth Party Congress. The report had not been discussed in the Central Committee, but we knew the essence of it. I had tried to speak on the Yugoslav question in 1955 in criticism of Khrushchev's policy, but the comrades didn't support me. Nevertheless, I enjoyed some prestige in the party. True, later they said I was right. Take Lenin, for example, who enjoyed tremendous prestige. A good many people understood that they must follow him. Ten years passed and Stalin gained tremendous prestige, and people began to follow him. Take Iaroslavskii. You can't imagine how many factions he had been associated with. But one day he said, "That's it! From now on I shall not be dragged into factions. I will just follow Stalin. That's for certain." After Stalin's death, many were confused: where are we to go?

[4-22-70]

When Khrushchev delivered his speech at the XXth Congress I was already sidelined. And not only at the ministry ... People made it a point to keep their distance from me. I got the news only at formal sessions ...

People often ask why you didn't speak against Khrushchev at the XXth Congress. Meaning, you and your group.

I think the time has come for me to answer that question of our party. At that time I analyzed my predicament at length and from various perspectives. The party was not ready for such an analysis. We would simply have been kicked out. I still hoped that if we remained in the party we would be able to correct the situation gradually. To speak out would have been unexpected at that time, and no one would have supported us. No one. We had to make a few preparations.

I did have a different opinion. I will merely say that some of my amendments on the question of socialism were passed, but I refused to initiate a substantive discussion. The danger was that our group comprised a great diversity of aims, a whole mix, and a split could have ensued. This would not have done any good at all, as the party as a whole was completely unprepared for the event.

Was Khrushchev's report discussed in the Politbiuro?

It was. The majority supported it without reservation.

The people weren't prepared for a critique of Stalin, but at the top, it seems, everything was ready.

It was not supported openly, but in fact people were drawn to it. Yes, they were. There was instability in these questions.

To this day there are many people who approve this report. At worst a split in the party might have occurred. I was afraid of this too, an open split. To heal it would have been very difficult.

The initiation of this affair was perfectly attuned to the prevailing mood in the party. Given the atmosphere in the party at the time, if we, or even I, had presented our views, we would have been easily expelled. This would have provoked a split at several levels in the party. That split might have run very deep. Tevosian, then minister of ferrous metallurgy, shouted at me, "How come!? How come!?" He was a Stalinist, yes. Iudin, too, our ambassador in China. Both of them came up to me at the congress.

It's best to admit it! Some people holding pretty much the same view blame me: "Why did you keep silent at the XXth Congress?" It was not that simple. But was it correct to say nothing? These things cannot be easily explained. To keep silent, they say, is tantamount to consent. That's how it turned out: I kept silent and thus consented. No one, not even my adversaries, could charge that I had agreed with Khrushchev, only that I remained silent, and that is a fact.

People keep asking, "How did you allow Khrushchev to deliver that report?"

The majority vote. Everyone was supposed to vote ... I can't remember if the speech was presented for us to read. But it was read out.

That speech of his turned politics upside down. It all started with that.

It didn't exactly turn politics upside down, but it helped. The change didn't start there. If you think about it, you'll recall that it certainly started earlier, of course. The Yugoslav question came up in 1955, a year before the XXth Congress. I think the turning point was already completed with the Yugoslav question. Of course I made an attempt to speak out, but everyone opposed me, everyone, including those who supported me for another year or year and a half.

So the turning point came before that, and insofar as it was completed, Khrushchev had selected to the XXth Congress those delegates who would keep cheering "Hurrah!" to him. I openly came out against him.

Why did he come out against Stalin so drastically?

Because he pursued a different policy. He is a rightist ... The rightist and the Trotskyite extremes come together. The main threat in the 19305 came from the rightists rather than from the Trotskyites. They had close ties with the village. Their social base was the kulak class. That's where Khrushchev had his roots.

Pospelov is said to have written the report?

It would seem so. Either that or he helped to prepare it. He had no firm theoretical grounding either, but still ... He had once been a staunch Stalinist ...

