On the Question of Stalin

Peking, On the Question of Stalin. 1963

This Chinese polemic on “the question of Stalin” shows how de-Stalinization became a fault line in the Sino-Soviet split. Beijing treated Khrushchev’s denunciation as a betrayal of revolutionary authority, arguing that condemning Stalin weakened the dictatorship of the proletariat and Communist discipline internationally. It linked the Stalin debate to a wider accusation that “peaceful coexistence” masked ideological retreat and accommodation with the West. The piece captures history being used as a weapon in a struggle for legitimacy and leadership inside the socialist camp.

Original Source: 人民日报》编辑部 / 《红旗》杂志编辑部,《关于斯大林问题——二评苏共中央的公开信》 (Guānyú Sīdàlín wèntí: Èr píng Sūgòng Zhōngyāng de gōngkāi xìn), 13 September 1963. Published in: 人民日报 (Renmin Ribao / People’s Daily) and 红旗 (Hongqi / Red Flag) in September 1963.

The Chinese Communist Party has consistently maintained that the question of how to evaluate Stalin and what attitude to take towards him is not just one of appraising Stalin himself; more important, it is a question of how to sum up the historical experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of the international communist movement since Lenin's death.

Comrade Khrushchev completely negated Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU. He failed to consult the fraternal Parties in advance on this question of principle which involved the whole international communist movement, and afterwards tried to impose a fait accompli on them. Whoever makes an appraisal of Stalin different from that of the leadership of the CPSU is charged with "defense of the personality cult" as well as "interference" in the internal affairs of the CPSU. But no one can deny the international significance of the historical experience of the first state of the dictatorship the proletariat, or the historical fact that Stalin was the leader of the international communist movement; consequently, no one can deny that the appraisal of Stalin is an important question of principle involving the whole international communist movement. On what ground, then, do the leaders of the CPSU forbid other fraternal Parties to make a realistic analysis and appraisal of Stalin?

The Communist Party of China has consistently held that Stalin did commit errors, which had their ideological as well as social and historical roots. It is necessary to criticize the errors Stalin actually committed, not those groundlessly attributed to him, and to do so from a correct stand and with correct methods. But we have consistently opposed improper criticism of Stalin, made from a wrong stand and with wrong methods.

Stalin fought tsarism and propagated Marxism during Lenin's lifetime; after he became a member of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party headed by Lenin he took part in the struggle to pave the way for the 1917 Revolution; after the October Revolution he fought to defend the fruits of the proletarian revolution.

Stalin led the CPSU and the Soviet people, after Lenin's death, in resolutely fighting both internal and external foes, and in safeguarding and consolidating the first socialist state in the world.

Stalin led the CPSU and the Soviet people in upholding the line of socialist industrialization and agricultural collectivization and in achieving great successes in socialist transformation and socialist construction.

Stalin's life was that of a great Marxist-Leninist, a great proletarian revolutionary.

It is true that while he performed meritorious deeds for the Soviet people and the international communist movement, Stalin, a great Marxist-Leninist and proletarian revolutionary, also made certain mistakes. Some were errors of principle and some were errors made in the course of practical work; some could have been avoided and some were scarcely avoidable at a time when the dictatorship of the proletariat had no precedent to go by.

In his way of thinking, Stalin departed from dialectical materialism and fell into metaphysics and subjectivism on certain questions and consequently was sometimes divorced from reality and from the masses. In struggles inside as well as outside the Party, on certain occasions and on certain questions he confused two types of contradictions which are different in nature, contradictions between ourselves and the enemy and contradictions among the people, and also confused the different methods needed in handling them. In the work led by Stalin of suppressing the counter-revolution, many counter-revolutionaries deserving punishment were duly punished, but at the same time there were innocent people who were wrongly convicted; and in 1937 and 1938 there occurred the error of enlarging the scope of the suppression counter-revolutionaries. In the matter of Party and government organization, he did not fully apply proletarian democratic centralism and, to some extent, violated it. In handling relations with fraternal Parties and countries, he made some mistakes. He also gave some bad counsel in the international communist movement. These mistakes caused some losses to the Soviet Union and the international communist movement.

Stalin's merits and mistakes are matters of historical, objective reality. A comparison of the two shows that his merits outweighed his faults. He was primarily correct, and his faults were secondary. In summing up Stalin's thinking and his work in their totality, surely every honest Communist with a respect for history will first observe what was primary in Stalin. Therefore, when Stalin's errors are being correctly appraised, criticized and overcome, it is necessary to safeguard what was primary in Stalin's life, to safeguard Marxism-Leninism which he defended and developed.

