Dzyuba’s Commonwealth of Cultures
Ivan Dzyuba, A Commonwealth of Cultures. August 1990
Written by a former dissident turned opposition leader, this measured rebuttal targets Russian nationalism's claim to a "special historical mission." Author Dzyuba compares Russian nationalists to the reactionary Black Hundreds, argues that smaller Soviet nations never benefited from their natural resources, dismisses debates over who suffered most under Stalinism as pointless and immoral, and contends that Russian patriots themselves created "Russophobia" through self-serving myths of selfless sacrifice.
Original Source: The Literary Gazette International, No. 2 (1990).
There has been a recent trend to reconsider the Soviet Union's future in the light of national revivals going on in the republics. Even people who not long ago were uncomfortable with the word "national" (let alone in conjunction with "revival") are now speaking along these lines. But what are the realities of these revivals? If national revival means a popular effort to achieve real political, economic, and cultural sovereignty, we are (bearing in mind the Ukraine) still far from this goal.
Some of the preconditions necessary for revival exist already. They are becoming more firm before our eyes. Most significantly, national self-awareness and civic activism are growing in the context of anxiety over the status of the individual republics and the entire union's future.
Our hopes for a national revival are directly connected with the fate of perestroika. Its collapse would mean the collapse of our hopes and the loss of what little we have. National revival can be brought about with years of constructive effort and purposeful work. There is no place for mass hysteria or passions. These things are not only fruitless but also often dangerous. This is especially true of state-making in the present situation of exacerbated interethnic relations. These nationalist emotions are destructive when someone tries to harness them to fulfill some "historic mission."
It seems that history's lessons have never registered in our minds. We remember the Black Hundreds from our classrooms, and we condescendingly think that it was just a band of social outcasts. Not a bit of it! It was a powerful social movement, a quite popular, ultra-nationalist movement with a sophisticated, broad ideological foundation. The Black Hundreds were guided by masters of social and national demagogy. Their task was to save the czarist empire from the threatening revolution. They were to direct the people's protest and anger away from the regime and against such "agitators" as the revolutionary intelligentsia, "Jew-Freemasons," and "foreigners oppressing the Russian people." Aren't we today witnessing the birth of a new variant of this movement? In any case, the movement's main ideas have currency again.
But is it only in this corner that trouble lurks? Have the attempts of one people to bring unfounded and unverified charges against another people helped to create mutual understanding?
It seems to me that here we approach the main source of stereotypes, falsifications, and myths in overly nationalistic self-awareness. We need to think about the situation. Every republic and every autonomous region has enough resources and every people has enough productivity and intelligence not only to escape poverty but also to flourish in the modern world. If the United Arab Emirates achieved their level of wealth due to only one resource--oil--then why hasn't black gold made Azerbaijan, Bashkiria, Poltava province, and other places wealthy? Why has "white gold"-cotton-brought nothing but suffering to the peoples of Central Asia? And what does the "hard currency workshop" of the Soviet Union-Yakutsk-have for all her diamonds, furs, and gold? These kinds of questions can be raised about any republic or any people. Where does all the incalculable natural bounty and incredible human effort go? It is consumed by the incredibly wasteful command system of bureaucracy!
It is completely immoral to make an issue over which people suffered most from the monstrous social experiments engineered by Stalin. But an issue is made! As if one could calculate human grief. Can we gauge the Ukraine's misfortunes (three famines, including the manmade one of 1932-33; the destruction of the intelligentsia; fascist occupation; and the present-day ecological damage, including Chernobyl) against the misfortunes of the Russian people or the woes of Byelorussia or the Crimean Tatars? No. It is better to look for small joys to share than to count our sorrows.
I find the statements of Russian patriots concerning "Russophobia" peculiar. I have the impression that some people very much want Russophobia to spread and are ready to do anything to stimulate it. Let's think soberly: What good can come of the wildly exaggerated thesis that Russia has always helped and saved everyone, and now, when she has given away all she had, she gets ingratitude in return and is left alone to wrestle with her fate?