[1-8-74, 3-11-83]

Deep down Khrushchev was an enemy of Stalin. On the surface Stalin was the be-all and end-all, but deep down it was another matter. Personal bitterness animated his every step. His bitterness toward Stalin stemmed from the fact that Khrushchev's eldest son got himself shot. Driven by such bitterness, Khrushchev would balk at nothing to besmirch the name of Stalin.

Nikita disowned his son, didn't he?

Yes.

[8-15-72, 1-8-74]

His son was something of a traitor, which also reflects on Khrushchev. A good political leader with a son like that?

Khrushchev's wife did not distinguish herself in any way, but she lived more or less honestly. She has a house in this neighborhood. She is very isolated here; no one comes to see her, no one stands in a shopping line next to her ... She is a very demanding person, however ... When Khrushchev had just come to power, she told Polina Semenovna once that Nikita Sergeevich was uneasy because he had to handle very complex questions; not everything was turning out the way he wanted, and he was uncertain about the Yugoslav question. She was afraid he was overdoing it and might go off the deep end ...

He not only overdid it, but she could do nothing--she wasn't up to it.

I still have things to say about Khrushchev.

[6-30-76, 10-30-80]

Stalin didn't want to pardon Khrushchev's son. And Khrushchev personally hated Stalin. Of course, that added to his animosity, but that was not the main thing about him. He was not a revolutionary. He didn't join the party until 1918--some militant! Ordinary workers had joined the party earlier. Some leader of our party he turned out to be! It was absurd, absurd.

Khrushchev was four years my junior, but he was no child. Our first revolution took place in February 1917. He was active in Yuzovka, but this was a center of Menshevism ...

[6-16-77, 12-9-82]

Khrushchev opposed Stalin and Leninist policy. He wanted changes in the Leninist policy pursued by Stalin and ultimately by all of us who supported Stalin. You know what the rightists were after? In the party? The rightists wanted to block us from pressing for the liquidation of the kulaks; they were champions of a pro-kulak policy. Even after the kulaks had been destroyed they continued to hold right-wing political views. So they maintained afterward that Stalin had pushed things too far, and that this had been a mistake. We saw this in Khrushchev, and spoke about it, and this was even openly acknowledged by the Central Committee under Stalin. Everyone makes mistakes. Lenin made mistakes, and Stalin made mistakes. Khrushchev was no exception. I had my own mistakes. Who is infallible? If, however, one has good intentions but is in error, he must be corrected ...

[1-8-74]

Khrushchev hinted that Stalin had Kirov killed. There are some who still believe that story. The seeds of suspicion were planted. A commission was set up in 1956. Some twelve persons, from various backgrounds, looked through a welter of documents but found nothing incriminating Stalin. But these results have never been published.

Who else was on that commission?

As far as I can recall, Shvernik was on it, I think, Suslov, Kaganovich, Furtseva, Procurator-General Rudenko, also someone who used to work in the Cheka ... what's his name? In all, there were ten or twelve people. I don't remember exactly. I think Mikoian was there, too. But I can't be absolutely sure. Voroshilov, I think, wasn't included in that commission. Or he might have been there after all. I can't recall all of them.

The KGB made a special report. Rudenko's group authenticated and examined the material--and there was a great deal of material. We used all the materials sent to us as well as those we managed to obtain ourselves.

The commission concluded that Stalin was not implicated in Kirov's assassination. Khrushchev refused to have the findings published since they didn't serve his purpose.

[7-1-79]

Khrushchev got by because we had many Khrushchev supporters. Stalin was firm, a firm hand--that was Stalin--and under that strong hand everyone sang the same tune. But as soon as that hand grew weak, everyone began to sing his own tune.

In 1957 Khrushchev was relieved of his duties for three days. This happened at one of the Politbiuro sessions. This, of course, had to be announced. He was chairing Politbiuro sessions; he was merely relieved of the chairmanship. Nothing more occurred then. He wasn't removed from his job, and he couldn't be removed. The Central Committee plenum would decide this. How else could he have been removed?