It would be beneficial if the errors of Stalin, which were only secondary, are taken as historical lessons so that the Communists of the Soviet Union and other countries might take warning and avoid repeating those errors or commit fewer errors. Both positive and negative historical lessons are beneficial to all Communists, provided they are drawn correctly and conform with and do not distort historical facts.

While defending Stalin, we do not defend his mistakes. Long ago the Chinese Communists had first-hand experience of some of his mistakes. Of the erroneous "Left" and Right opportunist lines which emerged in the Chinese Communist Party at one time or another, some arose under the influence of certain mistakes of Stalin's, in so far as their international sources were concerned. In the late Twenties, the Thirties and the early and middle Forties, the Chinese Marxist-Leninists represented by Comrades Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi resisted the influence of Stalin's mistakes; they gradually overcame the erroneous lines of "Left" and Right opportunism and finally led the Chinese revolution to victory.

What attitude have Comrade Khrushchev and other leaders of the CUPS taken towards Stalin since the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU?

They have not made an overall historical and scientific analysis of his life and work but have completely negated him without any distinction between right and wrong.

They have treated Stalin not as a comrade but as an enemy.

They have not adopted the method of criticism and self-criticism to sum up experience but have blamed Stalin for all errors, or ascribed to him the "mistakes" they have arbitrarily invented.

Khrushchev has maligned Stalin as "the greatest dictator in Russian history." Does not this mean that the Soviet people lived for thirty long years under the "tyranny" of "the greatest dictator in Russian history" and not under the socialist system? The great Soviet people and the revolutionary people of the whole world completely disagree with this slander!

Such abuse of Stalin by Khrushchev is a gross insult to the great Soviet people, a gross insult to the CPSU, to the Soviet Army, to the dictatorship of the proletariat and to the socialist system, to the international communist movement, to the revolutionary people the world over and to Marxism-Leninism.

In what position does Khrushchev, who participated in the leadership of the Party and the state during Stalin's period, place himself when he beats his breast, pounds the table and shouts abuse of Stalin at the top of his voice? In the position of an accomplice to a "murderer" or a "bandit"? Or in the same position as a "fool" or an "idiot"?

What difference is there between such abuse of Stalin by Khrushchev, and the abuse by the imperialists, the reactionaries in various countries, and the renegades to communism? Why such inveterate hatred of Stalin? Why attack him more ferociously than you do the enemy?

In abusing Stalin, Khrushchev is in fact wildly denouncing the Soviet system and state. His language in this connection is by no means weaker but is actually stronger than that of such renegades as Kautsky, Trotsky, Tito and Djilas.

The great majority of the Soviet people disapprove of such abuse of Stalin. They increasingly cherish the memory of Stalin. The leaders of the CPSU have seriously isolated themselves from the masses. They always feel they are being threatened by the haunting specter of Stalin, which is in fact the broad masses' great dissatisfaction with the complete negation of Stalin. So far Khrushchev has not dared to let the Soviet people and the other people in the socialist camp see the secret report completely negating Stalin which he made to the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, because it is a report which cannot bear the light of day, a report which would seriously alienate the masses.

What exactly is the gist of their "combat against the personality cult"?

To put it bluntly, it is nothing but the following:

  1. On the pretext of "combating the personality cult," to counterpose Stalin, the leader of the Party, to the Party organization, the proletariat and the masses of the people;

  2. On the pretext of "combating the personality cult," to besmirch the proletarian party, the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist system;

  3. On the pretext of "combating the personality cult," to build themselves up and to attack revolutionaries loyal to Marxism-Leninism so as to pave the way of revisionist schemers to usurp the Party and state leadership;

  4. On the pretext of "combating the personality cult," to interfere in the internal affairs of fraternal Parties and countries and strive to subvert their leadership to suit themselves;

  5. On the pretext of "combating the personality cult," to attack fraternal Parties which adhere to Marxism-Leninism and to split the international communist movement.

The "combat against the personality cult" launched by Khrushchev is a despicable political intrigue. Like someone described by Marx, "He is in his element as an intriguer, while a nonentity as a theorist."

Source: Alfred Senn, ed., Readings in Russian Political and Diplomatic History (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1966), pp. 239-243.