In the first place, Russia has in no way been left alone with all her problems. Aren't other republics, particularly the Ukraine, assisting in her revival? I won't even mention Russia's use of Tiumen and Northern and Far Eastern oil resources. Second, we do not need an emotional reaction to the real instances of Russophobia. What is needed is a deep sociological, historical, and psychological analysis of the origins of such anti-Russian feeling. Furthermore, I feel that much of the blame for strained interethnic relations falls on those Russians living in the other republics. Due to arrogance or lack of culture they do not respect or take an interest in the life, language, and culture of the local population. Third, much is made over the assistance given to less developed regions after the revolution. Yes, Russia helped, as did the Ukraine and other "strong" republics. What is so odd about this? After all, little Sweden gives aid to African peoples where there is no historical bond, and this aid has no strings attached.
Unfortunately, patriotism for parts of the intelligentsia has reached the point where offense is taken at the mention of completely genuine historical facts. For instance, they find it hard to swallow that Russian great-power chauvinism and Russian nationalism ever existed. It has always been assumed that only other peoples were nationalistic. People do not think about the fact that the Russian Empire was a prison for many peoples. To deny this, to try to soften the harsh realities of czarism, is to insult the memory of thousands and millions of the best sons of Russia's peoples (including the Russians themselves). These persons dedicated their lives to the freedom of their own peoples and the creation of a future-alas, still not realized-brotherhood of nations.
We cannot move toward a new union on this kind of ideological and psychological foundation. Interethnic conflicts, especially the criminal and bloody ones, cast a disturbing light on the general nationalities problem. They create an atmosphere of ill will. They put people who are speaking out for their native language and culture in the Ukraine, Moldavia, and other republics in an extremely difficult position. Certain parts of society come to think that such people are themselves guilty of creating difficulties and hostility. Thus new myths are formed.
Another negative factor in the nationalities issue is the irresponsible action of certain elements in the republics themselves. In particular, adventurist and provocative slogans have been giving national movements a militaristic or malicious character.
Still another factor that complicates interethnic relations is national demoralization. This phenomenon of self-denial even reaches the level of "self-devouring" (especially in the Ukraine). For a long time our society fought nationalism. Under the cover of this struggle, national self-awareness was eradicated. Today we must constantly remember the catastrophic perversions of the clampdown on nationalism. Even the word "nationalism" has become empty and stereotyped. This is very dangerous. We must give the word an objective, clearly defined content. Furthermore, actions taken against nationalism must be more sophisticated and tactful. They should not confuse right and wrong.
The main source of interethnic complications, however, is the set of unsolved political, socioeconomic, and ecological problems facing the Soviet Union. The concealment of facts and the falsification concerning the economy, particularly concerning the financial relations between the center and the republics, create tension. Ideological complications arise out of this economic situation. This, in turn, exacerbates interethnic relations.
Opponents of nationalities' individual development often refer to West European unification. But those who want to defuse national self-awareness seem to forget that the union of Western Europe is based on the political and cultural independence of its various peoples. Although they have a unified health care system, for instance, West European peoples do not in any way have the same health standards. Moreover, these countries jealously preserve their own sovereignty. They are not willing to recognize any hegemony in Europe, be it political, cultural, or linguistic. So there is no reason to place our hopes on a natural course of events, to wait while political and economic emancipation leads to linguistic and cultural independence. We have to work from both ends.
This does not mean that culture and language are secondary in a nation's emancipation. Indeed, culture sparks this process and is its crown of success. Statehood is not the final guarantee of a people's way of life; it is only a precondition. Only a complete, globally significant culture guarantees a people's way of life. Culture is the fundamental expression of a people's creativity and the chief goal of historical development. It is also the best means by which we can be understood by other nations. In this way, perhaps we could really help them.
Source: Isaac Tarasulo, ed., Perils of Perestroika: Viewpoints from the Soviet Press, 1989-1991 (Wilmington: SR Books, 1992), pp. 29-33.