[1-8-74]

At the XXth Party Congress a Presidium consisting of eleven members had been elected. Later, in 1957, we decided to remove Khrushchev. At the Politbiuro he chaired its sessions; we decided to replace him with Bulganin. The point was that starting with Lenin--and it was always so--the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars always chaired sessions of the Politbiuro. This was a Leninist tradition. From the beginning, Lenin chaired--when he was ill, Kamenev sat in for him-- then Rykov chaired, then I, then Stalin. Khrushchev was the first to break with this Leninist tradition. He began to act like a regional party secretary ... He was not chairman of the Council of Ministers, nevertheless he chaired Politbiuro sessions ... Now we had Bulganin chair.

Did Khrushchev remain silent?

No way! He screamed, he was furious ... But we had already reached an agreement. We were seven out of eleven, and his supporters were but three, including Mikoian. We had no program to advance. Our only goal was to remove Khrushchev and have him appointed minister of agriculture. Commotion could be heard behind the door. Furtseva, Serov, Ignatiev were there. They convened the members of the Central Committee.

The Central Committee plenary meeting was held the following day. Furtseva and Suslov were Central Committee secretaries who played roles. Serov played a major role. He employed the staff to best advantage. He had all the Central Committee members promptly summoned to Moscow. They all gathered in Suslov's office. Serov helped out, though his role was purely technical. Inasmuch as Khrushchev remained the first secretary of the Central Committee, the entire staff was in his hands.

Suslov is such a small-minded politician! And he is a big bore, too.

He and Khrushchev are birds of a feather. Zhukov is a great military man but a poor politician. He played a decisive role in elevating Khrushchev to a pedestal in 1957. But Zhukov himself cursed him soon afterward ...

We failed to have him removed as first secretary; we just didn't manage it. They convened a plenary session of the Central Committee, and the plenum sided with them--the game was over!

And they did not allow you to speak at the plenum?

No, they did, though I had to insist on it. Just let them show the stenographic record of my remarks to someone!

They still won't do that. But how did the plenum respond?

They yelled, they bellowed. I didn't talk about Khrushchev personally, I talked specifically about his leadership. No, I can't recall all that was said, but I indicated in particular that a commission on Stalin's archives was set up in 1953, with Khrushchev as chairman and myself as a member. Since 1957 the commission has not had a single meeting. Mikoian was a member of the commission, along with some others. The Stalin archive was entrusted to the commission. Do you see how Khrushchev was behaving?

Khrushchev apparently had been listening in on our telephone conversation. And he had his own spies. I spoke at the plenum and the audience wouldn't listen. They shouted. Later they doctored my remarks and published them. Initially the three of us were labeled "the antiparty group"--Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov--then they also added Shepilov who had joined us. After a while they included Bulganin and Voroshilov. Initially Voroshilov had been one of us, but then he repented. You can judge for yourself, from reading the published material, how he conducted himself. He behaved badly. He lost his head. He didn't know whom to look to. And Khrushchev was very sly. Voroshilov's becoming president didn't add to his prestige, which he had enjoyed since the civil war ...

Each year following I sent one or two letters to the Central Committee with a critical analysis of their policies. My last letter contained a critical review of the new party program which I considered deceptive and anti-Leninist. Khrushchev raised the question, and I was expelled from the party. Malenkov and others were absolutely unaware of my letters. They just minded their own business. But it was awkward to have me alone kicked out of the party. The "antiparty" group had to be removed, and four of us were expelled.

[4-22-70, 1-8-74, 5-9-85]

I don't think I precipitated this expulsion. Kaganovich, Malenkov, and myself were expelled. Shepilov too, though he was not part of the group. I don't know how well Shepilov knew economics, but he was a good speaker. He was a man of integrity. He sensed that the anti-Stalin campaign had gone far beyond objective truth, and he stuck with us and supported us.

He refused to be Khrushchev's servant, even though Khrushchev had very much counted on him. Apparently I tripped up Khrushchev in that case, though Shepilov was hardly aware of it.

[12-4-73, 12-30-73]

I don't consider Khrushchev an especially dedicated communist. He was capable, unquestionably. But he only fluttered about ... He had no serious interest in ideology. There is more than meets the eye in the fact that he succeeded in making short work of Malenkov, Kaganovich, and me. The reason is that there was no genuine bolshevist stability during that period. I ought to have been punished, true, but expulsion from the party? Punishment, of course, because sometimes the ax must be used without sorting things out. I believe we had to pass through a phase of terror. I am not afraid of that word, because back then we had neither the time nor the opportunity to sort things out, for not only Soviet power in Russia but the international communist movement as well were at risk.

[10-14-83]

I sent a letter to the Central Committee from Geneva, where I was on the International Atomic Energy Commission, and wrote that Khrushchev was continuing to repeat the same error Stalin had made when he argued that communism could be achieved under conditions of capitalist encirclement. I was recalled to Moscow and expelled from the party at the meeting of the Council of Ministers party nucleus. Lesechko and some women, whom Khrushchev had brought to the meeting, raged more than anyone else. I was expelled, but I appealed. The party bureau confirmed the expulsion. I appealed again. The Sverdlovsk District Party Committee and then the Moscow City Party Committee approved my expulsion. I appealed again. Demichev was particularly adamant against me. He took my party card ... The only person who conducted himself decently was Shvernik. He did not vote against me and refused to involve himself in that campaign. Four times I applied to be reinstated in the party. I wrote to Brezhnev. Not once did I get an answer. Asked about my party membership status at a party conference, Shaposhnikova explained to the communists that "he didn't apply to be reinstated in the party." I am going to send another application to the XXIVth Congress.

When I was expelled from the party, people like Serdiuk screamed about the repressions. But after all, I was not expelled from the party because of the repressions but rather because we spoke out against Khrushchev and wanted to have him relieved of his duties. When the repressions were condemned at the XXth Congress, I was not only not expelled from the party but was even elected to its Politbiuro!"

[2-19-71]

Were you charged with the repressions when they expelled you from the party?

I was. They claimed the antiparty group was fearful of being exposed. But as a matter of fact, Khrushchev was the one who should have been fearful of exposure. The game was played out rather well ...

As soon as you relieved Khrushchev of his chair functions, why didn't you appeal to party organizations, to the people?

The party organizations were not in our hands.

Anyway, you failed to take advantage of that moment.

Indeed, I wasn't able to take advantage of it. We had another disadvantage--we were not prepared to put forward a counter-program of our own. But Khrushchev did exactly that: "Life under Stalin was hard; from now on it is going to be better." People bought it. The overwhelming majority voted against me. A good many people bore me a grudge.

But they were all high officials.

Not only high officials but the rank and file as well.

But the working class was for you.

The workers also bought the line: "You will have it easier now, and there will be no more rushing ahead."

Viacheslav Mikhailovich, you said that when Demichev took your party membership card from you at the Moscow Party Committee, you made his task easier for him.

I don't think I made it easier for him. He simply said, "You must hand in your party card." Quite a crowd was gathered. A few people were selected to speak. I was the first to take the floor to offer my explanations. But as I was rabidly attacked, I was brief in my remarks. Criticisms mostly referred to the events of 1937. The chairman of the Moscow Soviet also spoke. When I worked in the Central Committee and then in the Council of Ministers, he was in charge of construction projects, and I often had to deal with him. A capable worker. I had no disputes or run-ins with him. He began cursing me out. Well, in such cases he was obliged to act so. He was chairman of the Moscow City Executive

Committee, but the party secretary, of course, shows the way, so to speak. How could he remain silent? I looked at him with utter astonishment.

Didn't they feel awkward about it?

Who knows? I am not going to speculate about that.

Children were shot to death in Georgia in 1956," said Shota Ivanovich. "They removed Mikoian's portrait and hung it in an outhouse, where his home was supposed to be. They hitched Khrushchev's portrait to a streetcar, but they carried your portrait at the head of a marching column of protesters that demanded, 'We want the Central Committee headed by Viacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov!' Did it really happen like this?

Children died then, and you know which children? Those whose parents were in jail in 1937. The children that were shot to death were not allowed a decent burial. People wailed, they couldn't understand. "Your parents perished at the hands of Stalin, but you are for him?"

[1-16-73]

In theoretical matters, wasn't Malenkov also weak?

He too. I know it for a fact.

"And what a grand name--Malenkov!" said Shota Ivanovich.

For peasants mostly. In that regard he was also involved in a lot of demagoguery. A special decision had been taken. Khrushchev was furious then, because he was supposed to announce the new policy. Everyone was preoccupied with office-seeking and gossiping, who said what. But in fact it was all sheer demagoguery. They couldn't do without it. Of course, there were cases when we overdid it. After all, back then we were wringing the last ounce of energy out of the workers; we had them on the rack. The same with peasants who owned any property.

I can't say I am not to blame, that I could not have been arrested for this, that, or something else ... Khrushchev thought it was right to defame me for potato deliveries to Moscow. That might have appealed to the layman. As chairman of the Council of Ministers, I thought it best to break the established procedure. Food shortages were our constant headache. So we used all the means at our disposal to wring potato supplies out of Belorussia, the northwestern regions, Novgorod, and the Chernigov regions. We took their last supplies. My task was to put pressure on the Moscow region where the possibilities were far from being maximized. The Muscovites were obliged to produce more potatoes in their region, and we reduced shipments from Belorussia where local food shortages were reported. We squeezed to the maximum just to provide food supplies in the capital. Khrushchev rose to his feet: "Just imagine, when we didn't even have enough potatoes to eat, Molotov reduced our food rations ... " It was all published. In his reports on agricultural issues he would now and then take potshots at me. I would like to know what he would have done had he then been in my shoes? Alternatives were nowhere to be found. In the end, when the Muscovites were hard up, we urged them to provide at least part of the food themselves.

Food deliveries had been on the rise anyway. Had we not brought in food from the provinces, we wouldn't have known where else to turn in order to satisfy the demand. In the Kremlin too we went without. In any case, Moscow enjoyed a privileged position. But we never resorted to purchasing food from abroad. We didn't want to do that because we needed equipment and metals in the event of war ... That consideration came first, and no one could deny it.

[12-4-73]

Khrushchev often traveled to the provinces, to the collective farms and state farms. He would often serve as a kind of walking delegate, and in this he was above reproach. This was precisely his positive quality. He was everywhere--stables, boiler works--he was interested in everything ... Of course, he mixed with peasants and workers more than Lenin or Stalin; in casual environments, too. There is no denying that. People would treat him like one of their own, and they would be absolutely at ease with him.

[4-27-73]

Khrushchev asked former KGB chairman Semichastnyi to find all the documents related to his work in the Ukraine. That was done, by the way, in the heat of the anti-Stalin campaign.

Surely, measures were taken to destroy all the documents on repressions in the Ukraine that he had ever signed.

How did Khrushchev happen to be moved up to the top? From the grassroots? How did he get on the Central Committee? He found a good many allies there. Many would have preferred a more dependable leader, but Khrushchev promised a quieter, more relaxed life at the top. Many went for this instantly. And he made promises to the common folk. People welcomed the change. But it was all deception, though many used the change to take it easy and enjoy themselves. A very dangerous thing. Stalin was quite apprehensive in that regard. So Khrushchev promised better living conditions, and a good many people took the bait, though it was a deception. They were deceived.

All the same, I thing he was not so much pulled from the top as pushed from below. From party cell secretary at the Moscow-based Industrial Academy he moved on to the job of secretary of the Krasnopresnenskii and then the Baumanskii District party committees in Moscow. This showed he had support in those places. Stalin's supporters would hew to the party line, but Khrushchev was always clever enough to adapt to that line. He was quite a capable man. You can't say he had been merely a lucky fellow. He could very well have become a Bukharinite, but he moved in the opposite direction. He sensed it would be more secure that way. Khrushchev in essence was a Bukharinite, but under Stalin he was not a Bukharinite.

Source: Felix Chuev, Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1993), pp. 346-360.